

**The Gulf Co-operation Council: Security,
Boundaries, and Political Issues**

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**A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Islamic and
Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Edinburgh of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

December 1998



Declaration

I hereby declared that this thesis has been written by me (the undersigned), and that it does not represent the work of any other person.

Ali Al-Rawas

ABSTRACT

This thesis is focused on the main challenges which faced the progress of the GCC when it was established in May 1981. The core topic is the security challenges and the bilateral boundary disputes, internal and external, as well as the steps which resulted in the establishment of the GCC. The importance of the GCC is that the six Arab Gulf States contain 60% of the world's total oil reserves. This study focuses on the political and historical development of the reasons behind the establishment of the GCC, and the main internal and external challenges, which prevented these countries from achieving a trustful co-operation on the objectives for which the Council was established. External security in the Arab Gulf States was and still is the main responsibility of the West, Britain and the United States in particular. The boundary disputes, along with the other secondary challenges, are the main obstacles in the way of the GCC's achievements.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Two of the core chapters concentrate on security (internal and external), and three on boundary disputes (internal and external and maritime). The first chapter provides a historical and political survey of the six states of the GCC. The second concentrates on the political developments which led to the establishment of the GCC. The third and fourth chapters address security in the Gulf, both external and internal; the fifth, sixth and seventh concentrate on the boundary challenges between the GCC states on one hand and the GCC states and their neighbours (Iraq, Iran and Yemen) on the other. The introduction of the thesis is a review of the relevant literature.

Dedication
To My Father, Omar b. Abdullah Al-Abadi Al-Rawas
With my Great Respect and Appreciation

Acknowledgments

This thesis could not have been completed without the encouragement and support of several individuals. I am very grateful to my late supervisor Dr M.V. McDonald, Senior Lecturer in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Edinburgh. Also I would like to express my appreciation to Dr Paul Lalor, Lecturer in Contemporary Arab Studies in that Department, for his assistance and support since the death of my supervisor. I would like to thank the Inter-Library Loans Department in the University of Edinburgh, the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh, the British Library, London, the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies in the University of Exeter, the Middle East Centre, the International Boundaries Research Unit at the University of Durham, the Omani Radio Station in Salalah and all the officials and educated people in the GCC who answered my questions. Also I am thankful to those who offered me encouragement, and for the support of my family of Bait Al-‘Abādī. I offer my deepest gratitude to my mother, my wife, my son Ya‘rub and my daughters Faṭimā and Munā.

Table of Contents

DECLARATION	II
ABSTRACT	III
DEDICATION	IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	V
TABLE OF CONTENTS	VI
LIST OF APPENDIXES	XV
LIST OF TABLES	XVII
LIST OF MAPS	XVIII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	XX
TRANSLITERATION	XXII
INTRODUCTION	XXIII
DISCUSSION OF SOURCES	XXV
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY	XXV
THE AIM OF THE STUDY	XXVI
ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY	XXVI

Chapter One

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE GCC STATES **1**

SAUDI ARABIA **1**

GENERAL GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION	1
POPULATION	3
ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM	4
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	4
THE FIRST SAUDI STATE	5
THE SECOND SAUDI STATE	5
THE THIRD SAUDI STATE	6
THE 1964 COUP OF FAISAL	8
THE REIGNS OF KING KHALID AND FAHD	10
DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENTS	12
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS	12
KING FAHD'S REFORMS	12
POLITICAL OPPOSITION	13

THE STATE OF KUWAIT **16**

GENERAL GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION	16
POPULATION	16
POLITICAL BACKGROUND	17
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	17
POLITICAL SYSTEM	20

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND	20
MAJLIS AL-UMMAH	21
<u>THE STATE OF QATAR</u>	24
GENERAL GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION	24
POPULATION	24
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	26
THE ERA OF THE AL-THĀNĪ FAMILY	26
<u>THE STATE OF BAHRAIN</u>	30
GEOGRAPHICAL SURVEY	30
POPULATION	30
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	33
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS	33
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	34
THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT	34
THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT	35
<u>THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES</u>	37
GENERAL GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION	37
POPULATION	39
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND	39
INTRODUCTION	39
THE QAWASIM	40
THE SHEYKHS OF ABU DHABI	41
THE SHEYKHS OF DUBAI	41
THE SHEYKHS OF AJMAN	42
THE UMM AL-QAIWAIN SHEYKHS	42
THE FUJAIRAH SHEYKHS	43
DIRECT BRITISH RULE	43
FEDERATION	44
POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP	45
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS	45
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM	46
<u>THE SULTANATE OF OMAN</u>	48
GENERAL GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION	48
POPULATION	49
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	51
INTRODUCTION	51
THE AL-BU SA'ĪD PERIOD	51
THE BRITISH INTERVENTION	52

THE REIGN OF SA'ID B. TAIMUR	54
THE DHOFARI OPPOSITION	56
THE COUP OF 23 JULY 1970	57
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	58
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENTS	58
THE SHURA COUNCIL	59
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS	61
THE OPPOSITION	61
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER ONE	63

Chapter Two

THE DEVELOPMENT AND ORIGINS OF THE GCC	66
INTRODUCTION	66
THE DEFINITION OF THE GCC	67
VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF THE COUNCIL	67
BISHARA'S DEFINITION OF THE COUNCIL	68
THE STRUCTURE OF THE GCC	70
THE SUPREME COUNCIL	71
THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL	72
THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL	72
UNDERLYING ELEMENTS OF UNITY BETWEEN THESE COUNTRIES	75
INTRODUCTION	75
THE MAIN JOINT ORGANISATIONS IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS	76
THE FIELD OF THE MEDIA	76
THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AFFAIRS	76
THE POLITICAL PROCESS	77
THE GULF REGION'S STRATEGIC PROMINENCE AND GROWING ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE	83
GENERAL GEOGRAPHICAL SURVEY OF THE GULF	83
PETROLEUM RESERVES IN THE GULF REGION	84
CRUCIAL FACTORS LEADING TO THE FOUNDATION OF THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL	91
THE EMERGENCE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION	91
THE EVENTS IN THE HOLY CITY OF MECCA IN 1979	93
DISUNITY AND BREAKUP OF THE ARAB WORLD	94
THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN 1980	95
POWER STRUGGLE IN THE GULF REGION	96
THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN	99
VIEWS BEHIND THE EMERGENCE OF THE GCC	100
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE FOUNDATION OF THE GCC	101
ARAB REACTIONS	101
INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS	105
THE UNITED STATES	105

THE SOVIET UNION	105
BRITAIN	107
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER TWO	107

Chapter Three

GULF SECURITY	112
INTRODUCTION	112
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN GULF SECURITY	114
SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF REGION	118
THE CONCEPT OF GULF SECURITY	119
EXTERNAL THREATS TO GULF SECURITY	121
BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF REGION	121
THE NIXON DOCTRINE (TWIN PILLARS)	123
THE SHAH OF IRAN'S AMBITIONS IN THE GULF	124
THE SAUDI ROLE IN GULF SECURITY	130
ATTEMPTS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY OF THE GULF	132
THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE GULF REGION	134
GULF SECURITY SINCE THE END OF 1979	136
DIRECT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN GULF SECURITY	136
INTRODUCTION	136
THE OMANI ROLE IN GULF SECURITY	137
THE CRITICAL PERIOD FOR GULF SECURITY	139
THE CARTER DOCTRINE (RAPID INTERVENTION FORCE)	141
AMERICAN ROLES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GCC	143
THE LACK OF CONSENSUS OVER THE ARAB GULF INITIATIVES	144
AMERICAN FACILITIES IN THE ARAB GULF STATES	146
INITIATIVES BY THE GCC LEADERS	147
THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT	148
SECURITY OF THE GULF REGION FROM THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT TO THE MID - 1990s	151
AMERICAN SECURITY PROPOSAL FOR THE GULF REGION	151
THE EUROPEAN PROPOSAL FOR THE GULF	152
THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE GULF	152
THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE GULF	152
THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION	152
THE GROWING PRESENCE OF THE USA, BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE GULF	158
THE GCC ARMY PURCHASE	161
THE UNIFIED FORCE OF THE GCC	162
DUAL CONTAINMENT POLICY IN THE GULF REGION	165
THE GCC STATES DEFENCE AGREEMENTS WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES	168

Chapter Four

INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE GULF	173
INTRODUCTION	173
PFLO AND NATIONALIST THREATS	173
SHI‘A ACTIVITIES OVER GULF SECURITY	175
THE FOREIGN POPULATION OF THE GCC STATES	185
ISLAMIC GROUPS AND THEIR OPPOSITION IN THE GCC STATES	191
SECTARIANISM	198
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM	202
POPULATION	207
DISPUTES BETWEEN AND WITHIN ROYAL FAMILIES	212
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTERS THREE AND FOUR	221

Chapter Five

THE GCC INTERNAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES	229
INTRODUCTION	229
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE AL-BURAIMI DISPUTE	233
THE AL-BURAIMI DISPUTE, SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN AND ABU-DHABI (UAE)	234
BRITISH AND SAUDI CLAIMS	234
BRITISH AND SAUDI NEGOTIATIONS	235
SAUDI OCCUPATION OF AL-BURAIMI	237
BRITISH AND SAUDI ARBITRATION	238
THE U.N. AND THE QUESTION OF AL-BURAIMI	239
THE BRITISH POSITION OVER AL-BURAIMI	242
THE SAUDI POSITION OVER AL-BURAIMI	242
THE ABU DHABI POSITION OVER AL-BURAIMI	244
THE OMANI POSITION OVER THE 1974 AGREEMENT	245
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE AL-BURAIMI DISPUTE (THE OMANI POSITION)	246
THE SAUDI-QATARI BORDER DISPUTES	252
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	252
THE BRITISH POSITION OVER QATAR	253
THE AGREEMENT OF 1965	253
THE INCIDENT OF AL-KHUFUS	256
THE IRANIAN POSITION OVER THE AL-KHUFUS INCIDENT	257
INDEPENDENT POLICY OF QATAR	257
EGYPTIAN MEDIATION	259
THE GCC ROLE OVER THE AL-KHUFUS INCIDENT	259
THE SAUDI ARABIA AND BAHRAIN BORDER DISPUTE	261
THE OFFSHORE DISPUTE	261
THE BRITISH AND SAUDI CLAIMS	261
THE AGREEMENT OF 1958	262

SAUDI-KUWAIT BORDER DISPUTES	265
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	265
THE AL-'UQAIR CONVENTION	265
THE AGREEMENT OF 1965	266
THE ISLANDS OF QARU AND UMM AL-MARADIM	267
THE BAHRAIN AND QATAR BORDER DISPUTES	271
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	271
THE DISPUTE OVER ZUBARAH	272
THE DISPUTE OVER THE HAWAR ISLANDS	273
THE DISPUTE AFTER THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL	274
SAUDI MEDIATION	275
DISPUTE AND ESCALATION	275
QATAR CAPTURES FISHT AL-DIBEL	276
THE GCC ROLE IN THE DISPUTE	277
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION	279
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE DISPUTE	280
THE OMANI-UNITED ARAB EMIRATES BORDER DISPUTES	284
POLITICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE DISPUTE	284
BRITISH MISSION IN OMAN AND THE TRUCIAL STATES	285
THE DISPUTE OF 1977	287
FOREIGN INTERVENTION	290
THE MEDIATION OF SHEYKH ZAYED	290

Chapter Six

THE GCC EXTERNAL BOUNDARIES DISPUTES	296
THE SAUDI-IRAQI BORDER DISPUTES	296
INTRODUCTION	296
THE BRITISH ROLE IN THE DEMARCATION	296
THE AL-UQAIR PROTOCOL	297
IRAQI AND SAUDI HARMONY	298
THE NEUTRAL ZONE	299
THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR	299
THE SAUDI-YEMENI BORDER DISPUTE	302
EARLY PERIOD OF SAUDI-YEMENI RELATIONS	302
THE WESTERN POWERS' INVOLVEMENT	303
THE TREATY OF 1934	303
THE EXTERNAL POWERS' INTERVENTION	304
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INITIATIVES	306
SOVIET AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT	307
THE WAR OF 1967	307
THE SAUDI ROLE IN YEMEN	308
CLASHES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES	309
THE DISPUTE OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY	309
THE UNIFICATION OF YEMEN AND THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT	312
THE SAUDI REACTION	312

SAUDI AMBITIONS IN ḤADRAMAUT	314
THE MEMORANDUM OF 1995	314
THE MILITARY INCIDENTS	315
THE YEMENI POSITION OVER THE BORDER	317
THE IRAQI - KUWAITI BORDER DISPUTES	320
EARLY BACKGROUND	320
THE TREATY OF 1899	321
THE ANGLO-TURKISH AGREEMENT OF 1913	321
IRAQ UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE	324
THE IRAQI CLAIM DURING THE MONARCHICAL ERA	325
THE COUP OF 1958	327
THE INDEPENDENCE OF KUWAIT	328
QĀSIM'S CLAIM OVER KUWAIT	330
THE KUWAITI REACTION TO QASIM'S CLAIM	330
KUWAIT REQUESTS BRITISH TROOPS	331
THE UN AND THE IRAQI CLAIM	331
'ABD-AL-NĀSSER AND THE ARAB LEAGUE	332
THE COUP OF 1963 AND THE IRAQI RECOGNITION	333
IRAQ REQUESTS WARBAH AND BUBIYAN	334
THE COUP OF 1968	335
KUWAIT REJECTS THE IRAQI REQUESTS OVER THE TWO ISLANDS	335
IRAQI TROOPS ON KUWAIT BORDER	336
SADDAM'S PROPOSAL OVER THE TWO ISLANDS	336
IRANIAN THREATS	337
KUWAIT SUPPORTS SADDAM	338
IRAQ'S CLAIM OVER KUWAIT AND THE UAE	338
KUWAIT REJECTS THE IRAQIS' CLAIM	339
THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT	339
THE ARAB SUMMIT IN CAIRO	340
ŞADDAM ACCEPTS THE TREATY OF 1975	340
INTERNATIONAL COALITION	340
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION	340
THE IRAQ REACTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION DEMARCATION	343
THE U.N.'s INVOLVEMENT	346
THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN	348
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	348
INTRODUCTION	348
IRANIAN CLAIM	349
BRITAIN REJECTS THE IRANIAN CLAIM	351
THE IRANIAN CLAIMS DURING THE 1920s	351
THE IRANIAN CLAIMS DURING THE 1930s	352
IRAN'S AFFILIATION WITH BAHRAIN	352
BRITAIN REJECTS THE AFFILIATION	353
THE SHAH OF IRAN'S CLAIM	355
THE UN REFERENDUM	355
IRAN'S RECOGNITION OF BAHRAIN	356
THE IRANIAN CLAIM OF 1979	357

THE IRANIAN-UNITED ARAB EMIRATES DISPUTES OVER THE ISLANDS OF THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA	359
INTRODUCTION	359
THE CLAIMS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES	360
THE IRANIAN CLAIM	360
THE QAWĀSIM CLAIM	361
THE BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE	362
THE NEGOTIATION OF 1971	363
THE IRAN AND SHARJAH MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 1971	365
IRAN'S OCCUPATION OF THE THREE ISLANDS	365
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLANDS	366
REACTION TO THE IRANIAN OCCUPATION	370
THE UN AND THE IRANIAN OCCUPATION	370
THE SAUDI POSITION OVER THE ISLANDS	371
THE BRITISH POSITION OVER THE ISLANDS	371
IRANIAN OCCUPATION DURING THE 1970S	372
THE DISPUTE IS REVIVED AFTER THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION	372
THE IRANIAN ACTION OF 1992	374
SHEYKH ZAYED'S REACTION	375
THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES	376
THE OMANI-YEMENI BORDER DISPUTES	380
INTRODUCTION	380
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT	381
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTE	381
ADEN SUPPORTS THE OMANI OPPOSITION	382
THE SUPERPOWERS' INVOLVEMENT	383
THE MEDIATION OF KUWAIT AND THE U.A.E.	383
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS	384
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS	385

Chapter Seven

THE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN THE GULF REGION	389
INTRODUCTION	389
THE SAUDI ARABIA - IRAN OFFSHORE BOUNDARY	392
THE KUWAIT-IRAN OFFSHORE BOUNDARY	395
QATAR AND IRAN OFFSHORE BOUNDARY	395
THE OMAN-IRAN OFFSHORE BOUNDARY	397
THE UAE'S OFFSHORE BOUNDARY WITH IRAN	397
ABU DHABI'S OFFSHORE DISPUTES WITH IRAN	398
THE QATAR-ABU DHABI OFFSHORE BOUNDARY	399
THE LAND AND OFFSHORE BOUNDARY WITHIN THE UAE'S	400
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTERS FIVE, SIX AND SEVEN	405
Conclusion	409
Bibliography	414
Appendices and Agreements	445

List of Appendices

1) Foreign Ministers Statement on the Foundation of the GCC (Riyadh Communiqué.)	445
2) The Decision to Establish the GCC.	445
3) The Co-operation Council for the Arab Gulf States of the Gulf Organisational Structure.	448
4) Charter of the GCC.	449
5) Abu Dhabi Supreme Council Summit - Final Communiqué.	475
6) The Unified Economic Agreement Between the Countries of the GCC.	477
7) Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention 1922.	482
8) Agreement Between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Relating to the Partitions of the Neutral Zone.	483
9) Letters from the Prime Minister of Iraq and the Ruler of Kuwait Reaffirming the Kuwait-Iraq Boundary, dated July 21, 1932 and August 10, 1932, respectively.	487
10) Saudi-Qatari Borders Agreement of 1965.	487
11) Agreement on the Delimitation of the Offshore and Land Boundaries Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar.	488
12) Text of Saudi-UAE Border Agreement.	490
13) International Border Agreement Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman.	493
14) International Boundary Agreement Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen.	504
15) Text of Memorandum of Understanding of 1995 Between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen.	515
16) UAE – Saudi Arabia Agreement on Security Co-operation.	516
17) Agreement Concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Iran and Oman.	519

18) Offshore Boundary Agreement Between Abu Dhabi and Dubai.	521
19) Agreement Concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Iran and Bahrain.	522
20) Bahrain – Saudi Arabia Continental Shelf Boundary Agreement.	524
21) Agreement Concerning Boundary Line Dividing the Continental Shelf Between Iran and Qatar.	526
22) Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty over the Islands of ‘Arabiyah and Farsi and the Delimitation of the Boundary Line separating the Submarine Areas Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran.	528
23) Offshore Boundary Agreement Between Iran and Dubai.	530
24) Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and Sovereignty Rights over Islands Between Qatar and Abu Dhabi.	531
25) Sea-Bed Boundaries – Agreement by the Ruler of Sharjah.	532
26) Sea-Bed Boundaries – Agreements by the Ruler of Umm al-Qaiwayn.	532

List of Tables

	Page
World Oil Reserves	86
Oil Reserves in GCC from 1985-1991	86
Natural Gas Reserves in the GCC from 1985-1991	87
Oil Production in the GCC from 1985-1992	88
The GCC military capabilities compared with Iran and Iraq	164
The GCC as an Organisation compared with Iran, Iraq, Israel and Turkey	164
The Foreign Labour Power in the GCC countries	188
Demographic Changes in the Arab Gulf States (GCC) (1970-2015)	209
Youth Population in the Arab Gulf States (GCC)	211
Royal Families of the GCC States	220

List of Maps

	Page
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	2
The State of Kuwait	23
The State of Qatar	25
The State of Bahrain	32
The United Arab Emirates	38
The Sultanate of Oman	50
The Gulf Region	89
The Strait of Hormuz	90
The Arabian Peninsula, British and Saudi claims	241
The British and Saudi claims and the 1974 boundaries agreement between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates	251
The Saudi Arabia and Qatar boundary	255
The Saudi Arabia maritime boundary with Bahrain	264
The Saudi Arabia boundary with Kuwait	270
The Bahrain and Qatar maritime boundary	283
The boundary of Oman and the United Arab Emirates	289
Oman and UAE international boundary	295
Saudi Arabia boundary with Iraq	301
Saudi Arabia boundary with Yemen	311
International boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen	319
Kuwait as defined by 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention	323
The land boundary as demarcated by the UN Boundary Commission	329
The area of Warba island	345
The northern sector of Kuwait and Iraq	347
The position of the three islands, the two Tunbs and Abu Musa	368
Satellite map showing the three islands, the two Tunbs and Abu Musa	369
The Omani-Yemeni boundary	387

The point numbers of the Omani-Yemeni boundary and the Saudi-Omani boundary	388
The maritime boundary between Saudi Arabia and Iran	494
Some of the Continental Shelf in the Gulf region	504

List of Abbreviations

ARAMCO	Arabian American Company
A.D.	Anno Domini
A.H.	Anno Hegirae
AWACs	Advanced Warning Air Craft
CDLR	Committee to Defend Legitimate Rights
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
DLF	Dhofar Liberation Front
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICO	Islamic Conference Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KUNA	Kuwait News Agency
<i>MEED</i>	<i>Middle East Economic Digest</i>
<i>MEES</i>	<i>Middle East Economic Survey</i>
MT\$	Maria Theresa Dollars
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFLO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
PFLOAG	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
SCC	State Consultative Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

b

Bin or Ibn

IBRU

International Boundary Research Unit

Transliteration

It should be noted that, this thesis contains the transliteration system of Arabic / English which is used at the Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies Department at the University of Edinburgh.

ARABIC	ENGLISH
اَ	Ā, ā
ح	Ḥ, ḥ
خ	Kh
ص	Ṣ ṣ
ض	Ḍ, ḍ
ط	Ṭ, ṭ
ظ	Ẓ, ẓ
ع	‘
غ	Gh
و	Ū, ū
ي	Ī, ī

INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, regional co-operative, economic, social, political and military gatherings were convened across the globe and especially in the South as a result of the common wish and characteristics of various countries and because of their fear that an external threat might again menace their political existence. Examples include the Arab League, the European Community, the Organisation of African Unity and the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation.

The Gulf Co-operation Council, which incorporates six countries similar in their political, economic and social systems, is a more recent example of such regional organisations. Despite the factors that led to the creation of the GCC, it has experienced many problems, especially in the security field. Nevertheless it represents an important experiment in regional cooperation and may still lead to the realisation of integration between the member states in the future.

The Gulf States comprise eight independent states bordered by the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.¹ This study concentrates on the reasons behind the formation and the challenges facing the GCC, which consists of six conservative (traditional) Arab Gulf States (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman). The political developments of the late 1960s and early 1970s constitute the main threats and influences on the Arab (Persian) Gulf region. This study deals with the period between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, in addition to giving the historical background for most of the political events and challenges faced by these countries. This study also includes the most important internal and external political developments.

The British withdrawal from the Gulf region resulted in the emergence of several mini-Sheikhdoms which were not strong enough to protect their independence. The Gulf area witnessed the emergence of two strong regional powers, Iran (dominated by the ambitions of the Shah of Iran) and Iraq (dominated by the ambitions of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq). Among the important events which had an impact on the Gulf during this period were the Iranian Islamic revolution, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the disunity and

breakup of the Arab countries as a result of the Egyptian accord with Israel (Camp David Agreement) and the continuation of the power struggle between the Soviets and Americans, who were both interested and involved in the Gulf region.

Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early 1970s, the Arab Gulf States (Sheykhdoms) have become an area of increasing importance for security, political, and economic reasons. The existing conservative Arab states were unable to face these challenges individually. Thus, with considerable support from Britain and the United States, the GCC was established to deal with these challenges and to minimise the tension in the area. The decision to establish the GCC resulted from both external and internal factors. Following the British withdrawal, the Shah of Iran committed his nation to protect the existing regimes in the Gulf area and western interests there. This stability and security was short-lived, however; the Shah was overthrown in 1978. Now there are perceived threats from Iran and Iraq. Against this background and because of the importance of oil the Gulf region has been a focus for policy analysts and researchers especially since 1973.

Discussion of Sources

Secondary Sources

There are numerous books and articles about the Gulf region and the GCC countries. However, these are limited in time and subject matter, as shown by this selection of some of the best. Derek Hopwood's volume *Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics* provides useful information on the history and politics of the Gulf region, while Husain M. Al-Baharna's *The Arabian Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems* covers political and legal developments (especially on boundaries) in the area. However, both were published in the early 1970s. John A. Sandwick edited one of earliest books in English on the GCC, *The Gulf Cooperation Council Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World*. However, it ends in the early 1980s, and does not deal with boundaries. F. Gregory Gause III's recent book published in 1994 *Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* was very useful in this study. It is of great value on political life in

1. The writer uses the term "Arabian (Persian) Gulf"

the Gulf monarchies. However, it does not explore boundary disputes. Two further books were of particular but limited value. The first by Hassan Al-Alkim, *The GCC States in an Unstable World Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of Small States*, is useful for Gulf states foreign policy but it does not deal with the GCC, boundaries, or security. The second, edited by Richard Schofield, *Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States* is the most important text on boundaries, but it does not provide much information on the history and politics of the GCC. There are also a number of secondary sources in Arabic. These too are constrained chronologically and in subject matter. The books by Nāyif ‘Alī Ubayed *Majlis al-Ta‘āwun Li-Duwal al-Khalīj al-Arabīyyah Min al-Ta‘āwun ilā al-Takāmūl* and by Abdullah Bisharah *Tajrubat Majlis al-Ta‘āwun al-Khalījī Khatwah Aw-‘Aqabah Fi-Tarīq al-Wahdah al-‘Arabīyyah* are of value regarding the establishment of the GCC, but they contain very little on boundary disputes. Two further books, the first edited by Mustafā Kāmil al-Sayyid, *Hattā Lā-Tanshub Harb ‘Arabīyyah-‘Arabīyyah Ukhrā (Min Durus Harb al-Khalīj)*, and the second edited by ‘Abd al-Mun‘im al-Mashshāt *Amn al-Khalīj al-‘Arabī. Dirāsah fī al-Idrāk Wa-al-Siyāsāt* are confined to security issues especially after the second Gulf War of the early 1990s. None of the books mentioned here or in the bibliography gives the full picture on the historical and political evolution of the GCC and its member states, and also cover security and borders disputes since the formation of the GCC in May 1981. This thesis aims to fill this gap.

Methodology of the Study

This thesis has focused on primary sources in Arabic and English including documents, dissertations and memoirs. It has also made use of interviews, despite hesitation on the part of officials in the region to discuss security and other sensitive issues with researchers from the area. I am, therefore, particularly grateful to ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās, the Omani Minister of Information and one of the most informed people in the region, for giving me his time. The thesis also involved an exhaustive survey of the secondary source material in Arabic and English. In the course of my work I made several research trips to Oman, the UAE, Cairo and Amman. Within the

UK I consulted material in Libraries in London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Durham and Exeter.

The aim of this Study

This thesis explores the origins and evolution of the GCC and its member states, and evaluates its performance up to the mid-1990s by providing the historical and political background to the formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council and by examining the main challenges it has faced between member states and with regional neighbours during this period.

Organisation of the Study

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first describes the geographical setting and provides the historical political background of the six states of the Arab Gulf. The second focuses on the importance of the process through which the GCC was founded, as well as the main internal and external factors which underlay the establishment of the GCC in 1981. The third and the fourth chapters analyse the security history external and internal of the Gulf region from the early 1970s until mid-1995 and tackle the main challenges still facing the security of the Arab Gulf States. The remaining core chapters of this thesis concentrate on boundary disputes. These are chapters five, six and seven, which discuss the historical and political disputes over boundaries (onshore and offshore) between the GCC states on the one hand and between the GCC countries and their neighbours on the other.

Brief Background of the GCC States

1

Saudi Arabia


General Geographical Description

Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Arabian Peninsula and is the only Arab Gulf State which extends from the Arabian (Persian) Gulf in the east to the Red Sea in the west, and from the Syrian Desert and the Euphrates in the north, to 'Asīr, Najrān, the Ḥadramaut Valley and Oman in the south and southeast. Saudi Arabia has land boundaries with all the GCC States. In the west, the Kingdom is bordered by the Red Sea and Jordan (452 miles; 728 km), and in the North by Iraq (502 miles; 808 km) and Kuwait (101 miles; 162 km). It also has borders with the lower Arab Gulf states: the state of Qatar (25 miles; 40 km), the United Arab Emirates (364 miles; 586 km) and the Sultanate of Oman (420 miles, 676 km) in the East and the Republic of Yemen (906 miles, 1,458 km) in the South. Saudi Arabia is close to a number of African countries across the Red Sea, namely Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea. It is also close to Israel and the Gulf of 'Aqaba in the north-west and, finally, Iran on the other shore of the Gulf.¹

The total area of Saudi Arabia is approximately 2,149,700 square kilometres (nearly 80% of the Arabian Peninsula)² (see map no.1). This map is, in fact, issued by the Saudi government and the border-line with the Republic of Yemen (especially with the ex-South Yemen) is still un-demarcated as it is in dispute. The Saudi line resulted from the 1943 Saudi claims (for more details of this line see map p. 241)

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1. Peterson, Erik. *The Gulf Co-operation Council, Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region*. Boulder, Colorado. Westview Press, London, 1988. pp. 15-16 and *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*, (ed.) Biger, Gideon. The Jerusalem Publishing House, Israel, 1995. Facts on File, New York, 1995. p. 460.
 2. Al-Amri, A.B.M. *The Gulf Co-operation Council, Integration or Co-operation*. M.Phil. Thesis. University of Salford, England, 1989. p. 17.

Map No.1



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Sixth Development Plan 1995-2000. Ministry of Planning. Ministry of Planning Press, 1995. S.A. p.35.

Population

The Saudi government census of 1992 estimated the Kingdom's population at 16.9 million including 12,304,835 Saudi citizens and 4,624,459 non-Saudis. However many Western writers do not agree with the Saudi government census and estimate the Saudi population at between five and seven million. It is hard to find two references which agree on the precise level of the Saudi population.³

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is divided into four major areas:

- a) The West, the area of the Ḥijāz, which contains the two holy cities of Islam, Mecca and al-Madinah al-Munawwarah. The population of these cities is mixed and indeed multi-racial.
- b) The South West which includes Najrān and 'Asīr. This is the most densely populated part of Saudi Arabia.⁴
- c) The Eastern province (Al-Ḥasā, Al-Qaṭīf, Dhahrān, Dammām) which is the most important oil-producing area. Nearly all the Saudi Shi'a population is found in this area. There is no exact figure for the number of the Saudi Shi'a population, but it is estimated at 500,000.
- d) The Centre which is inhabited by the Najdi tribes and is the birthplace of the Wahhābī (or *Muwaḥḥidun*) reform movement founded in the 18th century by Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. This movement contains the main supporters of the royal family of Al-Sa'ud and they continue to swell the ranks of both the regular Sa'udi Army and the National Guard. The area of Najd contains the Sa'udi capital Riyadh, which is also the home of the GCC Secretariat.⁵

3. Secretariat of G.C.C. *Economic Bulletin*. Vol. 8. Department of Information of the GCC, Riyadh, 1993. p. 189. Also See *Al-Hayāt Newspaper*, 13 May 1993. London. p. 1.

4. Shata, Hashim A. *A Study of the Security Relations Between the States of the Gulf Co-operation Council*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Keele, 1990. p. 59.

5. *Meri Report*. Saudi Arabia Middle East Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. Croom Helm, London, 1985. p. 21.

Administration System

Since 1992 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been divided into a new system of districts which divides the country into 13 provinces (*imārāt*, singular-*imārah*) which are, in turn, subdivided into districts and sub-districts. Each province (*imārah*) is administered by a governor-general (*Amīr*) from the Al-Sa‘ud family; each district is ruled by a governor and each sub-district is governed by a headman. The new administrative divisions of 1992 have allowed the people to form provincial local councils whose members are elected by the local Saudis and which are dominated by tribal chiefs and merchants.⁶

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is considered to be the largest oil-exporting country in the world and has the largest proven oil reserves. The first oil concession was granted in 1933 and Saudi oil began to flow in large quantities in the early 1950s. By the early 1970s the Saudi oil output had reached eight million barrels a day, with the capacity to rise to twenty million, compared to Iraq’s two million and Kuwait’s three million.⁷

Historical Background

The modern Saudi state has never been subjected to any foreign rule or direct control. The only time, in recent history, when central Arabia was under foreign domination was in 1818, when Turkish-Egyptian troops under Ibrāhīm Pasha, the son of Muḥammad ‘Alī of Egypt, occupied the heart of Arabia. They destroyed the Sa‘udi (*Wahhābī*) state and captured the capital at Dir‘īyyah in Najd.⁸ The history of Saudi Arabia dates back to the 18th century and can be divided into three phases.

6. Katzman, Kenneth “The Gulf Monarchies Open Up How Stable Are Saudi Arabia and Kuwait?” *Middle East Quarterly*. Vol.1:No.3, September 1994. Washington. p. 22.

7. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. “Saudi Arabia, Country Profile 1991-92” London. p. 5.

8. *Meri Report*. *op.cit.* pp. 4-5.

The First Saudi State

The first phase began in the year 1744, with the alliance between Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792), the founder of the *Muwaḥḥiddun* reform movement (which is known to western writers as Wahhābism, and Muḥammad b. Sa‘ud, the son of the founder of the Sa‘udi Dynasty and the ruler of a small district which surrounds the town of *al-Dir‘iyyah* in Najd in central Arabia. The movement of Shaykh Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb was the main means by which Muḥammad b. Sa‘ud was able to extend his authority over the tribes of Najd. This movement, which is known in Arabia as *al-Da‘wah ilā al-Tawḥīd* (the call to the doctrine of the oneness of God), called for a return to the original principles of Islam and the repudiation of all innovations contrary to the practice of the Prophet Muḥammad and the early generation of pious Muslims. As a result of popular appeal and military force, the resulting movement gradually spread.

Between 1801 and 1806 the followers of the movement launched attacks and raids in many areas of Iraq (especially against the Shi‘a Shrines in Karbala), and against the Turks in Mecca and al-Madinah.⁹ The first Saudi State was destroyed by Egyptian-Turkish troops during the era of ‘Abdullah b. Sa‘ud, the fourth ruler of the first Saudi state. The forces of Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha of Egypt brought the Sa‘udī state to an end and remained in the area of Najd until 1840 when his empire collapsed and he could not defend Arabia against the western imperialist countries such as Britain and France.¹⁰

The Second Saudi State

The second Sa‘udī state was founded in 1834 when Turkī b. ‘Abdullah b. Muḥammad b. Sa‘ud nominally recognised the suzerainty of the Ottoman empire. Turkī’s accession marked a change in the ruling branch of the royal family. The previous

9. Rentz, George. “Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia” in: Hopwood, Derek (ed.) *The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1972, p.p. 54-55. And also see Winder, Bayly R. *Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century*. Macmillan, London. 1965. p. 6.

10. Rentz, George. *op.cit.* p. 61.

Imams had all been descendants of ‘Abd al-Azīz b. Muḥammad b. Sa‘ud, whereas Turkī and the succeeding rulers, including the present ruler King Fahd, who is Turkī’s great-great grandson, all descend from a different line. Faiṣal b. Turkī succeeded to power after his father’s assassination in 1834. During his long reign (1834-1838, 1843-1865), Faiṣal faced many challenges and threats from the Egyptian military in the Ḥijāz after he returned from Cairo (where he had been held captive by Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha since 1838) and was also challenged by the other emirates in Najd which were supported by Turkish troops.¹¹ In two decades the stability and the tribal cohesion which had been built up during Faiṣal’s reign was destroyed by civil wars between two of Faiṣal’s sons, ‘Abdullah (1865-71 and 1875-89) and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. In 1871 Saud, another son of Faiṣal, came to power, although this brought anarchy in the whole of Arabia.

The Ottoman Turks, who had repossessed the area of Ḥijāz after the death of Muḥammad ‘Alī in 1844, captured al-Ḥasā and imprisoned ‘Abdullah. At the time of Sa‘ud’s death in 1875 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (1875 and 1889-91), the younger brother of Sa‘ud and ‘Abdullah, announced his accession. ‘Abdullah regained power after one year and ruled until his death in 1889, when ‘Abd al-Raḥmān once again assumed leadership. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, after ruling briefly from 1889-1891, was defeated when the ruler of the Shammar tribes (who had based his capital at Ḥa’il) drove him from Riyadh and destroyed the second Saudi state.¹²

The Third Saudi State

The third phase of the House of Sa‘ud’s history began in 1902, when ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, better known as Ibn Sa‘ud, returned from exile in Kuwait and recaptured Riyadh. He then created the *Ikhwān* (brothers) and adopted a more

11. Troller, Gary. *The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud*. Frank Cass, London, 1976. p. 15.

12. Carter, Laraine Newhouse. “Historical Setting” in: Nyrop, Richard. (ed.) *Saudi Arabia A Country Study*. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. Fourth Edition, 1984, pp. 24-25.

ambitious programme. He encouraged the Bedouin to found hundreds of *ḥujayrāt* (new towns). These were a combination of military cantonments, agricultural colonies and missionary centres for the propagation of the Wahhābī movement. The settlers called themselves *Ikhwān*.¹³

By 1912 Ibn Saud had gathered more than 11,000 members of the Najdi tribes into the forces of the *Ikhwān*. Tribalism and Islam were to play a central part in the building of the third Saudi state and they were exploited by Ibn Sa‘ud during his long reign which extended from 1902 until 1953. From late 1917 until 1930 the *Ikhwān* movement played a significant role in spreading and extending the authority of Ibn Sa‘ud in the Arabian Peninsula.

In 1913 Ibn Sa‘ud captured al-Ḥasā (the Eastern province) from the Turks and with the strong support of the *Ikhwān*, he extended his authority in 1921 to the north-west when he seized the capital of the Al-Rashid family, the old enemies of Al-Sa‘ud. However, by the end of the 1920s, the power of the *Ikhwān* movement in Arabia was beginning to pose a strong challenge to Ibn Sa‘ud’s ambitions. The leaders of the movement became a source of embarrassment rather than of support. The crushing of the *Ikhwān* was the first essential step in asserting the primacy of the Al-Sa‘ud family over the religious institutions in Saudi political life.¹⁴

Between 1924 and 1925, the forces of Ibn Sa‘ud were able to reach many areas in the south-west and occupied the southern parts of Arabia. Princes Saud and Faisal, the two sons of Ibn Sa‘ud, were able to capture many areas such as Tihāma, ‘Asīr and Najrān and penetrated right to the heart of the Yemeni area of Ḥudeida. Britain, during the First World War, recognised the authority of Ibn Sa‘ud in order to gain his support in their war against the Turks and paid him £5,000 to induce him not to attack westwards. However Ibn Sa‘ud, after the end of the Great War, came into conflict with Sherif Ḥussein of Mecca. This arose *inter alia* when Sherif Ḥussein declared himself to be the King of the Arabs and when he assumed for himself in

13. Rentz, George. *op.cit.* p. 64.

14. Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*. Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1995. p. 13.

1924, the title of *Khalīfah* of the Islamic people, three days after Atatürk had abolished the *Khilāfah* in Turkey.¹⁵ The struggle between Ibn Sa‘ud and the Sherif of Mecca over the control of the Arabian Peninsula came to an end when the Saudis succeeded, in 1926, in driving the Hashimites out of the Ḥijāz. Ibn Sa‘ud, later in the same year, declared himself King of the Ḥijāz and Sultan of Najd and, six years later, in 1932, he announced himself to be King of the whole country, which would henceforth be known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In May 1933 Sa‘ud, the oldest son of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Sa‘ud, was appointed Heir Apparent.

The 1964 Coup of Faiṣal

The reign of King Sa‘ud, which lasted from 1953 to 1964, is considered the most critical era of conflict in the history of Al-Sa‘ud. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 played a significant role in the political developments in Arabia. The first part of King Sa‘ud’s policy saw him form an alliance with Egypt and Syria in a joint command opposing the Baghdad Pact of 1955. He also supported Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956. During the early 1960s a serious dispute arose between King Saud and his brother, the Heir Apparent Prince Faiṣal, and many Princes were exiled to Cairo. The Free Princes movement of Ṭalāl, Badr, Fawwāz and his other cousins posed a real threat to the Saudi royal family, as they had strong support from ‘Abd al-Naṣṣer. The aim of the Princes Movement was to bring about the creation of a constitutional democracy within a monarchical framework in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, at the same time, several Saudi officers escaped to Egypt with their aircraft. Moreover, in June and September of 1969, two unsuccessful coups were attempted in Saudi Arabia.¹⁶ During the early 1960s the dispute between King Sa‘ud and Faiṣal over Saudi internal and external policy intensified, especially after the

15. Kelidar, A.R. “The Arabian Peninsula in Arab and power Politics” in: Hopwood, Derek. (ed.) *The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1972, pp. 146-147.

16. Henderson, Simon. *After King Fahd Succession In Saudi Arabia*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C. Second Edition, 1995. pp.10-11. See also. Cordesman, Anthony. *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in*

outbreak of the North Yemen revolution of 1962. Egyptian troops became involved by giving strong support to the republicans against the monarchists who were supported by Saudi Arabia. In March 1964 Prince Faiṣal, with the support of the Saudi royal family, the 'Ulamā' and the Judges, who had issued a *fatwā*, attempted to transfer the power to himself. King Sa'ud rejected the *fatwā*, and made many attempts with his Royal Guard to regain power, but he was in no position to protect himself. King Sa'ud later described the 1964 Coup as follows:

"When I tried to cancel the military agreement of 1951 between Saudi Arabia and the United States, the Americans made arrangements for removing me from Saudi Arabia. I was relying in the first place on the loyalty of the Royal Guard and the loyalty of the tribes. The Commander of the Royal Guard came to me and said: Sir, American planes are flying over our barracks; if we ever try to resist we will be in an impossible situation because the planes will wipe out the barracks and all therein.¹⁷

In 1964 King Faiṣal assumed power in Saudi Arabia, after his brother had been compelled to abdicate. Sa'ud went to Egypt to join his brothers there, hoping that the Egyptian President 'Abd al-Naṣṣer would support him. King Faiṣal's rule was an important period. Internally the country witnessed more modernisation with the boom in the oil industry. The first act he undertook was to finally abolish slavery in Saudi Arabia. Externally his containment of Arab Nationalism and Communism played a significant role in American policy in the Middle East. The main challenge facing King Faiṣal during his reign was the civil war in North Yemen, in which the Republican side was supported by Egyptian troops and the Royalists were backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States. Saudi Arabia and Egypt did not really begin to improve their relations until after the death of 'Abd al-Naṣṣer in 1970. The other important challenge which faced King Faiṣal was the conflict over al-Buraimi (for more details see chapter 5). In the later years of his reign King Faiṣal took many decisions to support Arab and Islamic causes, especially during the war of 1973 between the Arabs and Israel, when he threatened to suspend oil exports to some of

the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado and Mansell Publishing, London, p. 110.

17. *Al-Jabha al-Sha'biyyāh Li-Taḥrīr al-Baḥrayn. Al-ṣira' 'alā al-Khalīj al-'Arabī Dirāsah Iqtisādiyyah Siyāsīyyah Li-Mashru' al-Amn al-Khalījī.* Dār al-Ṭalī'ah, Beirut, 1978. p. 96.

the Western countries for a short time. The reign of King Faiṣal came to an abrupt end in March 1975, when he was assassinated by his nephew Faiṣal b. Musā'id.¹⁸

The Reigns of King Khalid and Fahd

Crown Prince Khālid, following the assassination, immediately succeeded to the throne and received the *bay'ah* (formal pledges of support) from the Royal family, the 'Ulamā and the tribal leaders within the traditional three days. Fahd, the Interior Minister, was named the Crown Prince. King Khālid's style of leadership was very different from that of Faiṣal and he adopted a more liberal policy in terms of informing the press of the rationale behind foreign policy decisions. The most important events during the reign of King Khālid were his early state visits to all the Arab Gulf States, which laid the foundation for the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council. During the reign of King Khālid, which lasted from 1975 to 1982, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faced many internal and external threats, such as the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979 and the Shi'a riots in al-Ḥasā in the Eastern Province. The main external threat was the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the fall of the Shah of Iran, the main ally of the Saudi regime according to the United States doctrine of the Twin Pillars.¹⁹

In spite of his seven years control of Saudi Arabia, King Khālid was not interested in politics and his health was not good. However, he was supported by his brother Crown Prince Fahd who took a major role in day-to-day decision-making. Fahd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz (the present King), succeeded to power after the death of King Khālid in 1982.²⁰ The beginning of Fahd's reign coincided with the strengthening and expansion of Saudi Arabia's strategic alliance with the United States. This Sa'udi alliance came as a result of many events and direct threats to the Kingdom's security, which were caused by the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq

18. Al-Ajmi, Hamza Jassim. *The International History of the Gulf: 1958-1979*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1988. p. 192.

19. Carter, Laraine Newhouse. "Historical Setting" *op.cit.* pp. 44-45.

20. Al-Ajmi, Hamza Jassim. *op.cit.* p. 14.

war (which lasted eight years), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The most important internal progress came in 1992 when King Fahd issued many decrees for the establishment of the Shūrā Council, the Basic System of Rule and the new system of administrative divisions and districts.²¹

Saudi political leadership is dominated by the royal family of the House of 'Al-Sa'ud. No reference work knows exactly how large it is, but it is estimated at 5,000 persons. The King is the head of the family as well as the chief of state and head of the government. The family of Al-Sa'ud have continued to dominate the political, economic and military sectors. During recent years a number of the second generation of Princes (grandsons of 'Abd al-'Azīz) have begun to enter public life, like Saud al-Faiṣal, the Foreign Minister, his brother Turkī al-Faiṣal, the Intelligence Chief, and Bandar b.Sulṭān the Saudi ambassador to the United States.²² Politically, the sons of 'Abd al-'Azīz were the prominent group in the government, but the new system, instituted by King Fahd in 1992, changed the previous system of government and provided for the establishment of a new procedure for the royal succession among the grandsons of King 'Abd al-'Azīz.²³ (see chapter no. 4)

The military sector in Saudi Arabia has not played a significant role in politics. The Saudi military is not able to protect the Kingdom against any strong external threat, such as that posed by Iraq before 1990, or Israel and Iran. This is in part due to the fact that the royal family has kept both forces, the military forces and the National Guard, small, since it is well known that many third-world regimes are overthrown by their own armed forces.²⁴ The active armed forces were estimated, in 1990, at 65,700 and the National Guard, which reports to Crown Prince 'Abdullah, was estimated at 35,000.²⁵

21. Al-Rayyis, Riyāḍ Najib. *Riyāḥ al-Sumūm, al-Sa'udiyyah wa-Duwal al-Jazīrah Ba'd Ḥarb al-Khalīj. 1991-1994*. Riyāḍ Al-Rayyis Books, London, 1994. p. 157.

22. *Meri Report*. *op.cit.* p. 14.

23. Butt, Gerald. "Saudi Arabia: A tentative step forward" . *Middle East International*. 6 March 1992. London. p. 13.

24. *Meri Report*. *op.cit.* pp. 6-7.

25. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. *op.cit.* p. 6.

Democracy and Constitutional Movements

Constitutional Developments

The history of the House of Al-Sa'ud is not renowned for democratic or constitutional processes. In 1926 King 'Abd al-'Azīz, the founder of the current Saudi state, established a small, un-elected Consultative Council (*Majlis al-Shūrā*) in the Ḥijāz area which ran for three years. After the establishment of the Saudi state in 1932, King 'Abd al-'Azīz established a kind of consultative assembly to reconcile the leaders and chiefs of some of the opposing tribes, who had refused to join him. This legislative body lasted for a short time and was then dissolved, when King 'Abd al-'Azīz spread his authority over the Arabian Peninsula.²⁶

Both King Sa'ud and King Faiṣal refused to set up any kind of consultative body. During the 1960s many Saudi princes, especially prince Ṭalāl, called for a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia, but King Faiṣal rejected the idea, being afraid of any public participation in his government.

King Fahd's Reforms

After the conclusion of the Mecca incident of 1979 (for more details see Chapter 2) and the riots of the Shi'a in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, Crown prince Fahd (the present King) promised the Saudi people that a parliament would be established within the year. After a long period of waiting and many promises and, in the wake of several crises facing the Kingdom, King Fahd issued a decree in March 1992 granting the Kingdom a Constitution (Basic Law), Al- Shūrā Council and a system of districts.²⁷ A few months later, in August 1993, the King appointed a cabinet and

26. See. Katzman, Kenneth "The Gulf Monarchies Open Up, How Stable Are Saudi Arabia and Kuwait?" pp. 21-22. See also. *Middle East Quarterly*. op.cit. pp. 21-22.

27. The Saudi Basic Law is divided into five main chapters: Systems of Government (monarchy); Features of the Saudi family, Economic Principles, Rights and Duties; The Authorities of the State; and Financial Affairs. The Saudi Basic Law came as a result of the direct demands and petitions from the Saudi 'Ulamā' and educated people and under pressure from Western governments, especially the US. See *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97". p. 5.

named the members of the Shūrā Council. The powers of the Shūrā Council turned out to be limited to expressing its opinion in respect to the general policies of the state referred to it by the Prime Minister (i.e. the King). However, it had no right to discuss whatever was not referred to it by the Prime Minister, general development, economic, and social plans and to study and interpret the regulations rules, international treaties and agreements as well as concessions. The Shūrā Council also had the right to summon any government minister to stand before it during its discussions on matters that fall within its jurisdiction. Meetings of committees are held in private. The Council has no power to legislate without referring to the Cabinet and no member of the Shūrā Council may speak about any subject for longer than ten minutes during discussions. According to the new Cabinet regulations, the Cabinet's term of office lasts for four years, but the term of office of any minister may be extended by a royal decree. In his organisational decrees, King Fahd has emphasised that the Cabinet, which he chairs, has the exclusive right to lay down foreign, internal, defence, financial, economic, and educational policies and all public affairs of state as well as being able to supervise their implementation. It is to the Cabinet that the Shūrā Council's decisions are referred for consideration. If the views of the two bodies coincide then the King issues his approval. If they differ then the King is entitled to endorse whichever he sees fit.²⁸

At the present time the government and leadership in Saudi Arabia are an elite consisting of four groups: Firstly, there are the members of the royal family, secondly, the Sheykh of large tribal federations and the descendants of princely families, thirdly, the religious leaders and finally, the bureaucratic elite.²⁹

Political Opposition

There are no political parties in Saudi Arabia and no criticism of the royal family of Al-Sa'ud is tolerated. The history of political opposition in Saudi Arabia dates from

28. Al-Reyyis, Riyāḍ N. *op.cit.* pp. 157-158. See also. *The Economist Intelligence Unit.* "Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97" *op.cit.* p. 6. See also *The French News Agency* 6 July 1997, and *The Omani News Agency*. 6 July 1997.

29. Shararah, Waḍāḥ. *The Family and the Loot, Political Principles in Saudi Arabia*. Al-Inmā Publication. Beirut, 1981, p. 39.

the movement of the *Ikhwān* at the end of the twenties, but King ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, with the support of Britain, crushed the movement by arresting its leaders. There were also two small opposition movements which appeared during the 1960s. One of these was led by a group from the royal family and called for a constitutional monarchy and was supported by the Egyptian leader Jamāl ‘Abd al-Naṣṣer. The other opposition group was led by many Nationalists during the 1960s and 1970s and advocated radical change and a regionally-based government, rejecting the term Saudi as being the name of just one tribe or family. These groups included the Ḥijāz Union of the People of the Peninsula, the Revolutionary Najd Party and the Union of the People’s Front for Liberation of Arabian Peninsula. Most of these groups were supported by Egypt during the period of Naṣṣer.

During the early 1970s many Saudi students in the United States set up an opposition movement called the Voice of the Vanguard.³⁰ After the second Gulf War, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia witnessed the emergence of real internal opposition groups. The most important and the strongest group, the appearance of which challenged the Saudi royal family, came from many ‘*Ulamā*’ from the Sunni (*Wahhabī*) sect. During 1991 over 400 members of the ‘*Ulamā*’ along with Islamic activists sent a petition to the King in an attempt to counter the other Saudi opposition group of intellectuals and the Western-educated elite who sought to persuade King Fahd to introduce democratic changes in Saudi Arabia.³¹ The Islamic group’s “Memorandum of advice” to King Fahd consisted of many demands for Islamic rights concerning the basic practice of the Saudi government. The occasion of the Gulf crisis led some of the elements in the Islamic movement in Saudi Arabia to speak against the government in the universities and mosques and to criticise its un-Islamic policies, the presence of American troops, and Saudi relations with the

30. *Meri Report*. *op.cit.* p. 19.

31. During late 1990, forty-three Saudis identified as “liberal” or “secularists” sent a petition to King Fahd explicitly calling for the maintenance of the existing regime and the “noble ruling family” praised the King’s openness and devotion to the people, and strongly supported his decision to establish a Consultative Assembly. *Middle East Journal*. *op.cit.* p. 11.

United States.³² In the early 1990s, the voice of the Saudi opposition was heard more openly from many Western capitals, especially from London.

The Shi'a activities constituted the main outspoken media criticism of the Saudi royal family and they launched a campaign of publications against Saudi discrimination. This was with strong support from Iran. During 1993, the Saudi government quietly moved for a conciliation with the leaders of the Shi'a and invited the opposition Shi'a group to return to Saudi Arabia, promising an end to some of the areas of economic discrimination as well as the release of all Shi'a political prisoners. Since the late 1970s, the activities of the Shi'a people in Saudi Arabia have become more intensive against the Saudi authorities, especially in their home area of the Eastern Province, where numerous oil and gas deposits are located.³³

The other voice of opposition, which has become internationally famous, rose from the activity of many Saudis in London, especially the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR),³⁴ which still operates in exile, and has been headed by Muḥammad al-Mas'arī since 1994. He won his appeal to remain in Britain, after the decision of the British government, who had been under Saudi pressure to exile him from Britain. ³⁵

32. Gregory Gause III, F. *op.cit.* p. 34.

33. Whitley, Andrew. "Minorities and the Stateless in Persian Gulf Politics" *Survival*. Vol. 35, No.4, Winter 1993. p. 42.

34. The CDLR organisation was founded in 1993 by a group of Saudi notables to act as an independent human rights commission and enforce what the founders saw as declining Islamic standards in the wake of the second Gulf War. See. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf". *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 17. No. 4. 1995. The Association of Arab-American University Graduates and Institute of Arab Studies. p. 65.

35. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Saudi Arabia Country Report" 2nd quarter 1995". p. 9.

The State Of Kuwait

General Geographical Description

The State of Kuwait occupies the north-western corner of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. It borders with the Republic of Iraq in the north with a total land boundary of 149 miles (240 km) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the south with a total land boundary of 138 miles (222 km). In the east it is bordered by the waters of the Gulf (121 miles (195 km) (see map No.2). It has a total area of 17,818 square kilometres, a little smaller than the state of New Jersey. The state of Kuwait is divided into five administrative areas (*Muḥāfaẓāt*), al-Aḥmadī, al-Jahrah, al-Kuwait (capital), Ḥawālī and al-Farwaniyah.

Population

The estimated population of Kuwait according to the Gulf Co-operation Council's *Economic Bulletin* in 1993, was 500,083 (citizens).³⁶ Oil lifted Kuwaiti society out of its traditional economic environment of hunting, pearl-diving and limited trade. The entire way of life of Kuwaitis changed in a very brief period of time. While in 1946 Kuwait's income from oil did not exceed \$760,000, by 1971 it had risen to \$963 million, and by 1977 to \$8.9 billion. It is within this context of rapid economic development that new social forces emerged in Kuwait. Under the new welfare state, the number of Kuwaiti citizens tripled between 1957 and 1975, from 113,622 to 470,123. By 1994, the total number of Kuwaiti citizens had reached 669,000, while the number of non-Kuwaiti residents was 1.1 million including the biduns (stateless persons) estimated at 150,000. During the period of the oil boom (1975-1981) the Kuwaiti population had one of the highest growth rates in the world, with a Gross National Product of \$17,000 per capita.³⁷

36. Crystall, Jill. "Kuwait" in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). *Persian Gulf States Country Studies*. U.S. government Printing Office. Washington. D.C. Third Edition. 1994. pp. 47-48. See also. The Secretariat of the G.C.C. *Economic Bulletin*. Vol. 8. Department of Information of the GCC, Riyadh, 1993. p. 189 and the *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. op.cit. p. 344.

37. Amin, S.H. *Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf*. Royston Limited. Glasgow, 1984. p. 10. For more details of the Kuwaiti society see. Ghabra, Shafeeq "Kuwait and

Political Background

Historical Background

Kuwaiti political history goes back to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when many tribes of the Banī 'Utub of the 'Aniza federation migrated from central Arabia and settled near the point of Ras 'Ajuza on the southern shore of the Kuwait Bay. The name of Kuwait is a diminutive of 'kut' meaning a small fortress. The area was also known by many European travelers as "Qurayn", which is in turn a diminutive of the Arabic 'Qarn' meaning a small hill. The heads of the three principal tribes of *Al-Jalāhimah*, *Al-Khalīfah* (the family which now rule Bahrain) and *Al-Ṣabah* agreed to appoint the head of Al-Ṣabāh as the dominant person in political affairs and, subject to consultation, the head of Al-Khalīfah to be dominant in commercial affairs and the Jalāhimah in maritime affairs. A dispute over leadership resulted in the deportation of Al-Khalīfah to their original home in central Arabia near the Qatar Peninsula in 1677.

Sheykh Ṣabāh b. Jaber, the founder of the Al-Ṣabāh dynasty in Kuwait, ruled the Kuwaiti tribal federation from 1750 until his death in 1762.³⁸ 'Abdullah succeeded to the leadership after his father's death. After the long rule of Sheykh 'Abdullah, which lasted 53 years from 1762 to 1815, the small Sheykhdom of Kuwait faced certain difficulties of a political and economic nature from Britain, as well as attacks of the Saudis (Wahhābis), the Ottomans and the Persians on the eastern shore of the Gulf. Relations between the Sheykhdom of Kuwait and Britain, which have been recorded since 1755, played a significant role in protecting the authority of the Al-Ṣabāh family against any external attacks, especially *Ikhwān*

the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change", *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 51. No.3. Summer, 1997, pp. 359-360.

38. Crystall, Jill. *Oil and Politics in the Gulf Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. p. 22. Also see Abu- Hakima, Ahmed M. "The development of the Gulf States" in: Hopwood, Derek (ed.) *The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1972. p. 32.

attacks from the Arabian Peninsula.³⁹ British government interests became more important since Kuwait had the best natural harbour in the Gulf and her location allowed her to benefit from the caravan trade to Aleppo and Baghdad from the Shatt el-Arab and the smuggling trade into Ottoman territories. The Ottoman influence over Kuwait became stronger during the reign of ‘Abdullah Al-Ṣabāḥ II, who ruled from 1866 to 1892.

However, the critical era in Kuwait’s modern history, when Kuwait came more closely under the British sphere of influence, came at the end of the nineteenth century, when Sheykh Mubārak (the Great) (1896-1915) sought British support against the Ottoman authorities in Baṣrah and al-Ḥasā after he murdered his two brothers (Muḥammad and Jarrah) who were pro-Ottoman. He concluded and signed a secret agreement of protection with the British government in 1899. The agreement provided that the British government would protect the Sheykhdom of Kuwait against any internal or external threats on condition that the Sheykh of Kuwait would not have any direct relations with any other foreign power, and would not sell, lease or cede land to any such power. This agreement remained the main element in the relationship between Britain and Kuwait until the announcement of the independence of Kuwait in 1961.

After Mubārak’s death, Kuwait was ruled by two of his sons, Jābir (1915-17) and Salim (1917-21) and, up until the present time, the Amīr has traditionally been chosen from the descendants of these two branches which are known as Al-Jābir and Al-Sālim. After Sālim’s death, the Sheykhdom of Kuwait was ruled by Aḥmad Al-Jābir for nearly three decades (1921-50); during this period oil was discovered (in 1938) and its large-scale exploitation began soon after 1945, transforming Kuwait City from a small fishing port into a thriving commercial centre.⁴⁰ In 1950 Ahmad Al-Jābir was succeeded by his cousin ‘Abdullah Al-Sālim.

The reign of ‘Abdullah (1950 to 1965) saw a number of crises in the history of Kuwait. The most important event was when Kuwait’s independence was announced

39. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. *op.cit.* pp. 33-34.

40. Crystall, Jill. “Kuwait” *op.cit.* pp. 74-75. Also see Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. *op.cit.* 36.

in June 1961. The Iraqi leader, ‘Abd al-Karīm Qāsim, declared his rejection of Kuwaiti independence and claimed that Kuwait was part of the old Ottoman Sanjaq of Basra. During early 1963, Iraqi troops moved near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border in an attempt to occupy some Kuwaiti territory, but British troops, which had landed in Kuwaiti territory with the support of Arab League forces, maintained the Sheikdom’s independence and prevented the Iraqi troops from invading.⁴¹ The independent Kuwaiti state was not accepted as a full member of the United Nations during 1961, because of the Iraqi claim which received support from the Soviet Union who then vetoed the independence of Kuwait. Moscow’s veto was not withdrawn until the new government in Iraq recognised the Sheikdom’s independence (for more details see Chapter 6).⁴²

From 1965 onwards the state of Kuwait was ruled by Sheykh Ṣabāḥ al-Sālim, who was succeeded by his brother. This choice was unusual, since it broke the alternation between the two branches of Al-Jābir and Al-Sālim, the sons of Mubārak. The reign of Ṣabāḥ continued until his death from a heart attack in 1977. The reign of Ṣabāḥ saw many changes in every aspect of education, health, and transport. Various Iraqi regimes were considered the major external and internal threat due to the presence of thousands of Iraqi workers in Kuwait. Sheykh Jābir, the present ruler (Amīr) succeeded his cousin Ṣabāḥ in 1977.

The influence of external and internal events dominated the political scene and posed a real direct threat to the stability of Kuwait. The most serious external threats were the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted eight years, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 which, for the first time in Kuwait’s history, placed the state under direct foreign rule until its liberation in February 1991. The other internal threat was the conflict between the royal family and some members (Nationalist and Islamic) of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, which resulted in the assembly being suspended twice in 1976 and 1986. The tensions in Kuwaiti society, between Sunni and Shi‘a,

41. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* “Kuwait Country Profile 1992-93” London, 1991-92. p. 3.

42. Al-Baharna, Hussein M. *The Arabian Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and Their International Problems*. Second Revised Edition, Librairie Du Liban, Beirut, 1975 Reprinted, 1978. p. 251.

resulted in the bombing of the United States Embassy, the Air France office and the attempted assassination of Sheykh Jābir in 1985 (for more details see Chapter 4).⁴³

Political System

The Constitutional Background

The political system of the state of Kuwait is a hereditary constitutional monarchy. Kuwait has had the most extensive past experience of open political life in any of the Arab Gulf states. The historical record of the consultative political process in Kuwait dates back to 1921 when Sheykh Aḥmad Al-Jābir established a consultative council of twelve representatives of the most powerful families in Kuwait and the main merchants.⁴⁴ However, the council's disputes with the Al-Ṣabāḥ family led to its being reduced to six members, which included two from Al-Ṣabāḥ. In 1930, as a result of the dissolving of the 1921 consultative council, the Sheykh of Kuwait established a Municipal Council consisting of twelve elected members. Two years later the ruler created another council for education when he dissolved the former council.⁴⁵

During 1938 there arose serious opposition to the rule of Sheykh Aḥmed Al-Jābir, who exercised power under the name of the royal family of Al-Ṣabāḥ. The Movement of 1938, which consisted of the main merchant families in Kuwait, created a real challenge and the tension escalated into a crisis. The complex relationship between the ruling family and the old established merchant families resulted in the movement's leaders demanding British protection. Some of them also

43. Crystall, Jill "Kuwait" *op.cit.* pp. 77-78.

44. Before the discovery of oil in Kuwait the relationship between the ruling family and the old merchant families was that of equals in the Kuwaiti oligarchy. After the development of oil, there was an unwritten social compact whereby the Al-Ṣabāḥ were allowed to remain politically pre-eminent as long as the oil wealth was distributed among the merchant families. See. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Kuwait Country Profile 1996-97" London, p. 6.

45. Peterson, J.E. *The Arab Gulf States Steps Toward Political Participation*. The Washington Papers. Praeger, New York, 1988. pp. 28-29.

fled to Iraq and established a National Bloc against the political system in Kuwait.⁴⁶ Under British pressure the ruler of Kuwait responded to petitions from the leaders of the movement and agreed to the formation of a council. A committee formed a list of eligible voters from 150 Kuwaiti families, who elected a 14 -person council (*Majlis al-Ummah al-Tashrīfī*) chaired by the heir-apparent ‘Abdullah Al-Sālim.⁴⁷ When the state of Kuwait became independent in June 1961, the agreement of 1899 and the British protection of the Sheykhdom came to an end. The members of the royal family of Al-Ṣabāḥ as a result of Iraqi threats, entered into serious negotiations with the leading Kuwaiti merchants and tribes in order to create an elected constituent assembly.

Majlis Al-Ummah

The first elections to the National Assembly were held in January 1963, with 205 candidates returning five members from each of ten districts.⁴⁸ Subsequent elections were held in 1967, 1971 and 1975 and, in 1976, the National Assembly was suspended due to a conflict between the royal family and the opposition groups on the one hand and the opposition members of the assembly on the other. The Prime Minister Jābir Al-Aḥmad (the present ruler) resigned on August 29 1976 and dissolved the National Assembly and placed restrictions on the press on the same day.

The second suspension of the Kuwaiti National Assembly took place in July 1986. This suspension came about as real internal and external threats faced the stability of Kuwait. Examples of this are terrorist activities and bombings in Kuwait, the conflict between the government and the opposition groups and the effects of the Iran-Iraq war, which had become a direct threat to Kuwaiti security and stability, especially as Iran had begun to make progress in the war. The third suspension of the

46. Crystall, Jill. "Kuwait" *op.cit.* p. 75. See also Ghabra, Shafeeq "Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change" *Middle East Journal*. Vol.51. No.3. *op.cit.* pp. 361-362.

47. Peterson, J. E. *op.cit.* p. 30.

48. *Meri Report*. *op.cit.* p. 7. See also. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability" *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 17. No.4. 1995. The Association of Arab-American University Graduates and the Institute of Arab Studies, U.S.A. 1995, p. 64.

Kuwaiti National Assembly came as a result of the Iraqi invasion in August 1990. However, political life was restored in October 1992. As mentioned above the election system the electorate is limited to the adult males who can trace their ancestry back to 1920.⁴⁹ The State of Kuwait is the only country in the GCC which has a different ruling system. Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy and the main positions of power in the political leadership are held by the Amir assisted by the Crown Prince (Prime Minister), the members of the government and the elected National Assembly (*Majlis al-Ummah*). There is an independent judiciary which constitutes the third branch of the government.

There are no parties allowed, but there are three principal opposition groupings. The first group is an alliance of secular politicians who espouse varying degrees of commitment to pluralistic principles, and who are generally referred to as Arab Nationalists (*Nasserists*, *Ba' thists* and *Ḥarakīyyin*). The principal organisation of this group is the Kuwaiti Democratic Forum. The other two opposition groupings are centered on two Sunni groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafīyya who are the majority, and the minority of Shi'a who have support from Iran.⁵⁰

49. Peterson, J.E. *op.cit.* pp. 37-47.

50. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. 1992-93. *op.cit.* p. 5.

Map. No. 2



Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA) Year Book. 1996. Washington, D.C.

The State of Qatar

General Geographical Description

The state of Qatar is a small country situated half-way along the eastern coast of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, with a total land area of approximately 4,000 square miles (11,000 square kilometres). It is a limestone peninsula projecting north from the Arabian mainland into the Gulf. The Peninsula of Qatar borders with the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and has a total land boundary of 25 miles. Until the early 1970s, the state of Qatar had a boundary with the United Arab Emirates, but the agreement of 1974 between Saudi Arabia and the ruler of Abu Dhabi dissolved the United Arab Emirates border with Qatar in favour of Saudi Arabia (for more details see Chapter 5). The other country close to Qatar is the Republic of Iran, which is situated 120 miles across the Gulf.⁵¹ (see map no.3).

Population

The population of Qatar grew from some 70,000 in the late 1960s to 369,000 at the time of the 1986 census. In 1992, the population was estimated to be 450,000. The indigenous Qataris are believed to number around 100,000. Qatar is the smallest country in the Arab world in terms of population. The population is divided into two groups; *Bedouin* and *Ḥadar*, both categories being of Arab origin. There are also certain immigrants settled in the towns, in particular Persians and Africans who migrated during the 1920s and 1930s. Qatar is divided into nine administrative divisions or Municipalities: al-Doḥa, al-Ghuwayriyah, al-Khawr, al-Wakra, ar-Rayyān, Jarayan, al-Baṭinah, Madinat al-Shamāl and Umm Salāl. ⁵²

51. El-Mallakh, Ragaei. *Qatar, Energy and Development*. Croom Helm, London, 1985. p. 6 and the *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. op.cit. p. 445.

52. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Qatar Country Profile 1994-95" London, 1994-95, pp. 6-7.

Map No. 3



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Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA) Year Book, 1995. Washington. D.C.

Historical Background

Qatar's modern history began in 1766. Before that its history is obscure and it had no real settlements at all except a few groups of nomadic tribes. During the 1760s, the peninsula of Qatar was settled by a group of Bani 'Utub clans which migrated from the centre of Arabia. The Banī 'Utub clans of Al-Khalīfah and Al-Jalāhimah established many forts and pearling centers to secure their lands and trade. Until 1782, the year of the Al-Khalīfah occupation of Bahrain, the Zubārah area (the north-east of the peninsula) was the main centre of Al-Khalīfah for collecting and marketing pearls.⁵³

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Gulf area witnessed a bloody conflict involving Al-Khalīfah, Al-Jalāhimah (with their leader Raḥmān b. Jābir, earning a reputation as one of the most feared raiders in the waters surrounding the Qatar Peninsula), Iranians and Omanis. The same period also saw the rise of British power in the Gulf area as a result of their growing interests in India. The East India Company vessels attacked what they claimed to be piracy centres in the Gulf area, destroying towns and forcing hundreds to flee during the 1820s. Britain played a significant role in preventing the attacks of the Al-Khalīfah on the Qatar area.

The Era of the Al-Thānī Family

During that time the British role maintained the independence of Al-Thānī against any external attacks especially of the Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain.⁵⁴ The origin of Al-Thānī, as they claimed, derived from the Tamīm tribe and, according to their ancestors, they had left *al-Washm* in Najd and settled in the Jibrīn oasis in eastern Qatar late in the seventeenth century. They soon moved to the north and inhabited Zubārah and later moved to Doha, the present capital and established a small town with a group of Arab tribes. The rise of the Al-Thānī as a prominent family in Qatar

53. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. "The Development of the Gulf States" *op.cit.* p. 44.

came as a result of their alliance with Britain during the 1820s and their acceptance of their allegiance to the Ottomans when Qāsim b. Muḥammad accepted Ottoman sovereignty as a *qā'im maqām* in 1872. The conflict between al-Khalīfah of Bahrain and Al-Thānī of Qatar soon intensified over the area of Zubārah, when the inhabitants of the area refused to give their allegiance and loyalty to Al-Thānī of Qatar. There is still conflict and dispute over the islands of Ḥawār and other small islands in the Gulf between Qatar and Bahrain (for more details see Chapter 6).⁵⁵

Muḥammad b. Thānī is considered the founder of the al-Thānī Sheykhdom in Qatar. His rule lasted until his death in 1876 when he was succeeded by his son Qasim who played a balancing role between the other strong powers of Britain, the Ottomans, the attacks of Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain and the expansion of the Saudis (*Wahhābis*). Sheykh Qasim remained *qā'im maqām* of the Ottoman government until his death in 1913. 'Abdullah b. Qāsim (1913-49) held the title *qā'im Maqām* until the beginning of the First World War (1914). In 1916 Sheykh 'Abdullah concluded an 'exclusive treaty' with Britain like those already signed by Bahrain, the Trucial States and Kuwait which put these Sheykhdoms under the direct control and protection of Britain. It should be noted that the area of Zubārah was not annexed to the authority of al-Thānī until 1937. This treaty of protection lasted between the two states until 1st September 1971, when Qatar was declared an independent state.⁵⁶

At the beginning of the twentieth century Qatar was a poor, small collection of villages dependent on the pearl banks, and some camel breeding and fishing, and was settled by a population of 27,000 which was predominantly tribal and nomadic Arab, consisting of twenty-five clans, largely concentrated in Doha and Wakra. The majority of the population are Sunni (*Wahhābī*) save for a few indigenous Shi'as and 425 Persian Shi'a, who are mostly boatbuilders. Oil was discovered in 1939, but its exploitation was halted between 1942 and 1947. This marked a turning point in the

54. Toth, Anthony. "Qatar" in. Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.) *Persian Gulf States Country Studies*. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. Third Edition, 1994, p. 157.

55. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. *op.cit.* p. 45. See also Toth, Anthony. *op.cit.* p. 158.

56. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. *op.cit.* pp. 45-46.

fortunes of the Qatari population.⁵⁷ Since Sheykh ‘Abdullah’s death in 1949, the Sheykhdom of Qatar has been controlled by many Sheykh of the al-Thānī family under the protection of Britain, such as Sheykh ‘Alī b. ‘Abdullah (1949-60) and Sheykh Aḥmad b. ‘Alī (1960-72). During 1972 the political system in Qatar witnessed a real change when Sheykh Khalīfah b. Ḥamad Al-Thānī came to power after a bloodless coup against his cousin, who had lost the support of the Al-Thānī family when he was outside Qatar in Europe.

Some sources indicate that Saudi Arabia was playing the leading role in supporting and backing the coup and supporting Sheykh Khalīfah, financially and politically with a show of Saudi armed force at the Saudi-Qatari border during the time of the bloodless coup. ⁵⁸ During the early 1970s, as a main result of the British withdrawal militarily from the region of the Gulf, the Sheykhdom of Qatar entered into serious negotiations with Bahrain and the Trucial States on forming a confederation between the Arab Gulf Sheykhdoms. However, the talks failed after Bahrain pulled out and the Qatari Sheykh announced his independence. (For more details of the Bahraini pull-out, see chapter 5). Sheykh Khalīfah b. Ḥamad remained in this position until 1995, when he was deposed from power by his son Ḥamad in a bloodless coup in June. The coup followed the same manner as the bloodless coup of 1972, but without any support from Saudi Arabia. The main support came from the United States, who announced her recognition and support for the new Sheykh in Qatar. This was followed by the recognition of all the GCC States. Since he came to the throne Sheykh Ḥamad b. Khalīfah has been seen as a proponent of progress in instituting political reform internally and externally. He issued a decree easing a ten year-old censorship law and consolidated his position in order to grant more participation and responsibility to Qatari Citizens. Externally, Qatar adopted a line of

57. Toth, Anthony. *op.cit.* p. 159.

58. Crystall, Jill. *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar.* *op.cit.* p. 166.

foreign policy independent of Saudi Arabia and fostered relations with Oman, Iran, Iraq and Israel.⁵⁹

Political life in Qatar is dependent upon decrees issued by the head of the state (Amīr). Since her independence from Britain, Qatar had formed an advisory council soon after the accession of Sheykh Khalīfah b. Ḥamad. The first advisory council consisted of 20 appointed members, plus members of the Cabinet, but the number was expanded to 30 appointed members in 1975. The chosen members came from three important communities, representing the merchants, the chiefs of the important tribes and the educated people. The legislative council is like that of the other countries in the Gulf Co-operation Council with the exception of Kuwait. The debate on political, economic and administrative policies is limited, but the council can initiate discussions on social and cultural affairs. The functions of the advisory council legislatively are to consider draft laws which have been proposed by the Cabinet. These are referred to the council for recommendations, amendments and revisions, and then returned to the Cabinet (which may or may not accept the council's changes). The government is not constitutionally bound to respect the opinion of the advisory council.⁶⁰

The leadership of the rulers of Al-Thānī in Qatar has been unchallenged since it emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, with the exception of occasional disputes with prominent local families, such as the Al-'Aṭiyyah clan, al-Muhanidah, al-Mani' and al-Darwīsh, which constitute important clans within the country and whose members have had serious conflicts with the members of the Al-Thānī over the domination of economy and army ranks.⁶¹

59. *The Economist Intelligence Unit 1995*. *op.cit.* p. 21. See also. *'AALAM AL-KHALEEJ*. No.48. June 1997, London. p. 3.

60. Peterson, J.E. *The Arab Gulf States Steps towards Political Participation*. *op.cit.* pp. 86-89.

61. Lawson, Fred H. "State of Qatar" in: Derbyshire, J. Denis and Ian (eds.) *Political Systems of the World*. Chambers, London, 1989. p. 928.

The State of Bahrain

Geographical Survey

Bahrain is a group of 34 small islands, situated mid-way along the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, just off the eastern shore of Saudi Arabia. The islands lie about 24 km from the east coast of Saudi Arabia and 28 km from Qatar. The archipelago of Bahrain has a total area estimated at 694 square kilometres and is formed by five principal islands. The largest and most heavily-populated island is Bahrain itself, which accounts for 83 percent of the total area. The name Bahrain which means “two seas” is derived, according to the natives of the country, from the existence of two strata of water located there (see map no.4).⁶²

During the Middle Ages and up until about the early sixteenth century, the name Bahrain included not only the present archipelago but the entire eastern Arabian coast from near Bahrain, in the north, to the Trucial coast in the south. The classical authors referred to the islands of Bahrain by the names of Tyros and Aradus; the Muslim writers of the Middle Ages often called it ‘Awāl.⁶³

Population

Bahrain was settled by many groups of Arab tribes and some groups of Persian origin. Bahraini society consists of two groups, the Sunni minority and the Shi‘a majority. The government of Bahrain has refused to give the correct numbers of the two groups, but the only census, which was taken in Bahrain in 1941, showed that the Shi‘a population was 64,359 and the Sunni one was 41,984.⁶⁴ The majority of Shi‘a in Bahrain constitute the poorer part of the population. The ruling family of Al-Khalīfah and most wealthy merchants are Sunni. Bahraini society is divided into four principal groups. The Bahrainis are of Sunni Arab tribal origin, which is centred on

62. Larsen, Curtis. E. “Life and land use on the Bahrain Islands” *The Geoarchaeology of Ancient Society*. University of Chicago, Chicago, 1983, p. 6.

63. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. *op.cit.* p. 40.

64. Al-Rumayhī, Muḥammad. *Al-Baḥrayn, Mushkilāt al-Taghayyur al-Siyāsī wal-Ijtimā‘ī*. Dār Ibn Khaldūn, Beirut, 1976, p. 35.

the ruling family and their tribal allies. The Sunni *ḥawāla* come next in social rank, being families of Arab origin who migrated to the Persian side of the Gulf in the distant past and then entered Bahrain at various times. The Shi'a majority are divided into the Baḥarinah (originally Arab) and the 'Ajam (Persians). There are also Shi'a foreign labourers including Iranians, Pakistanis and Iraqis.⁶⁵

The conflict between the two major societies, Shi'a and Sunnah, dates back to the occupation of the islands by the Al-Khalīfah. The roots of this conflict came about as a result of the different doctrines of the two sects, in addition to the Sunni minority dominating the power in Bahrain. The conflict between the two sides became quite dangerous, especially after the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. It should be noted that the majority of Shi'a in Bahrain still continue to be the main direct threat to the Sunni Al-Khalīfah regime.⁶⁶ The population, according to the latest statistics, is estimated at 500,016. The State of Qatar has a similar population.⁶⁷

Bahrain was the first oil state in the Arab Gulf. Oil was first discovered in 1932, and was first exported in 1934. The Sheykhdom of Bahrain has the oldest education system in the Arabian Peninsula. It was established in 1932. At the present time the state of Bahrain is the only Arab Gulf state which exports very little oil.⁶⁸


65. Hottinger, Arnold. "Political Institutions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain" in: Chubin, Shahram (ed.) *Security in the Persian Gulf: Domestic Political Factors*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower, Westmead, England, 1981. p. 7. And see. Peterson, J.E. *op.cit.* p. 63.

66. Rathmell, Andrew. "Bahrain: the pearl loses its lustre" *Middle East International*. 28 April 1995, London, 1995. pp. 18-19.

67. *Economic Bulletin*. Secretariat of the GCC, Riyadh. *op.cit.* p. 189.

68. Graham, Helga. *Arabian Time Machine*. Heinemann, London, 1978. p. 13.

Map. No. 4



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Historical Background

Political Developments

The modern history of Bahrain began when the *‘Utub* Arab tribes occupied the islands in around 1780. Prior to the *‘Utub* tribes, control of the islands had alternated between the Omanis and the Persians. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Al-Khalīfah of Zubārah (which is a few miles away from Bahrain on the peninsula of Qatar) launched attacks on the Bahrain islands and, having successfully conquered them, expelled their Arab governor who then derived his authority from Persia. On the 28th July 1783, the Al-Khalīfah (the present royal family of Bahrain) were able to gain control the islands.

The development of the Al-Khalīfah political system has the same origins as the Al-Şabaḥ in Kuwait, particularly as the two clans come from the same *‘Aniza* tribal confederation which migrated together from central Arabia to the shores of the Gulf area.⁶⁹ Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, the first Al-Khalīfah ruler in Bahrain (1783-96), adopted policies that enabled Bahrain’s ports to develop into prosperous trade and pearling centres. Under the subsequent Al-Khalīfah rulers relations between Al-Khalīfah and the British government were further consolidated and they concluded a series of treaties agreeing that Britain protect their authority against the Persians and Omanis and the attacks of the Saudis (*Wahhābis*).

Family rivalries prompted Britain, then the paramount power in the area, to appoint their first Resident Political Agent in Bahrain. After 1868 Britain became more involved in the internal affairs of Al-Khalīfah, supporting Sheykh ‘Alī b. Khalīfah (1868-69) in his conflict with his cousin, who refused to accept the legitimacy of the victor’s rule of Sheykh ‘Isā b. ‘Alī (1869-1923). The other factions were supported from Persia.⁷⁰ The previous treaties ensured the succession of the Al-

69. Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, The United Arab Emirates and Oman*. Unwin, Hyman, London, 1989, p. 82.

70. Hooglund, Eric. "Bahrain" in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.) *Persian Gulf States Country Studies*. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1994, p. 111.

Khalīfah rulers and provided a more stable framework for the ultimate independence of Bahrain under British protection. These treaties gave the British Political Agent the right to conduct Bahrain's foreign policy and advise the Sheykhs on domestic matters. After the end of the First World War the Political Resident became the real ruler of Bahrain. Bahrain, during the nineteenth century and until the early 1970s, was considered a most important centre by British governments and was used to control and supervise all the protected Sheykhdoms of the Arab Gulf States.⁷¹

During the late Sixties and early Seventies, the Sheykhdом of Bahrain, together with Qatar and the Trucial States, commenced negotiations for the United Arab Emirates Federation. However, the negotiations between the Arab Sheykhdoms of the Gulf failed as a result of the internal difficulties between the Sheykhs and external pressures from Iran and Saudi Arabia. On August 1971 Sheykh 'Isā b. Salmān (the present ruler) and the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir Geoffrey Arthur, exchanged notes ending the previous "Exclusive Agreement" between Bahrain and Britain, and declaring the independence of Bahrain, terminating the British government's responsibility for defence and foreign relations after 100 years. On the same date the ruler of Bahrain signed a 10-year treaty of friendship with Britain.⁷²

Democracy and Political Leadership

The Constitutional Experiment

The development of the Bahraini political constitution goes back to 1919 when the Sheykhdом held a Municipal election. This was followed by the election of a health and education council in 1956. During the early 1970's, as a result of the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf region, the Sheykhdом of Bahrain witnessed widespread riots demanding a permanent constitution and free direct elections, following clashes between the people and the government. On December 16 1971,

71. Shata, Hashim. A. *op.cit.* p. 79.

72. Al-Baharna, Husein M. *op.cit.* Second Edition, p. XXVIII.

the day that Bahrain formally became independent, Sheykh 'Isā b. Salmān said that the country would have a constitutional form of government. Six months later he issued a decree providing for the election of representatives to a constituent assembly. In December 1972 a 40-member committee was elected. 20 of the candidates were elected democratically, eight members were appointed by the ruler while the other 12 members of the committee were taken from the ministerial cabinet who already held posts in the government.⁷³ The state of Bahrain was the second state in the Arab Gulf to form an elected parliament. In December 1973, the state of Bahrain formed a first national assembly containing 30 elected members plus the non-elected members of the ministerial cabinet. The new national assembly was dominated by radical Bahraini organisations and Shi'a religious groups. In spite of the prohibition of any political parties, most of the candidates of the national assembly were representative of the three informal political activities of the Arab Nationalists (*Ba'thist and Naṣṣerist*), the Popular Front of Bahrain (Marxist) and the Shi'a. The short-lived national assembly had a Shi'a majority.⁷⁴

The End of the Constitutional Experiment

After nineteen months of the Bahraini constitutional experiment and as a result of internal and external influence, especially the conflict between the royal family of Al-Khalīfah and the members of the national assembly,⁷⁵ Sheykh 'Isā b. Salmān issued a decree abolishing the national assembly and suspended some articles of the constitution. The decree promised the establishment of a national assembly within a period of four years. The Bahraini Parliamentary experiment, which lasted from December 1973 until 1975, was never looked on with favour by Saudi Arabia, because Riyadh never intended to have an elected parliament and disliked the Bahraini and Kuwaiti experiments along these lines. The other, internal reason for abrogating the assembly was the fact that a vocal minority of deputies began

73. Majid, al-Majid. *Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī Azmat al-Siyāsah wa-al-Shar'īyah*. Ṭāhā Publications, London, 1990, pp. 11-12.

74. Lawson, Fred H. "State of Bahrain" in: Derbyshire, J. Denis and Ian (eds.) *Political Systems of the World*. Chambers, 1989, London, p. 74.

questioning, in public, the prerogatives of the ruler and his family. The press played its usual role of publicizing and amplifying the claims of the opposition deputies.⁷⁶ In 1993, as a result of many political developments in the Gulf region such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, political developments in Saudi Arabia, the establishment of the *Majlis al-Shūrā* and the renewal of the Omani consultative body, Sheykh 'Isā b. Salmān issued a decree establishing a consultative body in Bahrain consisting of 30 members with powers similar to the consultative bodies in the Gulf Co-operation Council States.⁷⁷ On the first of June 1996, the ruler of Bahrain announced an increase in the number of members in the council and gave it more extended powers.⁷⁸

75. *Middle East Economic Digest*. (MEED) Vol. 36. No.50. 18 December 1992. p. 3.

76. Hottinger, Arnold. *op.cit.* p. 6.

77. Lawson, Fred H. *op.cit.* p. 140.

78. *The Middle East Newspaper*. Vol. 18 No. 6396. Sunday, 2 June. London. p. 1.

The United Arab Emirates

General Geographical Description

The UAE is located in the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. It is a federation formed from the seven Sheykhdoms of Abu Dhabi (the capital), Dubai, Sharjah, ‘Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-Khaimah, who joined the federation after six months. The total area of the UAE is approximately 77,700 square kilometres. The federation has land boundaries of 876 km and borders with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the west with a total boundary of 346 miles (586 km) and with the Sultanate of Oman in the south with a total boundary (un-demarcated) of 336 miles (540 km).

Some maps continue to show the UAE as adjoining the state of Qatar in the area of Khawr al-‘Udaid. However, according to the border agreement of 1974 between Saudi Arabia and Sheykh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, the border corridor of Khawr al-Udaid is given to Saudi Arabia, which means that there is no border between Qatar and the UAE (for more details see Chapter 5).⁷⁹

The federation stretches for more than 1,400 kilometres along the southern shore of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. Abu Dhabi is the largest Emirate and accounts for 87% of the UAE’s total area. The Emirate of ‘Ajman is the smallest with a total area of 259 square kilometres. In spite of the formation of the federation, most of the Emirates have a history of conflict and border disputes, and the borders of these Emirates are still unresolved and undemarcated. The most complicated borders are in the al-Ḥajar al-Gharbī Mountains (Western *al-Ḥajar* Mountains), where five of the Emirates contest jurisdiction over more than a dozen enclaves (see map no 5).

79. *Meri Report*. United Arab Emirates. Middle East Research Institute. University of Pennsylvania. Croom Helm, London, p. 3 and see. *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. [op.cit.](#) p. 412.



Population

The United Arab Emirates had an officially estimated population of 2 million in early 1993. Only about 12% of the total were federation citizens. The number of foreign workers has increased dramatically since 1968 from 36% of the population to 88% in 1985.⁸⁰ Most of the population of the UAE is concentrated in the coastal strip extending along the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and the majority of the citizens are Sunni. A minority of Shi'a (originally Persians) are concentrated in the Emirate of Dubai and migrated from the Iranian coast of the Gulf during the 1930s and 1940s.⁸¹ The Union of the seven Emirates societies included major merchant families of Persian, Indian and Baluchī ethnic origin. These groups have dominated commerce and finance in Dubai and Sharjah and form communities within the UAE urban districts.⁸²

The Political Background

Introduction

The historical record of the UAE as a federation state began in December 1971. Before this date these Sheykhdoms had been known as the Pirate Coast, the Trucial Coast States, the Trucial States, Trucial Oman or the Oman Coast.⁸³ The early history of these Trucial States was as a part of Omani territories. The appearance of the Qawasim, as a strong maritime power in the Gulf during the eighteenth century, marked the first and main stage of independence from the influence of Omani power

80. Hooglund, Eric and Toth, Anthony. "United Arab Emirates" in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.) *Persian Gulf States Country Studies*. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1994, pp. 204-208.

81. Peck, Malcolm. C. *The United Arab Emirates A Venture in Unity*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, U.S.A. 1986, pp. 4--6.

82. Lawson, Fred H. "United Arab Emirates" in: Derbyshire, J. Dennis and Ian (eds.) *Political Systems of the World*. Chambers, 1989, London, p. 1170.

83. The name of Trucial States is derived from the treaty of 1835, which was termed a Perpetual Maritime Treaty. Under the terms of this treaty, the chiefs of the different Gulf tribes granted Britain the right to manage their foreign relations. See Al-Samarrai, Bashir. *op.cit.* p. 18.

in the Trucial States. The present seven Trucial States were, then, no more than small towns inhabited by various Arab tribes.

The Qawasim

The Qawāsim's power became more influential over these tribes as a result of the Omani civil war which provided the opportunity for the Qawāsim to establish their state.⁸⁴ Sheykh Sulṭān b. Ṣaqr al-Qāsimī (1803-66), who dominated the politics of the Omani Coast in the first half of the nineteenth century, took Sharjah as an alternative capital after British vessels destroyed the Qawāsim capital of Ras al-Khaimah in 1819. Sharjah became the main political and economic centre of the Qawasim State until the end of the nineteenth century. By 1892 the conflicts between Sheykh Sulṭān's sons became more intensive and divided the Qawāsim state into the two branches of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, leading to the independence of many tribes of Ru'us al-Jabāl (now the Peninsula of Musandam), Ḥamriyyah and Fujairah (which became independent under the Sharqiyyin tribe, the tribe which still controls power in the Emirate). The power of the Qawāsim began to decline after the destruction of Ras al-Khaimah in 1819. This was followed by many treaties that were signed between Britain and the Qasimī Sheykhhs such as the 1820 general peace treaty, in which the Qasimi Sheykh pledged not to attack British ships navigating in the Gulf, and the treaty of 1835 called the Perpetual Maritime Truce.⁸⁵ The name of Qawāsim is derived from Sheykh Qasim, the grandfather of Sheykh Rashid b. Muṭlīq, the first founder of the Qawāsim state in the Trucial States. Qawāsim authority extended to the Persian Coast of the Gulf and controlled the areas of Lingah, Kunj and Luft.⁸⁶

84. Al-Baharna, Hussein M. *The Arabian Gulf States, Their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems*. *op.cit.* p. 22. The family of al-Qawasim originally migrated from the borders of Iraq in 1730 and settled on the northern coast of Oman. They claim that they are descendents of the family of the Prophet Muhammad.

85. Abdullah, Muhammad Morsy. *The United Arab Emirates A Modern History*. Croom Helm, London, 1978, pp. 90-91.

86. Howley, Donald. *The Trucial States*. Allen and Unwin, London, 1970. p. 91.

The Sheykhs of Abu Dhabi

The Banī Yās have traditionally been the main rivals of the Qawāsim. The tribe of Banī Yās originally came from Najd in the seventeenth century and, as they were the most numerous tribal group in the area of the Trucial States, they came to control most of what is now Abu Dhabi and this town became the seat of the Al-Bu Falsah clan of Banī Yās which still control the Emirate, as it has since the 1790s.⁸⁷ The Banī Yās began to reach the peak of their power during the rule of Zayed b. Khalīfah (1855-1909) of Abu Dhabi. He consolidated the power of the Banī Yās and extended his influence and authority over the neighbouring tribes of the Manāṣīr, the Na‘īm and Dhawāhīr, thus becoming a potent force in the town of Abu Dhabi. By the time of his death Zayed b. Khalīfah had seven sons, the eldest of whom Khalīfah did not wish to succeed him so the second son ruled for three years until his death. The next ruler was Ḥamdan b. Zayed (1912-22). His brother Sulṭān b. Zayed (1922-26) murdered him and then seized the throne for himself. In 1926, when Sheykh Sultan invited his brother Ṣaqr to dinner, the latter fired on him killing him instantly. After many years of struggle between the family of Al-Bu Falasah of Abu Dhabi, Sheykh Shakhbūṭ b. Sultan became ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1928 and ruled until 1966. He attained a degree of internal security in Abu Dhabi against the opposition of the sons of Ṣaqr b. Sultan. The relations between Sheykh Shakhbūṭ and Britain (the protector of the Trucial States) deteriorated because Shakhbūṭ refused to modernise in his society. In 1966, with support from the British government and many tribes, Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan the present ruler of Abu Dhabi and the President of the United Arab Emirates, overthrew his brother Shakhbūṭ in a bloodless coup.⁸⁸

The Sheykhs of Dubai

The contrast between Al-Bu Falaḥ (sub-clan of Banī Yās) which is known today as Al-Nahayyan of Abu Dhabi, and the Al-Maktum (sub-clan of Al-Bu-Falasah) which

87. Peck, Malcolm. *op.cit.* p. 32.

is known today as Al-Maktum of Dubai, is striking, particularly in view of the fact that they are both members of the Banī Yās tribal grouping. The Al-Bu-Falaḥ (al-Nahayyan) reflect their Bedouin roots, while the latter have a decidedly urban approach which is directly linked to the geographical location and characteristics of the town of Dubai. The present ruling family in Dubai was established in 1833, when two members of the Banī Yās migrated with around 800 followers from Abu Dhabi. The ruling family have recently started to refer to themselves as the Al-Maktum from Sheykh Maktum b. Ḥasher, who ruled Dubai from 1894 to 1906. Since 1912 the Emirate of Dubai has become the main port of the U.A.E. following the immigration of a foreign population from India and Persia. Dubai, at the present time, is ruled by Sheykh Maktum b. Rāshid the ruler of Dubai and Vice-President of the United Arab Emirates.⁸⁹

The Sheykhs of Ajman

The ruling family of the 'Ajmān Emirate belong to the Al-Bu-Khuryban branch of the Na'im tribes, a large and important tribe which includes settled and nomadic people scattered over large areas from as far away as the Omani area in al-Buraimi. The present ruler is Ḥumaid b. Rāshid al-Na'imī (1981-) who succeeded his father, who ruled the Emirate from 1920 until 1981. During the nineteenth century the history of this family witnessed conflicts and assassinations.

The Umm al-Qaiwain Sheykhs

Similar to 'Ajmān, the tiny Emirate of Umm al-Qaiwain has an area of only around 480 square kilometres. It has no oil or gas and, economically and financially it is dependent on the federation government of the United Arab Emirates. Since 1820, when it entered the British Treaty System, the Emirate has been ruled by the Al-Mu'allā (sometimes call Al-'Alī). In 1929 Sheykh Aḥmad b. Rāshid (1929-1981)

88. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950-85*. Croom Helm. London, 1987. p. 8. And also see. Zahlan, Rosemarie S. *op.cit.* pp. 42-45.

89. Zahlan, Rosemarie S. *op.cit.* pp. 95-105.

became ruler and remained in power until his death in 1981. During the pearling era he had distinguished himself as a very successful pearl merchant. He was succeeded by his son Rashid, the present ruler of Umm al-Qaiwain.

The Fujairah Sheykhs

The Fujairah Emirate lies on the Baṭīnah Coast of the Sultanate of Oman. The history of this Emirate witnessed a direct struggle between the Al-Qawāsīm and the tribe of Al-Sharqiyyin (the ruling family of the Emirate). In 1952 the British government recognised the authority of Sheykh Muḥammad b. Ḥamad al-Sharqī as the ruler of the Trucial State of al-Fujairah. The Emirate of al-Fujairah has been ruled, since 1975, by Sheykh Ḥamad b. Muḥammad.⁹⁰

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Trucial States' economy has been dependent on four things: the growth of the pearl industry, the emergence of Dubai in 1930 as the main port on the coast, the new revenues derived from the rent of Sharjah airport and the conclusion of the oil concession during the 1930s.⁹¹

Direct British Rule

From 1952 to 1968 the British government became more involved in the Trucial States. In 1952 the Trucial States Council was formed by the British government and consisted of the seven rulers (Sheykhs), chaired by the British Political Agent. In the 1950s Britain proposed the creation of a federation in the Trucial States, similar to the South Arabian Federation, in order to strengthen the region politically, militarily and economically.⁹² During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Arab Sheykhdoms of the Gulf entered on to a new stage after the British government's decision to withdraw from the Gulf in early 1971. The Gulf area witnessed a direct and serious threat locally and regionally at that time. Iran threatened to annex Bahrain as part of

90. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. *op.cit.* p. 16.

91. Abdullah, Muhammad M. *op.cit.* p. 103.

92. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. *op.cit.* p. 16.

her national territory, and occupied three islands belonging to Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. Saudi Arabia refused to recognise any federation until she had resolved her territorial disputes with Abu Dhabi. The other external threat was the activity of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.⁹³

Federation

The period between February 1968 and July 1971 witnessed an intensive and extensive series of negotiations between the rulers of the seven Trucial States and the Sheykhdoms of Qatar and Bahrain to form a federation. The outcome was the establishment of a federation comprising only six of the Sheykhdoms. The whole series of negotiations started with the agreement, in February, between Abu Dhabi and Dubai (the most important Emirates in the federation) to unite under one flag. The Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, in their agreement, extended an invitation to all the Arab Gulf Sheykhdoms (Trucial States, Qatar and Bahrain) to join the federation. After six meetings the nine rulers (Sheykhs) elected Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan of Abu Dhabi as President, Sheykh Rāshid b. Sa'īd Al-Maktum of Dubai as Vice-President and Sheykh Khalīfah b. Ḥamad Al-Thānī, the Qatar Crown Prince (later the ruler of Qatar) as Prime Minister. Abu Dhabi was to be the temporary capital of the federation until the permanent capital was ready.

The federation of the Nine Emirates, however, did not materialize because of the difficulties facing negotiations between the Sheykhs of the Arab Sheykhdoms on the one hand and political pressures from Iran and Saudi Arabia on the other. Iran encouraged the ruler of Bahrain to declare his independence and recognised Bahrain as an independent state. Saudi Arabia refused to recognise the federation until she had resolved her claim to al-Buraimi with Abu Dhabi. The ruler of Qatar later announced his independence following the lead of Bahrain. The factors leading to the suspension of the Nine Arab Gulf Emirates Union were as follows:

(a) limits and authorities of the federal government; (b) representation rate in the national federal council; (c) site of the federal capital; (d) principle of voting in the council.

93. Kelly, J.B. *Arabia, the Gulf and the West*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980. p. 77.

The rulers of the Trucial States met in Dubai over the period 10-18 July 1971. At the conclusion of their meetings, they announced that the six states of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 'Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah and Sharjah had agreed to form a federation. They decided that the new federation would be called the United Arab Emirates.⁹⁴

The history of the UAE as a nation only began on the second of December 1972; the federation became the eighteenth member of the Arab League and the one hundred and thirty-second member of the United Nations.⁹⁵ The Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah was the only Trucial State to initially ask for more time but, after two months, she joined the federation. The reluctance of the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Sheykh Şaqr b. Muḥammad al-Qāsimī came as a result of the Iranian occupation of the two Tunb islands (belong to Ras al-Khaimah) and Abu Musa (belonging to Sharjah). The other reason was Sheykh Şaqr's reluctance to accept the domination of Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the federation.⁹⁶

Political Structure and Leadership

Political Developments

The federation of the United Arab Emirates formed a provisional constitution which was amended in 1972 to reflect the inclusion of Ras al-Khaimah into the federation. This constitution described the Union as a federal state and specified the nature of the relationship between the federal entity and the individual Emirates, who retained sovereignty over their own territories and territorial waters.⁹⁷ The federal nature guaranteed powers to the individual Emirates except for those explicitly reserved for the federal government: foreign policy, defence, security, immigration, and communications and federal administrations. Internal sovereignty, and existing political, economic and local administrative institutions, were left in the hands of the

94. Al-Alkim, Hasan Hamdan. *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*. Saqi Books, London, 1989, pp. 10-12.

95. Peck, Malcolm. *op.cit.* p. 21.

96. Zahlan, Rosemarie S. *op.cit.* p. 195.

97. Peterson, J. E. *The Arab Gulf State*. *op.cit.* p. 92.

individual ruling families of the Union.⁹⁸ The provisional constitution of the union provides for the separation of power into Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches. This temporary constitution was extended twice, in 1976 and 1981. In 1996 the seven Emirates finally agreed to make the constitution permanent and accepted the city of Abu Dhabi as their capital. The most effective federal institution is the Supreme Council or the Council of Rulers, representing the supreme authority in the state and consisting of all seven rulers or their deputies. The council functions as the highest authority in executive and legislative capacities.⁹⁹

The Political System

The Supreme Council is empowered to elect the President and Vice-President of the state from its members for five-year renewable terms, admit new members to the federation and appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and Judges of the Federal Supreme Court. It also ratifies all federal laws. The Supreme Council meets formally once a year although informal meetings are much more frequent. Decisions by the Supreme Council must be approved by a majority of five out of seven and those five must include Abu Dhabi and Dubai.¹⁰⁰ The two Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai still have the leading role and are the mainstay of the federation's structure as well as in substantive issues. The federation also contains a Council of Ministers, in which all the seven Emirates in the Cabinet are represented. Under the provisional constitution, the Union has a national council, the principal legislative body, but its role in the governmental process is limited to consultation. The national council consists of 40 members. These members are appointed by the rulers of the seven Emirates, eight each from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, six each from Sharjah and Ras al-

98. *Meri Report*. *op.cit.* p. 20.

99. Hooglund, Eric and Toth, Anthony. *op.cit.* pp. 241-242 and *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "The United Arab Emirates Country Profile 1996-97" p. 4. Thereby the new development in the United Arab Emirates confirming the prominence of Abu Dhabi as the leading Emirate of the Union. The federal revenues are supposed to be made up of contributions from all seven Emirates but in reality Abu Dhabi pays around 75% of contributions, Dubai around 20% and Sharjah the rest.

100. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "United Arab Emirates" EIU Country Profile 1994-95. London, pp. 4-5.

Khaimah and four each from Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah and 'Ajman.¹⁰¹ The seven Emirates of the federation have individual consultative councils. The powers of these councils are more than those of the federation council, whose members serve solely at the pleasure of the seven rulers.

On many occasions, the federation council has criticized the numerous obstacles in the path of federalization. The members have called for an expansion of the federal council's base in the context of endorsing democratic principles in the Union.¹⁰² The federation body is also responsible for a Federal Supreme Court, which is appointed by the Supreme Council and consists of five Judges who, at the request of individual emirates, adjudicate between them or between the emirates of the federal government and decide on the constitutionality of federal laws. The federal laws often depend on further legislation in the individual emirates.¹⁰³

Since the establishment of the UAE the union has been affected and threatened by many internal and external threats, such as the Saudi claim to al-Buraimi, the Iranian occupation of three islands (the two Tunbs and Abu Musā), the activities of the Popular Front for the liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf and the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran. The last, especially, has had an effect on the United Arab Emirates people, especially in Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. Internally, the border disputes between the members of the union have remained the most negative factor in the conduct of internal and external policies.¹⁰⁴ The other important internal threat facing the union is the huge number of migrant workers. The local newspapers of the federation have described the migrant workers as the "fifth column" for any external or internal threats to the federation.¹⁰⁵

101. Peck, Malcolm. *op.cit.* p. 68. And Hooglund, Eric and Toth, Anthony. *op.cit.* pp. 241-242.

102. Peterson, J. E. *op.cit.* p. 102.

103 *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "United Arab Emirates" EIU Country Profile 1994-95. p. 6.

104. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula" *op.cit.* p. 26. During the 1960s and early 1970s many members of the PFLOG (most of whom were Dhofaris) were living in the UAE as soldiers in the Omani Coast force which was controlled by British Officers. Most of these people were arrested in the early 1970s and handed to the Omani government by British Intelligence Officers and jailed there until the end of the 1970s.

105. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "United Arab Emirates" Country Profile 1994-95. London, 1995, pp. 6-7.

The Sultanate of Oman

General Geographical Description

Oman during the early stages of its history, was known by various names such as “*Majān*”, “*Mazoon*” and *Oman*. The name ‘Oman’ probably means “the land”, although there are local traditions which assert that the region was named after one “*‘Umān b. Qaḥṭān*”. Wendell Phillips, in his book “*Oman a History*”, says that the origin of the name is not clear. Some have thought that it means “*peace*”. However, the thirteenth-century Arab Geographer Yaḡut al-Ḥamawī says, in his Geographical Dictionary, (*Mu‘jam al-Buldān*) that “*Oman*” is derived from such words as *a’mānā* meaning ‘to stay in a place’. But many Omani historians claim that Oman refers to a Valley called Oman, and others claim that “Oman” refers to the son of Prophet Ibrāhīm or to ‘*Umān b. Saba or Sheba b. Yaḡṭhān b. Ibrāhīm*.¹⁰⁶

The Sultanate lies at the extreme south-east of the Arabian Peninsula and occupies a land area of some 120,000 square miles. The Sultanate is bordered in the north by a strategic entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, in the east by the Arabian Sea, in the west by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (420 miles; 676 km) and the United Arab Emirates (336 miles; 540 km) and in the south by the Republic of Yemen (179 miles; 288 km), with a coastline which extends for 1,700 kilometres from northern Oman to the southern province of Dhofar (see. map no 6) ¹⁰⁷

The country can be divided geographically into the three “*Muḥāfaẓāt*” (Governorates) of Muscat, Dhofar and Musandam and the five “*Manāṭiq*” (District areas) of al-Dākhiliyyah, al-Bāṭinah, al-Ẓāhirah, al-Sharqiyyah, and al-Wuṣṭā. The Sultanate is divided, administratively, into 59 *Wilāyāt* (local governorates).

106. Wendell, Phillips. *Oman a History*. Longman, London, 1976. pp. 1-2. And see. *Oman 95*. Issued by the Ministry of Information, Muscat, 1995. p. 40.

107. *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* p. 412 and see Clements, F.A. *Oman the Reborn Land*. Longman, London, 1980. pp. 5-6.

Population

Omani society consists of five basic categories: the people of the coastal areas, who live by fishing, seafaring and trading; the agriculturists of the Baṭinah coast and the south; those of the interior who employ the *aflāj* system of irrigation; the mountain people of Dhofar and the Musandam Peninsula; and finally the Bedouin of the desert areas. The Omani population was estimated in the last official census, which was conducted in December 1993, to be about 1.5 million.¹⁰⁸

Most Western and Arab writers maintain that the Ibāḍīs are the majority in Oman. But J.E. Peterson, the most experienced authority on the Arabian Peninsula and on Oman in particular, says “even though Sunnis form a narrow majority of the Omanis, the small Ibāḍī sect has provided the traditional form of government”. There is no official census of Omani sects, which consist of the two majority sects of Sunnah and Ibāḍī and a minority of Shi‘a, originally a majority of them non-Arabs.¹⁰⁹

108. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* “Oman Yemen” Country Profile 1995-96. London. pp. 8-9, and *Al-Watan Newspapers*. No. 3927. December 1993, Muscat, p. 1.

109. Peterson, J.E. “Security Concerns in the Arabian Peninsula” in: Ahrari, M.E. (ed.) *The Gulf and International Society The 1980s and Beyond*. Macmillan, London, 1989, p. 112.

The Historical Background

Introduction

The history of Oman, as a state, is dominated by three stages, the first stage being that of the Arab tribes who immigrated to Oman, the second stage the struggle between the Ibādīs (Imamāte) and the foreign powers, and the third stage the establishment of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman by the present dynasty of Al-Bu-Sa'īd, which has controlled the country since 1749.¹¹⁰ Oman is one of the oldest civilizations in the Arabian Peninsula and much of its history is a record of tribal struggles.

The Al-Bu Sa'īd Period

The modern history of Oman started with the election of Aḥmed b. Sa'īd, the founder of the Al-Bu-Sa'īd dynasty, as the Imam of Oman in 1749. Imām Aḥmad first came to historical light as a *Wālī* (governor) of Soḥār, having been appointed to that position by the Ya'rubī Imām Saif b. Sulṭān, one of whose daughters Aḥmad married. The Ya'rubī dynasty controlled Oman from 1615 to 1744. The new Imam came to power as a result of many internal and external conflicts witnessed in Oman. Internal stability became threatened during the middle of the 18th century when the Ya'rubī family lost control over the country and a civil war between the Omani tribes took place after the contrived election of the Imam. This civil war also resulted in the emergence of the two factions of *Hināwī* and *Ghāfarī*, who were to play a significant role in modern Omani history, in favour of or against the central authority in Nizwā and Rustāq (the old capitals of the Ibādī Imamates) or in Muscat.

An external threat emerged when the Persians occupied the main Omani Coast and the port cities of Muscat and Soḥār. The new factions of the *Hināwīs* and *Ghāfarīs* agreed on the election of Aḥmad b. Sa'īd as the Imām of Oman due to his

110. Wilkinson, J.C. "The origins of the Omani State" in: Hopwood, Derek (ed.) *The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1972. p. 67.



success in resisting the Persian occupation.¹¹¹ After the death of Aḥmad b. Saʿīd in 1787, a power struggle developed among the al-Saʿīd family for control of Oman. Oman would not experience unified rule until 1804, when Imam Aḥmad's grandson Saʿīd b. Sulṭān, who ruled from 1804 until 1856, began to build a new state in Muscat. Omani influence also reached Zanzibar and some ports in East Africa in addition to parts of Persia and Baluchistan. Muscat became an important commercial centre and the meeting point for the entire Gulf area. Saʿīd b. Sultan also ignored all the events in the Omani interior and abandoned all claims to the Ibāḍī Imāmate.¹¹² After the death of Saʿīd b. Sulṭān in 1856, the Omani Empire was divided into two parts, Asian Oman and African Oman, as a result of a dispute between the two sons of Saʿīd b. Sulṭān, Mājid and Thuwainī. In 1857, they reached an agreement with British mediation for Thuwaini to give up his claim to Zanzibar for 40,000 Maria Theresa Dollars (MT\$).¹¹³ British influence in Omani internal affairs was the main reason for the division the Omani Empire into two parts. British involvement in Omani affairs began with the decline of Al-Bu-Saʿīd fortunes following the death of Saʿīd b. Sulṭān in 1856. Since that time Britain and the Sultans of Muscat and Oman concluded several agreements, through which Britain became the principal power in Omani internal and external policies.¹¹⁴

The British Intervention

The historical record of British contact with Oman goes back to 1645 when Imam Naṣir b. Murshid invited the English East India Company to trade formally at Ṣoḥar and Seeb. As a result of these early contacts, Imam Nāṣir and Philip Wydle, the

111. Keely, J.B. "A Prevalence of Furies: Tribes, Politics and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman" in: Hopwood, Derek (ed.) *The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1972. p. 107. See also Barth, Fredrick "Complications of Geography, Ethnology and Tribalism" in: Pridham, B.R. (ed.) *Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Development*. Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 27

112 Kumar, R.P. "The Dismemberment of Oman and British Policy Towards the Persian Gulf" *Islamic Culture*, an English Quarterly. Vol. XXXVI. No.1. January 1962,. pp. 11-12.

113. Whelan, John. *Oman A MEED Practical Guide*. Routledge, London, 1981, pp. 11-14.

representative of the company, concluded an agreement in Ṣoḥar in January 1646. A second agreement was also signed in 1659 to establish a factory for the English Company in Oman. It was not until 1798, some 139 years later, under the Al-Sa'īd dynasty, that a fully-fledged commercial treaty giving extensive facilities to the British government was concluded.¹¹⁵ Oman did not sign any formal treaty with Britain, fully establishing relations until the agreement of 20 December 1951, after the conflict over al-Buraimi, which led Sulṭān Sa'īd b. Taimur to sign a full agreement with Britain to protect Oman's border against external Saudi influence.¹¹⁶

The situation, after the division of the Omani Empire, became more critical to the al-Bu-Sa'īd dynasty in Oman, when the two factions of Hināwī and Ghāfarī, with the support of Ibādī 'Ulamā' (religious Scholars) elected 'Azzān b. Qais of the Al-Bu-Sa'īd family as Imām and drove the branch of the family of al-Bu-Sa'īd out of Muscat. The Imamate forces ruled the country until 1871 when British government intervention restored Muscat to the Sultan. In 1866 Sālim b. Thuwaini was recognised as Sultan in Oman with support from Britain.¹¹⁷ In 1871, with strong support from Britain, Turkī b. Sa'īd resumed power after he had subjected most of the Omani interior. Britain became more involved in the defence of the Al-Bu-Sa'īd regime against the two factions of Hināwī and Ghāfarī, who caused a real threat to them and threatened to establish an Ibādī Imamāte in Oman. Sulṭān Faiṣal b. Turkī was the first Al-Bu-Sa'īd ruler to mount his throne peacefully in 1888, and his rule lasted until his death in 1913. In 1895, as a result of financial problems and the competition between the two factions of Hināwī and Ghāfarī, the Omani tribes took Muscat for a month until it was restored to the Sultan when he received strong

114. Peterson, J.E. "Oman's Odyssey: From Imamate to Sultanate" in: Pridham, R.B. (ed.) *Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Development*. Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 8.

115. Muhammed, Reda Bhacker. *Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar Roots of British domination..* Routledge, London. p. 32.

116. Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance*. *op.cit.* p. 427.

117. Allen, Calvin H. Jr "The Sultanate of Oman and American Security Interest" in: Stookey, Robert W (ed.) *The Arabian Peninsula Zone of Ferment*. Hoover Institution Press. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. p. 6.

support from Britain.¹¹⁸ Sultan Taimur b. Faiṣal succeeded to power after his father's death in 1913. The reign of Sulṭān Taimur was a most important period during which the Ibāḍī Imāmāte was restored in the Omani Interior.

The struggle between the 'Ulamā' of the Ibāḍīs (with the support of the two factions of Hināwī and Ghāfarī) revived during the period of Sulṭān Taimur. As a result of the election of a new Imam in May 1913, a revolt broke out in most of the Ibāḍī areas against the Sultan because of his relationship with Britain. This struggle led Britain to act as a mediator between the two parties. The negotiations between the two sides posed a real threat and saw attacks on Muscat by the opposition party. Through the mediation of the British Political Agent at Muscat a delegation of tribal and religious leaders met the representative of Sulṭān Taimur (the British Consul in Muscat, Wingate, I.C.S.) at Seeb near Muscat, where a written agreement was signed by both sides on 25 September 1920. The treaty did not recognise the independence of the interior of Oman, but it settled and maintained peace in the conflict between the Sultan and his factions for nearly 35 years, during which the interior of Oman gained a virtual autonomy under a revived Ibāḍī Imāmāte.¹¹⁹

The Reign of Sa'īd b. Taimur

In 1932 Sulṭān Taimur b. Faiṣal abdicated in favour of his son Sa'īd b. Taimur, who controlled Oman for 38 years, and maintained a policy of strict isolationism, which was totally against any social or economic development and kept Oman largely isolated from the rest of the world until 1970. No developments or difficulties threatened the authority of Sulṭān Sa'īd b. Taimur in the interior of Oman, until the Saudi occupation of the Buraimi Oasis in 1952.

During the early 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia was the main threat to the authority of Sultan Sa'īd b. Taimur. After the occupation of al-Buraimi in 1952, the second threat consisted of the strong Saudi support of the Ibāḍī Imamate between

118. Kechichian, Joseph A. *Oman and the World The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*. Rand-Santa Monica, 1995, p. 55.

1954 and 1959. In addition there was Saudi military support for the Dhofari rebellion during the early 1960s (Dhofar Liberation Front).¹²⁰ Oman has been involved in two civil wars since the 1950s. The first was the revolution of Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar in which the western tribes who supported the Ibādī Imamate were backed by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The second civil war was the Dhofari revolution, which caused a serious threat and was backed by many Arab countries including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and South Yemen in addition to China and the Soviet Union.¹²¹ During the early 1950s, Sulṭān Saʿīd b. Taimur realised that he could not ensure the independence of Oman unless he brought under his control its interior, which was controlled by the Ibādī Imam supported by the Hināwī and Ghafarī factions. As a result of many factors such as the Saudi occupation of al-Buraimi in 1952, the refusal of the Imam to allow the British Oil Company to search for oil in the Omani interior and the fact that the Sulṭān had gained a lot of money from the oil companies and had strong support from the British government, Sultan Saʿīd b. Taimur's forces, with strong military support from Britain, attacked and conquered the Ibādī Imamāte of Nizwā in December 1955.¹²² The Imām and some of his followers escaped to Saudi Arabia in 1959 after the Sulṭān's and the British forces destroyed the Imām's forces in Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar in 1959.

The Omani Imamāte organised the main opposition to the Sultanate in Saudi Arabia and Cairo, where ʿAbd al-Naṣṣer adopted the position of the Omani opposition. The Imam and his followers succeeded in gaining Arab League support for the Imamāte of Oman, and various attempts were made to bring the "Omani question" before the United Nations General Assembly for many years with the support of the nationalist Arab regimes in Egypt, Iraq and Syria.¹²³

119. Kelly, J.B. "A Prevalence of Furies: Tribes, Politics and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman" *op.cit.* p. 120.

120. Rigsbee, Wallace Lynn. *American Foreign Policy Towards the Sultanate of Oman 1977-1987*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cincinnati, U.S.A. 1990, pp. 44 and 59.

121. Cordesman, Anthony. *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability...* *op.cit.* p. 426.

122. Skeet, Ian. *Muscat and Oman the end of an era*. Faber and Faber, London, 1974, p. 163.

123. Allen, Calvin H. Jr. *op.cit.* p. 7. And see Cordesman, Anthony. *op.cit.* p. 429.

The Dhofari Opposition

The other main threat to the authority of Sulṭān Saʿīd b. Taimur was the Dhofarī rebellion during the early 1960s. It should be noted that Dhofar during its early history was a semi-independent region. Dhofar, between 1207 and 1829, was governed by numerous local and Ḥadramī rulers. Omani control over Dhofar was first asserted in 1829 by Saʿīd b. Sulṭān, but was not accomplished. Dhofar did not come under the Omani control of Al-Bu-Saʿīd until the period of Turkī b. Saʿīd in 1879, when the Sulṭān allied himself with some of the tribes of Dhofar, in spite of the resistance of many Dhofari tribes to the new ruler.¹²⁴ The Dhofarī rebellion came as a result of the Sulṭān Saʿīd b. Taimur's policy of isolation which forced thousands of Omanis to seek jobs and education outside the country, where they witnessed the rapid changes taking place in the Arab Gulf States and were affected by the various ideological currents flowing through the Arab world. The Dhofar rebellion (1965-1975) began as a tribally-based rebellion by the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). On 26 April 1966 a group of Dhofari soldiers attempted to assassinate Sultan Saʿīd b. Taimur, but the attempt failed.¹²⁵

The birth of the Dhofarī movement for change came about through the unification of many Dhofarī groups such as the Dhofar Charitable Association, the Arab Nationalist movement and the Dhofarī Soldiers Organisation. These groups united in June 1965 to become the Dhofar Liberation Front. On 9 June the Dhofar Liberation Front announced its manifesto, which was to liberate all the Dhofarī territories, and announced an armed revolt against the Sultan and his followers.

However, the situation changed when a group of Nationalists, backed by South Yemen, took over the leadership of the Front and called a second congress of the Front in 1968 where they adopted a new Marxist ideology. The Front changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf. Internal stability in Oman became threatened to an even greater degree after the unification of

124. Townsend, John. *Oman: The Making of Modern States*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, p. 25. See also. Allan, Calvin H. Jr. *op.cit.* p. 11.

125. Rigsbee, Wallece Lynn. *op.cit.* p. 45 also see Peterson, J.E. "Oman's Odyssey" *op.cit.* p. 12.

the Omani National Front in North Oman with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf in the early 1970s. This unification was supported by many Arab Nationalist regimes and many liberation movements in the Arabian Gulf, especially the leftist movements in Bahrain and Kuwait. The rebellion was victorious in most areas of Dhofar by the end of 1960 and the early 1970s, except for some parts of the coastal areas near Ṣalālāh. During the early 1970s the Dhofarī revolution was supported and backed first by China and later by the Soviet Union via the Marxist regime in Aden. The deterioration of the situation in Dhofar and the mounting of many attacks by the rebels in the North and South of Oman accelerated the British government's determination to change the situation in Oman.¹²⁶

The Coup of 23 July 1970

On the evening of 23 July 1970 Sultan Qaboos b. Sa'īd seized power in Oman after a small bloodless coup, when his father refused to abdicate and exchanged gunfire with the supporters of the coup. Sultan Sa'īd b. Taimur finally, on the same day, signed his abdication in front of the British Officer who led the 23 July coup. Sulṭan Sa'īd b. Taimur was exiled to England and died there in 1972. The coup of 1970 ended not only the 38 year reign of Sa'īd b. Taimur but also a social structure which had not changed very much in over a thousand years.¹²⁷ Sulṭan Qaboos's first act was to call on all the Omani people to return, to change the country's name from the Sulṭanate of Muscat and Oman to the Sultanate of Oman and to release most of the political prisoners.¹²⁸ During the early 1970s, Sulṭan Qaboos faced a real threat from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman which was directly backed by the neighbouring Marxist government in Aden. However, Sulṭan Qaboos has been successful in gaining the support of the tribal leaders and has adopted a policy of rapprochement and appointed many tribal leaders to ministerial posts. The

126. *Document of the National Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf*. The Gulf Committee, London, 1974. pp. 7-9. And Shahdād, Ibrāhīm M. *Al-Ṣirā' al-Dākhilī fī 'Umān Khilāl al-Qarn al-'Ishrīn*. Dār al-Awzā'i, Qatar, 1989, pp. 262-269

127. Skeet, Ian. *op.cit.* p. 63.

128. Allen, Calvin H.. Jr *op.cit.* p. 427.

government continues to pay tribal and opposition subsidies. The new Omani government obtained financial assistance and military equipment from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Britain, and Jordan, who supported the Sultan's forces against the Dhofari rebellion.

The Nixon Doctrine for the containment of Communism played a significant role in assisting Saudi Arabia and Iran to destroy the Dhofari revolution in the south of Oman. The Shah of Iran supplied the Omani government with more than 3,000 men to support the Omani forces. On 11 December 1975, Sultan Qaboos announced that the war in Dhofar was over.¹²⁹ It should be noted that, since 1970, when Sultan Qaboos came to power in Oman, the Sultanate has transformed itself from an isolated and backward territory into a modern and forward-looking state and played a significant role internally, regionally and internationally. The Al-Sa'īd ruling family in Oman is considered the oldest ruling family in the Arab region in modern history. In 1994 the 250th anniversary of the rule of the Al-Sa'īd family in Oman was celebrated.¹³⁰

Political Leadership

The Political System Developments

The Sultanate of Oman's political system is an absolute monarchy. On the 6th of November 1996 Sultan Qaboos of Oman issued a decree (Decree No.101/96) promulgating the Basic Statute of State. The new Basic Statute of State, which has been given the name of the *White Book*, consists of 81 Articles and contains seven chapters.¹³¹ The Sultanate is ruled by decrees issued by the Sultan himself, who is advised by an appointed Cabinet of Ministers chosen from the tribal leaders and

129. Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability...* op.cit. p. 437.

130. *Oman 95*. op.cit. p. 36.

131. *The Basic Statute of State*. Sultanate of Oman. The Omani Embassy, London. The Omani Basic Statute of the State came as a result of the political development witnessed in the Arab Gulf States since the second Gulf crisis. The Omani decree came into force on the date of its issue, but the Basic Statute is subject to new laws which will be issued by the Omani government. Some sources indicate that the Omani Basic Statute will come into force by the beginning of 2000.

merchants. No political parties or unions are recognised and the press is subject to strict censorship by the government.¹³² Omani consultative bodies have been through two stages of development; the first one started in 1980 when Sultan Qaboos issued a decree to set up the *Majlis al-Istishārī lil-Dawlah* (The State Consultative Council). The council originally consisted of 45 members including the chairman, who was appointed separately. The membership of the State Consultative Council included 17 members representing the government, 17 representing the Omani Wilāyāt (provinces), and 11 members representing the private business sector. All members were appointed by Sultan Qaboos personally, via royal decree.¹³³ In 1983 Sulṭan Qaboos issued a decree increasing the number of SCC members to 55. The Wilāyāt increased to 25, the government representatives to 18, and the business community representatives to 12. Most of the government representatives were nominated because of their official positions as under-secretaries of various ministers. (It should be noted that the members of the SCC did not have any legal power to participate in legislation with the government on their policies; the members were only empowered to present their opinions and recommendations.

The Shura Council

As a result of the country's political development, Sultan Qaboos announced, on 18 November 1990, the setting-up of a *Majlis al-Shūrā* to replace the 1980 State Consultative Council. By 25 November 1991, the new council had been established and its powers and operating framework were defined by Sulṭan Qaboos in a decree on 12 November 1991.

The system of the new *Majlis al-Shūrā* was to be wholly elected with no government members. Each *Wilāyāt* (local governorate), of which there are 59

132. *The Economist Intelligence Unit. op.cit.* p. 6.

133. See Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma "The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council" *The Middle East Journal*. Vol.50. No.4. Autumn 1996. London, p. 560. See also Peterson, J.E. *The Arab Gulf States. op.cit.* pp. 102-103. and Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma. *op.cit.* p. 560. The aim of the SCC was to advise on and recommend policies concerning economic and social development issues in Oman. These recommendations and opinions were then submitted by the chairman of the SCC directly to Sultan Qaboos.

throughout the country, sent one elected member to the *Majlis*. Each *Wilāyah* nominated three citizens as candidates for election to the *Majlis* (council). The nominations are administered by a committee consisting of respected citizens of experience and ability in the *Wilāyāt*. One of the three nominees is selected by the government for membership for three calendar years. This may be renewable for another term or more according to the respective procedures. The president of the *Majlis* is appointed by Royal decree. The function of the Shūrā Council is to review all social and economic draft laws prepared by the ministers before their enactment. The council also participates in setting up development plans and in following up on their progress. The council of ministers and the president and Bureau committee members of the council meet every six months to review the council's progress. The Council includes many committees which specialize in legal, economic, health, social welfare, educational, cultural and local affairs (the committees prepare reports on agenda items for full Council consideration).¹³⁴ Sulṭān Qaboos, in his first speech before the first members of the council, declared that the “*council would step on the road of participation which will serve the aspirations and ambitions of the citizens throughout Oman.*”¹³⁵

The council has no power to question foreign and defence policy, and the legislators of the Omani Council have the same rights and powers as in other GCC bodies except in Kuwait. It should be noted that, during the final stages of the selection, one of three nominees will be chosen by the government.¹³⁶ In 1994, the Omani government announced that the membership of the *Majlis* (council) would be increased to 81 members to reflect the last census in 1993.¹³⁷ The Omani Shūrā Council is the only council in the GCC States which contains women among its

134. *Gulf Report*. “Country Profile: The Democratisation of the Gulf” November Issue, 1993. The Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, Londo, p. 5.

135. *The Speeches of H.M. Sultan Qaboos b. Sa'id, Sultan of Oman, 1970-1990*. Muscat: Ministry of Information, 1991, pp. 215-216.

136. Joyce, Mariam. *The Sultanate of Oman A Twentieth Century History*. Praeger, London, 1995, p. 119.

137. According to the new regulations, each *Wilāyah* (province) with a population of less than 30,000 had to elect two representatives, one of whom was then nominated to membership. The *Wilāyah* (province) with more than 30,000 citizens elected four representatives, of whom two were nominated as members of the Council. Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma. *op.cit.* p. 562.

members. The present council of 1994-1997 has two women from the Capital city of Muscat. In an interview Sultan Qaboos declared that:

*"Women candidates will not be confined ... to the Muscat Governorate, but will gradually be extended in accordance with circumstances in other Governorates and Wilāyāt"*¹³⁸

It should be noted that the establishment of the Shūrā Council in November 1991, followed by the Basic Statute of State in November 1996, was a part of the Omani government policy of portraying the Omani State to the international community as a progressive political system where the people participated in the decision-making process in order to attract international investment companies to invest in Oman.¹³⁹

Political Movements

The Opposition

Oman has witnessed more real opposition to the ruling family than any other country in the Arabian Peninsula. Since the early twentieth century, the Omani Ibādī Imamāte has provided the oldest opposition to the central government of Muscat. This opposition led the government of Muscat and Oman, in 1920, to conclude a settlement agreement with the Omani Imamāte and interior tribes which permitted local autonomy, but did not recognise the Omani interior as a separate entity independent from Muscat. Nevertheless, the Ibādī leaders (religious and tribal Sheykhhs) in Nizwā (the Ibādī-Capital) seized every opportunity to express their autonomy until the troops of Sultan Sa'īd b. Taimur, with strong support from Britain, destroyed their base in the interior in 1959.¹⁴⁰

138. Kechichian, Joseph A. *Oman and the World The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*. *op.cit.* p. 55. It should be noted that the women candidates were extended in all the other Governorates (Wilāyāt) in 1997. In October 1997 the women candidates were extended to all the Omani Wilāyāt, but were unsuccessful in these Wilāyāt except in the capital of Muscat.

139. Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma. *op.cit.* p. 564.

140. Joyce, Mariam. *op.cit.* pp. 28 and 57.

The second opposition group to appear in the Southern region of Oman (Dhofar), during the early 1960s, consisted of a number of groups which united in 1968 to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. This Front adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and was backed by the South Yemeni regime. A third opposition group consisted of a Nationalist faction in North Oman called the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman which unified with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in 1974. In addition to this there was a group called the Arab Workers Party of Oman.¹⁴¹ It should be recorded that all the Omani opposition factions ended their opposition and returned to Oman at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, except for some people who still claim to represent the Omani opposition in Yemen and Syria. During the late 1980s, the Islamic movement became more active in charity associations, mosques and social occasions.

The Omani government announced, in 1994, the arrest of an Islamic group which had tried to overthrow the government of Oman. Many newspapers estimated the group to be over 400 persons in size. However, the Omani government did not jail any more than 200 persons. Some sources alleged that the Islamic group had links with the Muslim Brotherhood movement (for more details see Chapter no 4). However, as a result of many events such as the 25th anniversary (Silver Jubilee) of the accession of Sultan Qaboos to the throne in 1995, the effect on the Omani economy of the low price of oil, the increase of inflation and budget deficits, and the demands for amnesty from the tribal Sheykhs, Sulṭan Qaboos issued a decision to release all Omani political prisoners in November 1995.¹⁴²

141. Shahdād, Ibrāhīm M. *op.cit.* p. 276.

142. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Country Report Oman Yemen" 1st quarter 1996, London, 1996, pp. 11-12.

Conclusion of Chapter One

The first chapter of this thesis concentrated on historical, geographical and political developments in the GCC states. The aim of this chapter is to define the most important political developments in the history of those six Arab Gulf states who created a Gulf Co-operation Council in May 1981. Most of the ruling families of these states trace their roots back more than two centuries. The rise of the Saudi ruling family can be dated from their alliance with the Wahābī movement in the mid-eighteenth century. The Al- Ṣabāḥ of Kuwait and the Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain both have their origins in tribal migrations from central Arabia in the eighteenth century. Al-Thānī of Qatar established their dynasty in the 1860s. The seven states (Sheykhhs) of the UAE, are the Al-Nahayyan (of Abu Dhabi 1800s) and Al-Maktum (of Dubai 1830s). The other important power, the Al-Qawāsim of Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaimah, trace their origins to the powerful Qawāsim tribal grouping of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The other ruling families were established by the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Al-Bu-Sa'īd dynasty of Oman was founded in the 1740s and is the oldest dynasty in the Arabian Peninsula 143.

There are many historical factors which have played an important role and accounted for the survival of these families. First, the British role: all the GCC states were (with the exception of Saudi Arabia) under direct British protection for nearly 150 years; Britain, from the 1820s, played a significant role in the protection of all these states against internal and external threats, especially from the most powerful regional countries such as Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, who put forward territorial claims at various times.¹⁴⁴ The British protection of this area came under the pretext

143. As Fred Halliday mentions, Oman was never officially a British protectorate, but it was, to all intents and purposes as much under British control as the other Gulf states. The Sultanate of Oman, was known before 1970 as the "Sultanate of Muscat and Oman" is a fully independent sovereign state. Since 1798, the Sultanate has maintained close treaty relations with UK. Oman relations with Britain are based on the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 20 September 1951, and on the Agreement of 25 July, concerning military, technical and economic assistance to the Sultanate. For more details see Al-Baharna, Husain M. *op.cit.* p. VII.

144. Britain signed the "Exclusive Agreement" with Bahrain in 1880, the Trucial States in 1892, Kuwait in 1899 and Qatar in 1916. For more details see Hasant, Seyd Farooq, *Security Problems in the Persian Gulf*. Progressive Publishers, Lahore, Pakistan. p. 15.

of protecting the British maritime trade routes to India. From 1947 until the early 1970s, the British Foreign Office in London assumed direct responsibility for Gulf affairs, and there was a resident British Commissioner in Bahrain and Political Agents, in Bahrain, Muscat, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Sharjah respectively.

Secondly, Islam and tribal rule: all of the Arabs of the Gulf state monarchies used the rhetoric of Islam and tribalism as symbols to legitimate themselves against any internal or external threats or crises. Islam and tribalism were interpreted by these regimes to legitimate their rule domestically and internationally. The historical record of the Arab tribal system in these states played a main part, with support from Britain, in creating these states during the eighteenth century. Britain was the main creator of the four artificial states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Since the early 1950s Britain had tried many times to create a union between these Sheykhdoms (with the exception of Kuwait); however, the British attempts paved the way for the creation of a union consisting of the seven Emirates of the UAE in December 1972. Despite the lack of political participation, the political history of these Sheykhhs (becoming royal families during the early 1970s) was full of conflict and assassinations.

Thirdly, the discovery and exploitation of oil: it should be noted that oil not only ushered in a period of rapid modernisation but strengthened the position of the ruling families (oil was discovered at different times in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain in the 1930s, in Qatar in 1940, in Abu Dhabi and Oman in the 1960s, in Dubai and Sharjah in the 1970s and in different quantities); oil gave the Arab Gulf states the means to create the structures of modern states and to become dispensers of wealth and welfare in the early 1970s. The Arab Gulf states' political systems are family-based, whereby power is concentrated in the hands of the ruling families. The decision-making in these countries comes in three stages, the first circle exclusively comprising members of the royal families and their close associates from the political elite who hold senior posts; the second including the other members of the executive authority, namely the members of the council of ministers; and the third encompassing the bureaucrats involved in the formation and execution of policies.

Since the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, Shī'a political opposition constitutes the main internal threat to these regimes especially in Bahrain and

Kuwait. By the end of the 1970s, the nationalist movements in the Gulf area became less influential after the destruction of the PLFO. Since the mid-1980s two important factors have changed the socio-economic and political conditions under which the “social contract” between the Arab Gulf states and their societies exists. First, the collapse and stagnation of oil prices. Second, in response to regional military and political threats, the acquisition of a huge amount of expensive weapons.

The Arab Gulf states, with the exception of Kuwait, have responded to previous developments by allowing a certain level of political participation which can absorb the growing public dissatisfaction without threatening the power of the ruling families. All of the consultative bodies in the Arab Gulf states, with the exception of Kuwait, are no more than a symbol of political participation. All these councils have an advisory role, and all members are appointed by the King (in Saudi Arabia), the Sultan (in Oman) and the Sheykh (Amīr) in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. The number of members in these councils is not representative of the population and the powers of the council must be endorsed by the heads of the states.

The Development and Origins of the GCC

2

Introduction

After the British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early seventies, the Arab Gulf States faced many direct internal and external threats to their stability. Many of them felt that there was a 'vacuum of power' after the withdrawal of the British umbrella, which had protected them for so many years. At the same time many voices in the Arab Gulf States were calling for a new wave of national consciousness and for a greater co-ordination of efforts and strengthening of bonds between them. These States were Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and the most important one, Saudi Arabia, which played a very significant role in the creation of the Gulf Co-operation Council.¹

The attitudes and motivations which led to the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council vary. Some people believe that the Council was founded because of the political developments in the Arab Gulf States after Britain's withdrawal. These developments were based on the wish of such countries to achieve the utmost co-operation between themselves at all levels, politically, socially and economically. Others believe that the establishment of the Council was due to the political and security developments that took place in the Gulf area. The main developments of this kind were the fall of the Shah's regime, and the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran under the leadership of Khomeinī, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the Iran-Iraq war. The first was disastrous as the Shah had been the main ally of the Arab Gulf States.

A third group believes that the creation of the Gulf Co-operation Council was mainly due to a desire to become a part of the capitalist system, with Saudi Arabia leading the way in order to build stronger relations with the West and especially with

1. 'Aṭiyyah, Ḥusyan Afandī "Majlis al-Ta'āwun Wa-Zāhirat al-Takāmūl al-Duwālī" *Al-Ta'āwun Magazine*. Vol. 1312. GCC Secretariate, al-Riyāḍh, 1989, pp. 20-21.

the United States of America, their main supporter. The political developments mentioned above had a great effect on the growth of the idea for the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council.² Its creation was a unique event in the modern history of the Arabian Peninsula.

The histories of both Arabia and the entire Arab nation show that the formation of the GCC represents only one of many efforts for the establishment of greater co-operation between the Arab Countries. There were, for example, the unsuccessful attempts to form a “collective Security plan” between the countries of the Gulf and Iran and Iraq. The Arab Gulf States agreed, after many meetings and conferences, to found a Council, in which they would co-ordinate their activities in economic, social, media, and security matters. The six heads of the Arab Gulf States gathered in Abu Dhabi in May 1981 and declared the foundation of the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council.³

The Definition of the GCC

In spite of the fact that the council has been established since May 1981 legal consultants still disagree on the legal nature of the council, a matter which is considered the most essential challenge to the council’s progress in making decisions.

Various Definitions of the Council

There are various definitions of the legal nature of the council. The Council Charter has not defined it in a specific way as other international organisations usually do. Some specialists think that the GCC is an international-regional organisation with limited membership, because its member states have common features and distinguished relations it is also national.

2. Al-Anbārī, Tawfīq N. *Majlis al-Ta’āwun Li -Duwāl al-Khalīj al-‘Arabiyyah wa-Taṭawwūr al-Nuḍum al-Iqlimiyyah*. M.A. Thesis. The Arab Organisation of Education, Culture and Science, Cairo, 1988. pp. 342-351.

3. Etaibi, Ghalib Tulhab. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Arabia’s Model of Integration*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, 1984. p. 1.

It is considered a governmental organisation with a general function, and its members as an international body. It is active in many different fields.⁴ Other people believe that the GCC is an international and regional organisation, which has general functions due to the presence of major factors that should be present for the establishment of international and governmental organisations.

Bishara's Definition of the Council

The former Secretary-General of the GCC, 'Abdullah Bishārah, (1981-1992) explained in a symposium held by him in Abu Dhabi in 1985, that there was no prior agreement between the Member States concerning a unified legal definition for the Council. He said that the first summit of the Council, held in Abu Dhabi on 26 May 1981, stated that the council was not a con-federal or federal organisation, but just a co-operative council. During the third summit held in May 1983, however, he explained that the council was a con-federal structure, the aim being confederation, despite the fact that the council did not embody any political theory. He added, "each member state wants to maintain her own charter, legislation and sovereignty". However, during the Kuwaiti Summit of 1985 he said, "A year and a half ago I described the co-operative as being similar to the con-federal system, but after the Kuwait summit I have come to believe that the council is a co-operative between six states which are similar in their ruling systems, economics, geography and associated by their fate and future".

The council, according to Bishārah's definition, is neither a gathering nor a coalition nor an alliance, but is just a co-operative framework which depends on economic co-ordination, defensive co-operation and political rapprochement. Bishārah believes that the reason for such a definition of the council is that the Kuwait summit (1985) did not deal with theories because people in the Gulf do not tend to make theories; they only confirmed the co-operative form of the council

4. Rajab, Yaḥyā Ḥilmī. *Majlis al-Ta'āwun Li-Duwal al-Khalīj al-'Arabiyyah Ruyā Mustaqbaliyyah Dirāsah Siyāsiyyah Iqtisadiyyah*. Dār al-'Urūbah, Kuwayt, 1983. p. 91.

without involving it in the complexity of theories, and adopted the well-known Gulf methodology, which is a pragmatism free of linguistic transcription.

‘Abdullah Bishārah confirms that the member states have no intention of considering the co-operative council as a federal or con-federal framework or anything subordinate to the Arab League or even as a supplement to it. They intend to define the council as a co-operation, provided that this form is very flexible concerning the its decisions. The nature of the council is one of the most important challenges facing it, because the member states are not bound by its decisions unless they are agreed on them, because they coincide with their local rules and regulations. The flexibility and acceptability of these decisions encourage these states not to take them seriously. It is clear that most of the economic agreements signed by the council have no validity if they are contradictory to the local laws of the member states. An example is the unified economic agreements and the security agreement which Kuwait and Qatar refused to sign and approve recently.

The flexible nature adopted by the officials of the council represents one of the major obstacles to reaching any concept of co-ordination either at a political, economic or social level. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās defines the GCC as a council that has been formed by a group of countries with homogenous political, social and economic systems. These countries have agreed to co-operate in all fields. The council is not federal or con-federal but is just a kind of co-operative between its six member states.⁵ Ḥassan al-Alkīm defined the GCC as a Sub-Regional Organisation.⁶ Gulf nationals believe that the council is just a functionless meeting with no positive benefits for the lives of the people of the member states: just an excuse for ministers to meet seasonally as a yearly summit of the region; following these meetings there are common communiqués formulated and issued by a committee composed of the foreign ministers of the member states in co-ordination with the council Secretariat. They have the same content and formulation without affecting the lives of the ordinary people at economic or social levels. In its 17 years, the GCC has not been

5. Interview with ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās. *op.cit.*

6. Interview with Ḥassan Ḥamdān Al-‘Alkīm, Chairman of Political Science at the University of the UAE. February 1998.

able to achieve those objectives for which it was established (except for co-operation in the field of internal security) either at an economic, political or defense level. The structure and nature of the GCC are considered some of the other stumbling-blocks hindering the council's progress. The GCC does not represent the supreme power of these countries. However, it does represent a framework for co-operation dependent on economic co-ordination, defence co-operation and a compromise of political points of view, and the sovereignty and interests of these countries.

The former Secretary-General 'Abdullah Bishārah considers the council's experience to be based on a realistic formula, which does not depend on constitutional systems or strict obligations. No doubt, the nature and structure of the council have restricted the council's efficiency in realising any progress at the political, economic or defensive levels.⁷

The Structure of the GCC

The legal structure of the GCC is one of the main obstacles to the process of decision-making in the council. For example, the issue of national sovereignty is still very dear to the people and leadership of each of the six members. The GCC, as a regional integration institution, does not have power over national entities: there is, as yet, no GCC super-national government through which regional development priorities can supersede national ones.⁸ Voting and Membership are the main hindrances to council activities. Article 9 of the charter states that resolutions of the Supreme Council, in substantive matters, shall be carried by a unanimous approval of

7. Mitkis, Hudā. "Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī wa-Māba'ad al-Azmah al-Wāq'i', wa-al-Taḥaddiyāt wa-al-Āfāq" *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabī* Year 15. No.168, February 1993. p. 97. For more details see Shaw, Malcolm N. *International Law*. Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press. 1991. p. 762.

8. See Angell, Nicholas B "Impact of the GCC on the Developing Legal Systems of the Gulf Countries" in: Sandwick, John A. (ed.) *The Gulf Cooperation Council Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World*. Westview press, Boulder, Colorado. 1987, p. 129 and El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah Ibrahim "Economic Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Challenges, Achievements and Future Outlook" in: Sandwick, John A (ed.) *The Gulf Cooperation Council Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987. p. 77.

the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by a majority vote.

The system of voting makes things difficult for the decision-makers and makes it possible for one country to veto the rest on important issues.⁹ Under its Charter the GCC has three basic structures, the Supreme Council (al-Majlis al-A‘lā) the Ministerial Council (al- Majlis al-Wizārī) and the Secretariat General (al-Amānah al-‘Ammah). The Council also consists of many specialized Committees.

The Supreme Council

The Supreme Council is composed of the heads of State of the six member countries and is chaired by its members on a rotating basis. Each member has one vote. The Supreme Council may pass resolutions at properly-convened meetings at which a quorum of two-thirds of its members attends. Resolutions dealing with substantive matters require the unanimous vote of all those members attending, while a majority vote will pass a resolution dealing with a procedural matter. The charter provides that the Supreme Council may: examine any question of interest to the member states; draw up major GCC policy; examine recommendations, reports, studies and joint ventures referred to it by the Ministerial Council; discuss reports and studies prepared by the Secretary-General; adopt policies for dealing with other nations and international organisations; and finally amend the charter. Its sessions are governed by rules of procedure that are concurrently approved by the charter. The Supreme Council meets once a year although special sessions may be called if requested by any one member and seconded by another.

The first session of the Supreme Council was held in Abu Dhabi in May 1981, and it has held sessions (commonly called summits) each November and December.¹⁰

9. For more details of Article 9 of the Voting in Supreme Council see Appendixes p. 459.

10. Since its establishment in May 1981, the Supreme Council of the GCC has not held any special or exceptional sessions. During December 1995, the Qatari government delegation withdrew from the final session of the Supreme Council in Muscat as a result of the appointment of the Saudi candidate to the office of Secretary-General of the Council. Some sources mentioned that the Qatari withdrawal from the Muscat meeting was a result of the clash between Prince ‘Abdullah of

The Ministerial Council

The Ministerial Council, the most active body, consists of the foreign ministers of the member states. The Ministerial Council holds a session every three months and, like the Supreme Council, its chairmanship rotates. Its meetings are governed by the same quorum and voting requirements as are the Supreme Council meetings. The Ministerial Council is empowered to: initiate policies and studies relating to the co-operation and co-ordination between the member states in various fields; make recommendations to the Supreme Council on the co-ordination of existing activity; submit its recommendations to the relevant ministers for implementation; encourage private sector co-operation between the member states; submit proposals to specialized committees for study; recommend amendments to the charter; prepare for Supreme Council summits, and finally examine matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.

The Secretariat General

The Secretariat General is composed of the Secretary-General who is assisted by three assistant-generals in the fields of political affairs, economic affairs and military affairs. The Supreme Council appoints the Secretary-General.

The Secretariat General is provided with the authority, under the charter, to: prepare studies relating to the co-operation and co-ordination of the programs of the member states; prepare reports on GCC activities; supervise implementation of resolutions of the Ministerial Council and Supreme Council; prepare reports and conduct other activities at the request of the Ministerial Council or Supreme Council; draft the administrative and financial regulations governing the GCC; and, finally, prepare the GCC budgets and final accounts and prepare the agendas and final resolution for the sessions of the Ministerial Council.¹¹

Saudi Arabia (the head of the Saudi delegation) and the Qatari Amir Sheykh Hamad. See. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Qatar Country Report 1st quarter 1996" pp. 23-24. Documents of the charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. See Angell, Nicholas B. 'Impact of the GCC on the Developing Legal Systems of the Gulf Countries' *op.cit* p. 130.

11. *Documents of the Charter*. *op.cit.* and see Angell, Nicholas B. *op.cit.* p. 131.

The Secretariat General contains a number of departments that prepare reports and conduct research on specific types of issues: the office of the Secretary-General, Legal Affairs, Economics, Political, Man and the Environment, Information, Military, Finance and Administration, and the Information Center. The member states contribute equally to the budget of the GCC Secretariat General.

Following the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council, ‘Abdullah Bishārah (Kuwait) headed the council from 1981 to 1992, Fāhim Al-Qasimī (UAE) from 1992 to 1995, and Jamīl Al-Ḥujaylān (Saudi Arabia) from 1995. Besides the three basic bodies, the GCC also contains a number of specialized committees established to deal with particular problems or subject matters: Oil, Health, Power and Electricity, and Finance and Economy. The GCC bodies, official representatives and employees, including the members of the Secretariat, are given the same diplomatic privileges and immunities that are accorded to members of similar organisations under international law. The Secretariat members are not representatives of their individual countries, but are regional bureaucrats with the primary responsibility of furthering the interests of the GCC. In the performance of their duties, they are not subjected to any influence or pressure from any of the member-states. They are also pledged not to reveal any secrets that might damage the GCC, either during or after their tenure in office.¹²

The basic objectives of the Charter are defined by the council as co-operation between the member-states in all fields including economics, finance, health, social welfare, information, tourism, legislation and administration. The internal and external security of the six states has been the most visible preoccupation of the GCC leaders. In fact, it has continued to remain the guiding factor behind its multifarious activities.¹³

‘Abdullah Bishārah the former Secretary-General of the Council commented on some of the issues which represent real challenges and obstacles to the effectiveness

12. Dietl, Gulshan. *Through Two Wars and Beyond: (A Study of the Gulf Cooperation Council)*. Lancers Books, New Delhi, India, 1991, pp. 15-18.

13. For more details of the basic objectives of the Charter of the GCC article 4 of the Basic Structure of the Council. Security cooperation is not mentioned in the areas of cooperation of article 4. See also Dietl, Gulshan. *op.cit.* p. 12.

of the council when he said “I personally feel that, since the formation of the council in 1981, Gulf unity has not been included in the negotiations and does not represent the pivot of the arguments and discussions. It does not play the role of the arbitrator in settling any dispute.” Bishārah added, “I can say that the territorial considerations for each country of the member states and their urgent interests are the prevailing arbitrator which settles the disputes between these countries; particularly in the deliberations of the technical committee and working teams the territoriality and interests of the member states are considered to be the most difficult challenges facing the council”. He explained that the Co-operative Council was an organisation which could deliberate between but not unite these states; “It is decorated with fine expressions and impressed by protocols”, and that the Co-operative Council was an organisation which speaks but does not make any progress. Because of the ambiguous legal nature of the council, which represents one of the challenges to the council’s relationship with the member states, ‘Abdullah Bishārah explained that the council members had selected the co-operation form as a compromise between the six member states in order to agree on a unified concept for the council. He said, “The selected co-operation form does not have the features and nature of a bloc, alliance or organisation. The issue is limited to the general framework of co-operation; the final objective has been determined as the unity of these countries at a final stage”. Bishārah stated that, due to this flexible approach, the council had become too weak to take on board any of the decisions issued by its specialized councils. For example the economic, political and security projects and agreements adopted by the council, since its foundation, are still being debated and are, as yet, unimplemented by the six member states because they oppose and contradict their local systems.¹⁴

14. Bishārah, ‘Abdullah “Humūm Majlis al-Ta‘āwun” *Majallat al-Ta‘āwun*. No. 28. December 1992. The Secretariat-General, Riyadh, p. 66.

Underlying Elements of Unity Between these Countries

Introduction

The establishment of the GCC came about through the accumulation of significant, economic, social and political factors. At that time there was already co-operation between the members of the GCC: many government specialists and administrators were already holding conferences and meetings for co-ordination and co-operation in their own fields: social welfare, trade and industry, public works, public health, agriculture, finance and education. The Arab Gulf States have a common language, religion and geography with similar natural resources and political systems and have free enterprise economies linked with the industrialized democracies of the West. The six countries pursue a foreign policy of co-operation with the League of Arab States and the Islamic Conference Organisation. Long before the emergence of the GCC, member states of the council, at both the regional Arab level the sub-regional and Gulf sub-regional level, entered into joint projects.

The formation of the council, however, further stimulated this trend and opened up new possibilities for the GCC region. The moves towards integration among the Arab Gulf States date back to the early 1960s, but a political integration between the six Arab Gulf states (excepting the experiment of the UAE) began to be considered seriously only on the eve of the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1971. Before the establishment of the GCC, the Arab Gulf States were co-operating with each other in many areas of economics, social, and cultural affairs, trade and the media, both in the Arab region and more specifically in the Gulf.

The main joint organisations in the field of social and cultural affairs:

- 1). The Permanent Committee for Communications in the Arab Gulf (1971)
- 2). The Arab Gulf Bureau of Education (1976)
- 3). The Arab Gulf Health General Secretariat. (1976)
- 4). The General Secretariat for the Agricultural Ministers of the Arab Gulf States
- 5). The University of the Gulf. (1980)

The field of the Media:

- 1). The Gulf News Agency (1976)
- 2). The Joint TV Production Institution (1976).
- 3). The Gulf TV Corporation (1977)
- 4). The Gulf Centre for Information and the Gulf Data bank (1981).

The field of Economic and Technical affairs:

- 1). The Gulf Air Company (1950)
- 2). The Gulf International Bank (1975)
- 3). The Gulf Post Organisation (1977)
- 4). The Gulf Institution of Industrial Constitutions (1976)
- 5). The Gulf Aluminum Company (1981)
- 6). The Arab Navigation Company Limited (1976)
- 7). The Arab Gulf Chamber of Trade, Commerce and Agriculture
- 8). The Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting (1976)
- 9). The Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation (1976).¹⁵

15. Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah. *Al-Iṭār al-Qānūnī wa-al-Siyāsī Li-Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalijī*. Al-Nahḍah al-'Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1988.op.cit. pp. 109-125. And Al-Muhanadi, Mohammed Essa. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: A mechanism for the security of the Citizens of Its member States*. Pacific Lutheran University, M.P.A., 1982, Michigan, U.S.A. p. 15 and see. Nonneman, Gerd "The Gulf: Background Assessment" in: *The Middle East and Europe The Search for Stability and Integration*. (ed.) Nonneman, Gerd. Federal Trust for Education and Research, London, 1993. pp. 55-56.

The Political Process

The significant social factors which link these countries are the common Arabic language, Islam (the majority of Muslims are Sunni, with a minority of Shi'a (except in Bahrain and some Ibādīs in the north of Oman), a closely comparable social structure, and similar political systems (monarchies). In addition to this, all of these countries have evolved from the Arab tribal system.¹⁶

Politically the significant links between the Arab Gulf States have a long history springing from the time of British domination. All the Arab Gulf States, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, had been under the umbrella of British protection for more than a hundred years. The other important political example was the negotiations between the Arab Sheykhdoms of the Gulf (Trucial States, Bahrain and Qatar). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, these states entered into serious negotiations to form a federal union, encouraged by the British government.¹⁷ In 1971 the Dubai agreement was reached, under which Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States were to consider joining together in some kind of federation or union. However, the negotiations collapsed as a result of external pressures from Iran and Saudi Arabia in addition to the border disputes between the Sheykhhs of the smaller Arab Gulf states (for more details see Chapters 5 and 6). The seven Trucial states of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah formed a federation known as the United Arab Emirates in December 1971, while the two sheykhdoms of Qatar and Bahrain declared their independence.

By the early 1970s all the Arab Gulf states had become independent and Oman, with her new leader, Sultan Qaboos, was in a new position to build more links between these countries.¹⁸ The experiment of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 had

16. Christie, John. "History and Development of the Gulf Cooperation Council: A Brief Overview" in: Sandwick, John A (ed.) *The Gulf Co-operation Council, Moderation and Stability in an Independent World*. Boulder, Colorado, 1987. p. 9.

17. Al-Alkim, Hasan Hamdan. *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*. op.cit. p. 8.

18. Christie, John A. op.cit. pp. 7-8.

amply illustrated that Arab Co-operation, especially in the Gulf area, was indeed possible between these states at both on official and popular levels.¹⁹

During the mid-seventies, as a result of direct internal and external threats to the stability of Gulf security, many Arab Gulf States officials called for more co-ordination between the countries of the Gulf, particularly in the area of security. Many initiatives had been taken to discuss co-operation in areas of common interest. In 1976 Sultan Qaboos of Oman took the initiative and organized a meeting in Muscat for the foreign ministers of the three regional powers, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the foreign ministers of Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. The object of the meeting was to discuss a co-ordinated policy for regional security and defence. However, a dispute between the Iranian and Iraqi delegations on the security question led to the failure of the Omani initiative. The fear of the Arab Gulf States being dominated by Iran and Iraq also led to the collapse of the talks.

Another attempt was made when King Khalid of Saudi Arabia made a state visit, in April 1976, to all the other Arab Gulf States. The aim of the Saudi King's visit was to promote closer relations, particularly in regard to security. King Khālid's visit came after the a successful conclusion of the visit of the Saudi Interior Minister to all the Arab Gulf States in March 1976. He had proposed a security plan with the smaller Arab Gulf States.²⁰

Between 1976 and 1979, there was an improvement in the relationships between the governments of the Arab Gulf States. Following the lead of Saudi Arabia a number of security plans were made. By the end of 1979, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had concluded some serious security agreements with all the Arab Gulf States, establishing permanent foundations for security and co-operation. Saudi influence and political predominance in the Gulf region became even stronger after

19. Peterson, Erik. R. *op.cit.* p. 26. See *The Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Its Charter, Structure and Achievements*. GCC Secretariat, Riyadh, 1987. pp. 17-19.

20. Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. *op.cit.* p. 137. It should be noted that Iranian and Iraqi proposals failed to attract support from the conservative rulers because each country's proposal was intended to curtail the influence of others in the Gulf region. There was no consensus between Baghdad and Tehran over the security of the Gulf on the one hand and between the Arab Gulf states and Baghdad and Tehran on the other.

the Intelligence Departments of the Arab Gulf States were linked to the Saudi Security Department.²¹

Between 1976 and 1979 many officials in the Arab Gulf States called for more recognition and mutual links, most of these initiatives being concerned with security. The first initiative was advanced early in 1976 by Sheykh Jābir al-Aḥmed, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister and Crown Prince (now Amir of Kuwait). He called for:

"The establishment of Gulf Unity with the object of realising co-operation in all economic, political, educational, and informational fields and the creation of a form of unity or a union with solid foundations to serve the interests and stability of the people in the region." ²²

The Kuwaiti initiative followed a tour by Sheykh Jābir of the Arab Gulf States in which they discussed joint actions for the preservation of security and stability in the Gulf region against the competition of external powers and the threats from the radical Arab regimes. Many other efforts were undertaken by the various states to bring about co-operation and understanding in the Gulf region. High-ranking officials issued individual and bilateral initiatives in joint communiqués after their visits to the Arab Gulf States and following on from the visit of the Kuwaiti Prime Minister and Crown Prince to all the capitals of the Arab Gulf States in December 1978. All these countries and Kuwait called for the facilitating of greater co-operation and swift action to consolidate the efforts of the states in the region to unify.²³ Extensive contacts and initiatives continued on all levels throughout the latter part of the 1970s. An Omani initiative called for a project to establish a naval force owned by the Arab Gulf States and supported by Japan and the West, so that Gulf security could be protected, especially in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. The Omani initiative was rejected and Saudi Arabia called for more co-operation and integration among the

21. Kechichian, Joseph A. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Security in the Persian Gulf*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1985. p. 2.

22. Christie, John. *op.cit.* p. 9.

23. Etaibi, Ghalib Tulhab. *op.cit.* p. 39. For more details on the Kuwaiti communiqué with the other Arab Gulf states see Nakhleh, Emile A. *The GCC Policies, Problems and Prospects*. *op.cit.* pp. 2-3.

Arab Gulf States to unify their armies by confining themselves to one source when buying arms.²⁴

During 1979 many statements were issued by officials in the Arab Gulf States regarding co-operation. As for the emergence of the GCC, it should be pointed out that no official record exists stating the intent of the six Gulf States to form an integrated community, prior to February 5, 1981. Some Kuwaiti sources claim that the idea of setting up the GCC was presented by Kuwait during the Arab Summit meeting in Jordan in November 1980. During the Arab Conference the heads of these countries held a separate meeting to discuss the situation in the Gulf, especially after the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War.²⁵ The statement, released by the Islamic Conference Organisation, which was held in Ta'if in Saudi Arabia in January 1981, was the first indication that the Arab Gulf States leaders were interested in adopting a joint co-operation especially on security matters; said:

*"We affirm our collective conviction that the security and stability of the Gulf as well as the safety of its waterways are the absolute responsibility of the Gulf States without any foreign interference"*²⁶

‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās said, in an interview, that the Muscat meeting of 1976, for the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all eight countries of the Gulf (the six Arab Gulf states plus Iraq and Iran), considered the first principle that led to the foundation of the GCC and the establishment of the first security mechanism in the Gulf. Al-Rawās stated, in the same interview, that Sultan Qaboos of Oman played a major role in establishing the GCC when he convinced the Iraqi President Ṣaddām Ḥussein of its importance during the Arab Summit held in Amman in 1980. Al-Rawas said that Sultan Qaboos was more than a half an hour late for the meeting held by the leaders of the Arab Gulf States in Amman in November 1980, because of his meeting with

24. Ramazani, R.K. *The Gulf Co-operation Council. Record and Analysis.* University Press of Virginia, 1988. p. 3.

25. Al-Anzi, Abdulla Meshail A. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Reasons and Challenges, Critical and Analytic Study.* Ph.D. Thesis, Claremont Graduate School, U.S.A. 1986. p. 55 and See Etaibi, Ghalib T. *op.cit.* p. 47.

26. Dietl, Gulshan. *op.cit.* p. 9

the Iraqi President. This meeting was to convince the Iraqi President of the importance of the establishment of the GCC, in spite of the fact that there were no relations between Oman and Iraq at all. The Omani Minister of Information added that the name of the council, “the Gulf Co-operation Council of the Arab Gulf States” resulted from the name Sultan Qaboos gave it and this was before the establishment of the council.²⁷

The Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) claimed, in a book published in May 1981, that the 1976 Kuwaiti initiative evolved into nearly three-and-a-half years of extensive diplomatic effort to bring about a general consensus and accord between the six Arab Gulf states. The second serious attempt took place in January 1981 during the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Taif in Saudi Arabia in February 1981. The leaders of the Arab Gulf States gathered, in a separate meeting, to discuss a consensus view on security matters in the Gulf in particular and the Middle East in general. The statement of the OIC was the first indication that the Gulf leaders were interested in adopting a joint policy.

The first meeting paving the way for the creation of the GCC was held in Riyadh on 4 February and was attended by the foreign ministers of the six Gulf States.²⁸ Following this meeting, a committee of experts from the six states met twice: in Riyadh on 24 February and in Muscat on 4 March. The purpose of these meetings was to draft a charter and the by-laws for the Council. This would then be reviewed by the foreign ministers. At the conclusion of the Muscat meeting, on 8 March 1981, the committee of experts had agreed on a draft charter that included three structures; a supreme council, a ministerial council and a secretariat-general. On 9 March, the foreign ministers met in Muscat and approved the basic structure and draft charter with minor amendments. Specifically, the ministers approved three of the documents: the by-laws of the co-operation council, of the supreme council and of the ministerial council.

They made four recommendations: 1) to hold the meetings of the supreme council in May and November every year; 2) to hold the first session of the supreme council in

27 .Interview with ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās. *op.cit.*

Abu Dhabi on 26-27 May 1981; 3) to hold a meeting of the committee of experts in Abu Dhabi on 20 May 1981 to finalize the by-laws for the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes; and 4) to agree, in principle, that the Secretary General of the GCC should be from Kuwait. The Committee of Experts met in Abu Dhabi on 19-20 May to prepare for the Summit and to discuss the by-laws for the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes. The meeting of the foreign ministers followed on 23 May and accomplished what it set out to do; it approved the by-laws, nominated 'Abdullah Bishārah from Kuwait as the Secretary-General and prepared the agenda for the impending Summit. On 25th May 1981, the heads of the Arab Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates held the first summit of the newly created GCC. The Summit lasted for two days.²⁹

The leaders of the GCC concentrated on the three proposals submitted by Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman and the State of Kuwait. The Saudi proposal called for the setting up of a Gulf Organisation and suggested that the Arab Gulf countries should buy weapons from the same source as this would make training easier and improve understanding. The project also called for a wider co-operation among the internal security agencies instead of establishing a military pact. The Saudi proposal asked that regular armies should take part in reinforcing the authority of every country and preserving the laws and the entire security system. The Omani proposals dealt with the extremely sensitive issues of defence and security in essence, they called for close military co-operation among the member states, leading to full military integration in terms of command, communications, supply and strategy. The proposal contained a suggestion to set up a common maritime force to protect the Strait of Hormuz. The Kuwaiti proposal, which became the main proposal for the structure of the Gulf Co-operation Council, called for more co-operation and co-ordination in all fields, whether economic, social, petroleum or cultural. It should be recorded that the Kuwaiti proposal became the focal point which led the Arab Gulf

28. Ramazani, R. K. *The Gulf Cooperation Council Record and Analysis*. *op.cit.* p. 1.

29. *Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf*. Bahrain Government Printing Press, Bahrain, 1983. pp. 17-19.

States to define their fields of responsibility and encouraged the GCC states to achieve military independence.³⁰

The final Communiqué of the Abu Dhabi Supreme Council Summit, from the heads of the GCC, mentioned *inter alia* the relationships and co-operation between the Arab Gulf states, especially on security. It stated that:

*"Their Majesties and highnesses reviewed the current situation in the area. They reaffirm that the region's security and stability are the responsibility of its peoples and countries and that this council expresses the will of these countries and their right to defend their security and independence in the region from any source. They call for keeping the entire region free of international conflicts, particularly the presence of military fleets and foreign bases, in order to safeguard their interests and the interests of the world"*³¹

The Gulf Region's Strategic Prominence and Growing Economic Importance

General Geographical Survey of the Gulf

The Gulf region's strategic prominence and its growing economic importance came as a result of the strategic position of the area. David Newton, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Carter Administration, described the area as follows:

If the world were a flat circle and one were looking for its center a good argument could be made that it would lie in the Gulf, Arabian or Persian, depending on your perspective.

The Arabian (Persian) Gulf lies in a strategic geographical position, connecting the trade and communication routes of Asia, Africa and Europe. The Strait of Hormuz is

30. See. Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah. *op.cit.* pp. 23-24 and 'Ubayd, Nayif 'Alī. *Majlis al-Ta'āwun li-Duwal al-Khalj al-'Arabiyyah Min al-Ta'āwun ilā al-Takāmul*. Arabian Union Studies Center, Cairo, 1996. pp. 131 and 196 and see Christine, John "History and Development of the Gulf Cooperation Council: A Brief Overview" *op.cit.* p. 11.

31. Ramazani, R.K. *The Gulf Cooperation Council Record and Analysis*. *op.cit.* p. 28.

one of the busiest waterways in the world. Most of the shipping of the great industrial countries of the world passes through this gate (see map no. 8)³²

The region known to the Arab countries as the Arabian Gulf,³³ is a shallow marginal sea of the Indian Ocean lying between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. The Gulf extends 614 miles north-east from the Gulf of Oman in the south through the Strait of Hormuz to the Shatt al-Arab in the north. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait border the Gulf in the south-west, while Iraq borders it in the north-west and Iran in the north-east. The Gulf occupies 92,254 square miles in area and is 210 miles wide at its widest point, which is between Bandar-el-Maqam in Iran and Ras al-Sila on the coast of the UAE.³⁴ The Gulf countries cover an area of over 1.8 million square miles and have borders with eight countries whose population is greater than 75 million people (see map p. no. 89). GCC countries have a population of approximately 19 million people and a land area of about 2,653,000 square kilometers.³⁵

Petroleum Reserves in the Gulf Region

The economies of the Arab Gulf States (GCC) are dominated by the production of petroleum, which is the major export of the region and its link to the western world and Japan. The Gulf area, today, still remains vital for world geo-politics. The Gulf countries currently provide 25% of all the petroleum moving in international

32. The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow and curved channel connecting the Arabian (Persian) Gulf to the Indian Ocean, is approximately 100 nautical miles long. The Strait is a geological depression bounded by Oman (Musandam Peninsula) in the South and Iran in the north. The deep-water channel of the Strait passes close to the Omani shores. For more details see Mujtahed-Zadeh, Perouz. *Political Geography The Strait of Hormuz. The Evolution of Iran's Role (1970s and 1980s)*. Geography Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1990, p. 10 and Al-Anazi, Abdulla M. *op.cit.* p. 68.

33. Amin, S.H. *Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf*. Royston Limited, Glasgow, 1984. pp. 81-82. The difference over the Gulf's name, whether Arabian or Persian, is not only one of phonetics, but covers a political conflict of deep strategic dimensions which relates to the vital question, who is capable of dominating the Gulf regional system. For more details on the Gulf name see 'Abdullah, 'Abdulkhālīq. "Al-Nizām al-Iqlīmī al-Khalījī" *Majallat al-Siyāsah al-Duwalīyyah* (International Politics Magazine) 114, October 1993, Cairo. p. 30.

34. Joyner, Christopher C. "The Geography and Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf" in. Joyner, Christopher C. (ed.) *The Persian Gulf War*. Green wood press, London, 1990, pp. 2-3.

35. Al-Mashshāt, 'Abd al-Mun'im . *Al-Hayāh Newspaper*. No. 11467, Date 11-7-94, London, p. 7.

commerce, and the region of the Gulf contains 65% of the world's reserves. Nearly 30% of Western Europe's oil imports and 65% of Japan's originates there. As regards the United States, its 1989 figure for oil imports was 52%, with around 18% of those imports or 9% of the total coming from the Gulf. The demand for oil is going up in the Western countries and the supply is being fulfilled by a rise in the production of the GCC Countries. Considering the fact that production in the United States has been declining and the fields in North Sea have matured, the world economy is becoming increasingly dependent on the oil of the Gulf region. The industrial countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) share 10.6% of the proven oil reserves in the World compared with 46.1% the GCC.³⁶ The GCC States also have reserves totaling more than 10.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas, equal to about 14% of the world's total reserves.³⁷ The most exciting oil developments occurred in the years after the British withdrawal and the increasing importance of the Gulf countries oil came about after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The increase in the level of production and the size of the reserves of oil and gas, in addition to the increasing needs of the great industrial countries in particular, and the world economy in general, made Gulf security all the more important. It was not only for the eight countries looking over the Gulf, but also because an international and regional obsession developed in a way that nobody expected. The Arab Gulf States, by the mid-1970s, became a most important area for the rest of the world, especially for the great industrial countries.³⁸

36. Al-Faris, Abdul-Razak Faris "Forecasting the Demand for Gasoline in the GCC Countries" in. *Gulf Energy and the World Challenges and Threats*. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Abu Dhabi 1997. p. 117, and Kavery, Benjamin. *op.cit.* p. 56; see also. Joyner, Christopher. *op.cit.* p. 5.

37. Carter, Laraine Newhouse "Gulf Co-operation Council" in Narop, Richard F (ed.) *Saudi Arabia, A Country Study*. Foreign Area Studies, The American University, U.S.A. 1984. p. 355. See. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf" *op.cit.* p. 66.

38. Idrīs, Muḥammād al-Sa'īd. "Dawr al-Amn wa al-Ta'āwun al-'Askarī fi-Taṭawwur Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī Ka-kiyān Iqlīmī" *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabī* Vol.215. January 1997. The Arab Strategic Studies Center, Beirut, 1997. p. 42.

Table (1)**Oil Output 1990 (Billion Barrels) 39**

1	Saudi Arabia.	225,0
2	Iraq	100,0
3	Kuwait	94,0
4	Iran	92,9
5	United Arab Emirates.	92,2
6	Venezuela	58,5
7	Soviet Union.	58,4
8	Mexico	56,4
9	United States	34,1
10	China	24,1

Table No: 2Oil Reserves (million barrels) in Gulf Co-operation Council from 1985-1991(40)

Country	U.A.E.	Bahrain	Saudi Arabia.	Oman	Qatar.	Kuwait	G.C.C.
1985	33,0	0,16	169,20	4,00	3,30	92,50	302,2
1986	33,0	0,14	169,60	3,90	3,90	97,50	308,0
1987.	98,10	0,13	170,00	4,00	3,10	94,50	369,90
1988.	98,00	0,11	252,40	4,10	3,10	94,50	452,40

39. Rogers, Paul and Donald, Malcolm. *A Violent Peace, Global Security After the Cold War*. Brassey's, London, 1992, p. 93.

40. *Al-Ta'āwun, Quarterly Journal*. Issue No. 32. Eighth Year. Department of Information. The Secretary General of Gulf Cooperation Council, Riyadh, 1993, p. 169.

1989.	98,10	0,17	254,,90	4,10	4,50	97,00	456,00
1990	98,10	0,14	260,00	4,30	4,50	97,00	464,00
1991	98,10	0,15	260,90	4,30	3,75	96,5	463,70

Table No.3.

Natural Gas Reserves in the Gulf Co-operation Council, 1985-1991

(000 billion cu. ft) 41

Country	U.A.E	Bahrain	Saudi-Arabia	Oman	Qatar	Kuwait	G.C.C.
1985	32,8	7,1	130,2	7,7	148,1	36,6	362,5
1986	18,2	7,1	139,9	8,2	156,7	41,2	371,2
1987	203,5	6,7	145,8	9,4	156,7	42,6	564,7
1988	201,5	6,4	183,5	9,3	156,7	48,7	606,1
1989	200,8	6,5	183,5	9,3	163,1	53,6	543,4
1990	200,4	6,1	114,7	7,3	163,1	53,6	543,4
1991	= =	5,9	184,5	12,2	= =	= =	= =

41. *Al-Ta'āwun, Quarterly Journal*. Issue No. 32. *op.cit.* p. 169.

Table NO. 4.Oil Production in the Gulf Co-operation Council, from 1985-1992.Thousand 000 B/D⁴²

Country	U.A.E.	Bahrain	Saudi Arabia	Oman	Qatar	Kuwait	G.C.C.
1985	1056,8	41,9	3174,8	498,0	290,0	1061,3	6122,8
1986	1308,9	42,4	4178,2	560,0	334,6	1416,0	8446,2
1987	1417,7	41,7	4142,0	582,0	293,1	1465,0	7923,5
1988	1509,5	43,0	5200,0	619,0	341,0	1463,0	9175,5
1989	1857,8	42,7	5100,0	640,5	380,5	1741,0	9762,5
1990	2059,9	42,2	6400,0	685,0	397,0	1222,0	10806,1
1991	2388,0	38,0	8100,0	716,0	391,0	193,0	11834,0
1992	2292,0	42,1	8331,0	708,2	397,0	1056,0	12826,3

42 *Al-Ta'āwun, Quarterly Journal*. Issue No. 32. *op.cit.*, p. 170.

Map No. 7.




INDEX CHART

The limits of the book are shown by the land tint and by packed lines.
Chapter numbers are shown in bold; the arrows show the general direction in which the chapters follow.
Large scale charts of individual places are denoted by a number against the relevant name.
*3452 indicates that a plan is shown on chart 3452.
For details of smaller scale general charts see Catalogue of Admiralty Charts NP 131.

NOTE

The charts shown on this index represent those published at the date given at the foot. They are liable to alteration and amendment.



Crucial Factors leading to the Foundation of the Gulf Co-operation Council

The Emergence of the Iranian Revolution

The concept of security in the Gulf area was greatly affected by the events of 1979. The Iranian revolution had three main implications for the Arab Gulf states. First, it removed the Shah of Iran, the main effective regional deterrent to Soviet Union advances in the region. Secondly, Khomeinī consolidated the power of Iran and sought to export his revolutionary ideology through the Shi'a in the region. Third, there always was the suspicion that the new Iranian regime might act aggressively against some of the states. The royal families of the conservative States of the Arab Gulf felt that the main support of the twin pillars, Iran and Saudi Arabia had undergone changes in favour of Iran, Iraq and the radical Arab regimes against the Arab Gulf States.⁴³

Iran, under the revolution as under the monarchy, remains a state ambitious in foreign affairs, keen to play a role on the regional and international scene. More significant, however, is the sectarian split between the two shores of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. Iran is the only state based on Shi'ism a distinctly nationalistic expression of Islam. Bernard Lewis has suggested that a major distinction between Shi'a (Iran) and Sunni (the Arab Gulf States) is that 'Sunnism is associated with the *status quo*, Shi'ism with a rejection of the *status quo*.⁴⁴

Since the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, the Iranian leaders have frequently announced their intention of enlarging their Islamic revolution beyond their border. Iran adopted a new policy with the Arab Gulf states and encouraged Shi'ite residents and dissidents in the Gulf region to export the revolution to these countries.

43. Ramzani, R.K. *The GCC Record and Analysis*. *op.cit.* p. 6, and See Al-Marhuby, Abdullah Amor. *Prospects for Collective Security in the Gulf following the Kuwait crisis*. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, U.S.A. 1991, pp. 12-13.

44. Chubin, Shahram "Iran and regional security in the Persian Gulf" *Survival*. Vol. 34. No. 3, Autumn 1992, London. *op.cit.* p. 68.

She also supported the anti-government demonstrations of the Shi'a community in Bahrain and Kuwait. On 18 April 1980 Ayatollah Khomeinī condemned the Iraqi President and declared that he would overthrow the Iraqi regime.⁴⁵ Ṣadīq Ṭabaṭabaī, Under Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior stated that the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran gave the Shi'ite movements in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf countries momentum to revolt against those governments. A very important speech, which caused a great deal of alarm among the Arab Gulf States, was delivered by Ṣadīq Ruḥanī, an Iranian revolutionary official, on 18 April 1980. He said:

*"Iran will claim Bahrain again if Iraq insists on claiming the three Islands (which were seized by Iran in 1971). The Shah's Parliament, which surrendered the Iranian claim on Bahrain, was not legally empowered to do so." Ruhani also threatened that if Bahrain would not adopt an Islamic government it would be annexed to Iran.*⁴⁶

The Iranian Revolution had new implications for Gulf security and American regional policy. The Iranian revolutionary government adopted a policy of opposition to America and the West (those countries which had the most allies among the Arab Gulf States). The success of the Iranian Revolution greatly encouraged the Shi'ite population everywhere in the world, especially in the Arab Gulf States.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s violent demonstrations were held by Shi'ites in most Arab Gulf States. During the demonstrations they shouted anti-American slogans and pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini were displayed openly.⁴⁷ There was always a suspicion that the new Iranian regime might accelerate its aggression against the conservative countries of the Arab Gulf.⁴⁸

It should be noted that, before the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, all the Arab Gulf States had recognised the security, both internal and external, of the Gulf region as the responsibility of the Shah of Iran with the assistance of Saudi

45. Feste, Karen A. *The Iranian Revolution and Political Change in the Arab World*. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi 1996. p. 9.

46. Al-Anazi, Abdullah M. *op.cit.* pp. 73-74 and see Ramazani, R.K. *op.cit.* p. 7.

47. Mahmood, Fazal. *Threat Perception of the Gulf Arab States A Study of the Emergence of the Gulf Co-operation Council*. Center of West Asian Studies, Aligrah Muslim University, India, 1990, p. 28.

48. Al-Marhuby, Abdullah A. *op.cit.* p. 12.

Arabia and support from Washington. The fall of the Shah in 1979 constituted a real internal and external threat to the conservative Arab States as well as posing a real threat to the interests of the United States: she could no longer act as the region's policeman and use Iran as a buffer state between the Soviet Union and the Gulf.⁴⁹

Iran's style of Islam was revolutionary, militantly anti-Western and activist, and it repeatedly clashed with the Arab Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, who sought to use Islam pragmatically to bolster the *status quo*.⁵⁰ The Iranian revolution, under Ayatollah Khomeinī, brought a direct threat to the Arab Gulf States' regimes by its impact for political change.

The Events in the Holy City of Mecca in 1979

The most important internal threat which faced Saudi internal security was the seizure of the Grand Mosque. Some 200-300 persons occupied the Holy Mosque in Mecca on 4 November 1979 and held the area of the Mosque for more than two weeks. The group, which was commanded by Juhayman al-'Utaibī, called itself the Muslim Revolutionary Movement in the Arabian Peninsula.⁵¹

The seizure of the Grand Mosque was a new stage of internal threat to the Arab Gulf States and was a serious challenge to the Saudi royal family, as this was the main holy place of the Muslims. The occupation of the Mosque seemed to be part of a growing Islamic tide in the Arab Gulf States, especially among those who disagreed with Saudi foreign policy and her relations with the West, and in particular, the United States. During the recapture of the Mosque 102 insurgents and 127 soldiers were killed. Later, in January 1980, 63 members of the group who had been captured were beheaded at public executions held in various cities throughout the country.

Many sources indicate that Special Forces from the West, especially from France, played a significant role in the battle with the Juhayman force. During the fighting in the Grand Mosque there were riots and demonstrations by Shi'a dissidents

49. Christie, John. *op.cit.* p. 9.

50. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Iran - Saudi Arabian Relations and Regional Order" *Adelphi Paper* 304, London, 1996. p. 15.

in the Eastern Province and over 20,000 troops, including some from Pakistan, were required to restore order and prevent the unrest from spreading to the Shi'a communities in the rest of Saudi Arabia.⁵² This event led directly to the co-ordination of the royal families in the Arab Gulf States towards strengthening their internal security against Islamic movements, especially Shi'ite ones. Since 1979 Saudi Arabia has played a significant role in co-ordinating the Intelligence Departments of the Arab Gulf States on matters of security through treaties and agreements.⁵³

Shortly after the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, the Shi'a of the Arab Gulf, with strong support from Iran, became more militant. Some Shi'a, from Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, established an "Islamic Revolution Organisation for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula". This organisation was often involved with secular dissidents in various anti-regime activities. Some sources indicate that, by 1986, there were about 900 political prisoners in Saudi Arabia.⁵⁴

Disunity and Breakup of the Arab World

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 had a considerable effect on Arab policies and the Arab co-operation system, especially on the countries of the Arab Gulf. This development led to the emergence of a strong tide of nationalism, and the radical (revolutionary) Arab States of Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and South Yemen, as well as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, launched a strong campaign against Egypt and those Arab countries with good relations with the United States.

The Arab Gulf States hesitated a great deal before joining the Arab Summit of 1978, which was held in Baghdad to discuss Egypt's planned peace treaty with Israel.

51. Mahmood, Fazal. *op.cit.* pp. 31-32.

52. *Jane's Sentinel NewsLetters*: The Gulf States. 1995, London. p. 25.

53. Salamé, Ghassân. *op.cit.* "Assessing Alternative Future Arrangements for Regional Security" in: Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross (eds.) *Powder Kegs in the Middle East The Struggle for Gulf Gulf Security*. Roman and Littlefield Publisher, Inc. Langham, Maryland, U.S.A. 1995, pp. 40-41.

54. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Iran - Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" *Adelphi Paper* Issue No. 304. The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1996, London, p. 16.

However, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf countries were in no position to boycott the conference. Egypt, who had been the main ally of the Arab Gulf States under the regime of Sadat, no longer had any importance for the Arab countries, particularly the conservative regimes of the Gulf. All the countries of the Arab Gulf severed their diplomatic relations with Egypt and rejected the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, with the exception of the Sultanate of Oman, who welcomed the Treaty and maintained its relations with Egypt.⁵⁵ During the late 1970s, the Arab Gulf States had to assure their security and stability without any security umbrella after the axis between Cairo, Tehran, and the Arab Gulf States became redundant. After the many events which took place in the Gulf area affecting the stability of the Gulf monarchies, splits and polarization in the Arab system became prevalent, particularly at the start of the Iran-Iraq war, when Syria and Libya supported Iran.⁵⁶

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980

The crucial and immediate threat to direct security in the Arab Gulf States, which led to the setting up of the Gulf Co-operation Council, was the War between the two largest regional countries, Iraq and Iran in September 1980. The war began after a period of deteriorating relations between these two historic rivals, dating from the fall of the Shah and his replacement by the Iranian Islamic Revolution.⁵⁷

The political hostilities between Iran and Iraq took a decisive step when Şaddam Hussein (who had become the Iraqi head of state in mid-1979), took the formal step of abrogating the 1975 accord between Iraq and Iran which was signed under the auspices of the Algerian President Bu Madyan for sharing the sovereignty of the

55. Mukhleş, Aḥmad A. *Majlis al-Ta'āwun Li-Duwal al-Khalij al-'Arabiyyah Dirāṣah Siyāsiyyah*. Arabian Gulf Studies Center. University of Başra, Iraq, 1986, p. 85.

56. Abe, Hiroyuki. *Regional Integration in the Gulf The background to the Formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council*. The Institute of Middle East Studies, Japan, 1987, p. 74.

57. Tartter, Jean R. "Regional and National Security Consideration" in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed) *Persian Gulf States Country Studies*. *op.cit.* p. 325.

Shatt el-Arab between the two countries. The Iraqi President declared that Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab had been restored.⁵⁸

The speech which best explains the effect of the Iran-Iraq war on the Arab Gulf States security is that of the former Secretary-General of the GCC, 'Abdullah Bishārah:

*The Iran-Iraq war has always been our major concern. It is a nightmare that sleeps with us, has breakfast with us, comes to picnic with us. However, we have an expertise in war management--to head off the crisis, to contain it, to minimize the damage and to scare away the threat. We have outsmarted the war, outwitted it through juggling. We are not going to be dragged into it, no matter how it intensifies.*⁵⁹

From the outbreak of war to the time of the establishment of the GCC, the conflict went through four distinct phases: the period before September, escalating tensions and incidents on the border; the Iraqi attacks of 22 September; the Iranian strikes in November on the Iraqi oil infrastructure; and a period lasting up until May 1981 in which no major victories were achieved by either side. It should be recorded that the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted for eight years from 1980 to 1988, resulted in an estimated 400,000 deaths and 1 million wounded on the Iranian side and 300,000 deaths and 800,000 wounded on the Iraqi side. By 1987, Iran had suffered more deaths in battle than the United States did in World War II, and Iran only had a third the population of 1945 America.⁶⁰

Power Struggle in the Gulf Region

The Gulf area has, for centuries, attracted the attentions of the leading nations of the world. The Portuguese, Ottomans, Dutch, French, Russians, British and the United States are some of the major players in the history of the Gulf region. The modern

58. Peterson, Erik R. "The GCC and Regional Security" in: Sandwick, John A.(ed.) *The Gulf Cooperation Council, Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado. p. 170.

59. Dietl, Gulshan. *op.cit.* p. 53.

60. Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert. *Politics in the Middle East*. Fourth Edition, 1994. p. 386 and see. Al-Marhuby, Abdullah A. *op.cit.* p. 14.

history of power struggles and competition in the Gulf region started in the period after the end of the Second World War, except for British involvement.

The Gulf region became an important area for these powers after the discovery of oil. The presence of Britain, followed by the United States after the end of the Second World War, gave the other great powers, especially the Soviet Union, the pretext to become involved in the Gulf region.⁶¹ Historically, the Soviet Union has viewed the Gulf region, the area adjacent to its south-eastern borders, as a tempting area for expansion. Soviet involvement in the Arabian Peninsula came as a result of her support for the revolutionary regime in North Yemen and her relations with Naşşer of Egypt. The conflict in North Yemen (between the revolutionaries backed by Egypt and the Soviets and the Royalists backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States) was the first Soviet step in gaining a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf.⁶²

The Soviet strategic aim was to stretch her authority as far as the warm waters of the Gulf, with consideration given to geographic, ideological, and increasingly economic factors. Soviet behaviour was also influenced by ideological competition with the West. This resulted in her support of anti-western movements in the Arabian Peninsula and other parts of the Middle East through the Leftist, Communist and Nationalist Parties in Iraq, South Yemen and the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman.⁶³ The growing Soviet strategic link with Iraq (in 1972, the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation), South Yemen and Ethiopia caused a direct threat to the Arab Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia and Oman, who were affected by the perceived Soviet threat from neighbouring South Yemen and the activities of the Dhofari rebellion in the south of Oman, which was directly supported by South Yemen and the Soviet Union. The struggle for power become more critical during the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union and her allies, Cuba and East Germany, established a regular presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia, supported by her

61. Al-Anazi, Abdullah M. *op.cit.* 57.

62. Muqallid, Ismā'īl Ş. *Amn al-Khalīj Wa-Taḥḍīyyāt al-Şirā' al-Dūwālī*. Al-Ruby'ān Publication, Kuwait, 1984. p. 3.

acquisition of military facilities in Aden, Socotra in South Yemen and the Dahlak islands in Ethiopia.

The struggle over the Gulf region become more intensive during the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block were faced by severe oil shortages. The Siberian fields had become depleted and, like the West, they too became dependent on supplies from the Gulf area.⁶⁴ During the late 1970s, direct and indirect Soviet intervention across the geographical zone spanning southern Africa and south-east Asia presented a pattern which greatly concerned Western policy-makers: radical leftist regimes were appearing in countries such as Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Angola with close economic, diplomatic and military links to the Soviet Union. Many Western scholars could see the Soviet Union gaining momentum in the third world, in contrast to the relatively rapid decline in the Western position in that area.⁶⁵

The American presence in the Gulf area, from the early 1950s, came as a result of her relations with her allies, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Baghdad Pact of 1955 was the first American exercise in foreign policy in the Gulf region. The Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 was the first step towards ensuring America's rights to post military forces in the area to block any expansion of the Soviet Union into the Gulf region and the Middle East. The American policy aim was to secure the alliance of the conservative regimes in the Gulf by attaching them, uncompromisingly, to the Western world with respect to their military and economic interests.⁶⁶

During the years from 1957 to 1967 Arab radicalism posed a real threat to the Arab Gulf States. They feared the threats posed them by political forces backed from outside, Ba'athists, members of the Arab nationalist movements, and the Arab migrant

63. Mottale, Morris Merhrdad. *The Arms Buildup in the Persian Gulf*. Lanham University Press of America, London, 1986, p. 46.

64. Acharya, Amitav. *The Gulf Co-operation Council and Security: Dilemmas of Dependence. 1981-88*. Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, London, 1989. pp. 6-7.

65. Litwak, Robert and Macfarlane, Neil "Soviet activism in the Third World" *Survival*. Vol. XXIX No.1. pp. 21-23.

66. Murray, Gordon. *Conflict in the Persian Gulf*. The Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1987, p. 21.

workers, especially Palestinians, Iraqis and Yemenis.⁶⁷ (for more details see chapter no. 3 and 4)

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The second major event which represented a direct external threat to the Arab Gulf States was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The presence of over 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan brought this external threat closer to the Arab Gulf States (since the distance from Afghanistan to the Gulf region is only 450 miles).⁶⁸ The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coincided with a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East in favour of the Soviet Union. At the time of the Soviet invasion, the United States was in no position to protect the Arab Gulf States against any invasion from Afghanistan.

The United States had no tangible policy and virtually no military capability in the region to counter additional Soviet advances toward the area of the Gulf.⁶⁹ The situation in Afghanistan led to an intensive effort between the Arab Gulf States and the United States to counter the Soviet expansion. In Washington, President Carter declared the Gulf region to be a vital region for the United States and created a new force (DIF) to protect the Gulf from aggression or any attempt by the Soviet Union to seize the Gulf oil fields and cut off the West's vital oil lifeline. He also encouraged the Arab Gulf States to form closer relations in order to help cope with the Soviet external threat.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a new level in the relations between the Arab Gulf States and Washington and American troops were stationed in the

67. Halliday, Fred. "The Gulf War and its Aftermath: First Reflections" *International Affairs*. Vol. 67 No. 1 January 1991. The Royal Institution of International Affairs, Cambridge, 1991, p. 99.

68. Magnus, Ralph H. "Afghanistan and the Gulf Security: A Continuing Relationship" in: Darius, Robert G and others (eds.) *Gulf Security into the 1980s. Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions*. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1984. p. 26.

69. Teicher, Howard and Teicher, Gayle Radley. *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush*. William Morrow and Company Inc, New York, 1993. p. 77.

Arab Gulf States on a permanent basis to protect the countries from internal and external threats.⁷⁰

Views Behind the Emergence of the GCC

The most important reasons for the foundation of the GCC as mentioned by the Secretary-General ('Abdullah Bishārah) of the GCC, are as follows:-

- 1) The radical changes in international economic relations which transferred the oil power from the companies and major consumers to the producers. These changes were crowned by the British withdrawal from the Gulf region and the rise in the importance of the oil of the Arab Gulf states after 1973.
- 2) The changes in the Arab countries which brought into force the concept of Arab security unification, a matter which convinced the six Arab Gulf states that they should make collective efforts for the security of the region.
- 3) The Iran-Iraq war, the clear message of which was that the Arab Gulf countries should think and deal in a non-traditional way. In other words, they should depend on their own means and abandon the old concepts of Arab security.
- 4) The nature of the region, its political and economic advantages and its international importance.
- 5) The problems of development, manpower, similarity in economics and the social and political structure. These states are well aware of the importance of being less dependent on oil and of diversifying the sources of their income.⁷¹

Dr Ḥassan Al-'Alkīm believes that, in addition to the previous reasons for the establishment of the GCC, Saudi Arabia desired to legitimise her dominant role over the other Arab Gulf states and enhance her position in the sub-Gulf regional system and the regional system in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-'Alkīm also believes that, among the causes of the establishment of the GCC, was the wish of the U.S.A. to

70. MacDonald, Charles G "U.S. Policy and Gulf Security" in: Darius, Robert and others (eds.) *Gulf Security into the 1980s Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions*. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, USA, 1984, p. 93.

71. Bishāra, 'Abdullāh Y. *Tajrubat Majlis al- Ta'āwun al-Khalījī khaṭwah aw 'Aqabah fī Ṭarīq al-Waḥdah al-'Arabiyyah*. Muntadā al-Fikar al-'Arabī, 'Ammān. pp. 32-33.

bring about a system of security for the allied countries so that they could look after themselves until the arrival of American military supplies.⁷²

It should be noted that the South-East Asian League including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei (who enrolled in 1985), which was founded in 1967, is considered as the organisation most similar to the GCC in its regional developments, and foreign political tendencies. The main objective of this League was to confront Communist expansion in south-east Asia. The United States of America played a major role in supporting the establishment of the league in order to resist the Communist expansion supported by Moscow and Peking. But the South-east Asian League, with an initiative from Malaysia in 1975, gave the economic side a great deal more importance than the political one as far as the relations between these states went. The political tendencies, which led to the foundation of the South-east Asian League, are similar to those of the GCC, which opposes Communism and supports Western policies.⁷³

Regional and International Reactions to the Foundation of the GCC

Arab Reactions

All the Arab Gulf States (GCC) claim that the Co-operation Council is considered as a “brick in the Arab building” and not an alliance or an axis directed against someone. It is just a regional organisation working within and according to the Arab League objectives.⁷⁴

The Council was welcomed by the newspapers in Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, and Egypt, and was considered as a step in the right direction. Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya and Algeria were more reserved, however. Libya, South Yemen and Syria adopted a rather cautious official approach towards the foundation of the GCC, neither

72. Interview with Ḥassan Al-Alkīm. op.cit.

73. Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullāh. *Al-'Alāqāt al-Duwalīyyah Li-Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī*. Dhāt al-Salāsīl Publication, Kuwait. p. 38 and Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah. *Al-Iṭṭār al-Qānūnī*. op.cit. p. 168.

74. Rajab, Yahyā Ḥilmī. op.cit. p. 71.

supporting it nor condemning it outright. They took note of the emergence of this regional body against a backdrop of increased American presence in the region. Her naval activity in the Indian Ocean had increased and the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and new naval bases had been established in Oman and Bahrain.⁷⁵

The official Arab positions varied according to the interests and strategic relations of those states with the Arab Gulf States of the GCC.⁷⁶ Chedli Klibi, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, described the Council as a pioneering step in the Arab world. Al-Ḥabīb Al-Shaṭī, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Organisation, considered the foundation of the Co-operation Council of the Arab Gulf States as a new and important factor, a solid support for the Arab nation.⁷⁷ Iraq, which was the only non-GCC country with borders on the waters of the Gulf, emphasized that the freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the maintenance of security in the Gulf region was the responsibility of the states bordering the waterway and declared her opposition to any regional alliance. Although Iraq had her reservations about the establishment of the GCC, she was not in a position to mount serious opposition because she had just started a war with Iran and needed to improve her relations with the GCC states and the other Arab states in order to obtain aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Iraqi foreign minister, Sa'dūn Ḥammādy, in an interview in London in March 1981, commented that "the Gulf Cooperation Council was an attempt to disregard and emasculate the Arab League"⁷⁸

Somalia also expressed her opposition to the establishment of the Council after her application for membership was turned down. The former Yemen Democratic Republic also criticised the establishment of the Council and called on the Peninsular States, the States of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa to convene a conference to

75. Al-Moussa, Abdulaziz. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: An Experiment in Regional Organization A Legal and Political Analysis*. Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneve, 1988. p. 23.

76. Al-Nūfaysī, 'Abdullāh F. *Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī al-Iṭār al-Siyāsī Wal-Istrāṭijī*. (Gulf Co-operation Council: The Political and Strategic Framework) *Arab Gulf* Vol. 15 PT 1, London, 1983, p. 30.

77. Rajab, Yaḥyā Ḥilmī. *op.cit.* pp. 71-72.

78. Mukhlis, Aḥmad 'A. *op.cit.* p. 115.

discuss the security issue in the region. In the Arab Republic of Yemen, the Ṣan‘ā newspapers expressed strong criticism for the Council and considered it harmful to Yemen. They accused the six states of the GCC of disregarding the interests of Yemen because they had met to discuss the security of the region without Yemen’s participation as if Yemen had no connection with it. Ṣan‘ā newspapers commented: “if our brothers in the Peninsula and the Gulf considered that Yemen was a non-oil state and that was the only reason for excluding it from the security scheme and from the Gulf Co-operation Council, the Council should rather been called the Oil Gulf States Co-operation Council.⁷⁹

During the council Summit, held in Doḥa in December 1996, the Republic of Yemen submitted an application to join the GCC, but the application was rejected. The council members suggested that they should deal with Yemen according to special agreements between Yemen and the Arab Gulf states. But Qatar, who refused to support the separation of South Yemen and supported Ṣan‘ā during the civil war of 1994, suggested, after long negotiations between the leaders of the GCC countries, the foundation of a Regional Co-operative Council including both Iraq and Yemen. This was totally rejected by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Some reliable Gulf sources mention that some of the Gulf countries of the council, including Oman, Qatar and the UAE, did not make any reservations about the affiliation of Yemen to the council. However this did not amount to full support for Yemen’s affiliation to the co-operation council because of the strong objections by some of the other countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. She claimed that this matter would represent a very dangerous precedent and would have negative reactions on the existing homogenous structure of the member states regarding the similarity in all levels.⁸⁰

Ṣan‘ā confirmed that the question of their application for membership into the co-operation council was still on the table. However, the Yemeni leadership confirmed through the speech of President ‘Alī ‘Abdullah Ṣaleḥ, that the reasons that made Yemen apply for affiliation to the Gulf Co-operative Council were that Yemen

79. ‘Ubayed, Nāyif ‘Alī. *Majlis al-Ta‘āwun Li-Duwāl al-Khalīj al-‘Arabiyyah Min al-Ta‘āwun ilā al-Takāmūl*. *op.cit.* p. 135.

considers herself an integral part of the structure of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. When She applied for affiliation to the GCC she took into consideration the fact that Yemen shares the same geography, history and strategic attitude as the GCC States. She also took into account the economic and security considerations in addition to the fact that co-operation between Yemen and the six member states would serve the peace, stability and security of the region.⁸¹ The Yemeni Minister for Legal Affairs confirmed that the systems of the GCC did not include any provisions which might hinder the affiliation of Yemen to it. All the main terms and conditions were satisfied, the most important of which is the historical and geographical correlation, as no one is allowed to delete Yemen from the map.⁸²

Iran condemned the project of the GCC immediately. 'Alī Khameneī the spokesman of the revolution explained the opinion of his government, indicating that this agreement had been made against Iran. However, no practical reason has been given by Iran to explain her rejection. Iran, with emphasis on 'neither East nor West', expressed serious doubt as to the professed goals of the GCC.⁸³ Tehran declared, before the formal constitution of the council, that the council would be nothing less than a military alliance under the umbrella of the United States, a substitute for a treaty organisation. Once the GCC was established, Iran warned that nothing could be decided in the Gulf region without her consent.⁸⁴

80. *'AALAM AL-KHALEEJ*. Issue No. 46. April 1997. London. p. 1.

81. *Rose al-Yūsuf Magazine*. Vol. 3604. No.72. Monday 7/7/1997. Cairo. p. 29.

82. Some political analysts have explained that the acceptance of Yemen as a member of the GCC would have meant the acceptance of a revolutionary state which had deep socialist roots in a conservative, capitalist gathering of hereditary monarchies, a matter which might politically influence these ruling regimes. However, the *Middle East News Newspaper* issued in London, alleged that an American strategy sought to join Yemen to the co-operation council; the Newspaper explained that the USA considered Yemen as the South-East gate of the Gulf region, and that its affiliation to the council would allow the deployment of Gulf Forces or Allied Forces from the Gulf at Bab al-Mandab at the south entrance of the Red Sea. *Reuter News Agency*. News issued on 30/2/1997, London. See also *'AALAM AL-KHALEEJ*. *op.cit.* p. 1.

83. Al-Rumaiḥī, Muḥammād. *Al-Khalīj Lays Nifṭan Dirāsah fī-Ishkāliyyāt Tanmiyah Wa-al-Waḥdah*. Kāẓmah Publication, Kuwait, 1983, p. 117.

84. Braun, Ursula "The Gulf Cooperation Council" in: Maul, Hanns W and Pick, Otto (eds) *The Gulf War Regional and International Dimensions*. London, 1989, p. 90.

International Reactions

The United States

The United States of America welcomed the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council. The State Department issued a statement which said: “the establishment of the Council was a initiative which, as far as we know, came from the member States of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates without consultation with any states outside the region. That initiative is their business and we have no right to comment on their goal or on the extent of the co-operation between these states. American policy, which generally supports the concept of co-operation among countries of the Gulf, is an old-established and well-known policy. We have been able, for a long time, to maintain strong relations with those countries who have become members of the Council.”⁸⁵

The Soviet Union

Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, gave the Soviet Union’s reactions when Sheykh Şabaḥ Al-Aḥmad, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait, visited Moscow in April 1981, to explain the idea of the Co-operation Council to Soviet officials. The response of Gromyko, quoted by Pravda, was to criticise the Omani proposal for the establishment of a common navy to protect the Strait of Hormuz; Pravda also criticised the Saudi initiative for the “unification of the military potentials of such countries” saying that this alliance could not serve stability in the region.⁸⁶ The Soviets considered that the establishment of the GCC could not have taken place without American support and that the United States and her allies in NATO were trying to create an alliance similar to their own in the Gulf region. They believed that

85. Rajab, Ḥilmī. *op.cit.* p. 70. See also. Mukhlis, Aḥmad ‘A. *op.cit.* p. 116., and See. *Wathā’iq Majlis al-Ta’āwun al-Masīrah wa-Taḥdiyyāt*. The GCC Secretariat Publications. 1986, pp. 63-64.

86. ‘Ubayd, Nāyif ‘A. *op.cit.* p. 136.

the GCC could not serve stability in the Gulf or the interests of the Arab people.⁸⁷ The Soviet media adopted a negative attitude towards the GCC by calling it “a rich men’s club of conservative Arab oil-producing countries”.

Radio Moscow said that the Riyadh Conference, at which the establishment of the council was decided, had not devoted its attention to the presence in the region of a huge naval fleet of the USA and its NATO allies. Nevertheless the Soviets, while remaining critical of the council, found it preferable to avoid any expression of open or direct attack against it at this time. The Soviet Union supported, however, those countries in the region with a pro-Soviet orientation, and encouraged them to join together as a counter-weight to the GCC. One such move was the South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia treaty.⁸⁸

In a report published by Kuwaiti *Al-Anbā* Newspaper on 30 December 1984 on Soviet attitudes to the GCC, it stated that the indifference of Moscow to the council was due to the following reasons:

- 1) Five of the Co-operation Council states have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc Countries. Some of these five states still insist on not establishing diplomatic relations despite the many attempts of the Soviet Union regarding this matter.
- 2) Those countries which refuse to establish any relations with Moscow, however, have close relations with the USA.
- 3) Despite the fact that the Co-operation Council has an economic bias towards Gulf co-ordination and integration, the Gulf military and security side has become one of major interest, especially, as this Gulf military interest is similar to U.S plans of containing the Soviets.

One of the Soviet officials gave his opinion on the Co-operation Council: “the Co-operation Council is a kind of regional coalition, and one of Washington’s ideas was to establish Arab military coalitions in the Middle East, and that these coalitions should be hostile to the Soviet Union”. The official added that the Co-operation

87. Mukhlis, Ahmad ‘A. op.cit. p. 117.

Council was one of Washington's concepts, and that the Council was established on an economic basis not on a military one. However it would gradually become one of the military fronts associated with Washington.⁸⁹

Britain

In London the former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, welcomed the establishment of the GCC and paid tribute to its members and called for closer relations especially on the issue of security in the Gulf area.

Other countries such as Pakistan, India, Turkey, China, Japan, South Korea, France, West Germany, Holland, Belgium and Austria welcomed the establishment of the GCC.⁹⁰

Conclusion of Chapter Two

This chapter focuses on the political developments which paved the way for the establishment of the GCC in May 1981. Despite the talk that the GCC foundation came as a result of the joint factors existing between the Arab Gulf states such as Arabic, Islam, similar regimes (monarchies), similar economies, social affairs, culture, and shared geography, in reality internal and external security provided the main reasons which caused these states to create a foundation between them.

The British decision to withdraw from the Gulf region in the early 1970s was one of the main events that caused the Arab Gulf states to find some form of co-ordination amongst themselves in order to cope with threats to internal security (coming from the PFLO, the rise of the Shi'a (supported by Iran), the nationalist movements and expatriates) and external security (coming from the fall of the Shah

88 Al-Moussa, Abdulaziz. *op.cit.* pp. 26-27.

89. However, in 1985, the relations between Moscow and the Arab Gulf states witnessed some progress in the diplomatic field, shown by the decision of both Muscat and Abu Dhabi to establish diplomatic relations, followed by Riyadh and Manamah subsequently. It should be noted that, before 1985, Moscow did not have diplomatic relations with any of the Arab Gulf states except Kuwait. See *Wathāiq Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Masirah wa-Taḥādiyyāt*. The Secretariat of the GCC Publications, The University of Kuwait, 1984, pp. 59-60.

90. 'Ubayd, Nayif 'Ali. *op.cit.* p. 137.

of Iran, the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War).

On May 25, 1981, six Arab Gulf states-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman-signed a charter establishing a regional entity called “the Co-operation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf” otherwise known as the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The formation of the GCC was aimed at shoring up the security of the Arab Gulf states and their regimes. Following a number of incidents of political violence, particularly the attempted coup in Bahrain in late 1981, “security”, internal or external, became the most prominent priority for Arab Gulf regimes and the council agenda. In fact the idea of establishing a Gulf regional organisation began in 1976 when Muscat hosted a regional conference for the eight countries of the Gulf (GCC + Iraq and Iran). After some consultations between the eight countries there were many proposals and projects that contributed to the founding of GCC.

The foundation of such a council and the restriction of its membership to the six conservative Arab states gave rise to regional and international reactions ranging between anger, acceptance and support. The USA and Britain were the countries that most welcomed the foundation of such a council and encouraged the efforts and objectives for which was established; on the other hand some of the progressive Arab countries, as well as Iran and the Soviet Union, believed the foundation of the GCC to be an expansion of American and British domination in the Gulf area.

The basic charter of the council mentioned co-operation between the six states in every aspect; economic, social, political, cultural, and trade. However, most of the basic charter, which was signed in 1981, did not make much progress, except for the close co-operation on internal security between their intelligence departments (internal security co-operation between the GCC states, in fact, remains one of the most developed forms of co-operation within the Gulf community). Since the early 1970s the Arab Gulf states have made many attempts to reach political co-operation; however these attempts have failed as a result of the following:

a) the lack of political participation by these countries; b) the disputes over borders; c) the concept of sovereignty for the individual state; d) the nature of the royal families' regimes; e) outside powers' attention and rivalry; f) the nature of domestic politics and finally; g) the low degree of economic interaction and the political disputes over foreign policy.

The Omani Minister of Information said that the main objective of the Muscat conference of 1976 was to allow co-operation between the eight Gulf countries (GCC+ Iraq and Iran) and reach a common security between them. But the ideological differences, between Iran and Iraq on one side and Iraq, Iran and the Arab Gulf states on the other, stood in the way of the realisation of such an objective. The Minister added that there was no doubt at all that, for the benefit of the six states, there should be a joint co-ordination between them. This should be on a political and economic level and should be limited to the six states only.⁹¹

The importance of this council came as a result of oil, as all the GCC states sit on the world's largest known reserves of crude oil. The region's production is about 14 million barrels per day. Many political analysts considered that the formation of the GCC, in May 1981, might encourage the six Arab Gulf states to benefit from the 1970s experience concerning Gulf security. They might understand those lessons, particularly that the balance of power was in favour of Iran and Iraq as compared to the power of the six Arab Gulf states.

The objective of the GCC's establishment was the creation of a third power in the region, starting with the concept of security and ending with common economic and political integration between the council member states. These aims have not been achieved, and the council has failed to carry out the collective security function. The Arab Gulf states began to build up their own military power individually. The consensus between these countries did not go beyond the establishment of the "Desert Shield" Force.

There were continuous discussions on the necessity of developing military co-operation between the GCC states as well as collective co-ordination in the security, political and economic fields. The GCC summits continued to repeat many claims

without making any practical application to them. Since the foundation of the GCC in 1981, the security of the Arab Gulf states has just remained appeals and slogans. The six countries realise that Gulf security is the responsibility of the Gulf peoples despite the extensive Western military presence in the region.

Regarding the basic proposals which might activate the role of the GCC, Aḥmed Yusuf Al-Ḥārthy, the Chancellor of the Arabian Department at the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believes that the council's role is to realise the objectives for which it was founded. They are superior objectives seeking integration between the six countries in order to achieve social, economic and political security for their peoples, a matter which must be realised through the application and the implementation of the unified decisions of the GCC, especially in the supreme council.

In addition to the above-mentioned reasons there is the popular and governmental desire in the Gulf countries, who view the council as a sort of refuge, to conserve the political and social identity of the six separate states. This formal and popular concurrence forms the basic reason for the existence and the continuation of the GCC.

I myself think, as a Gulf citizen who believes absolutely in a link between causes and results, that the GCC has responded to some of its objectives. I mean that it has conserved the political identity of the six states during serious threats to its security in the form of the political events witnessed by the region during the past two decades, such as the Iranian Revolution, the eight year war between Iran and Iraq and, more recently, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and her liberation. The GCC provided the political protection for the security and organisation of Kuwaiti refugees who fled to the other GCC states. Moreover the GCC countries defended their case with all their power. To say that the council has realised most of the objectives for which it has been established, however, is a dream and not a reality.

Therefore, the GCC can be considered as a political, co-operative formulation between the six members to conserve the features and the characteristics of their

91. Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Rawās. *op.cit.*

countries as well as their internal independence and realise a degree of co-operation between them in the economic, security, defensive and political fields. The creation of the GCC can be considered as the first organised constitutional framework between these countries.

Gulf Security



Introduction

The security equation in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf is complex and involves the global and regional balance, as well as questions of national defence and internal security.¹ Security (internal and external) in the Gulf region is one of the most important challenges facing the Gulf Co-operation Council States. The rivalry between the great powers has been one of the main features of Gulf history.

The Portuguese became the first Western country to be involved in the Gulf region, in 1506. They remained a dominant power in the area for more than a hundred years. The Ottoman Empire attempted to extend its sovereignty over the Gulf region many times (for example in 1538 and 1581). In the aftermath of the crushing military defeat of the first Saudi State and the destruction of the Wahhābī Fort of Diriyah in 1818, the Ottomans were able to further expand their influence in Arabia. Oman and the Trucial States remained relatively independent of Ottoman domination. The Ottomans secured their influence in Arabia, by recognising the authority of several Sheykhs throughout the various regions. However, their influence in Arabia had declined by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. From 1622 until the beginning of the eighteenth century the Dutch became the paramount power in the Gulf.

With the rise of the British East India Company, the Gulf became more important to the imperial policy of Britain, especially during the Seven-Years war with France in the eighteenth century (1756-1763).² Britain's influence and presence in the Gulf area grew on the pretext of British Commerce and the free movement of international trade. Britain especially wanted to protect the route to India against any of the other powers such as Holland, Russia, France and Germany.

1. MacDonald, Charles G "U.S. Policy and Gulf Security"op.cit. p. 98.

In 1763 Britain began to impose colonial rule by establishing a port at Bushire and appointing a British Political Resident. Britain's major involvement in the Arab (Persian) Gulf region began with the 1798 treaty with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. From 1800 the British government in India concluded a series of agreements with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the other Sheykhhs of the Trucial States, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain. The exclusive agreements between Britain and the rulers of the Arab Gulf forbade any foreign contacts or agreements with countries other than Britain except with British consent and approval. They were to refrain from ceding, selling or letting any part of their respective territories, in any manner or under any circumstances, to any foreign states without prior British agreement. They were also not allowed to grant concessions for the exploration of oil or any other mineral to any foreign country or company without prior consultation and agreement with the British government.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain had earned international recognition for making the vast area of eastern and southern Arabia her own sphere of influence. This recognition was confirmed through bilateral treaties between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, Germany, Japan and Russia.³ In return the British government undertook to defend the sheikhdoms or Emirates against any threat, whether internal or external, and to control their foreign policy on their behalf.⁴

In fact, the British political and military presence in the Gulf region provided a regional security umbrella for the Arab sheikhdoms for more than a hundred years.⁵

2. Al-Baharna, Husain M. *op.cit.* p. 507, and Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah. *Al-Iṭār al-Qānūnī wa-al-Siyāsī Li-Majlis Al-Ta'āwun Al-Khalījī. op.cit.* pp. 61-66.

3. Etaibi, Ghalib Tulhab. *op.cit.* p. 23.

4. Al-Alkim, Hasan H. *The GCC States in An Unstable World. Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Small States.* Saqi Books, London, 1994, p. 35.

5. In the British perspective, the Gulf was seen as part of the larger imperial strategy which focused on India. Until Indian independence in 1947, Britain's Gulf duties were administered by the India Office, with British political officers of the Indian civil service staffing Gulf posts. After 1947, the Gulf was entrusted to the Foreign Office and, in view of Britain's commercial (especially oil) interest in the region, the focus of policy became ensuring local stability and fulfilling treaty requirements. See Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973", *Review of International Studies* Vol.11. No.4. October 1985. (ed.) Jones, Roy E. Butterworths, London. p. 249, and Kelly, J.B. *Arabia, The Gulf and The West. op.cit.* p. 99.

Her presence and the control she exerted until her withdrawal from the area ensured the Gulf's security until December 1971.⁶

American Involvement in Gulf Security

By the end of the Second World War, and as a result of the new American policy in the world, and following the Roosevelt and Truman Doctrines, the United States of America sought to improve and strengthen its political, military and economic relations with the rulers of the Arab Gulf states, particularly the two regional powers of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The American policy in the Gulf region focused on two strategic levels, oil and containment of Communist expansion in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf.⁷

The military intervention of the United States in the Gulf area began during the Second World War with the adoption in 1941 of the ports of Khorramshahr and Shahpur in Iran as bases for the supply of military equipment to the Soviet Union, and the establishment of Al-Ṣāhrān base in Saudi Arabia as a supply base for the American airforce. American strategy also involved supporting Iran and Saudi Arabia through arms sales, military training and oil investments.⁸ The United States continued to build her position in the region, following the Second World War, through diplomatic contacts, intelligence activities and economic and military assistance to friendly governments.

The first American involvement in the Gulf came as a response to the Soviet Union's attempts to establish puppet States in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan after the Second World War. In 1947, the United States President Harry Truman declared a Doctrine which became known as the Truman Doctrine. It was to provide economic

6. Petersen, J.E "The GCC and Regional Security" in: Sandwick, John A. (ed.) *The Gulf Co-operation Council Moderation and Stability in an International World*. Westview press, Boulder, Colorado, U.S.A. 1987. p. 169.

7. Mukhlis, Ahmad 'A. op.cit. p. 59.

8. Dhahir, Ahmed J "The U.S. Relations with the Arab Gulf" in: The Arab Gulf Studies Center Publications (eds.) *The Arab Gulf and The World*. University of Baṣra, Dār al-Ḥikmah, Baghdad, 1991. p. 135.

and military assistance to Iran, Turkey and Greece to help them fight against Soviet expansion in their countries.⁹

During the Eisenhower administration in the mid-1950's, the United States created a new Doctrine to oppose Soviet expansionism in the world. The Eisenhower doctrine consisted of an alliance comprising those countries situated along the southern flank of the Soviet Union. The original members of the alliance, beside the United States and Britain, were Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan. However, the United States was not recognised as a member in order to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union. On 24 February 1955, Iraq and Turkey signed a bilateral treaty of mutual co-operation establishing the Baghdad Pact. Baghdad and Ankara invited regional states to join them in fostering peace and security in the Middle East and the Arabian (Persian) Gulf regions. Britain, Iran and Pakistan joined the Pact in the same year and a permanent secretariat was established in Baghdad. The Pact, linking medium size powers, was initiated by the United States to protect the "Northern Tier" from potential Soviet expansion. The emergence of the Baghdad Pact was the first idea for regional security in the Gulf area and was the first attempt to unite two gulf states, Iraq and Iran, in a move to curb overt and covert Soviet influence in the Gulf region. American policy makers had, for some years, recognised the strategic importance of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf , more particularly the oil of the Gulf, to the defence of Western Europe and for Western interests generally. In 1957 President Eisenhower wrote to an adviser that 'should a crisis arise threatening to cut the Western world off from Mideast oil, we would have [Eisenhower's emphasis] to use force.¹⁰ This pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) ¹¹ and its

9. Mukhlis, Ahmad 'A. op.cit. p. 58.

10. Kechichian, Joseph A. *Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations*. Prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for policy. RAND, USA. p.10. Cordesman, Anthony. op.cit. p. 68. See also Gregory Gause, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" *Review of International Studies*. Vol.11. No.4. October 1985. p. 258.

11. Kechichian, Joseph A. *Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations*. op.cit. pp. 11-12.

headquarters then moved to Ankara after a nationalist military coup in Iraq in 1958.¹² However, the first test for the Eisenhower doctrine came in 1958, when American troops landed in Lebanon after the overthrow of the pro-western monarchical regime in Iraq. On this occasion, however, the Lebanese crisis was solved internally, and American intervention proved unnecessary.¹³

The United States presence in the Gulf region became more firm after the security relations between Washington and the Shah of Iran became stronger and closer following an incident in 1953 when American intelligence assisted the Shah of Iran in overthrowing the government of Muṣṣadeq and saved the Shah's throne. More significantly, the alliance between Iran and the United States was formalised in 1959 when the two countries signed a bilateral security pact. The Pact provided for continued American military and economic aid to Iran as well as an American commitment to take appropriate action including the use of armed forces to assist the Iranian government if Iran was attacked.¹⁴

In the seven years following the Shah's return to power after the downfall of Muṣṣadeq in 1953, the United States donated more than \$400 million in subsidies to the Iranian defence budget. From 1953 to 1960, Iran's army grew from 120,000 men to 190,000; the air force doubled to 8,000 men and the Navy to more than 4,000 men. The price of the Iranian defence expansion increased from 2.5 billion rials in 1953-54 to 14.2 billion in 1959-1960 (7.2 rials equaled one dollar). From the mid-1960s, the Shah of Iran pursued a foreign policy designed to make Iran the strategically dominant power in Western Asia and a pillar of American interests in the Middle East. Writing toward the end of the Shah's period, Fred Halliday said:

Iran is an expansionist power, the most important factor is directly political in that the Iranian regime is concerned to prevent any movement or state from emerging in the region which could weaken Iran's own strategic position. This means that Iran will intervene to crush any nationalist or revolutionary forces outside its boundaries which it regards as a threat to it, and

12. Gordon, Murray "Arc of Crisis : Threat to U.S. Interests" in. Gordon, Murray (ed.) *Conflict in the Persian Gulf*. *op.cit.* pp. 17-20.

13. Edward, Raise. *al-Tawassu' al-Amrīkī Siyāsiyyan Wa-'Askariyyan Fi-al-Khalīj*. Translated by Al-Dalaymī, Muwaffaq. Dār al-Taḳaddum, Moscow, 1989, pp. 9-15.

14. Acharay, Amitav. *U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf: Origins and Evolution Under the Carter and Reagan Administrations*. Routledge, London, 1989, p. 3.

Iran is an expansionist power, The most important factor is directly political in that the Iranian government which it believes it has a reasonable chance of suppressing. This outlook provides the basis for an extremely ambitious policy of intervention, one that has already provided legitimization for a number of aggressive actions and which could do so again in the future. No third world state has a record of intervention outside its frontiers comparable with Iran's in the period since the mid-1960s 15

On the other side of the Gulf, the United States influence had become stronger in Saudi Arabia, especially after the American government had obtained military facilities in Al-Zahrān during the Second World War. The Arabian American Company (ARAMCO) became an important channel of communication in Saudi Arabian international affairs, particularly in its relations with the American government in the wake of the Second World War. Raymond and Hollis summarise ARAMCO's links with the Saudi Royal family during the 1930s and 1940s as follows:

*In all of Saudi Arabia's relations with the United States government the Arabian American Oil Company has played a major role. Company officials frequently serve as informal advisers to the king and his ministers and perform the function of unofficial ambassador in Washington where the company maintains an office. This type of relationship, although admittedly subject to abuse, appears to have been quite advantageous for a government, which until the last few years has had little diplomatic or economic contacts with the outside world. Moreover, so long as the foreign oil policy of the United States coincides more or less with that of the oil company, the arrangement may continue to be useful to the United States government.*16

Saudi Arabia was the first country in the Arab World which allowed an American presence on its territory. On 23 June 1947, Saudi Arabia signed a military agreement with the United States. This agreement was renewed twice, once in 1949 and once in 1959. The Al-Zahrān base in Saudi Arabia was the first American military base in any of the Arab countries. Nevertheless, the Saudi authorities deny this and say that

15. Feste, Karen A. *The Iranian Revolution and Political Change in the Arab World*. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi 1996. pp. 8-9 and Mottale, Morris Mehrdad. *The Arms Build up in the Persian Gulf*. op.cit. p. 3.

16. Al-Shamsi, Saeed, M. *The al-Buraimi Dispute: A Case Study In Inter-Arab Politics*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. The American University, Washington D.C. 1986, pp. 85-86 and see also Reese, John N. *Towards Collective Security in the Gulf: An Evolving United States Role in Support of the GCC States*. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, USA. 1991, pp. 15-17.

there is only an American military team there dealing with the training of the Saudi forces.¹⁷

Following the end of the Second World War the Gulf area became of strategic significance to rival external powers because of its political, economic and strategic importance, especially after the discovery of oil. The end of the Second World War brought about a change in the balance of power; the United States became the sole western power succeeding the British, to rule not only in terms of leadership, but also in terms of an a new imperialistic hegemony .

Soviet Involvement in the Gulf region

The Soviet interest in the Gulf area began during the early 1950s and she became more involved during the early 1960s with the rise of nationalist and left-wing Arab regimes in Cairo and Baghdad. Thus, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union and her allies in the Middle East, Iraq and Egypt, were the greatest direct threat to Gulf security. Moscow's involvement in the early 1960s, in the North Yemen Civil War between the Royalists (backed by Saudi Arabia and America) and the Republicans (backed by Naṣer's Egypt and the Soviet Union), was one of her first involvements in a third world conflict. The situation in North Yemen during the 1960s was a severe challenge to security in the Gulf, especially to that in Saudi Arabia. The Soviet involvement in North Yemen, supporting the Republicans, was the first time that a communist country had extended military assistance to a non-communist country.¹⁸

The security of the Arab Gulf states, during the period of competition between the super-powers in the Middle East after the Second World War, was in the hands of the British. Britain's political and military presence provided a security umbrella against any internal or external threat. After the British withdrawal in the early 1970s

17. Musā, Ḥusayin. *Al-Ittifāqiyyāt al-Muwaqqā'ah Bayn al-Wilāyāt al-Muttaḥidah Wa-Duwal Majlis al-Ta'āwun*. Al-Ḥaḳīqah Press, Beirut, 1987, p. 7. For more details concerning Saudi and United States relations since the early of 1940s see Gormly, James L. "Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia: The United States and the Dhahran Airfield, 1945-46" *Diplomatic History*, Vol.4. 1980. pp. 189-205.

the Gulf region became the centre of international politics and competition. The Soviet threat to the conservative Arab Gulf States became critical after a number of States granted facilities to the Soviet navy. The close relationship the Soviets developed with the Iraqi government at the end of the 1960s allowed them to establish a presence in the port of Umm Qaşr in the Gulf. In addition, through her influence in South Yemen, the USSR had naval facilities in the Arabian peninsula, and an opportunity to support the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). This caused a serious internal threat to the Gulf region in general and threatened Omani internal security for more than ten years. The Omani Front changed its name in 1974 to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). Soviet expansion in the third world also took the form of backing states in the Horn of Africa, an area close to the Gulf region. Somalia was the first country in the Horn of Africa in which the Soviet Union enjoyed a considerable influence. She had the use of port facilities in Berbera up until 1977.

After the Ogaden war between the Marxist regime in Ethiopia (which came to power after a military coup, backed by the Soviet Union, which overthrew the pro-Western monarchy in 1974) and Somalia, Soviet influence increased in Ethiopia. She became, with South Yemen, the most important country in the area for the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. From the early 1970s the Soviet Union concluded many treaties of friendship and co-operation with Iraq, South Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia.¹⁹

The Concept of Gulf Security

The concept of the security of the Gulf region changes according to the needs of the time and the perspectives from which we tackle the subject. To the Western countries, the concept of security in the Gulf focused on securing their vital oil

18. Al-Masaed, Mishel A. *USSR-Gulf States Relations Since the British Withdrawal from East of Suez in 1971*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Denver, USA, 1990, p. 102.

19. Rigsbee, Wallace Lynn. *American Foreign Policy Towards the Sultanate of Oman 1977-1987*. op.cit. p. 13.

supplies and protecting the monarchies regimes in the Gulf against any internal or external threat.

Some Arab countries saw oil as a means of serving general Arab causes, foremost of which was the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, Iraq was an exception to this and aimed to dominate the oil-producing countries in order to protect them from countries like Iran and from the West. The Iranian concept of Gulf security on the other hand, during the Shah's era, concentrated on the superiority of Iran in the Gulf region; during the revolution it aimed to dominate the area with the support of the Shi'a in the Arab Gulf States. The other Arab Gulf states had a different concept of security and Saudi Arabia, the most important Gulf power, aimed to bring all the Arab Gulf States under its umbrella and link their security with her own via individual security agreements with them.²⁰

Not every GCC country was affected by every threat. On the contrary, only Saudi Arabia is exposed on all fronts (Iraq, Iran, and Yemen). Oman and Kuwait (who had a different view, during the 1970s and 1980s, on the security concept in the Gulf) could expect attacks from outside the Gulf region (Iraq is a danger to Kuwait and South Yemen to Oman) while the other GCC countries, UAE, Qatar and Bahrain, are only exposed to threats coming from within the Arab Gulf States (Saudi Arabia and Oman).²¹ There have been three principal stages in the development of the concept of security in the Gulf region since 1971.

The first stage began with British withdrawal in 1971 and continued until the end of 1979, the second stage with the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 until the late 1980s, and the third stage with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 until the mid-1990s.

20. Al-'Aqqād, Ṣalāḥ. *al-Tayyārāt al-Siyāsīyah Fi-al-Khalīj al-'Arabī Min Bidāyāt al-'Uṣūr al-Ḥadithah Ḥatā Azmat 1990-1991*. Al-Anglo al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo, 1992, p. 456.

21. Guazzone, Laura "Gulf Cooperation Council: The Security Policies. [op.cit.](#) pp. 139-140.

External Threats to Gulf Security

British Withdrawal from the Gulf Region

As a result of the many events faced by the British government at the end of the 1960s such as the economic crisis in Britain, her failure to resolve the dispute between the Arabs and Israel and the rise of Arab resentment over British presence in the Arab Gulf (some sources indicated that the continued British presence would serve as a target for radical domestic opposition to the traditional rulers, and was unacceptable to the increasingly nationalistic states in the region),²² the British Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, declared that the British government had decided to withdraw all her forces, by the end of 1971, from East of Suez and the Gulf. It was not until the 1960s, especially with the advent of the Labour Party to power in 1964, that British commitments east of Suez in the Middle East and Far East were called into serious question. They were the remnants of the post-war period of decolonization, and included a British presence in Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and South Arabia along with the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. A combination of budgetary constraints, the opposition of the left wing of the governing Labour Party, and a general (but not universal) consensus that Britain must seek her future in Europe rather than in empire contributed to growing pressures on the governments of Harold Wilson which lasted until 1970 to end the 'east of Suez' role. In response, on 2 March 1965, 20 Labour backbenchers introduced an amendment calling for 'greatly accelerated progress in the reduction of Great Britain's overseas commitments'. The economic crisis of 1967 in Britain accelerated the government's decision before the House of Commons to withdraw from East of Suez by the end of 1971.²³

22. James Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern Affairs said that US viewed the British withdrawal from the Gulf as not only inevitable but beneficial for Western interests: 'Its departure meant a net gain for Gulf stability'. See. Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" *op.cit.* p. 261.

23. Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" *op.cit.* pp. 250-251.

British presence in the Gulf region had traditionally been involved in the management of military and foreign affairs, training and the supply of weaponry. Britain had been the main protector of the conservative Arab Gulf states for more than one hundred years (1820-1971).²⁴ This involvement had been codified in many conventions and treaties between Britain and the Arab Gulf rulers.²⁵ The British influence, at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Gulf region, was summarised by the then British Viceroy in India, Lord Curzon, when he visited the Gulf area, in one of the addresses which he delivered in the Sharjah Emirate on 2nd November 1903, before the Sheykhhs of the Trucial Coast:

*Sometimes I think that the record of the past is in danger of being forgotten, and there are persons who ask why Great Britain continues to exercise these powers. The history of your families, and the present condition of the Gulf, is the answer. We were here before any other power, in modern times, had shown its face in these waters It was our commerce as well as your security that was threatened and called for protection. . . . The peace of these waters must still be maintained . . . , and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme.*²⁶

Sir Jeffrey Arthur, one of the most important British Political Residents in the Gulf, said in a lecture at the University of Durham in 1973:

*When Britain tried to investigate all the contracts and agreements which connect her with the Arab Emirates in the Gulf it was unable to gather it, and it followed that it was sufficient to do away with all agreements without collecting them, when Britain began to give independence to these countries.*²⁷

The British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early 1970s was not a full withdrawal. Britain retained a presence in many areas of the lower Gulf including bases in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. At that time these states faced a real threat from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the

24. Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early of 1970s, Gulf security has become the most popular topic among analysts, scholars and writers concerned with the strategic dimensions of Middle East policy. See Hooglund, Eric "Rethinking Persian Gulf Security?" *Middle East Insight*. Vol. XII. No.2. January-February 1996. p. 31.

25. Gregory Gause III, F " British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" *op.cit.* p.251. See al-Masaed, Mishel A. *op.cit.* p. 2.

26. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. *Bahrain Islands A Legal-Diplomatic Study of the British-Iranian Controversy*. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1955, p. 188.

27. Al-Rumayhī, Muḥammād. *Al-Khalīj Lays Naftan*. *op.cit.* p. 98.

Arabian Gulf. The presence of approximately 800 officers and soldiers along with the training they provided and the occasional manoeuvres carried out by the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), helped to deter threats to the Gulf region.²⁸

The Nixon Doctrine (Twin Pillars)

The United States of America assumed responsibility for protecting its interests in the Gulf area and filled the security gap after the British withdrawal in 1971, when Washington, under the Guam Doctrine or Nixon Doctrine, encouraged the development of an indigenous security system in the Gulf. This led the American administration to adopt the *Twin Pillar* policy in the area, consisting of Iran as the prime regional country and Saudi Arabia as her historical ally. From the early 1970s until 1979, the two countries became militarily the largest and strongest pro-western states in the Gulf region to assume the primary burden of ensuring the stability of the other small conservative Arab states and assist in protecting Western oil interests in the area.²⁹

During the early 1970s the United States administration was unable to replace the British troops in the area because of the American involvement in Vietnam at that time. The Nixon administration also did not want to be involved in any confrontation with the American Congress and the American public.³⁰ However, as a result of

28. It should be recorded that the Sheykh of the Arab Gulf States were not happy with the British withdrawal from the Gulf region. Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan of Abu Dhabi told the British Minister of State, Goronwy Roberts, that he and his fellow Trucial rulers would be willing to bear the entire cost of maintaining British forces in the area. Also Sheykh Rashid b. Sa'id of Dubai reaffirmed Sheykh Zayed's offer. See. Kelly, J.B. *Arabia, the Gulf and the West*. op.cit. pp. 49-50 and *The Times* 22 January 1968. London. p. 1. See also. Gregory Gause III, F. "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" op.cit. pp. 253-256 and Ali, Abdul-Jaleel Kassim. *The Gulf Co-operation Council and Regional Integration: An Analysis of Cultural Origins, Political Evolution and Collective Security*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. The Catholic University of America, Washington D.C. 1987, p. 5. For more details of the British position on the withdrawal from the Gulf region see Gregory Gause III, F "British and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973, op.cit. pp. 249-258.

29. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. p. 10.

30. Stoddard, Philip "The U.S. Approach to the Gulf: Vital Interests in Search of a viable Strategy" in: The Arab Gulf Studies Center Publications. *The Arab Gulf and the World*. University of Basra, Dār-al-Ḥikmah, Baghdad, 1991, p. 37. The US administration (Johnson) had actively opposed the British government's (Labour) progressive withdrawal from east of Suez. For more details of the

Britain's declaration, in 1968, that it would withdraw from the Gulf by the end of 1971, President Nixon announced in Guam in 1969 that:

The United States will keep all its treaty commitments. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with the United States, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole. In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.

The Nixon Doctrine was specifically concerned with the future of American commitments in the Far East. It stated that the United States would help the regional powers ensure local stability through military assistance programs, rather than through the direct military involvement of America. Kissinger, the architect of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf, perceived that the local balance of power had to be stabilised through helping friends of the West build themselves up militarily. He saw Iran, at that time the largest and apparently most stable American ally in the region, as a perfect candidate for becoming the balancing force in the region, and said:

It was imperative for our interests and those of the Western world that the regional balance of power be maintained so that moderate forces could not be engulfed, nor Europe's and Japan's (and as it later turned out, our economic lifeline fall into hostile hands). We could either provide the balancing force ourselves or enable a regional power to do so. There was no possibility of assigning any American military forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam War and its attendant trauma. Congress would have tolerated no such commitment; the public would not have supported it. Fortunately, Iran was willing to play this role... And this was achievable without any American resources, since the Shah was willing to pay for equipment out of his oil reserves.³¹

The Shah of Iran's Ambitions in the Gulf

With the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf area, the Shah of Iran, the "Superpower" of the Gulf countries, was eager to fill the power vacuum. He made no secret of his ambitions and ability to become the guardian of the interests of the

American policy pre-Nixon Doctrine See Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" *op.cit.* pp. 258-260.

31. Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" *op.cit.* p. 262.

United States and the West in the Gulf and protector of the other pro-Western Arab States. The Shah claimed that Iran could provide the Gulf with as much protection as the British forces in the area at the time.³²

Iran's opposition to the continued British presence was voiced immediately after the January 1968 decision of the Labour government and reiterated frequently in the subsequent years. It was no secret that the Shah intended to make Iran the dominant regional power, and wanted no competition from Britain or the United States. In order to smooth the way, he even dropped the Iranian claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, an issue that had blocked the development of co-operative relations with Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf States.³³ The Shah of Iran expressed his role in the Gulf region as follows:

*Our responsibility is not only local; we also have a role to play as protector of 60 percent of the world's oil reserves. Western interests in the Gulf are strategic ones, involving the security of the West, America and Japan. These states cannot, however, defend their interests, so we must do the job for them. Should the struggle in Oman succeed, imagine what would confront us in Muscat, which lies opposite the Straits of Hormuz.*³⁴

When the British troops withdrew from East of Suez, the United States, with the support of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf states, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, started to assume responsibility for the area's security under the provisions of the Nixon Doctrine. In August 1971, in response to a request from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the State Department made the first official statement of American policy in the Gulf after the British withdrawal:

U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf recognises that the littoral states, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, intend to assume primary responsibility for the security of the Gulf once operational British forces are withdrawn ... It is our policy to encourage this determination, to urge the cooperation of Saudi Arabia,

32. Acharya, Amitav. *op.cit.* p. 21 and Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration" United States Army Foreign Military Studies Office. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, 1991, p. 2. The Shah of Iran was particularly pleased with this concept since it fitted in well with his view that Iran could and should play the dominant role in the Gulf region following the withdrawal of the British and that there was no power vacuum because of Iran's presence and capability.

33. Gregory Gause III, F "British and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" *op.cit.* p. 256.

34. *Documents of the National Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf.* *op.cit.* p. 84.

Kuwait and Iran in assisting the orderly development of the Gulf states and to support them as appropriate in this role...35

Since the Shah of Iran had assumed the task of maintaining security in the Gulf region, he launched a campaign, which focused on economic co-operation, diplomacy, trade and cultural exchanges in order to improve his relations with conservative Arab states. From the early 1970s, the United States set up many naval units in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to secure the route through the Strait of Hormuz. She also established many fleet facilities in Bahrain (Jufair military base), Sa'udi Arabia (al-Ẓahrān military base), and Oman (Maṣīrah military base). The facility in Bahrain became America's headquarters in the Middle East.³⁶

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia (as a result of the rapprochement policy, which was mediated by the United States at the end of the 1960s) became supporters of the United States' new policy in the region. It should be noted that military relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran did not begin in the 1970s. Their relationship goes back to 1929, when King 'Abd al-Azīz b. Saud proposed a military pact between Riyadh and Tehran. Iran rejected the Saudi idea of building an independent military force. The Shah of Iran, in his visit to Riyadh in 1957, was content to sign a mere friendship accord. The Saudi-Iranian military co-operation became unequivocal during the Yemen civil war of the early 1960s when they fought against the revolutionaries who were backed by the Nasser regime in Cairo.³⁷

America's policy in the Gulf during the 1970s focused on the idea that Iran should protect the conservative Arab states from any internal and external threats (thus the Iranian military intervention in Oman in 1973 backed the Omani government against the Marxist revolution, which was backed by South Yemen and the Soviet Union). Saudi Arabia, in the meantime, made contributions to the material needs (especially after the oil crisis of 1973, when she gained a lot of money), and

35. Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" *op.cit.* pp. 263-264.

36. Ḥarb, Usāmah Ghazālī "Al-Amn Wa-al-Ṣirā' Fi-al-Khalīj al-'Arabī" in. *Majallat al-Siyāṣah al-Duwalīyyah (International Politics)* Year 16, Issue 62, October 1980, Cairo, p. 11.

37. Bā-Dhib, Sa'īd M. *Al-'Alāqāt al-Sa'ūdiyyah al-Irāniyyah 1932-1983*. Dār al-Sāqī, London, 1994, pp. 169-72.

supported American policy in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf area in particular. Saudi Arabia, during the 1970s, came to be accepted as a major power in the Arab world.³⁸

As a result of Nixon's visit to Tehran in May 1972, the Shah of Iran was able to conclude a secret agreement with the American President providing for the supply to Iran of unlimited quantities of arms she might need. Nuclear and chemical weapons were exempted from this. Iranian arms purchase from the United States in the period from 1950-72 were about \$1.6 billion. In 1972, \$590 million of weapons were supplied to Iran in one year; in 1973 it reached \$2.2 billion, and in 1974 it soared to \$4.2 billion. The value of the Shah's requirements for American weapons, during the period between 1972 and 1978, reached more than \$20 billion in all, and American arms sales to Iran during the reign of the Shah were more than those to any other allied country. (It should be noted that the American administrations dealt directly with Iran without approval or supervision from the Pentagon or the Secretary of State, as a result of the decree of the American National Security Council issued in 1972.)³⁹ Between 1971 and 1978 the size of Iran's armed forces grew from 191,000 to 430,000 personnel, with a similar increase in the number of main/medium battle tanks and combat aircraft. Between 1973 and 1978 Iran spent \$43 billion on its military budget. In 1975 Iran became the largest armament importer in the world. At the time of the Shah's downfall, some \$12 billion in United States military sales was awaiting delivery to Iran for the next five years.⁴⁰

The most important threat facing the Gulf States during the early 1970s was the Soviet influence in Iraq, South Yemen and the Horn of Africa. The only internal threat was the activity of the Omani revolution in the southern part of Oman (Dhofar) which caused a serious threat to Omani security during the early 1970s. When it succeeded in gaining control of many areas in the mountains of the Dhofar province

38. Ḥarb, Usāmah Ghazālī. *op.cit.* pp. 11-12

39. Edwārd, Raise. *op.cit.* p. 127.

40. Furtig, Henner "Iran's Gulf Policy During the 70s" in.: The Arab Gulf Studies Centre Publications. (eds.) *The Arab Gulf and the World*. University of Basra, Dār al-Ḥikmah, Baghdad, 1991, pp. 142-147.

it became a threat not only to the Omani government but to all the other Arab Gulf States.⁴¹

As a result of this threat the Shah of Iran said in an interview:

We consider what is happening in Dhofar as a form of aggression and oppression. Can you imagine the consequence if those savages-the... insurgents - took control of the other side of the Gulf entrance, namely the Strait of Hormuz on which our lives and livelihood depend. Those barbaric people fighting the Sultan are heinous creatures and may be far worse than even the Communists themselves.

Some sources maintain that the Shah's occupation of the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs was the greatest direct threat facing the conservative Arab states in the Gulf, but the Iranian occupation of the three islands came as a result of a previous accord between Iran, Britain and the United States to help the Shah to secure the area of the Gulf, especially the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

Some sources, however, suggested that the Iranian claim on Bahrain was abandoned under an Iranian-Saudi bargain to improve their relations in the early 1970s.⁴² The main implementation of the Nixon Doctrine policy in the Gulf came when the Shah of Iran sent troops to Oman in the early 1970s to combat the Popular Front for Liberation of Oman (PFLO). In 1973 the Shah, "the policeman of the Gulf", at the request of Sultan Qaboos of Oman, sent 3,000 soldiers backed by artillery, helicopters and strike and reconnaissance aircraft to the Dhofar province to assist and support the Omani Army against the activities of the PFLO. The latter was supported and backed by South Yemen and the Soviet Union.⁴³

The Iranian military presence in Oman was encouraged and supported by the United States as well as by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, who backed

41. El-Reyyes, Riyād N. *Riyāḥ al-Sumum al-Sa'udiyyah Wa-Duwal al-Jazīrah Ba'd Ḥarb al-Khalīj 1991-1994*. Riyāḍ El-Reyyes Publications, London, 1994, p. 411.

42. Al-Na'imī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān. *Al-Ṣirā' al-Khalīj al-'Arabī*. Dār al-Kunūz al-Adabiyyah, Beirut, 2nd edn, 1994, p. 140.

43. Acharya, Amitav. *op.cit.* 30.

the Sultan of Oman financially. The Saudi government aid programmes to the Omani government during the struggle in Dhofar were estimated at about \$3 billion .44

Dissident Omani sources in Aden claimed that the Iranian intervention on Omani soil was the implementation of a secret pact concluded by Thuwainī b. Shihab, Sultan Qaboos's representative to the Shah of Iran in 1972. This treaty empowered the Iranian military to contribute to suppression of the revolutionary activity in Dhofar. This was to be balanced by Oman conceding control of the strategic island of Umm al-Ghanam, which was located at the entrance of the Gulf in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz.⁴⁵ Muscat, Tehran and London shrouded the Iranian presence in Oman, which lasted until the time of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, in great secrecy. Iranian soldiers were ordered not to enter Omani cities and were kept away from any public gathering. By the end of 1974, Iranian forces in Dhofar had reportedly grown to between 1500 and 3,500 troops, but Iran's role became even more pronounced in 1975 when the total reached between 3,500 and 5,000 troops. Iranian Phantom F-5's patrolled the South Yemeni borders from their base at Thamrait (80km north of Ṣalalah). Iran's presence in Oman was obliquely criticised by almost all the Arab countries, who saw this presence as a living proof of Iran's expansionism. Conservative governments in the Arab world introduced several schemes to reduce Iranian forces arrangement, but the Omani government denied the entire matter and Iranian influence in Oman. Saudi Arabia and Egypt sought to replace Iranian troops by Arab forces.⁴⁶ The Shah's forces, as the main pillar of American policy, also became involved in many other areas; for example, Iran provided logistics and troops to support the Pakistani government

44. Dawisha, Adeed I. "Security in the Middle East" Wells, Samuel F. & Bruzonsky, Mark A. (eds.) in: *Regional Change and Great Power Strategic*. p. 91.

45. The PFLO claimed at that time that the Sultan had allowed Iran to build a naval base on this island. The radical Arab states launched a massive propaganda campaign against this suspected See. Mojtahed-Zadeh, Perouz. *Political Geography of the Strait of Hormuz*. op.cit. p. 36.

46. Mojtahed-Zadeh, Perouz. *Political Geography of the Strait of Hormuz*. op.cit. p. 31. The Iranian troops remained in Dhofar until they were pulled out by the new regime in Iran in 1979. op.cit. p. 37. Shahdād, Ibrāhīm M. *Al-Ṣirā' al-Dākhiḷī fi 'Umān Khilāl al-Qarn al-'Ishrīn 1913-1975*. op.cit. p. 164.

against the Baluchī insurgents, and to support Somalia in its war with Ethiopia, which was backed by Cuba and the Soviets.⁴⁷

The Saudi Role in Gulf Security

The Saudi participation in Gulf security with the United States and Iran during the 1970s came as a consequence of the historical relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. However, the Saudi role in Gulf security came about without any agreements or official pacts with the United States. The Saudi Royal family's aim was to avoid any confrontation with the Saudi Islamic Scholars by claiming that Saudi Arabia was opposed to any foreign troops on Arab soil; in fact, behind the scenes, it had a strong and lasting relationship with the United States and her allies.⁴⁸

The Saudi role in the "Twin Pillar" policy in the Gulf was focused on giving financial support to other pro-western countries. Saudi Arabia was able to exercise regional and international influence through its foreign aid programmes, especially in most of the Arab countries, Muslim countries (Pakistan and Bangladesh) and other countries in the third world. The Saudi aid programmes were consistently used to combat destabilising agents and ideas in their own region as well as in the wider international arena. The main aim was to support countries against Soviet and Communist influence. Moreover, Saudi aid programmes went to such distant countries as South Korea, Taiwan, and Zaire because of their virulent anti-Communism.⁴⁹ Between 1950 and 1964, the total sales agreements between Saudi Arabia and the United States totalled \$87 million. In 1965 alone they equalled \$342 million. A decade later the total was over \$2 billion and in 1980 reached \$35 billion.⁵⁰ In the early 1970s joint Saudi-Iranian efforts were concerned with Gulf security as well as the external implications of these problems. In 1974 these countries were joined by Egypt, Morocco and France and together they formed a secret security club, which concentrated on intelligence activities in the Gulf region,

47. Acharya, Amitav. *op.cit.* p. 27.

48. Edwārd, Rāise. *op.cit.* pp. 191-201.

49. Dawisha, Adeed I. *op.cit.* pp. 91-92.

the Third World and Europe. This club did not have a centre or headquarters, but the French pledged to harmonize its activities under the command of Conte Alexandre de-Marché. This intelligence co-operation continued and was supported until the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979.⁵¹

The concept of Gulf security took a strategic turn, especially on the Arab side, after the Arab - Israel war of 1973, when the Arab oil countries and in particular Saudi Arabia took the initiative to impose an oil embargo on some of the Western countries who had supported Israel in her war against the Arab countries. In the wake of this, and after the oil crisis which resulted, Gulf security became connected to the security of oil. Many American officials floated plans to seize the Arab Gulf States' oilfields as a reaction to the 1973 oil embargo. Henry Kissinger, the architect of this plan, is reported as saying that the "*military option could not be ruled out, if the Arabs refuse to co-operate with us*".⁵²

As a result of the 1973 oil sanctions on some western countries, and because of the strong American reaction to them, especially where Saudi Arabia was concerned, Riyadh and Washington concluded a bilateral agreement in January 1974. This agreement included the establishment of joint commissions in many fields, particularly security and defence. An example of this was the joint commission on security co-operation, headed by the Assistant Secretary of Defence for National Security Affairs and the Vice-Minister of Defence, Prince Turkī b. 'Abd al-'Azīz. The Saudi-American agreement was agreed to at the highest level, headed by Crown Prince (later King), Fahd b. 'Abd Al-'Azīz and the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Saudi Arabia became the second pillar of American policy in the Middle East; the vast United States military sales to Riyadh included the supplying of American advisers and training for many years.⁵³

50. Peterson, J.E. *op.cit.* p. 183.

51. Ba-Dhib, Sa'īd M. *op.cit.* p. 174.

52. Jha, Ajay N "Gulf Co-operation Council: An Economic Grouping or Security Alliance?" *Asian Profile*. Vol. 14 PT 4, 1986, p. 363.

53. Musā, Ḥusain. *op.cit.* pp. 21-22.

Attempts at Collective Security of the Gulf

The concept of a comprehensive collective security in the Gulf area did not appear until after the British withdrew from the region (except for the federation between the Trucial States, which became known as the United Arab Emirates). The Arab Gulf States developed their own perception of security, which was moulded by thoughts of national benefit as well as by necessity. This led to a number of contradictions in the plans of these countries for reaching a common platform for collective Gulf security, since each country had its own political and ideological thinking.

The interests of some of these countries had sometimes agreed and sometimes disagreed with those of the great powers, which was of significance in the Gulf security pact, especially for the United States and the Western European Countries.⁵⁴

The United States, with the support of the Shah of Iran, tried on many occasions after the British withdrawal from the Gulf to form a pact between the Arab Gulf States and Iran. However, the American proposal failed to materialise due to the Saudi fear that Iran would dominate the newly independent Arab Gulf States. In addition, the radical Arab nationalist countries might attack this pact and lead to a further deepening of the existing rifts in Arab world. As a result of this, Washington focused her efforts on promoting the Shah of Iran as the prime actor in defending Gulf security and Western interests against any internal or external threat.⁵⁵

As the leader responsible for the development of security in the Gulf area, the Shah of Iran called the rulers of the Arab Gulf States to co-operate on Gulf security and sign a military co-operation pact with Iran (excluding Iraq). The Iranian proposal failed after the Saudis refused. Oman was the only Arab Gulf State to welcome the Iranian suggestions.⁵⁶

The second initiative of the Gulf security plan took place in November 1976 when the foreign ministers of the eight countries of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq

54. Muḥammad, Jasim. *Al-Istrāṭijiyāt al-Amniyyah fī-Minṭaqat al-Khalīj al-'Arabī*. The Arabian Gulf Studies Center, University of Baṣra, 1983, p. 63.

55. Acharya, Amitav. *op.cit.* p. 21.

56. Kechichian, Joseph A. *The Gulf Co-operation Council : Search for Security in the Persian Gulf*. *op.cit.* p. 2.

Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) agreed, during the Islamic Conference in Jeddah in 1975, to hold a meeting in Muscat in the Sultanate of Oman at which they could try to find a united formula for security in the Gulf. At this meeting Sultan Qaboos of Oman called on the conference members to reach a formula for collective security and to define an area for co-operation between the countries of the region. At the meeting various plans put forward by all the eight states of the Gulf were discussed without any agreement being reached. The Omani proposal centred especially on the Strait of Hormuz, and a continued dependence on the support of western countries and Japan as well as Iran. However, all the Arab Gulf States rejected the proposal, particularly Iraq, who launched a campaign against Oman: Iraq was still, at that time, a supporter of the Omani opposition.

The Saudi rejection of the Omani proposal was because she feared an Iranian domination of the Arab Gulf States. This fear intensified after the Iranian troops' arrival in Oman in 1973.⁵⁷ Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states were wary of Iranian and Iraqi ambitions to dominate the area. (Nevertheless, it should be noted that after the Iraqi agreement with Iran, which settled the issue of the border, the conservative Arab states concluded many economic, cultural and social agreements with Iraq).⁵⁸

57. During the November meeting of the eight foreign minister in Muscat in 1976 Iraq was not trusted by the other seven because of her radical Ba'athist ideology and history of attempted subversion in the region. Iran was suspect because she was non-Arab and because of fears that the Shah's military buildup was the rebirth of a centuries-old drive for Persian hegemony over the Gulf. See Peterson, J.E. "The Future of Gulf Security After the Kuwait War" *op.cit.* p. 65. *Rusi Journal* Defence Year Book. 1992. p. 136. Al-Makhawi, Rashid A. *The Gulf Co-operation Council A Study in Integration*. Ph.D. thesis. University of Salford, England, 1990, p. 26.

58. Al-Samarrai, Bashir. *Military Buildup and Political Instability in the Gulf 1965-1974*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Denver, USA, 1978. p. 52 and see. Peterson, J.E. *Defending Arabia*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986, p. 217.

The American Presence in the Gulf Region

The American policy towards the Gulf area became more active during the mid-1970s, as a result of the arms sales programmes to the Gulf States, especially to Iran and Saudi Arabia. By 1977, defence-related personnel constituted about one-fifth of the 30,000 Americans living in Saudi Arabia, although most of these Americans were described as civilians.

In Iran defence-related personnel constituted about one-third of the 40,000 Americans there.⁵⁹ Most Americans were deployed at the most sensitive domestic sites such as oil wells or oilfields and areas where political and religious opposition groups were active.⁶⁰

Pakistan and Jordan, who have a long history of security co-operation with the United States and the Arab conservative states, were to play a significant role in the Arab Gulf states' Security. After the mid-1970s, Pakistani troops became more important for the security of the Saudi Royal family and supported the other Arab Gulf states with training. Jordan had a similar position in American strategy in the Gulf region under the Nixon Doctrine. In the early 1970s, Jordan was the only Arab country which sent troops to Oman to support the Omani Sultan against the rebellion in the Dhofar province. Additionally Jordanian army personnel were assigned to training duty to the engineering units in Oman.⁶¹ During the early 1970s Jordan was the main supporter of the other small Arab Gulf states, and had already established substantial security links with them supplying officers and military intelligence as well as personnel, infrastructure and training missions.⁶²

In fact, with the encouragement and support of the American administrations of Nixon, Ford and Carter, the Shah of Iran became the main pillar of the Nixon Doctrine, along with Saudi Arabia, who was the other pillar. Thus, the two countries,

59. Acharya, Amitav. *op.cit.* p. 31.

60. Shuker, Zuhair. *Al-Siyāsah al-Amrīkiyyah fī al-Khalīj al-'Arabī Mabdhā Carter*. Dār al-Inmā al-'Arabī, Beirut, 1982. p. 130.

61. For more details of the Iranian and Jordanian intervention in Oman see Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz. *Political Geography of the Strait of Hormuz*. *op.cit.* p. 31.

62. Acharya, Amitav. *op.cit.* pp. 141-145.

with the support of other Arab Gulf states, were able to dominate American strategic policy until the fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979.

There is no doubt that the Arab Gulf states rulers did not approve of the Shah's imperialistic attitudes towards the Arab Gulf states, but a strong monarchical and pro-American Iran was seen as a useful guarantee for them against any internal or external threat in the Gulf region. It should be noted that the fall of the Shah in Iran not only removed that guarantee but also caused the Iranian revolution to call for the destruction of all monarchical regimes in the Gulf and the elimination of the Western and American presence in the Gulf area.⁶³

The exciting oil developments occurred a few years after the British withdrawal. Gulf oil became increasingly important after the 1973 war, due to the size of the reserves and the level of production, in addition to the increasing needs of the world and the great industrial countries in particular. These developments made Gulf security not only an obsession for the eight countries of the Gulf but also an international and regional obsession that developed in a way that nobody expected.

The Arab Gulf States disagreed during the 1970s on the internal and external sources of the threat to the Gulf security. During the 1970s there were many sources for the threats to Gulf security, the most important of them being the radical Arab regimes and Arab nationalism represented by the Republic of Iraq in the North and the Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. There were also nationalist opposition movements and Marxist movements which spread in the states of the region, the most important being the popular movement for the liberation of Oman.⁶⁴

63. Rizvi, Hasan Askari "Gulf Co-operation Council" *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 35, London, 1982, pp. 30-31.

64. Idrīs, Muḥammād A "Dawr al-Amn wa al-Ta'āwun al-'Askarī fī-Taṭawwur Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī Kakiyān Iqlīmī" *Al-Mustāqbal al-'Arabī*. Issu No. 215. January 1997. The Arab United Studies Centre. Beirut, 1997, p. 42.

Gulf Security Since the End of 1979

Direct American Involvement in Gulf Security

Introduction

A major political change in the Third World took place in 1979, during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter, particularly in the so-called “arc of crisis”, which extends from Pakistan in Asia to Ethiopia in the African Horn. These changes were epitomised by the success of the Iranian revolution and many military coups, which proved to be pro-Soviet and anti-Western. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was the main example of these changes, and removed the main pillar of American strategy in the Third World. ⁶⁵

During the late 1970s there were many military coups against pro-western regimes such as that of Haile Mariam in Ethiopia in 1977, which was supported by the Soviet Union and destroyed the pro-western regime of Haile Selassie. In Cambodia the Pol Pot regime fell in 1977 as a result of Vietnamese military intervention. The emergence of Iraq as a military power even greater than Egypt was a great event at that time, and when the Egyptian - Israeli Camp David accord was reached, Iraq led the Arab hard-line platform against Egypt in two conferences held in Baghdad. This resulted in the radical Arab regimes (Syria, South Yemen, Algeria, Libya and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation) forming the so-called *Front of Arab Solidarity and Confrontation*.⁶⁶

During the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of its geographical position and the Soviet and Cuban presence in South Yemen, which supported the Omani rebellion in the Dhofar province, Oman was the Gulf country most concerned about Gulf

65. During the end of 1979 and 1980s the concept of security in the Gulf region meant for the Arab Gulf States and their allies in the West the containment of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and its consequences, the Soviet expansion in Afghanistan and the securing of a free flow of oil, especially for the industrial countries. See. Kechichian, Joseph A. *Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations*. op.cit. p. 18.

66. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit., pp. 37-40, and also al-Na'imī, 'Abd-al-Rahmān M. *Al-Širā 'alā al-Khalīj al-'Arabī*. op.cit. pp. 67-68.

security, and she called for many security initiatives between the Gulf countries. In September 1979, the Omani government proposed a plan for regional security co-operation between the Gulf States with the participation of United States, Britain, West Germany and Japan. The Omani proposal called on the Arab Gulf States to raise a \$100 million to bolster the defence of the Strait of Hormuz. The money was to be spent to purchase minesweepers and radar equipment to protect the Strait of Hormuz. It also envisaged the creation of a multilateral naval force drawn from the US, Britain and West Germany “to provide a presence outside of the Gulf” as a supplementary force capable of guaranteeing the security of the Strait.⁶⁷ But these countries rejected the Omani proposal. It was discussed by the foreign ministers of the Arab Gulf States (Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE) at a special meeting held in Tā’if in Saudi Arabia on 16 October 1979. The consensus at the meeting was to concentrate on potential domestic uprisings and to heed the Iranian leader’s calls of spreading its revolution to the Arab Gulf States. The Iraqi reaction to the Omani proposal became more intensive, when Baghdad described the proposal as a bid to create a new western alliance to replace CENTO and openly criticised its intentions.

The Omani Role in Gulf Security

As a reaction to the Soviet threat and presence in many bases in South Yemen such as Socotra, Khawr Maksar and al-‘Aber and the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, Oman concluded a facilities agreement with the United States on 4 June 1980. This agreement provided many facilities for American troops in large areas of Oman such as Maşirah island in the Arabian Sea, the Khaşab base in the Musandam peninsula, which was located close to the Straits of Hormuz, the Seeb air base in Muscat and the Thamrait air bases in Dhofar.⁶⁸

67. Chubin, Shahram. *Security in the Persian Gulf: The Role of the Outside Powers*. IISS, London, 1982. p. 154

68. Regsbee, Wallace Lynn *op.cit.* pp. 78-86.

Sultan Qaboos announced that the United States Air and Naval facilities in the Sultanate were only:

*To be used at the request of the majority of the Gulf co-operation states, in case of a direct threat, which they cannot repulse with their own forces.*⁶⁹

During 1981-1987, the most costly programme undertaken by the United States in the Omani airforce facilities was estimated at \$259 million. The Omani forces carried out many military exercises with American troops on Omani soil.⁷⁰

At a press conference held on 15 December 1979, Sultan Qaboos said:

If the big powers find that their interests in the region (meaning the Gulf region) are threatened, they will not seek permission from me or anybody else to intervene.

In another interview, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war while the Gulf Co-operation Council was still awaiting its first summit, Sultan Qaboos said:

*Why are countries friendly to the West, that have strategic locations, possess vital resources for the industrial world and hold common interests with the west, not invited to join NATO as associate members or observers, thus becoming an integral part of the Western defence system?*⁷¹

During late 1979 and throughout 1980 Oman was very clear and unequivocal about its relations with Western countries and the United States. The Omani foreign affairs minister emphasised this fact when he said:

*There is a tactical accord that Oman gives the United States the right to intervene if Oman is attacked by the Soviet Union, Ethiopia or South Yemen.*⁷²

The Omani-American bilateral accord was explained away and disavowed by some of the main officials: for instance the Omani Minister of Information once said:

69. Wingerter, Rex B "The Gulf Co-operation Council and American Interests in the Gulf" *American Arab Affairs* Vol. 16, June 1986, London, p. 17.

70. Regsbee, Wallace Lynn. *op.cit.* 86.

71. El-Reyyes, Riad N. *Oman's Role in the Gulf Co-operation Council and the Region. Oman; Economic, Social and Strategic Development.* Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 198.

72. Al-Na'imī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān M. *op.cit.* p. 87.

There are no American military bases in Oman; the agreement concerning such facilities emanates from the concept of Omani national independence and sovereignty. These facilities do not mean that the Americans can come at any time they may wish to. They are rather dependent on the Omani people and country's free will. No American plane or otherwise can ever contemplate landing in an Omani airport without prior Omani permission.

He indicated the purpose of the Omani-American accord as follows:

The Gulf region is now, more than at any time in the past, more exposed to foreign intervention - our national and domestic potentials are known and limited and we cannot resist any intervention precipitated by a world superpower. So we contemplated and suggested that a solution may be sought in an accord that does not impinge on our national sovereignty, and such an accord should be a device at our disposal to be employed whenever we might wish. It should be a strong stick that we wave in the face of the Soviets who are now present in South Yemen, which they brought under their domination via a military pact.⁷³

The Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, as a result of the Baghdad summit decisions in 1979 and to exert pressure on the Arab Gulf states and especially Oman, issued a charter called the Arab Charter. This called for the creation of a collective Arab Gulf Security Force, as a supplement to the Arab League Joint Defence Pact, and of a joint military command which would control the force as an independent unit financed by the participating member states. However, the Iraqi security plan was not accepted by the other Arab Gulf states except Kuwait, who called, without success, for a study of the Iraqi plan. Many sources indicate that the Iraqi plan was intended to contain the Omani security plan of 1979.⁷⁴

The Critical Period for Gulf Security

The security of the Arab Gulf States by the end of the 1970s witnessed a real direct internal and external threat brought about by the following events that took place in the vicinity of the Gulf:

- 1) The fall of the Shah of Iran and the rise of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (January 1979).
- 2) The North and South Yemen War (February 1979).

73. Shuker, Zuhair. op.cit. p. 145.

74. Ramazani, R.K. *The Gulf Co-operation Council Record and Analysis*. op.cit. p. 5.

- 3) The seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca (November 1979)
- 4) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979)
- 5) The outbreak of the Iraq - Iran War (September 1980).

The events of 1979 had far-reaching geopolitical implications in the region and caused a direct threat to the Arab Gulf States and Gulf oil supplies to Western European countries. The event which most changed the balance of Gulf security in 1979 was the Iranian revolution. This had ended the Shah's regime and the United States efforts to promote Iran as the dominant regional power and as the focal point for a United States security belt along the southern border of the Soviet Union. It also damaged the security umbrella which protected the Arab Gulf States.

Some sources claim that the Shah's collapse smoothed the way for the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan in December 1979.⁷⁵ The United States Strategy in the Middle East and South Asia was also negatively affected in Turkey and Pakistan, after serious strains developed between the United States and these two countries, especially after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 which created a deep rift with Washington. As for Pakistan, her decision to go ahead with the building of an atomic bomb caused the United States to cut off the economic and military assistance given to her.

The Security of the Gulf region became more critical after the United States, the main partner of the Arab conservative States in the Gulf, lost many partners and allies in the Gulf region, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Asia and Africa. All these events of 1979, especially the fall of the Shah in Iran, prompted experts from the American administration to propose new security plans to deal with and confront the new situation in the world, particularly in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.⁷⁶

75. Mahmood, Fazal. *op.cit.* pp. 16-17.

76. Gordon, Murray. *op.cit.* p. 16

The Carter Doctrine (Rapid Intervention Force)

On January 23, 1979 the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, reacting to fall of the Shah and the Iranian revolution, made the following statement in an address on the state of the Union:

Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The American President concluded a litany of projected United States responses to potential Soviet aggression by declaring:

Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a co-operative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security and prosperity of all.⁷⁷

Since the fall of the Shah of Iran and the demise of the Nixon Doctrine of the Gulf, the Carter administration adopted many new plans for dealing with the situation in the Gulf. The Egyptian president Anwar Al-Sādāt adopted the role the Shah had had and, from early 1979, the Carter administration adopted a programme of arms sales to Egypt. The other support of the American strategy in the Gulf was Pakistan, who hurried to send troops to Saudi Arabia to protect the Saudi Royal Family. Pakistan and Egypt were to play a significant role in American strategy in the Gulf during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The two countries agreed to provide military facilities for the United States to use in defending the Arab Gulf States. Egypt would provide facilities in the Qana and Ras Banas bases.⁷⁸

The advisers and experts of the American administration adopted three plans in reaction to the 1979 events, for the consolidation of America's position in the Gulf. The first initiative consisted of a strategic plan for rapid intervention in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf region or any other remote part of the world. This plan focused on the

77. Brzezinski, Zbigniew "After the Carter Doctrine: Geostrategic Stakes and Turbulent Crosscurrents in the Gulf" in: Sindelar, Richard III and Peterson, J.E. (eds.) *Crosscurrents in the Gulf, Regional and Global Interests*. The Middle East Institute, Washington. D.C. 1988, p. 5.

78. Al-Na'imī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān M. *op.cit.* p. 78

expansion of air and maritime transportation systems, and called for more facilities in the Indian Ocean for the American fleet. The second plan mainly consisted of the arrangement of a new command entrusted with recruitment, training and planning for the intervention of American troops in overseas regions. The third initiative included diplomatic moves which aimed at getting hold of selected military facilities in the Gulf.⁷⁹ However, they finally decided to deal with the situation in the Gulf by establishing a Rapid Intervention Force.⁸⁰ The use of force had been discussed and considered in American military circles since 1977, as a way of protecting the oilfields in the Gulf area. The establishment of this force came about as a result of a direct threat to American and Western European interests in the Gulf. It was also established to protect the regimes of the Arab Gulf states against any internal or external threat.

Many military and political analysts conclude that the main reason for the setting up of the rapid intervention force was to occupy the oil fields in the Arab Gulf states in case of an external intervention from countries such as the Soviet Union, Iran and Iraq or internal threats within the Gulf regimes.⁸¹ The security of the Arab Gulf States was severely threatened, following the fall of the Shah of Iran. The Iranian Islamic Revolution, which adopted a hostile policy against the United States, starting with the taking hostage of the American citizens in the American Embassy in Tehran, also adopted a new policy towards the Gulf states. It sought to export the Islamic revolution and encourage the local Shi'ite leaders in the Arab Gulf to support Khomeini's regime.

From early 1979, most of the Arab Gulf states, especially Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, faced many internal problems caused by the Shi'ite people in their countries especially in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and many places in

79. Record, Jeffrey. *Rapid Intervention Forces*. op.cit. p. 85.

80. The Carter Doctrine was accompanied by the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida on 1 March 1980. This was a permanent military force designed to deploy rapidly into the region to respond to contingencies threatening US interests, specifically threats to Persian Gulf oil. The RDJTF evolved from a planning concept which was then called the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

81. The idea of occupying the Arab Gulf States oil fields, especially the Saudi oil fields, came from the former US Secretary of State Henry Kissenger. Al-Na'imī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān M. op.cit. p. 80.

Kuwait. These problems included bomb attacks. Bahrain was the country which faced the greatest threat from the Shi'a. Ayatollah Şadeq Ruĥanī threatened to annex Bahrain unless she adopted an Islamic government after the Iranian model. The Shi'a in Bahrain constitute the majority of the population.⁸²

American Roles in the Establishment of the GCC

As a result of the Iranian threat, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, officials from the Arab Gulf states and Washington called for the creation of some kind of security link between the Arab Gulf states, the main aim of this being to counter the Iranian revolution through the assistance of the United States and the Western European countries. The most important initiative was that of the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and prime minister Shaykh Jābir Al-Aĥmad (the present Amir) who called for the establishment of a Gulf Union with the object of realising co-operation in all fields economic, political, educational and information, in order to serve the interests and stability of the people of the region.⁸³

The establishment of the GCC officially took place between the 4th February and the 25th May 1981. Many sources indicate that the establishment of the GCC was the result of an American initiative (for more details see The American position towards the establishment of the GCC in Chapter no 2).

However, the Kuwaiti political writer 'Abdullah Al-Nufaysī, in his paper which discusses the Symposium held in Kuwait in 1981, states that the Saudi government took the initiative to establish the GCC, comprising Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. One of the strategic goals of this council was the setting up of a common defence and security system between these states and the United States. The most important part of this was the bargain made between the United States and Saudi Arabia to provide the AWACs. These bargain became an integral defence umbrella for all the GCC States which was, essentially, an alliance to

82. Ramazani, R.K. *op.cit.* p. 7.

83. Peterson, J.E. *op.cit.* p. 172.

counter the effects of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the events in Afghanistan.⁸⁴

The Lack of Consensus Over the Arab Gulf Initiatives

During the first meeting, which led to the establishment of the council, the States of the Gulf Co-operation Council, especially Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, were not able to overcome their differences and conclude a unified security agreement.

The Omani proposal focused on naval security in the Strait of Hormuz and requested that the Council should finance the acquisition of naval units with the co-operation of Western countries. The Kuwaiti plan concentrated on the collective security of the Arab Gulf states, both internal and external. The different views of these two proposals led to a separate Saudi proposal, which called for closer internal security relations between the member states. The Saudi plan, which represented the main branch of Saudi policy towards the other Arab Gulf states from the early 1970s, suggested that the security co-operation between Arab Gulf states should be on the basis of bilateral agreements between the GCC states. The Saudi proposal came as a reaction to the attempted coup by the Shi'a in 1981 in Bahrain.⁸⁵

As regards the first summit meeting between the GCC States, held in Abu Dhabi in 25 May 1981, five principles were agreed upon guiding their security policy. First, the welfare and security of each state's people must be maximised; second, an attack against one state was to be seen as an attack against all the council states; third and fourth, 'internal supervision' and outside intervention must be prevented; and fifth, the military policy of the GCC countries should be inseparable from that of the Arab nation.⁸⁶ The council has not been able to achieve any more as regards these five principles since its establishment in 1981. The events which have taken place in the GCC states have no force against any external threat irrespective of

84. Al-Nūfaysī, 'Abdullah F. *op.cit.* p. 15.

85. Salīm, Muḥammad A "A Ru'yā al-Sa'ūdiyyah Li-Amn al-Khalīj" in: Al-Mashshāt, 'Abd al-Mun'im (ed.) *Amn al-Khalij al-'Arabi Dirāsah fī-al-Idrāk wa al-Siyāsah*. Center for Political Research and Studies, Cairo, 1994, pp. 53-54.

86. Nakhla, Emile. *The Gulf Co-operation Council*. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 1982, p. 4.

whether it comes from Iran or Iraq. The best example is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Thomas McNaugher of the Brookings Institution in the United States noted that:

*the GCC can be expected at best to police the Peninsula - to deal with various threats from the Yemens and hopefully to settle disputes among themselves amicably. But they cannot hope to defend the peninsula against external attack . . . [which] they can hope at best to deter by promising some damage to the attacker, to limit damage initially, and thus to buy time until reinforcements arrive.*⁸⁷

Since the early 1980s and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf area has become one of the most tense areas in the world. This war presented the super powers with a great numbers of pretexts to intervene in the area. The status of the GCC became the prime security issue in every common or bilateral meeting held during that period. However, the rulers considered security as an individual problem and failed to devise a common or plural mechanism to deal with it. As regard US policy towards security in the Gulf, the Reagan Administration believed that the fundamental threat to peace and stability in the region was not from the Arab-Israeli conflict (especially since Egypt and Israel were moving towards the implementation of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty as scheduled) but the Soviet Union and its policies. The Reagan administration introduced the concept of "strategic consensus" which called for the regional states, from Pakistan to Egypt, to cooperate with Washington and amongst themselves in opposing the common Soviet threat.⁸⁸

Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait, the most important members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, each had a different perspective on security and each sought to resolve this predicament in different ways. The Iran-Iraq War escalated in 1982, 1984 and 1986, when Iran scored some initial victories. GCC States, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, felt obliged to encourage and support Iraq directly with an estimated \$30 billion in aid. Kuwait was the GCC country most affected by this war and this prompted her to ask the United Nations Security Council to intervene and

87. Peterson, J.E. *op.cit.* p. 199.

protect her oil tankers. The United States and the Soviet Union responded positively to this Kuwaiti request.⁸⁹

American Facilities in the Arab Gulf States

Saudi Arabia, the most important country in the Gulf Co-operation Council, requested military protection from the United States and Pakistan soon after the war broke out between Iran and Iraq. Saudi Arabia's air defence was enhanced by the developing American military presence in the country and the deployment of American AWACS. They also provided her with great intelligence support.⁹⁰ The American administration approved the immediate deployment of four AWACS early warning aircraft accompanied by 300 United States airforce crew and ground support personnel.⁹¹

As a result of the American policy of having a Rapid Intervention Force in the Gulf area, Saudi Arabia provided many facilities for them in Saudi bases. These included Khamīs al-Mushayt located in the south-western province of Asir, just north of Yemen, Tabuk, situated just south of the Jordanian border near the Gulf of 'Aqaba, Sharura on the edge of the Rub al-Khali desert near the Yemeni border, King Khalid Military City located at Ḥafr al-Batin, just south of the Iraqi-Saudi Neutral Zone and Asad Military City at al-Kharj, south of Riyadh.

88. Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration" *op.cit.* p. 3.

89. Yetiv, Steven A. *The U.S. Strategic Position in the Persian Gulf (1978-1990): The Impact of the Iranian Revolution, the Afghanistan Intervention and the Iran-Iraq War*. Ph.D. Thesis, Kent State University, U.S.A. 1990. pp. 52.

90. As a response to the Arab Gulf States security, the United States sent four AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia during the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 to assist Saudi Arabia to defend its territory from a possible escalation in that conflict. Later, in support of the Reagan administration of the American policy in the Gulf region, AWACS aircraft were sold to Saudi Arabia. For more details of the Saudi Arabia and the United State bargain on the AWACS, see Reese, John N. *op.cit.* p. 18.

91. In January 1983, the RDJTF formally became CENTCOM. CENTCOM was organised as a unified command with a broad and continuing mission focused on an Area of Responsibility (AOR) that included the Northern Tier from Iraq to Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Jordan and the Horn of Africa including Kenya and Sudan. CENTCOM has responsibility for all military activities and crisis military operations within the Area of Responsibility. See. Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration" *op.cit.* p. 3. Acharya, Amitav. *op.cit.* p. 129.

On the other hand many sources indicate that the Pakistani government provided more than 20,000 troops after the outbreak of the Iranian revolution to protect the Saudi Royal Family against any internal problems. This became especially necessary after the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca, the Shi'a riots in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 1979 and the Yemeni border conflict in 1979. Many reports claim that most of the Pakistani troops were stationed near the Saudi-Yemen border.⁹²

Initiatives by the GCC Leaders

During the late 1980s, and as a result of the end of the Iran-Iraq war which had lasted eight years, the leaders of the GCC agreed to fix up of security Committee in 1990 to work out a common security plan. The Committee was headed by Sultan Qaboos of Oman and consisted of one member (minister) from each country of the GCC. By October 1991, the Omani plan had taken shape. It envisaged a force of more than 100,000 troops, with a Command independent of any one of the GCC member governments, and would be answerable directly to the GCC. At the twelfth Summit in Kuwait in December 1991 Sultan Qaboos was thanked for his efforts, and the plan was shelved. Since that time no action has been taken over collective security among the GCC, except the security agreements signed between the GCC States and the United States, Britain and France. The new security committee, created at the Doha summit in December 1990, held its first meeting in Şalalah in March 1991, but there was no tangible outcome then or at its meeting in May 1991. Likewise, the GCC foreign ministers' meeting in Kuwait in May 1991 to work out the details for a Gulf peacekeeping force produced little more than a statement welcoming UN deployment along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Their next meeting in Dhahran in June 1991 had the same result.⁹³

92. Peterson, J.E. *op.cit.* pp. 178-183

93. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" *Survival*. Vol. 34. No. 3, Autumn 1992, London. p. 47 and see Peterson, J.E "The Future of Gulf Security After the Kuwaiti War" *op.cit.* p. 132 and see. *Rusi Journal* Defence Year Book, *op.cit.* p. 137. For more details over security agreements between the GCC states see Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic: Saudi*

Feisal al-Mazidi in his book *The Future of the Gulf. The Legacy of the War and the Challenges of the 1990s* describes the differences between the GCC states:

*The problems relating to sovereign as opposed to collective decision-making are not unique to the GCC, but they are likely to become increasingly pressing if common GCC external policies are to evolve. The danger is that in the absence of such institutionalised means for foreign policy development, differences between the GCC states could lead to a serious crisis.*⁹⁴

The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Since the termination of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989, the lack of trust between the countries of the Gulf and Iran has grown. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war in July 1988, the Republic of Iraq faced immense problems. Iraq's total international debt was estimated at \$80-85 billion and debt servicing required an annual \$8 billion, while her foreign reserves were no more than \$2,000 million. Added to this was the fall in world oil prices, from about \$28 per barrel in July 1985 to \$13-16 per barrel in 1988-89. This caused further economic damage to the Iraqi economy. It should be noted that about \$16 billion of this debt was owed to Kuwait.⁹⁵ All the Arab Gulf States supported Iraq militarily and financially. The Iranian media launched a hostile campaign against the members of the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By mid-1990 the Iraqi President Ṣaddam Ḥussein, as a result of loans (during his war with Iran) from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, launched a blistering attack on Kuwait and the UAE for what he maintained was a conspiracy with the United States to wage economic war on Iraq by causing oil prices to fall. He also accused Kuwait of border violations. Since 1989, United States goals in the Gulf region have been concentrated on maintaining stability in the region; preventing either Iran or Iraq from dominating the region; preventing the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism; and reducing the

Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance. op.cit. p. 27, and "Role of the Outside Power" op.cit. p. 153.

94. Al-Mazidi, Feisal. *The Future of the Gulf The legacy of the War and the Challenges of the 1990.* I.B. Tauris, London, New York, 1993. p. 33.

95. Allocke, John. B and others. *Border and territorial disputes.* 3rd edn, Longman, 1992. P. 186.

threat of terrorism from and in the region. The Bush administration continued to rely on both diplomatic and military approaches in its Gulf strategy.⁹⁶

The government of Kuwait rejected the Iraqi accusation in an identical letter sent to the Arab League on the 19th of July 1990. During July 1990 many Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Mubarak visited Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia on a one-day tour on 24 July), intervened to mediate between Kuwait and Iraq and held a meeting between the Kuwaiti heir apparent and the Vice-President of Iraq on 28-29 July. But the negotiations in Jeddah did not resolve the disputes between the two parties and helped pave the way for Iraqi troops to invade Kuwait on 2 August 1990. On 25 of July 1990 the Iraqi President and his foreign minister Tariq Azīz met with A. Glaspie, the US ambassador to Iraq. During this meeting the two Iraqi leaders complained bitterly to Glaspie about Iraq's tenuous economic situation. In one exchange, Şaddam H̄usseini complained that the drop in the price of oil had cost Iraq \$6 to \$7 billion, which was, in his words, a "disaster." In direct response, Ambassador Glaspie said: "I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." Some people claim that US tried to provoke Şaddam into invading Kuwait on 2 of August 1990.⁹⁷

Most countries in the world, especially the United States and the West, condemned the Iraqi occupation and called for her unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning Iraq, demanding that Iraq withdraw all its forces immediately and unconditionally to the position in which they were located on August. On the Arab side they held a Summit Conference in Cairo on 10 August 1990. But the Summit showed that there were rifts between the Arab Countries on the Summit resolutions.

96. Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H. *op.cit.* p. 5 and see Snow, Charles "The Political Scene" *MEES*. Vol. XXXIII. No.42, 23 July 1990, pp. CI-C2.

97. Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert. *Politics in the Middle East*. *op.cit.* p. 389 and see Snow, Charles "The political Scene" *MEES*. Vol. XXXIII. No.42. 23 July 1990, p. C2.

The GCC States as well as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia and Djibouti voted in favour of the resolutions of the Summit. Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania tried to create a middle ground where none existed by expressing reservation. Algeria and Yemen abstained and Libya and the PLO joined Iraq in voting against the resolutions of the Arab League Summit (it should be recorded that this was the first time in its history that the Arab League had passed a resolution by majority vote rather than consensus).⁹⁸

Since the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait the security of the Arab Gulf states (internal and external) became more critical for the rulers as they faced a real threat provoked by internal demands for change and participation in political affairs. Many blamed their governments for the huge influx of non-Muslim troops in their lands, especially in Saudi Arabia. Also the governments of the Arab Gulf States were unhappy about the hundreds of thousands of troops which had taken up a defensive position in their lands. It should be noted that the Arab Gulf States (GCC) were not able to defend their external security against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which resulted in the demand for outside troops (US and Western) to protect them and liberate Kuwait from Iraq.⁹⁹ The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (on 2 August) lasted until the International Coalition, led by the US, liberated the state of Kuwait and defeated the Iraqi troops in mid-February 1991.¹⁰⁰

98. Snow, Charles "The Political Scene" *MEES*. Vol. XXXIII. No.44. 6 August 1990, Cyprus, 1990. p.C1. The Arab Summit of Cairo coincided with the first American troops landing in Saudi Arabia see Snow, Charles "The Political Scene" *MEES*. Vol. XXXIII. No.46. 20 August 1990, p. C1.

99. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Bahrain Country Profile 1996-97" p. 6 and see *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Qatar Country Profile 1996-97" p. 33 and see *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Kuwait Country Profile 1996-97" p. 7.

100. Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert. *Politics in the Middle East*. *op.cit.* pp. 390-392.

Security Of The Gulf Region From the Liberation Of Kuwait To the Mid -1990s

The American Security Proposal for the Gulf Region

Since the defeat of Iraq and her withdrawal from Kuwait, the search for new security arrangements in the Gulf region has led in a number of directions. The members of the GCC and the United States have been pursuing a multi-tiered approach to regional deterrence and defence: strengthening the national armed forces of the GCC member states; enhancing the GCC countries' collective capacities to deter and defend against outside threats; expanding the co-operative defence links between the GCC members and their regional partners, especially Egypt and Syria; and getting guarantees for the commitment of the international coalition's great powers, primarily the US, Britain and France, to the GCC region's defence.¹⁰¹

Several security schemes were introduced for the Gulf area during and after the second Gulf war of 1991. The most notable of these was a US proposal. On 6 March 1991, President George Bush, speaking to a joint session of the US Congress, defined four key challenges that had to be met in the Middle East: 1) The creation of shared security arrangements in the region with the help of the US. This would include US participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces and the maintenance of a US naval presence in the region. 2) Controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems. 3) putting an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict with a comprehensive peace based on the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle for peace. 4) Fostering economic freedom and prosperity for all the people of the region.

101. Reese, John N. *Towards Collective Security in the Gulf: An Evolving United States Role in Support of the GCC*, op.cit. pp. 36-37 and see Anthony, John Duke "The GCC, Iran, and Iraq Gulf States Deal with Twin Threats to Security" *Middle East Insight*. Vol. XII. No.2. January-February 1996. p. 34.

The European Proposal for the Gulf

The second security proposal was made by France, Italy and Spain. This project was based on the European experience in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The idea was to hold a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East to guarantee existing borders in the area, encourage economic co-operation and regional integration, control the local arms race, and promote democracy and respect for human rights.

The Iranian Proposal for the Gulf

The Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani made the third security proposal in a speech on 21 September 1990. Rafsanjani called for an Islamic Peace Project based on security agreements between the GCC countries and Iran. The project called for the replacement of “foreign” forces in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf with Arab i.e. Gulf Arab and Iranian forces. It also called for an Islamic Court of arbitration to resolve conflicts in the area. Finally, the project called on the Arab and Persian states to pay for the reconstruction of Iran and Iraq.

The Egyptian Proposal for the Gulf

The Egyptian project called for a new Arab order based on a reinvigorated Arab League, in which the Arab partners who took part in the international coalition to liberate Kuwait would form part. They would be the main safeguards of security in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.¹⁰²

The Damascus Declaration

After the termination of the second Gulf war and the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991 by the American and international coalition troops, Egypt and Syria, with strong support from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, sought to build a new political and security

102. Aly, Abdel Monem Said and Saleh, Hassan “Conflict in the Gulf: Views from the Gulf Cooperation Council” in *Powder Keg in the Middle East The Struggle for Gulf Security*. (eds.)

system to deal with security in the Gulf area. This charter came to be known as the Damascus declaration and was signed by the foreign ministers of the eight countries concerned in Damascus on 5 and 6 March 1991. The text of this declaration was concerned with co-operation between the participating countries in developing security arrangements in the Gulf region, and it proposed that the Egyptian and Syrian forces, which had taken part in the liberation of Kuwait and were still in the Arabian Peninsula, would form the nucleus of the regional Arab security forces in the Arab Gulf region.

The Damascus declaration reflected the common view of the participating countries that they should go beyond the crisis of the occupation of Kuwait. Its purpose was to build a new Arab Order and reach an agreement on security arrangements, while leaving the declaration open to the other Arab countries who had refused to take part militarily in the liberation of Kuwait. The declaration defined the aims of the co-operation between the GCC States, Egypt and Syria in three main areas: Politics, Economics, and Security. These were the prime causes which led to the convening of the meeting.¹⁰³

The details of the Damascus declaration generally did not depart from traditional Arabic political rhetoric as it dealt with co-operation between the Arab countries to face the challenges and threats which lay before them. However, what was new in the Damascus declaration, which came as a result of strong reactions and political endeavours from some of the Arab Gulf states after the liberation of Kuwait, was that it was the first time an Arab charter had discussed the setting up of a peace-force to deter threats and guarantee peace and security for the Arab countries.

But only two months after the signing of the Damascus declaration, the Egyptian President made a U-turn and announced the withdrawal of all Egyptian troops from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It was a decision which, he said, would take place one month after the signing of the declaration.

Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Gross. American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington. 1995. pp. 199-200.

103. Butt, Gerald "The Damascus Declaration: Eight Pairs of Eyes on Iraq" *Middle East International*, 22 March 1991, p. 10.

Following the Egyptian forces' withdrawal, the Syrian troops also withdrew from the Gulf region. The Damascus declaration altered after the withdrawal of the Egyptian and Syrian forces in July 1991, particularly in its security aspects.

A long debate took place between the participating Arab factions over the Damascus declaration. This was in spite of the accusations which were used to justify this alteration being rejected, particularly these concerning the security charter which was the core of the Damascus declaration.¹⁰⁴ The Arab press highlighted the details of the Egyptian decision to withdraw her troops from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE.

It stated that the main reason for this was the friction between Egypt and Kuwait, which came as a result of Kuwait granting the contract for her reconstruction to foreign companies from America and Britain. Further, the Egyptian government was dissatisfied with the Kuwaiti treatment of Egyptian labourers.

According to political analysts, the main reason for the Egyptian decision to withdraw was the announcement by the American Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, during his official visit to the GCC countries, of their acceptance of American suggestions on the security arrangements after the second Gulf war. The American Secretary also announced that there would be an agreement signed between Washington and the GCC countries in this respect. These agreements took into consideration the financial, administrative, technical and political needs of the peace-force. In addition, the fears of the GCC States in the organisation towards countries such as Syria and Egypt, which were considered radical by the organisation, were also given a thorough appraisal. The United States position also showed a lack of enthusiasm towards the Damascus declaration, which contradicted the American strategy and her security arrangements in the Gulf region.¹⁰⁵

Despite the silence of the Egyptian government on the defence agreement between Kuwait and the United States, some sources known to be close to President Mubarak suggested that there was more to the pact between Kuwait and Washington

104. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" *Survival*. Vol.34.No.3, Autumn 1992. p. 46 and see *MEES*. Vol. XXXIII. No.21. 25 February 1991. pp. C3-C4.

105. Salīm, Muḥammād A. *op.cit.* p. 64.

than had been announced. Cairo argued that this accord was the end of the Damascus Declaration and the notion of a joint Egyptian/Syrian commitment to Arab Gulf security.¹⁰⁶ In addition, Iran strongly objected to the Damascus declaration and rejected the presence of Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Gulf area. (A fundamental Iranian strategic principle is that Persian Gulf politics should be dissociated from Arab politics).

The Shah opposed Nasserist inroads in the Gulf for this reason (as Tehran today opposes the model of the Damascus Declaration): neither of these countries were part of the Gulf region, and both of them faced great difficulties and problems. For instance Syria was having a problem with Lebanon, while Egypt was in the grip of economic hardship and confrontations with Islamic movements. This suggested that neither of these countries could play a positive role in the protection of Gulf security.

The GCC States were unwilling to commit themselves to arrangements that might limit their own resources, and the concerns of Egypt and Syria were not sufficiently similar to those of the GCC to allow for anything other than an arm's length approach. The other reason for the failure of the Damascus Declaration formula was the reluctance of the GCC governments to become embroiled in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The GCC countries would have liked to distance themselves as much as possible from this dispute.¹⁰⁷ The former secretary-general 'Abdullah Bishārah said, "Trust is the most important element in co-operation among states, that is, our relations must be based on trust and confidence". In addition, he noted, "There is no

106. Kechichian, Joseph A. *Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula*. *op.cit.* p. 87.

107. 'Alawī, Muṣṭafā "Tartībāt al-Amn fi-al-Khalīj Ba'd al-Ḥarb" in. Al-Sayyid, Muṣṭafā Kamil (ed.) *Ḥattā La-Tanshub Ḥarb 'Arabiyyah-'Arabiyyah Ukhrā Min Durūs Ḥarb al-Khalīj*. Centre of Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 1992, pp. 664-668. See also Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" *op.cit.* p. 47. It should be noted that Israel has much more to offer the GCC governments in military and Intelligence capabilities than does Syria and Egypt. Israel's access to the U.S. is also helpful in facilitating U.S. military sales to the GCC. Israel could also receive considerable benefits from close connections with the Arab Gulf governments. See. Salamé, Ghassān "Assessing Alternative Future Arrangements for Regional Security" *op.cit.* p. 79.

such thing as free Arab money or open borders, we do not accept this. We are countries in every sense of the word'.¹⁰⁸

In reaction to the Damascus Declaration, two days after it was announced, the Iranian Senior Vice-President, Ḥussein Ḥabībī, and the foreign minister 'Alī Akber Velayatī arrived in Damascus to find out and discuss more about the declaration and the new alliance between the eight Arab countries. Ḥafīz Al-Asad of Syria declared that the Syrian participation in the new Damascus declaration alliance was in no way meant as a threat to Syrian-Iranian relations.¹⁰⁹

In spite of repeated attempts on behalf of the officials of the countries which took part in the Damascus Declaration there were considerable difficulties faced by the Gulf States over the inclusion of Syria and Egypt in this Arab security pact. As a result the Damascus Declaration was invalidated only a few months after its inception. The six states of the GCC revoked the formula of the collective security arrangement made between the Gulf Co-operation Council states, Egypt and Syria. Instead it became known as the bilateral agreement between the GCC States on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other hand. Oman was the least enthusiastic of the Gulf States over the conditions set in the Damascus Declaration.

Oman considered that the presence of the Egyptian and Syrian forces would weaken the solidarity of the Arab Gulf states, and thus she openly drew attention to the important role of Iran in the security arrangements of the Gulf region, because it was one of the most important countries in the area.¹¹⁰ Certainly, Oman made her position very clear by placing severe reservations on Arab participation in Gulf security. When differences came to the surface between the signatories to the Damascus Declaration, Oman approached the remaining members of the GCC states with a view to altering it, particularly concerning the clause on Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Gulf area, such that, if any country of the GCC wished to station

108. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" *op.cit.* p. 46 and see Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" *Adelphi Paper* 304. The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1996. Oxford University Press. p. 25.

109. Chubin, Shahram "Post-War Gulf Security" *Survival*. Vol. XXXIII No.2. 1991. p. 145, and Butt, Gerald. *op.cit.* p. 10.

110. 'Alawī, Muṣṭafā. *op.cit.* p. 668.

Egyptian or Syrian forces on its soil, then Oman preferred that it should be included in the bilateral arrangements between the concerned parties. The significance of Oman's stand is that she was the only country in the GCC states who did not station any Arab forces on her soil during the second Gulf crisis.

On 15 July 1991, after the meeting between the foreign ministers of the countries who signed the Damascus Declaration in Kuwait, they declared that they had all unanimously agreed on fundamental changes in the specific statement concerning military co-operation, such that the previous statement was repealed and became a sub-clause in the issue of military co-operation.

The previous text read as follows:

The presence of the Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Gulf region resembles the nucleus of the Arab security force to guarantee the peace and security of the Arab Gulf countries.

This statement was replaced by another part, which says:

*However, it is within the prerogative of any country in the Gulf Co-operation Council states to seek help from the Egyptian and Syrian forces if it wishes.*¹¹¹

This collective co-operation is replaced by selective bilateral relations between the countries involved in the Damascus Declaration, which had collapsed after the Egyptian government decided to withdraw all her forces from the Gulf region in April 1991. It should be noted that the foreign ministers of the Damascus Declaration held many meetings in May, July, September and November 1991 after the substitution of the original statement; however these gatherings did not achieve any result to do with security in the Arabian Gulf area. Following the November meeting, an Egyptian publication went as far as to say that the Damascus Declaration signatories had abandoned the idea of forming an Arab force to be deployed in the Gulf, that they saw the Gulf crisis as 'a thing of the past' and that they would now be turning their attention to 'spontaneous co-operation'.

111. Idrīs, Muḥammād A "Ru'yā 'Ūmān wa al-Imārāt wa-Qaṭar wal-Baḥrayn Li-Amn al-Khalīj" in: Al-Mashshāṭ, 'Abd al-Mun'im (ed.) *Amn al-Khalīj al-'Arabī Dirasah fi-al-Idrāk wa al-Siyāsah*. Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo, 1994, p. 215.

The Egyptian Foreign Minister said that certain differences existed among the signatories and suggested that it was 'better to admit this and to seek to solve them honestly'.¹¹² A year after Kuwait's liberation, the Damascus Declaration was not officially dead but seemed for all practical purposes to have been shelved. The attempts by the GCC States to create a self-reliant force (based on Sultan Qaboos's plan of 1991 to establish an integrated military force called Peninsula Shield, consisting of 100,000 soldiers, under a unified command) were unsuccessful.

The Growing Presence of the USA, Britain and France in the Gulf

The failure of the GCC States to establish a collective security system or to sustain a regional force caused these countries to increase their reliance for security on international powers, especially the United States, Britain and France. It should be noted that this growing dependence on the West did not represent any change by the GCC States in their security policy.¹¹³

However, the concept of Gulf security has taken on a different role in American strategic policy towards the Gulf region since the liberation of Kuwait. The Bush administration's plans after 1991 to protect Gulf security were based on the stockpiling of large stores of American equipment in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait along with the presence of American divisions. The United States also sought to set up support equipment for five or six fighter wings consisting of approximately 400 aircraft as well as naval support.¹¹⁴ (Historically, American efforts in the Gulf region have been directed at maintaining the balance of power between the two dominant

112. Sayigh, Yazid "Regional Security in the Gulf 1. The Geopolitical Realities" *Middle East International*, 31 May 1991, London, p. 17 see also Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" *op.cit.* pp. 45-46.

113. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf" *op.cit.* p. 64.

114. Reese, John N. *Towards Collective Security in the Gulf: An Evolution United States Role in Support of the GCC States.* *op.cit.* p.6, and see *The Times*, No.56620 Monday, July 1 1996. London. p. 15, and Gold, Dore "The US and Gulf Security" *Middle East Military Balance*. 1992, 1993. London, 1993, p. 87. For more details over the US policy in the Middle East see Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration After the Gulf War" *Rusi Journal* Defence Year Book 1992. p. 153.

states, Iran and Iraq. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait clearly showed that these efforts were unsuccessful.

During 1991, the United States signed new defence memoranda with all of the GCC states except Saudi Arabia which was reluctant to sign a special memorandum and instead based her post-war defence relationship on the 1977 Military Training Mission Treaty between the two countries.¹¹⁵ In the aftermath of the second Gulf crisis the United States concluded many security arrangements with the Arab Gulf states. In a speech on 6 March 1991, President Bush outlined the United States objectives in the Gulf area:

*We must work together to create shared security arrangements in the region . . . This does not mean stationing US ground forces in the Arabian Peninsula, but it does mean American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces. It means maintaining a capable naval presence in the region, just as we have for over 40 years. Let it be clear: our vital national interests depend on a stable and secure Gulf.*¹¹⁶

Kuwait, the only Arab government during the 1970s and 1980s to criticise the American presence in the Gulf region, concluded a military agreement with the United States on 9 September 1991. This agreement officially covers such matters as United States access to Kuwaiti ports, the legal status of American forces in Kuwait, arms prepositioning and joint training and manoeuvres. The agreement also concluded a deal for American engineers to make Kuwait's two airbases *inter-operable* with the United States airforce, the idea being to enable the rapid deployment of substantial American forces in Kuwait when needed, rather than basing them there permanently. The agreement was valid for ten years.¹¹⁷

115. The US constituted in April 1991 a joint Saudi-US security study team to determine the security need of the Kingdom over the next five to ten years, including the identification of potential threats. See Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration after the Gulf War". *op.cit.* p. 9.

116. Al-Alkim, Hasan H. *The GCC States in an Unstable World Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of Small States*. *op.cit.* p. 147.

117. It should be recorded that the Kuwaiti-American defence co-operation was the main factor which suspended the working of the Arab collective security of the Damascus Declaration. See Jabir, Nadim "The Gulf: Elusive Security" *Middle East International*, 27 September 1991, London, p. 12.

The Kuwaiti Council Ministers declared that the agreement was intended 'to maintain the country's security, safety and stability and ensure the safety of its borders against the expansionist ambitions of the Iraqi regime'.¹¹⁸

The Kuwaiti Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Ḍārī al-‘Ūthmān said that:

*The ten years accord was aimed at achieving close co-operation between the two countries to boost the military capabilities of the Kuwaiti armed forces through programs and training.....to deter any aggression or threat to Kuwait's sovereignty.*¹¹⁹

The Kuwaiti-American defence agreement was followed, on 11 February 1992, by a British-Kuwaiti memorandum of understanding on security co-operation. The agreement involved mutual consultation and co-operation with Kuwaiti armed forces in the defence of Kuwait, as well as provision for training and joint exercises. Like the US-Kuwaiti agreement, it was to run initially for ten years, but unlike the other agreement, there was no provision for the storage or prepositioning of military equipment.¹²⁰ Kuwait also signed two defence agreements with France on 18 August 1992 and Russia on 29 November 1993. The other GCC States, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the UAE ¹²¹ signed individual agreements similar to the Kuwaiti one with the United States during 1991 and 1992. Kuwait also signed defensive agreements with Britain, France and Russia .¹²²

Iran condemned the Kuwaiti-American agreement, and the Iranian government officially denounced it. Tehran radio said on 9 September:

*The Kuwait-American pact is bound to encourage more military intervention from the United States in the region and will certainly not serve Kuwait's interest.*¹²³

118. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" *op.cit.* p. 49.

119. Butt, Gerald "Kuwait and Iraq: A Shabby Episode" *Middle East International*, 13 September 1991, London, p. 9.

120. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" *op.cit.* p. 49, and Kechichian, Joseph A. *Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula*. *op.cit.* p. 87.

121. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Oman Country Profile 1996-97" p. 5.

122. Gold, Dore. *op.cit.* p. 87, and Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" *op.cit.* p. 49.

123. Haeri, Safa "Kuwait and Iran Angered by Kuwait?" *Middle East International*, No. 404, 13 September, 1991, London. p. 9.

Colin Powell, the American chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported the national military strategy of the United States in January 1992 as follows:

Because of the changes in the strategic environment, the threats we expect to face are regional rather than global. We will, of course, deter and defend against strategic nuclear attacks as we have for the past forty years. We will also retain the potential to defeat a global threat, should one emerge. However, our plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars.

Since 1990 the United States has built a new security arrangements by extensive arms sales to the Gulf region countries. After the liberation of Kuwait she supported the Arab Gulf states in building these forces, particularly Saudi Arabia, and reached the conclusion that the Kingdom should aspire to enlarge her armed forces from 90,000 to 200,000 men.

The GCC Army Purchase

From August 1990, the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to late 1992, arms orders for the Middle East reached \$32.3 billion. Most of these arms orders were sent to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Kuwait was reported to have dedicated some \$12 billion to weapons purchases over the next decade. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia announced in 1993 that Saudi defence spending would rise by 9%.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has become the largest single customer for American military contractors, larger than the Pentagon.¹²⁴ According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oman spends about 15% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defence and security, which makes it the biggest defence spender in the Middle East in GDP terms.¹²⁵ Gulf security even in the aftermath of Kuwait's liberation, is still threatened by the two big regional countries, Iran and Iraq.¹²⁶ However, the latter is not capable at the present time of making any direct

124. Kenneth, Katzman. *op.cit.* pp. 15-16, and *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.18. 1 February 1993. p. A11. and also *MEED*. Vol. 39. No.11. 17 March 1995. p. 18. and see *SWB*. BBC Monitoring. Summary of World Broadcasts. 18 February 1997. p. 6.

125. *MEED*. Vol. 36. No.9. 6 March 1992. p. 21.

126. Potter, Lawrence G "The Need for Confidence-Building Measures in the Persian Gulf" *Middle East Insight*. Vol. XXI, No. 2. January-February 1996. p. 27.

threat, because of the American presence in the Gulf and the United Nations sanctions.

Since the defeat of Iraq in the second Gulf war Iran has emerged as a real threat to the Arab Gulf states and the American and Western countries' interests in the Gulf region. The government of Iran, despite its domestic economic difficulties, has begun an intensive military build-up from Russia, China and North Korea. Many Americans have pointed however to the fact that post-Khomeinī Iran was still spending less money than in the days of the military build-up under the Shah .¹²⁷

The Unified Force of the GCC

Although the Gulf Co-operation Council had been created specifically to bring about the co-ordination of all the Arab Gulf States' security, economic and political policies and despite the good relations between the GCC States, especially during and after the crisis of Kuwait in 1990, the Gulf states were not able to reach any unified plan for external Gulf security. During 1991 Sultan Qaboos of Oman, headed a security committee consisting of one minister from each of the GCC countries. This Committee was established after the Doha summit in 1991.

The Omani military security proposal suggested in brief the establishment of a force from the members of the GCC States, which should consist of 100,000 men. The purpose of this force, as the Omani proposal mentions, was to protect the Arab Gulf states from any direct threat or invasion until they could get foreign assistance from friendly countries (meaning the United States and other Western countries, especially Britain). The Omani proposal (presented by Sultan Qaboos during the Abu Dhabi Summit in 1992) mentioned that the new Arab Gulf force should be made up from the regular forces of the Arab Gulf States and that the citizens of the GCC Countries should be free to join up. The proposal also affirmed that the numbers of this force will not be limited equally between the members, but entry would be allowed for any citizen of the GCC states. However, the Omani security plan was

127. Gold, Dore. *op.cit.* pp. 79-81, and see Anthony, John Duke "The GCC, Iran, and Iraq Gulf States Deal with Twin Threats to Security" *op.cit.* p. 34.

shelved after the summit without any result. Many political circles mentioned that the failure to approve the Omani proposal was due to Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti reluctance because they feared that Oman would dominate the force. This was probably because most of the force would consist of Omani citizens. Saudi Arabia also feared that she might lose her domination and supervision of the council in the future.¹²⁸

States of the GCC, since it was established, have not been able to agree on any unified security or military plan for the confrontation of external threats or invasion, because of the differences between the interests of the individual states of the Arab Gulf. Since 1982, two initiatives have firmly established the imperative of a security dimension in the GCC. The first one was the Council's military mission to Oman to solve the Omani situation. She was threatened by South Yemen at the time, backed by the Soviet Union. The second initiative involved internal security co-ordination and was prompted by the attempted coup in Bahrain in 1981.¹²⁹

The GCC was not able to conclude any military arrangement, except for the Peninsula Shield Force which came as a result of the attempted coup in Bahrain in 1982. This force was established from small armed units from each of the Council members in November 1984, to be the nucleus of a Gulf force and to intervene and assist any member needing help. However the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait confirmed the failure of this force to protect the GCC from any external threat.¹³⁰ A comparison between the GCC, and Iran and Iraq demonstrate their military weakness.

128. El-Rayyis, Riyād N. *Riyah al-Sumūm*. op.cit. pp. 83-84. See also. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf" op.cit. p. 61, and *MEED*. Vol. 39. No.11. 17 March 1995. p. 9.

129. Idrīs, Muḥammad S. op.cit. p. 152.

130. El-Reyyes, Riad N. *Oman's Role in the Gulf Co-operation Council and the Region* op.cit. pp. 200-201.

Table No. 5**The GCC Military Capabilities Compared with Iran and Iraq(131)**

Country	Iran	Iraq	S.A.	Oman	Kuwait	U.A.E.	Bahrain	Qatar
Total Armed	513,000	382,000	104,000	42,000	16,000	1,00	8,100	0,100
Army	345,000	350,000	70,000	25,000	10,000	7,000	6,800	,500
Reserves	350,000	650,000	---	---	23,700	--	---	---
Navy	18,000 incl 2,000 Naval Force and Marines	2,000	12,000incl 1,500 Marines	4,200	2,500	,000	600	00
Air Force	30,000 incl 12,000 air defence	30,000 incl 15,000 air defence	18,000	3,500	2,500	,500	700	00
Artillery	2,300	1,500	170					
Tanks	1,245	2,200	770	73	164	25	---	--
Aircraft	213 (100 serviceable)	260	253	57	34	00	24	8

The other table shows that the GCC states are the smallest and weakest organisation compared with main regional countries like Iraq, Iran, Israel and Turkey.

Table No. 6**The GCC as an Organisation Compared with Iran, Iraq, Israel and Turkey(132)**

Countries	Populations (m)	Armed Forces (Thousand)	Reserves (Thousand)	D.P.	Military Expenditure (billion)	Foreign Dept. (m)	Government expenditure on military %
The GCC.	17, 1	225,5	20	,5	9,2 (average)	56600	10,3
Iraq	19,7	382	650	0-	8,6	109670	--
Iran	56	473	350	,5	4,3	18800	9,6
Israel	5	176	430	,4	6,8	23700	22,4
Turkey	56	480	1104		5	56100	10,

131 Al-Mashshāt, 'Abd al-Mun'im *Al-Hayāh Newspaper*. No. 11467, Date 11-7-94, London. p. 4.

132. Al-Mashshāt, Abd al-Mun'im '*Al-Hayāh Newspaper* . op.cit. p. 4

133 Al-Mashshāt, 'Abd al-Mun'im *Al-Hayāh Newspaper*. op.cit. p. 4.

Dual Containment Policy in the Gulf Region

Since coming to power in January 1993, the Clinton administration has given top priority to an American Foreign Affairs Working Paper on issues pertaining to the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. This policy is known as dual containment ¹³⁵ and aims to bring about a direct co-operation between the members of the GCC. This policy was first raised during the political address delivered by the President's advisor on Eastern and South Asian affairs in the National Security Council, Martin Indyk, on May 18 1993, in Washington. This dual containment policy aims to protect the Arab Gulf state monarchies, and American and European interests in the Gulf, especially as Iran and Iraq are thought to be a threat to the Gulf oil producers. The aim to keep them weak and prevent them from increasing their power. The main emphasis of American policy in the Middle East and the Gulf, according to Indyk's address, is concentrated in many challenges:

- 1) The protection of Israel by ensuring the security of Israel's military superiority in the region and the bringing about of a permanent peaceful settlement between the Arabs and Israel.
- 2) Dual containment policy against Iran and Iraq preventing them from building arsenals, in order that they will not pose a threat to the Arab Gulf States.
- 3) Confronting the extreme Islamic movements, terrorists and Muslim fanatics who claim to cover themselves with a religious robe, according to Indyk's interpretation.

135. More details of this policy see Katzman, Kenneth. *Beyond Dual Containment*. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 1996. pp. 10-19., and see Burrows, Sir Bernard and others "Towards a Security Community in the Gulf" in: Nonneman, Gerd (ed.) *The Middle East and Europe The Search for Stability and Integration*. Federal Trust for Education and Research, London. p.p.65-66. As far as Arab reactions to the dual containment policy in the Gulf, are concerned four states) of the GCC (UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain), have unofficially expressed serious reservations about the wisdom of a policy that seems, at least to them, to be unduly confrontational. All of these countries stated that the continuation of UN sanctions was hurting the civilian people in Iraq. See Hoogland, Eric "Rethinking Persian Gulf Security?" *Middle East Insight*. Vol. XXI. No.2. January-February 1996. pp. 31-32 and *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Kuwait Country Profile 1st Quarter 1997" p.15; see also *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Oman Country Profile 1996-97" p. 5. For full text of the United States policy on Iraq, Iran and Islam see the Appendixes. The statement was delivered on 27 July 1993 before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. See *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.44. 2 August 1993. pp. D1-D3.

These factions came about as a result of the vacuum created by the fall of Soviet power and the defeat of Iraq.

Martin Indyk, addressed this policy to the three countries in the Middle East who are close friends of the United States and are the main supporters of this policy. These were Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.¹³⁶ The United States proposed several steps to promote stability in the Gulf :

- (1) Imposing the GCC states' overall defensive capabilities and accelerating the integration of their plans and programmes for the defence of their territory;
- (2) Strengthening US military ties with the GCC states;
- (3) Maintaining a limited military presence in the peninsula;
- (4) Working with the GCC states to develop a greater role for the regional and extra-regional powers such as Egypt, Syria, the United Kingdom and France.¹³⁷

Dual containment was envisaged not as a long-term solution to the problems of Gulf stability, but as a way of temporarily isolating the two chief opponents of American-sponsored regional order. Regarding Iraq, the policy involved the maintaining of full-scale international economic sanctions and military containment, including a no-fly zone in southern Iraq and a protected Kurdish enclave in the north.

On Iran the dual containment policy initially involved the mobilisation of international political opposition against her, together with limited unilateral economic sanctions. The Clinton administration asserted that it was not trying to change the Iranian regime but rather her behaviour, particularly as regards her quest for nuclear weapons, her support for terrorism and subversion in the region, and her opposition to the peace process.¹³⁸

William J. Perry, the Former American Secretary of Defense, in a report prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations in May 1995, explained the

136. El-Reyyis, Riyād N. *Riyāḥ al-Sumūm*. *op.cit.* pp. 441-443 and Rathmall, Andrew "Middle East" *Jane's Intelligence Review*. Vol. 7. No.3. London. p. 16. For more details of the reasons for the dual containment policy, See. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" *op.cit.* p. 22.

137. Munro, Alan "Gulf Security The War and its Aftermath" *Rusi Journal* Defense Year Book 1993, 138, IV, London, pp. 9-10.

138 Brzezinski, Zbigniew "Differentiated Containment" *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 67. No.3. May/June 1997. Washington, pp. 22-23.

implementation of a dual containment policy in the Gulf region on the basis of three strategies:

*The Dual Containment Policy is to bolster the individual defence capability of the Gulf States. We have bilateral defence working relationships with each of these countries. The purpose of these is to consider arms purchases and to plan joint training and joint exercises. The second part of our strategy is working to bolster the collective capacity of the Gulf nations to defend themselves through the Gulf Co-operation Council. Some strides have been made in this area in the last several years, but I have to confess to you that it's hard to be too optimistic on this point. The Gulf Co-operation Council is not, nor will it ever be, NATO or anything remotely comparable to NATO. It is maintaining the significant forward-deployed forces in the region. Today we have enough equipment pre-positioned on the ground in the Gulf States. Besides . . . equipment in the Gulf states, we have additional pre-positioned Army and Marine Corps equipment afloat in the Indian Ocean and pre-positioned aircraft support supplies in several locations, including Saudi Arabia and Oman.*¹³⁹

It should be noted that the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the United States unprecedented freedom of action, while the Madrid Conference, sponsored by the Bush administration, inaugurated a fundamentally new phase in the Middle East peace process. The external security of the Arab Gulf States as can be seen from the events and crises of the last few years, direct or indirect, cannot be the responsibility of its countries, because they are incapable of protecting themselves from any external invasion from neighbouring countries such as Iraq and Iran. The Gulf's security is, in fact, dependent on friendly outside powers such as the United States and other Western countries, particularly Britain, the former protector of the area, in partnership with the GCC, who would provide the facilities for American and Western troops during any direct external threat.¹⁴⁰

Since the second Gulf war ended, most of the GCC (except Oman) and in particular Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have preferred the security of the Gulf to be realised through the concept of bilateralism and unilateralism rather than collective security. They prefer to strengthen national self-defence and support this with

139. Perry, William J. "Working With Gulf Allies To Contain Iraq and Iran". *Report. Prepared Remarks of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the council on Foreign Relations*, New York, May 18, 1995 pp. 1-6. See Katzman, Kenneth. *Beyond Dual Containment*. *op.cit.* p. 10.

140. For more details of the US dual containment policy in the Gulf region see Brzezinski, Zbigniew et al "Differentiated Containment" *Foreign Affairs*. Vol.76, No.3. May/June 1997. Washington. p. 22. Background Papers *The GCC: A New Departure in Arab Politics; A Troubled History*

bilateral defence within the GCC as well as agreements with external (non-Arab) powers especially the western powers.

The GCC States Defence Agreements with the Western Countries

Since 1991 the three western powers (the United States, United Kingdom and France) have come to play the major external role in co-operative security, partly as a result of the GCC's reluctance to consider collective alternatives, and partly to serve their own interests.

The following external bilateral agreements have been signed since the termination of the second Gulf war.¹⁴¹

- 1) United States-Kuwait (September 1991). The 10-year US-Kuwaiti agreement provides for joint training and exercises, defence sales and the pre-positioning of US military equipment in Kuwait for contingency use. The agreement also sets up a US-Kuwaiti Defence Review Group, with the task of developing a 10-year plan to defend Kuwait and deter external aggression.
- 2) France-United Arab Emirates (September 1991). Described as a framework agreement' that allows for joint manoeuvres and arms sales.
- 3) United States-Bahrain (October 1991). Expands previous arrangements to include a joint exercise programme, US access to ports and airfields, and the pre-positioning of US military equipment in the Emirates.
- 4) United Kingdom-Kuwait (February 1992). Provides a memorandum of understanding on security co-operation, including mutual consultation and co-operation in the defence of Kuwait, the establishment of a joint defence committee, and provision for United Kingdom sales and training support for Kuwaiti forces. The 10-year agreement does not provide for the pre-positioning

Overcome Through Co-operation. In: Gulf Center for Strategic Studies. *The Gulf in the 1990s Seminar.* London, August, 1992, pp. 127-128.

141. Al-Mazidi, Feisal. *op.cit.* p. 73, and Potter, Lawrence G "The Need for Confidence-Building Measures in the Persian Gulf" *Middle East Insight*. Vol. XII. No. 2. January-February 1996. p. 30. Like their Iranian counterparts, the Omani leaders have said publicly that peace in the Gulf can come only from a regional agreement among all the Gulf states. Sultan Qaboos of Oman, in an interview, confirmed that isolating Iran or Iraq would not bring peace to the Gulf. See. *Al-Hayat Newspaper*. January 24, 1993 and Kenneth, Katzman. *op.cit.* p. 24.

of UK forces or supplies in Kuwait, although facilities will be offered to UK naval forces operating in the area (the Armilla patrol).

- 5) United States-Saudi Arabia (June 1992). An Agreement was reached on expanding the 20-year-old military training agreement as the legal basis for renewed military co-operation, rather than the new memorandum of understanding which was initially envisaged by the United States. Saudi reluctance to appear as a US protectorate was further emphasised by a refusal to allow the direct pre-positioning of US military equipment or troops, and Saudi-US differences over a 'status of force' memorandum which would have defined US military rights of access in the Kingdom. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia did subsequently allow US and UK aircraft to use Dhahran air base for operations designed to enforce the no-fly-zone south of the 32nd parallel in Iraq;
- 6) United States-Qatar (June 1992). This provides for arms sales and joint exercises.
- 7) United Kingdom-Bahrain (July 1992). This Defines areas of military co-operation between the two countries.
- 8) France-Kuwait (July 1992). The 10-year agreement provides for military co-operation, the drawing up of training programmes, the exchange of expatriates and the presence of French experts and technicians on the Kuwaiti defence staff. It does not include permanent French troops or supplies in Kuwait. The agreement also stipulates the direct defence of Kuwait by France in the event of Kuwait being subject to renewed external threat.¹⁴² In December 1995 the UAE signed a defence treaty with France in which France agreed to come to the defence of the UAE if it were attacked by a third party. The move followed the UAE purchase of over \$3.62 billion of French armaments in 1993.¹⁴³ The UAE also signed a military co-operation agreement with Germany in 1997, which provides for the exchange of expertise in technology, armaments and armament servicing. The accord is less

142. Al-Mazidi, Feisal. *op.cit.* pp. 73-75. When the Kuwaiti Ministers adopted the agreement on cooperation with the United States, they declared that it was intended to maintain the country's security, safety and stability and ensure the safety of her borders against the expansionist ambitions of the Iraqi regime. See Tripp, Charles "the Gulf States and Iraq" *op.cit.* p. 49.

143. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "United Arab Emirates Country Profile 1996-97" p. 4. French Military sources refused to give more details of the December accord with the UAE and said no details were available for public release. See. *Reuter News Agency*. 26 December 1995.

comprehensive than those already reached with the UK, the USA and France, but does provide a platform for German defence contractors to break into the lucrative UAE market.¹⁴⁴

During early 1997, the UAE and Britain concluded a defence agreement after many years of dispute between the two countries over the formulation. Britain was reluctant to sign any formal agreement because she blamed the government of the UAE for purchasing most of her weapons from France in addition to the dispute over the validity of the agreement.¹⁴⁵ The United States has developed defence and security arrangements with the GCC states along with aggressive programs for the procurement of US military presence, pre-positioning of equipment, and the development of the Fifth Fleet, all measures to demonstrate the US commitment to Gulf security and the containment of Iran and Iraq.¹⁴⁶

The United States' current position towards Gulf security is based on:

- 1) dual containment of Iraq and Iran
 - 2) broadening the base of the bilateral defence agreements with GCC states
 - 3) supporting the GCC efforts to achieve greater military integration and co-operation
 - 4) allowing the GCC access to high technology US weapons systems
 - 5) encouraging United States allies (particularly the United Kingdom and France) to expand their military role in the area.
- (6) maintaining an effecting force capable of intervening in the Gulf.¹⁴⁷ At present, the most immediate and visible military threats to the GCC states come from the two largest regional states, Iraq and Iran. Since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iran and Iraq agree completely on at least one issue-that the US and other outside powers should be excluded from a role in Gulf security. Iran and Iraq believe that a system limited only to the Gulf States gives each the best chance of emerging as the

144. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "United Arab Emirates Country Report 2nd quarter 1997" London, p. 14.

145. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*. No. 6574. Wednesday 27/11/96. London, p. 5.

146. Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S "The Gulf Security Dilemma: The Arab Gulf States, The United States, and Iran" in. (ed.) Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S. *Iran and the Gulf A Search for Stability*. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Abu Dhabi, UAE, p. 332.

147. Al-Mazidi, Faisal. *The Future of the Gulf The Legacy of the War and the Challenges of the 1990s*. *op.cit.* p. 14.

hegemony. CIA estimates suggest that Iraq still has some 7000 scientists with experience in its nuclear program and that, if the UN's inspections were lifted, Iraq could produce nuclear weapons within 5-7 years, restore its chemical warfare production in less than a year, and produce biological weapons in 'a matter of weeks'. Iraq is also suspected of retaining a residual long-range missile capability and may have hidden stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.¹⁴⁸ In August 1996, US officials began to talk openly of attacks against Iran if it were found to be complicit with terrorist activities against US citizens and military, whether in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere.¹⁴⁹

Since the termination of the second Gulf War the relations between the GCC states and Iran have improved, but Iran's strengthening its influence and sovereignty over the three islands, especially Abu Musa has a negative effect. The Iranian policy to build up its military strength, as well as growing co-operation between Iran and the Islamic fundamentalists in Sudan, Algeria, Gaza and the West Bank, the struggle for power amongst Iranian leaders, the extremists and the moderates, also cause worry.¹⁵⁰ Iranian-encouraged activists are attempting to aggravate domestic tensions that might otherwise have been successfully addressed by these states and this threatens the Arab Gulf states. The main activities and policies contributing to this concern include: a) Iran's continued occupation of the UAE islands; b) ongoing Iranian programmes to develop a conventional military arsenal and to acquire nuclear weapons; c) Iranian sponsorship of extremist groups and covert operations around the world; d) Iran's active role in attempting to destabilise Arab Gulf governments; e) Iranian public opposition to the peace process between Israel and the Arab states; and f) Iran's nationalist quest to expand Persian influence and attempt to dominate the Gulf region as the sole hegemonic power. All of these factors have played a major role in any rapprochement of relations between the Arab Gulf states and Iran.¹⁵¹

148. Katzman, Kenneth. *op.cit.* p. 15, and for more details see Al-Mazidi, Feisal. *op.cit.* p. 8.

149. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula" *op.cit.* p. 20.

150. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf" *op.cit.* p. 59.

151. For more details over the relations between Iran and GCC see Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S. *op.cit.* pp. 339-346.

Dr Al-‘Alkim summarised the difficulties that hinder the GCC members in reaching a common security formulation as follows: different attitudes towards the security of the region amongst the GCC states; the prevailing competition between the GCC states and the division of the Council states into different camps; the lack of consensus on the sources of external threats and the difference of the internal threats; the Western military presence, especially the United States, a matter which increased the level of competition between the GCC members.¹⁵²

¹⁵² Interview with Hassan Al-Alkim. op.cit.

4

Internal Security of the Gulf

Introduction

The Arab Gulf States have, historically, experienced a low level of political violence. This is was as a result of the nature of their political systems, the presence of the British and the enormous boom in oil wealth they experienced during the 1970s and 1980s. However, since the early 1990s, significant internal and external developments have changed the dynamics of the political processes in the region and these developments represent a serious threat to the power bases of the Arab Gulf States.

PFLO and Nationalist threats

Until the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1971, the most serious internal threat faced by the Arab Gulf states was the activities of the People's Front for the liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLO). They became active in 1965 under the leadership of a group from the Dhofari tribes known as the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). The aim of this Front was to fight the authority of Sultan Sa'īd b. Taimur and gain Dhofari independence. The Front was taken over in 1968 by a group of Marxists and renamed the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).

During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Front had strong links with the pro-Soviet Arab nationalist regimes, especially in South Yemen, Iraq, Algeria and Libya, as well as with the nationalist opposition in Bahrain and Kuwait, and particularly with the Arab nationalist movement *Ḥarakat al-Qawmiyyīn al-'Arab*. The People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf changed the Front's name for a second time to the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman.

This came as a result of the Kuwaiti government's pressure on South Yemen, the main backer of the Omani opposition.

During the early 1970s the Dhofari rebellion constituted the main internal threat to Gulf stability. The Shah of Iran described the situation in Oman as follows: "Should the struggle succeed in Oman, imagine what would confront us in Muscat, which lies opposite the Strait of Hormuz".¹ With the support of Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as the other Arab Gulf States, the United States and Britain, the Omani government forces were able to destroy the rebellion's activities in the Dhofar region in 1975.²

During the 1960s and 1970s the nationalist Arab regimes in Cairo and Baghdad, backed by the Soviet Union, were the most important internal threat to the Conservative Arab Gulf states. The Naṣerist and Ba'ṯhist movements in the Gulf area were supported by Egypt and Iraq and aimed to destroy all monarchical regimes there. Naṣer's involvement in the North Yemen civil war during the early 1960s was a direct threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Sheikdoms for the Egyptians supported many nationalist groups in Oman, Yemen and the other Sheikdoms.³

Since the revolution of 1958 Iraq has aspired to having greater involvement in the Arab Gulf states and has hoped to gain more influence as well as access to the Gulf waters. In 1961, the revolutionary government claimed that Kuwait had been an integral part of Baṣrah province during the time of the Ottoman Empire. This claim posed a direct threat to the Arab Gulf states and become more severe following the involvement of the Great Powers in the region. The United States, the Soviet Union and Britain spread their troops along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border to protect Kuwait from any Iraqi invasion.

The Iraqi-backed internal threat to the Arab Gulf states continued under the Ba'ṯhist regime which supported many nationalist and leftist groups in the Gulf area, especially the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman. Many sources indicate that

1. *Documents of the National Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf*. op.cit. pp. 16-20

2. Peterson, J.E. op.cit. p. 169 and Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf" op.cit. p. 55.

3. Regsbee, Wallace Lynn. op.cit. p. 13.

the improvement of relations between Iraq and the Arab Gulf states during the mid-1970's was an Iraqi tactic to support and finance the pan-Arab and Ba'athist cells that had been previously active in the Gulf against the ruling families.⁴

The second internal threat was the outbreak of war between North and South Yemen in February 1979. The war became critical to the Arab Gulf because of the Soviet and Cuban support for South Yemen. The two countries entered into a short war over a disputed border and as a result of the differences between them. Saudi Arabia, the other Arab Gulf States and the United States played a significant role in supporting the North Yemen regime and stopping the South Yemeni advance in the North. This war turned into a proxy conflict between East and West, in which the South Yemen regime tried to help support the Socialists of North Yemen to overthrow the tribal regime.⁵ Oman and Bahrain were the two countries in the Gulf most threatened by leftist opposition groups. These included the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and Bahrain. Cells of these groups were arrested several times in Oman and Bahrain after they tried many times to disrupt the internal security of the two countries.

In November 1985, Oman revealed that she had discovered a military group backed by the Omani opposition in South Yemen. The Omani government declared that this military group aimed to disrupt the internal stability of Oman. The group was made up of Dhofaris who were all identified as members of the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and totalled between 200 and 250 persons.⁶

Shi'a activities over Gulf Security

During the 1970s the two parliamentary countries, Kuwait and Bahrain, suspended their experimental Parliaments, because of the direct threat to royal families from pan-Arab groups in Kuwait and the influence of the Shi'a in Bahrain. During the

4. Day, Alan J. *Border and Territorial Disputes*. Longman, London, 1987. pp. 246-247.

5. Mahmood, Fazal. *op.cit.* pp. 28-33 and Kechichian, Joseph A "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia" *The Muslim World*. Vol. 80. No.1. (January 1990) p. 21.

6. *Oman Television Broadcast*. Statement issued by the government of the Sultanate of Oman, Şalālah, January 1986.

1970s many attacks were carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and this group was linked with and supported by the Omani opposition.

The conflicts between the governments (in Kuwait and Bahrain), and the opposition groups in the parliaments of the two countries, accelerated the decision-makers in both countries to dissolve the parliamentary experiment.⁷ However, Gulf internal security was exposed to a real direct threat with the events of 1979, namely the fall of the Shah of Iran, “The policeman of the Gulf Region”, and the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The Iranian Islamic Revolution, which brought the Khomeinī regime to power, actively encouraged the Shi‘ite population living or working in the Arab Gulf countries to rise up against them.

During late 1979 and early 1980 many violent anti-American demonstrations took place and the Shi‘ites actively supported Khomeinī in many areas of the Arab Gulf, especially in Bahrain (where they constituted the majority population), the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Iranian media also started a campaign against the American presence and the monarchies. In November 1979 in Saudi Arabia, where the Shi‘ite population is estimated at 350-400,000, bloody clashes took place between demonstrators and the Saudi National Guard resulting in the killing, injuring and arrest of more than 600 people. In October 1993, the Saudi government reached an agreement with exiled Shi‘a leaders of the community, in which resistance activities abroad were stopped in exchange for greater civil liberties at home and promises to address longstanding complaints about discrimination. However, this agreement appeared to break down in 1996, following the June 1996 bombing, when a Shi‘a Newsletter, published in Washington, complained that none of the provisions of the 1993 agreement had been adequately implemented. In September 1996, Saudi Shi‘a Clergymen inside the Kingdom, calling themselves the Grouping of the ‘Ulamā’, publicly urged the release of 23 Shi‘a Clergy and a leading clergyman, Hāshim Muḥammad Al-Shaykh.⁸

7. Hottinger, Arnold “Political Institutions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain” in: Chubin, Shahram (ed.) *Security in the Persian Gulf 1: Domestic Political Factors*. Gower Publishing, England, 1981, pp. 7-9.

8. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* “Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97” p. 8.

The Iranian revolution also coincided with a most traumatic domestic threat to the royal family of Al-Sa'ud, in particular, and the other monarchies of the Arab Gulf states in general. The Grand Mosque was seized on 20 November 1979 by some 200-300 armed persons and was held by them for two weeks. This group, in a statement published in Beirut, called themselves the Muslim Revolutionary Movement in the Arabian Peninsula; they also revealed that the action was directed against the royal family of Al-Sa'ud and claimed that the Al-Sa'ud regime had lost its right to rule because it had strayed from the tenets of the Wahhabī Islam which the Kingdom had been built on. Saudi security was also affected by many violent Shi'a demonstrations which took place during the Ḥajj in 1981, 1984 and 1987. The Iranian Pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca against the Saudi state and the American presence in the Gulf area and launched a campaign in support of the Iranian Islamic government.

The 1987 confrontation in Mecca between Iranian Pilgrims and the Saudi security forces resulted in the death of 402 people, including 275 Iranians. Iran's reaction was to hold mass demonstrations in Iran and sack the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. The Iranian leaders also threatened to avenge the deaths by overthrowing the Al-Sa'ud dynasty. These events persuaded the Saudi government to limit the number of pilgrims entering the country in 1988. This was one of the decisions which was adopted by the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) and paved the way for the break in diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran in 1988.

It should be noted that Iran subsequently boycotted the 1988 Ḥajj.⁹ Bahrain, with a Shi'a majority population of between 60% and 70%, witnessed a real internal threat to the Sunni royal family. Conflicts and tensions between Sunnis and Shi'as in Bahrain have a long history, further exacerbated following the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. The conflict between the Shi'a movements backed by Tehran and the Bahrain authorities backed by Saudi Arabia still continues until the present day, as is shown by the violent riot of May 1995.¹⁰

9. *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.25. 21 March 1994. p. C3.

10. Hottinger, Arnold. *op.cit.* p. 7.

In early 1979 and 1980 large Shi'a demonstrations took place in Bahrain supporting the Iranian revolution. In October 1979 the Bahrain government expelled Hādī-al-Mudarsī the self-professed representative of Imam Khomeinī in Bahrain. Then in April 1980, Bahrain witnessed a large Shi'a demonstration following the execution of the Iraqi Shi'ite Muḥammad Bāqir Al-Ṣadr in Iraq.¹¹

The Iranian threat to Bahrain became clearer when Ayatollah Ṣādeq Ruḥanī threatened the annexation of Bahrain unless she adopted an Islamic government after the Iranian model. The Government of Bahrain, on 13 December 1981, arrested a number of Shi'a after the discovery of an attempt by an Iranian-backed group to assassinate a Bahraini official. Bahrain disclosed that this group belonged to the Islamic Front (*al-Jabha al-Islāmīyyah*), which had its headquarters in Tehran, and that it consisted of 73 Shi'ite members: 60 Bahrainis, 11 Saudi dissidents, 1 Omani, and 1 Kuwaiti; there were no Iranians in the group.¹²

The Prime Minister of Bahrain, Sheykh Khalīfah b. Salmān, stated in an interview that:

*The external danger is Iran and the present regime in Tehran. This Iranian regime is instigating the Shi'ites in Bahrain and in the Gulf under the slogans of the Islamic revolution and with a sectarian motive against the Arab Gulf states and their regimes. The regime in Iran is exploiting the Shi'ites in Bahrain and the Gulf, encouraging their political ties with the ruling Ayatollahs in Tehran, training them in the use of weapons and acts of sabotage and sending them to their own countries to foment chaos and shake security.*¹³

All the Arab Gulf states condemned the 1981 coup attempt in Bahrain; Saudi Arabia was the country most affected after Bahrain. Nāyif b. 'Abd al-Azīz, the Saudi interior minister, stated that:

We had hoped that Iran, our neighbour and friend, would not have such conspiratorial intentions. But after what has happened in Bahrain, our hopes have unfortunately been dashed and it has become clear to us that Iran has become a source of danger and harm to Gulf nations and their security. At the

11. Mahmood, Fazal. *op.cit.* p. 29.

12. Al-Suwaidī, Muḥammad Aḥmad. *Al- Sirā' al-Duwalī Ḥawl al-Baḥr al-Iqlīmī wal-Jurf al-Qar fi al-Khalīj al-'Arabī Dirāsah fi al-Jughrāfiyā al-Siyāsīyah*. M.A. Degree. Cairo University, 1983. pp. 59-60.

13. Ramazani, R.K. *op.cit.* pp. 7 and 34.

*very beginning of their revolution, the men in power in Iran said they would not be the policemen of the Gulf. Today they have unfortunately become the terrorists of the Gulf.*¹⁴

The chain of political violence was started in August 1994, when some riots broke out and led to instability in Bahrain. Some of the unemployed, most of whom were Shi'a, demonstrated and gathered together in order to attack the Employment Department. This resulted in clashes with the Bahraini police and then developed into demonstrations in December 1994 calling for the release of 'Alī Salmān, one of the Shi'a 'Ulamā' in Bahrain, who had been arrested for security and political reasons (he distributed a petition signed by thousands of Bahrainis calling on the Bahraini government to restore the Parliament, dissolved in 1975, and the constitution, which was suspended in 1975). The demonstrations in Bahrain reached their peak at the beginning of 1995 particularly after a repatriation policy was applied by the Bahraini government to many religious leaders of the Shi'a including 'Alī Salmān, Ḥamza al-Dirī and Ḥaydar al-Sitrī, who had all been accused of instigating acts of sabotage and riots in Bahrain. This policy was conducted between Iran and Bahrain in an atmosphere of high tension. The events occurred intermittently up to the end of April 1995. On 25 September 1995, the state of Bahrain again witnessed a real internal threat when political violence broke out again amongst the Shi'a. The cause of this violence was the arrest of one of the Shi'a 'Ulamā', namely 'Abd al-Amīr al-Jamrī.

The confrontation between government security forces and the Shi'a resulted in the death of 13 persons. Damage and losses were estimated in millions of dollars. On 3 June 1996, the government of Bahrain announced that it had foiled a plot by radical Islamist forces to overthrow the of Al-Khalīfah regime. According to the government

14. Ramazani, R. K. *The GCC Record and Analysis*. *op.cit.* p. 35

15. During November 1994, according to the Bahraini opposition (Shi'a) as many as 4,000 Saudi security officers entered Bahrain to support the Bahraini police against the demonstrations which were led by Shi'a clergymen. Jordan is the other country which consistently supports Bahraini security. Around 1,500 Jordanian nationals are in Bahrain's security and defence forces. In early 1995, Bahraini opposition movements accelerated their demands and protests against the government and exploded many bombs in different areas in Bahrain. As a reaction to that the Bahraini Crown Prince issued a statement warning that the Bahraini Defence Force was prepared to impose martial law to end the unrest once and for all. See, *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Bahrain Country Report 1st quarter 1996" pp. 8-10

a group named Ḥizbullah Bahrain, which had links with Iranian-backed organisations, was involved in the disturbances.¹⁶ The opposition movement in Bahrain is not limited to the Shi'a, it includes other opposition movements. In addition to the Islamic Front and the People's Liberation of Bahrain Front, there is the Coalition of the Constitutional Front which sprang up in 1992 and has 30 members such as the national representatives of democratic and religious trends. The claims of this movement have been laid down by 'Abd al-Amīr al-Jamrī (Shi'a), 'Abd al-Laṭīf Maḥmūd (Sunnī), and Dr Aḥmad al-Sha'lān (Sunnī). Its demands are as follows: (a) activation and restoration of Parliamentary life through general elections to constitute a new legislative council; (b) repatriation of Bahraini exiles who have been exiled to Kuwait, Lebanon and other countries; (c) recognition of the civil and political rights of Bahraini women; (d) equality between Bahraini people, whether Shi'a or Sunnah.

Bahrain is the member of the GCC which contains the greatest number of opposition movements, the most important of them being: the Islamic Movement for the Liberation of Bahrain, a Shi'ite movement based in Tehran, considered the most important opposition movement; the Free Bahraini Islamic Movement, a Sunni movement residing in London; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which is a leftist movement associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and considered as one of its branches. It was based in Damascus and Baghdad; the Bahrain National Liberation Front, a leftist opposition movement based in Damascus and Baghdad; the Committee for the Defence of Political Arrests in Bahrain, which resides in London and Western Europe and includes both Shi'a and Sunni members; the Bahrain Liberty Movement, which is based in London; the Bahrain Constitutional Movement. The most important organisations are the Shi'ite opposition organisations because they are the most powerful, active and dominant. This is due the fact that the majority of the unemployed people are Shi'ites.

16. Dr 'Abd al-Laṭīf Maḥmūd was arrested in Bahrain in December 1991 after his return from a conference in Kuwait where he delivered a paper criticizing the Gulf regimes and calling for directly elected legislatures with real powers in the Gulf states. He was released shortly thereafter. See. Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies*. *op.cit.* p. 32, and *MEED*. Vol. 40. No.25. 21 June 1996. p. 2.

It should be noted that the new Legislative Council of Bahrain consists of an equal number of Shi'a and Sunni members, as does the Ministerial Council. The Bahraini crisis was very complicated. It was a mixture of reactions to the internal situation where people demanded democratic reforms and the restoration of parliament and the Constitution in addition to the provision of job opportunities to solve the problem of unemployment.

The other main reason was the influence of the Iranian government in supporting the Shi'a in Bahrain and encouraged them to demand their rights which the Bahraini government had suppressed. As a reaction to the seizure of the Grand Mosque and the abortive Bahrain coup attempt, Saudi Arabia hurriedly concluded several bilateral security agreements. During an official state visit to all the Arab Gulf states in February 1982 Prince Nayif signed bilateral security agreements with all the GCC states except Kuwait, who rejected the security agreement. Many sources stated that the Kuwaiti rejection of the Saudi proposal stemmed from a desire to reject the Saudi hegemony and avoid confrontation with Iran and the Shi'a groups. However, Kuwait was the GCC country most affected by Shi'a attacks during the 1980s. The Kuwaiti rejection stemmed from the fact that Article 12 of the Security Agreement contradicted the Kuwaiti Constitution. The Saudi bilateral security agreements with the GCC provided an opportunity for the exchange of equipment, expertise and training, as well as the extradition of criminals and border co-operation. During the November 1982 Summit, Saudi Arabia tried to conclude a comprehensive internal agreement with the other Arab Gulf states. The plan failed to win approval from some of the council states, however. This agreement did not win approval until 1994 when it was signed by four of the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates); Kuwait and Qatar remained reluctant to sign; Qatar out of protest against border clashes with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait because her Assembly did not approve it.¹⁷

The Economist Intelligence Unit reported that:

*The GCC security pact effectively buries the Damascus Declaration, which was signed after the Gulf war. Kuwait and Qatar, in declining to join the latest pact, have indicated their continuing underlying distrust of Saudi Arabia.*¹⁷

Since 1982 the GCC states have held many joint military, naval, and air force exercises.¹⁹ The State of Kuwait is the only state of the GCC with a long history of representative institutions and has the freest political climate among these countries. However, Kuwaiti democracy witnessed a real internal threat following a number of explosions and attacks on the ruling Al-Ṣabāḥ family. The Kuwaiti Parliament was suspended and dissolved many times as a result of the confrontations between members of the Parliament and the government and, in particular, the Al-Ṣabāḥ family.

Some media sources mention that, as a result of the refusal of the Amir of Kuwait, Sheykh Jābir Al-Aḥmad, to accept the Kuwaiti petition of 1989 for the restoration of constitutional rule in Kuwait (signed by 30,000 Kuwaitis), Ṣaddam Ḥussein of Iraq was able to exploit the confrontation between the government and the Kuwaiti people and he thought that the Iraqi invasion might meet with a measure of popular support in Kuwait. The democratic movement of Kuwait contains many other political movements and still plays a significant role in Kuwaiti society. The most important of these movements are:

- 1) The Representatives' Block" (*takattul al-nuwwāb*), three groups which emerged from Islamic social organisations;
- 2) The Islamic Constitutional Movement (*al-ḥaraka al-dusturīyya al-islāmīyyah*), a Sunni group connected to the Muslim Brotherhood;
- 3) The Popular Islamic Alignment (*al-tajammu' al-Islāmī al-Sha'bī*), the political wing of the Sunni Salafi movement;

17. For details over the Kuwaiti reactions of the internal security agreement see Al-Anzi, Abdulla Mashell. *op.cit.* pp. 127-130

18. Al-Makhawi, Rashid. *The Gulf Co-operation Council: A Study in Integration.* *op.cit.* p. 74.

19. Ramazani, R.K. *op.cit.* pp. 34-35 and also see *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. Oman, Yemen 1st quarter 1995 January 31, 1995, London, p. 8.

- 4) The National Islamic Coalition (*al-itiḷāf al-Islāmī al-Waṭanī*), representing Shi'a Islamists;
- 5) The Constitutional Alignment (*al-tajammu' al-dusturī*) a movement very close to the Al-Ṣabāh family and consisting of the merchants from the Kuwaiti families;
- 6) The Kuwaiti Democratic Forum (*al-minbar al-dīmuqrātī al-Kuwyatī*), which represents Western-style liberals and old Arab Nationalists (*Ḥarakiyyīn*, *Ba'thist* and *Naṣṣerist*). In addition to all of these there are prominent figures who are not affiliated with any political movement and form an independent group (*majmu'āt al-mustaḡillīn*). Most of these are very close to the government of Al-Ṣabāh.

During the 1960s and 1970s, there were dissident groups operating inside Saudi Arabia as well as from locations outside the country such as Egypt. The most notable of these were the Committee for the Liberation of Saudi Arabia, the Ḥijaz Union of the People of the Peninsula, the Revolutionary Najd Party, the Union of the People Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Voice of the Vanguard (a movement of Saudi Students in the United States).²⁰ The stability of the Saudi government faced a complex long-term problem, especially from Islamic groups (*Wahhābī* western-educated liberals, the Shi'a dissidents and the ethnic conflicts between Najdis and Ḥijazis).

The founding of the GCC in May 1981 did nothing to protect the internal security of the council against terrorist attacks. Bahrain and Kuwait suffered many major assaults on their internal security. The first attempt took place on 12 December 1983, when the targets of the attacks included the French and the United States Embassies in Kuwait City. Other targets included American business offices, the airport control tower, the Ministry of Electricity and Water, a major petro-chemical refining complex and other facilities. Responsibility for these attacks was claimed by Islamic Jihad. The second assault involved the hi-jacking of a Kuwaiti airline in December 1984. The third and most serious assault on Kuwaiti internal security was the attack on the motorcade of the Kuwaiti head-of-state Sheykh Jābir Al-Aḥmad on

20. *Meri Report*. Saudi Arabia. *op.cit.* p.19 and see. *Jane's Sentinel Newsletter*: The Gulf States. *op.cit.* p. 13.

25 May 1985, in which two guards were killed and several others injured. Again Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. The fourth violent attack took place in July 1985, when popular cafes in Sharq and Salmiyah in Kuwait were bombed: 11 people were killed and 89 injured. This time a revolutionary group of Shi'a, who already during that time claimed responsibility for many attacks on diplomats from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates in Europe and India, claimed responsibility.²¹

The State of Kuwait has not approved any of the Saudi and Omani security proposals over the internal and external threats to the Gulf area since the establishment of the GCC. However, since the emergence of the Iranian revolution, the Iranian leaders, in an attempt to export the revolution, began offering training and military and financial assistance to many of the Shi'a groups living or working in the Arab Gulf states. These groups include the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Islamic Front and the al-Da'wa Party in Iraq.

According to the Iranian ex-prime minister Mīr Ḥusain Musavī, who was a supporter of these movements:

The fight against imperialism should take place all over the World. (which means the Arab Gulf states as a part of the world) 22

Direct Shi'a attacks did not happen in the other Arab Gulf States like Oman, Qatar and the UAE except for tension between the Shi'a and Sunnis who supported opposite sides in the eight-year war. Dubai was the only Emirate to have good relations with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and this was only because most of the merchants in Dubai are of Iranian origin.²³ The three Gulf countries mentioned above arrested many Shi'a groups backed by the Iranian government during the 1980s. Shi'a political activities in the GCC were one of the most serious internal threats that affected the stability of these countries.²⁴

21. Al-Makhawi, Rashid. *op.cit.* p. 34, see also Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies. op.cit.* pp. 90-92.

22. Ramazani, R.K. *op.cit.* p. 29.

23. Mahmood, Fazal. *op.cit.* p. 29.

24. Al-Makhawi, Rashid. *op.cit.* pp. 82-83.

The Foreign Population of the GCC States

During the boom which followed the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the Arab Gulf states during the fifties and sixties, many people migrated to the Gulf.²⁵ The infrastructure projects lured expatriate workers from Arab countries and from South Asia. Many of these people came from Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Indonesia and Korea. However, the greatest number were from Palestine during the 1940s.²⁶

The phenomenon of the flow of foreign manpower to the Arab Gulf Countries has been associated with the discovery of oil. Gulf societies began to move from the primitive phase to the urban phase, which depends on a modern economy and the development of oil fields. The foreign manpower that has been recruited brought with them their own traditions and customs. These traditions and customs might affect and influence life in the Arab Gulf States and affect the economic, social and political security of these countries.

During the early 1950s and 1960s large numbers of Iranian workers crossed the Gulf to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Most of these groups settled down and became citizens of these countries. The demand for immigrant labour dramatically increased with the expansion of the Arab Gulf states' economy and the growth in construction activity during the early 1970s.²⁷

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25. There were two main reasons for the shortage of the national work force in the GCC countries. The first was small national populations. In 1975, the total national population of the GCC countries was estimated to be little more than 6 million. The largest national population was in Saudi Arabia-estimated about 4.6 million-and the smallest in Qatar, with only 60,000. The second reason was very low rates of labour force participation. See Winckler, Onn "The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 33. No. 3. July 1997. Frank Cass, London, p. 480.
 26. Winckler, Onn "The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 33. No.3. July 1997, Frank Cass, London, p. 487 and see. Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert . *Politics in the Middle East*. 4th edn, Harper Collins, 1994, New York, pp. 377-378.
 27. For more details on the foreign population in the Arab Gulf States (GCC) see Winckler, Onn "The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" See. Bonine, Michael E "Population and Labor after the Gulf War" *Middle East Insight*. Vol. XII. No.2. January-February 1996. pp. 37-38. *Middle Eastern Studies*. op.cit. p. 480 and *Middle East Journal* "Saudi Arabia: Jobs for the Boys" No.225 (July 1993. p. 26 and see *Middle East Economic Digest (MEED)*, Vol.40. No.14. 5 April 1996. p. 55 also see Hill, Alan G. *Population Migration and*

Foreign immigration and foreign labour in the Arab Gulf states posed the main internal threats to the Gulf societies, politically, economically, socially and culturally.

Politically the growth of foreign labour during the 1970s and 1980s led to the presence in the Arab Gulf states of hundreds of thousands of foreigners who might be used by their countries of origin or opposition parties against the local authorities. The population growth during the years 1975-1985 was the highest that the Gulf area has ever experienced. In fact it was one of the highest in the entire world for that period.²⁸ In a seminar on co-operation developments in the Gulf, held in Kuwait in April 1982 under the auspices of the University of Kuwait, Dr 'Abdullah Al-Nufaisī, one of the Kuwait University staff, stated that the presence of foreign workers in the Gulf had political, security, cultural and social consequences in the region. Whereas Asian immigrants used to come to the Arab Gulf in order to work and gain a living, the use of oil as a weapon against Western countries and the latter's ambitions in respect to Arab Gulf oil led to South Koreans, Taiwanese and Filipinos being brought to the region for reasons which had nothing to do with work but had political and even military objectives.

Al-Nufaisī added that the United States was responsible for the dispatching of thousands of South Koreans and Taiwanese who had military training to work in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. These immigrants were being prepared for military operations as an attempt by America to occupy the sources of oil in the Arab Gulf area. The South Korean government allows army personnel wishing to work in the Arab Gulf states a leave of absence. The personnel, according to reports from the Saudi security police, are well trained in fighting, as shown during the clashes which occurred between them and the Saudi police in al-Kharj region in 1981.

Development in the Gulf States in: Chubin, Shahram (ed.) *Security in the Persian Gulf 1: Domestic Political Factors*. Gower Publishing, England, 1981, pp. 64-67.

28. For more details over the foreign population in the Arab Gulf States (GCC) before and after the 'oil boom' see Winckler, Onn "The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" *op.cit.* p. 481.

Indians and Pakistanis constitute the majority of the foreign labourers in the Arab Gulf states. These two governments have on many occasions criticised the Arab Gulf states for the mistreatment of their nationals. During a visit by the former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the Arab Gulf states she criticised the policy, carried out by some Gulf states, of replacing Indian workers with Muslim ones from Pakistan. The Indian Prime Minister also criticised Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for their mistreatment of Indian workers.

It is noted that some of these manpower-exporting countries tried to intervene in the rules issued by some Arab Gulf States governments against foreign workers who did not abide by their labour laws. In 1980, the Indian government protested against a law issued in the UAE stipulating the expatriation of illegal residents for large numbers of Indian workers were illegally present in the country. This problem was discussed in the Indian Parliament and the Prime Minister made a visit to the UAE and was successful in stopping the laws being carried through.²⁹

During late 1992, in protest against the destruction of the Mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, India, thousands of Pakistanis and Indian Muslims closed their shops in most of the Gulf Co-operation Council cities. In the United Arab Emirates hundreds of them marched and condemned the Indian government's position toward the Hindu extremists who had destroyed the Mosque. The case of the Mosque in India united the Indian and Pakistani Muslims against the Hindus and became the main internal threat, when these people refused to work or open their shops to demonstrate their anger against the Indian government.³⁰

In statistical form, the following table shows that foreign labour was estimated at 40% of the total population of the GCC states, i.e. about 7 million, out of 17,6 million in 1992. Furthermore, foreign labour is estimated at 70% of the labour power in the Arab Gulf states (GCC).

29. Al-Nufaisi, 'Abdullah F. *Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī al-Iṭār al-Siyasī wa al-Istrāṭījī*. *op.cit.* pp 64-65. In a conference held by the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Abu Dhabi (UAE) in September 1997, he declared that India has 3 million workers in the GCC countries 1.3 million in Saudi Arabia, 1.2 million in the United Arab Emirates, 320,000 in Oman, 115,000 in Bahrain, and 112,000 in Qatar. *Middle East News Agency*. Saturday 20-September 1997.

Table No. 7
The Foreign Labour Power in the GCC Countries (31)

Country	Citizens	Non-Citizens	Proportion of Non-Citizen Population	Total
Bahrain	330,000	134,000	29%	464,000
Kuwait	387,000	803,000	67%	1,190,000
Oman	1,062,000	380,000	26%	1,442,000
Qatar	141,000	272,000	66%	413,000
S. Arabia	8,066,400	4,192,000	34%	12,259,000
U.A.E.	513,000	1,294,000	70%	1,825,000

Source: Hardy, Roger. *Arabia After the Storm: Internal Stability of the Arab Gulf States*. A Middle East Programme Report. The Royal Institution of International Relations, London, 1994, p. 48.

During the internal incidents of the early 1980s Kuwait expelled some 20,000 persons.³² Kuwait was the country most affected by the presence of Iraqis and Palestinians who constituted an important and active minority, most of whom occupied high-ranking positions, such as local government officials and consultants to the royal family. Until the Iraqi invasion in 1990 they were estimated to be more than 450,000 persons, which was 25% of the Kuwaiti population. The Kuwaiti government blamed Palestinians several times, during the dissolution of the Kuwaiti Assembly, because they were close to the Kuwaiti opposition, the Pan-Arab Movement. As a result of the second Gulf crisis, the government of Kuwait expelled 300,000 Palestinians³³ following her liberation in 1991 as well as a large number of

30. Al-Alkim, Hasan H. *The GCC States In An Unstable World*. *op.cit.* p. 49, and *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "UAE Country Profile 1996-97" p. 18.

31. Hardy, Roger. *Arabia After the Storm: Internal Stability of the Gulf Arab States*. A Middle East Programme Report. The Royal Institution of International Relations, London, 1994, p. 48. The statistics quoted from Barkner and Partners, Report of the Market of the GCC in 1992.

32. Al-Makhawi, Rashid. *op.cit.* pp. 83-84.

33. The principal target groups were the 350,000-375,000 Palestinians and the 250,000-300,000 bedoon (stateless). Beside this many thousands of Arab peoples whose governments backed Iraq have also suffered, including Yemenis, Sudanese, Algerians and Tunisians. See Whitly, Andrew. *op.cit.* p. 39 and see *Middle East Economic Digest (MEED)*, Vol.35. No.39. 4 October 1991. p. 6.

Sudanese, Jordanians and Yemenis. The other GCC States were not affected by the Palestinian presence in the same way as Kuwait.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, expelled nearly 800,000 Yemenis³⁴ as well as a number of people from Jordan and Sudan in response to their government's reaction to the Iraqi invasion and the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia. Egyptians and Syrians replaced the Yemenis and the Palestinians, as citizens of the two Arab countries who most supported Saudi Arabia against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.³⁵

Since the early 1980s many officials in the GCC states have warned of the social and internal security consequences of immigrant labour. The United Arab Emirates is the country most affected by immigrant labour in social, criminal and internal security matters. In a symposium held in Sharjah on the dangers of immigrant labour, the ruler of Sharjah said that foreign labour amounted to 90% of the country's labour force and that this was a threat to internal security.³⁶

Economically, many financial sources reported that the money transferred by immigrant labour out of the Arab Gulf states was over \$20 billion each year.³⁷ The GCC States, in which foreign manpower-maintained its productive capacity during the seventies and eighties, face a serious unemployment problem among their own nationals, especially Secondary School and University graduates, and must work to solve it. Economic reports have shown an increase of unemployment in Bahrain, the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia, and these three form four-fifths of the population of the GCC Countries, which some estimate at 18 million.³⁸

34. Bonine, Michael E "Population and Labor after the Gulf War" *op.cit.* p. 39.

35. Hardy, Roger. *Arabia after the Storm: Internal Stability of the Gulf Arab States.* *op.cit.* p. 50 and Al-'Alkim, Hasan *op.cit.* p. 30. For more details on the expatriates in the Arab Gulf States see Bonine, Michael E "Population and Labor after the Gulf War" *Middle East Insight*. Vol. XII. No.2. January-February 1996. pp. 37-40.

36. Bu- Ḥaliqah, Iḥsān 'Alī "Al-'Amālah al-Wāfidah fī al-Qimah al-Khalījīyyah" *Majallat al-Majallah*. Issue No. 825, December 1995. p. 55

37. Winckler, Onn "The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" *op.cit.* pp. 480-481.

38. In a report (GCC Market Report 1992) issued by Birks Sinclair & Associates, the Mountjoy Research Center estimated the total number of the non-national people in the Gulf Cooperation

Since the Second Gulf War (1990-1991) the Arab Gulf States (GCC) have begun to set up economic policies to provide more job opportunities for nationals, but these policies conflict with private sector interests. They prefer to employ foreigners, due to their skills and educational qualifications, in addition to the low wage they demand. Nationals claim high wages and, when they are paid, do not abide by the instructions given to them by the private sector. 39

We should note that foreign workers dominated the private sector in the Arab Gulf States. The private sector could not dispense with them, because they represented 90% of the labour force in the UAE, 83% in Qatar, 82% in Kuwait, 69% in Saudi Arabia and 60% in the Sultanate of Oman and Bahrain. Studies and official statistics show that the total population of the GCC States, including expatriates, will increase to 39.4 million by the year 2010 and will include about 9 million foreign workers, and that the serious effects of unemployment in the Council Countries will be aggravated in the future, especially amongst those who are under 19 years of age. These studies suggest that the increase in unemployment could lead to political problems and internal riots, unless job opportunities are provided within the coming 15 years. A good example of such a situation were the political events witnessed in Bahrain in 1995-1996.⁴⁰

and for details of the non-national people in the GCC countries see *MEED*, Vol. 36 No. 30. 31 July 1992. p. 15

39. In the private sector positions are also increasingly scarce. See Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert. *Politics in the Middle East*. *op.cit.* p. 378.

40. Sabbāgh, Ranā "Duwal Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī fi Ma'ziq Bisha'an al-'Amālah al-Ajnabiyyah" *Report Issued by Reuter News Agency*, 31 December 1995.

Islamic Groups and their Opposition in the GCC States

During the 1960s and 1970s, Islamic groups did not play any effective political roles in the Arabian Gulf region, because of the absence of unification, the domination of pan-Arab and nationalist Arab ideas in the Arab world and the claims of the Gulf rulers that their states were subject to Islamic law. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s the Arab Gulf States, with the exception of Oman, encouraged the Sunni associations to contain the Shi'a expansion in the Gulf area financially. This was to counteract Iranian support for Shi'a movements everywhere in the world. Since the late 1980s, political activism among Sunni groups in the Arab Gulf countries has grown, especially among the new educated generation. The most important activists have been the students who were educated in Egypt, Britain and the United States.⁴¹ The political Sunni Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the unification movement *al-Salafīyah*, did not expand in the region as a political opposition until the end of the 1970s. In Kuwait, however, there was a little freedom in this respect during the 1960s.

All of the Islamic groups in the Gulf region called for a return to the purest sources of the religion and were in favour of political, social, and economic consensus leading to social justice and democracy. The campaigns of the Islamic movements in the Gulf took the form of criticising the Gulf governments in the mosques and universities. Mosques were used as strongholds for holding meetings, recruiting new members and organising propaganda activities.⁴² The Islamic movements are now (in the Gulf region in particular and in the Arab nation in

41. All the GCC have used Islamic rhetoric and symbols to legitimate themselves. They have created an ideology of Islam, based on their own interpretations of these concepts, to legitimate their rule domestically and internationally. For more details see Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*. *op.cit.* p. 10.

42. Ghabra, Shafeeq "Kuwait and the Dynamics of Change" *Middle East Journal*. Vol.51. No. 3. Summer 1997. p. 359.

general) the most significant potential challenge to the legitimacy of the Arab regimes and the royal families of the Arab Gulf States.⁴³

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the GCC is likely to accelerate with the general political evolution in the area. The ruling families are anxious about this because they believe that the rise and evolution of these movements in the Gulf will reflect negatively on these societies and will leave them badly fragmented. A good example of these frictions is the struggle between those demanding a greater role for religion in these states and those demanding more modernisation.⁴⁴

The second Gulf crisis (the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990) caused a negative reaction by the scholars (*'Ulamā'*) of the Gulf area. This was particularly true in Saudi Arabia,⁴⁵ after King Fahd invited the American troops to protect the Kingdom from any invasion from Iraq. (It should be noted that the Saudi government, during the presence of American and international troops in Saudi Arabia, was careful to defend her policies, soliciting and receiving a *fatwā* from the Kingdom's highest religious authority, Shaykh 'Abd Al-'Azīz b. Bāz. He approved the invitation to the foreign forces and the initiation of the conflict with Iraq).

Many scholars in the Gulf area, especially the Saudis, condemned and criticised the Saudi royal family for inviting American troops on to Saudi soil. The internal threat and criticism of the Saudi government has come, not from suppressed groups or marginal individuals, but from the fundamentalist *Wahhābī 'Ulamā'* and those religious activists who hold positions within the state's religious bureaucracy.

43. Hardy, Roger. *op.cit.* pp. 30 and 39 and see Rashidian, Khalil "Fundamentalism and Islamic State Stability" *The Gulf in the 1990s Seminar*. See. Bu- Ḥaliqah, Iḥsān 'Alī. *op.cit.* p. 55, and Center for Strategic Studies *op.cit.* pp. 99-100.

44. Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma "The Politics of participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council" *The Middle East Journal*. Vol.50. No.4. Autumn 1996. Washington. p. 568.

45. The most powerful Islamist opposition in the Arabian Peninsula is in Saudi Arabia. The ruling family of Al-Sa'ud were faced with real challenge from some of the Saudi *'Ulamā'* (the religious leaders) during the second Gulf war in 1991. This reaction came as a result of the presence of hundreds of thousands of non-Muslims in Islam's holy land. See *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97" *op.cit.* p. 7. Today, the leadership of the Arab Gulf States is challenged by the Islamic opposition movements which continue to take root and grow in soil fertilized by the twin granules of corruption and oppression. See Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert. *Politics in the Middle East*. *op.cit.* p. 379.

These groups have been active since the termination of the second Gulf war in 1991. In response to the Saudi scholars' criticism of the regime, 'Abd Al-'Azīz b. Bāz in December 1991 publicly condemned the religious scholars and called their assertions "lies" and "conspiracies against Islam and the Muslims".

Prince Turkī Al-Faisal, head of one of the Saudi intelligence agencies, warned religious activists not to go too far. King Fahd also warned the Islamic activists and said in one of his public receptions, in January 1992, that "If matters exceed their limit, then for every action there is a response." The Committee of Higher '*Ulamā*', the senior members of the religious establishment, issued a public statement condemning a Memorandum issued by the most famous religious scholars (see below pp.195-196). In December 1992 as a result of differences among the Saudi religious and the government (Western news sources reported that the seven were removed from office for their failure to join in the condemnation of the Memorandum) it was announced that seven members of the Committee of Higher '*Ulamā*' had resigned their position for health reasons and ten younger scholars had been appointed to take their place. The other main opposition to the Saudi regime and which launched a strong campaign against the Saudi royal family called the "Committee to Defend Legitimate Rights" (CDLR) (*Lajnat al-difā' 'an al-ḥuqūq al-shar'iyyah*) was formed in 1993 by six Saudi Islamic activists, whose exiled members now operate from London.⁴⁶ This group is made up of technocrats who clothe their campaign in terms of western-style human rights but also want a stricter Islamic rule in Arabia. The activities of this group have caused the Saudi royal family considerable concern. However their direct supporters in the Kingdom number no more than a few thousand.⁴⁷

46. The group purpose of this Committee was to use "legitimate means and methods" to combat injustices in Saudi Arabia, and it called on Saudi citizens to contact them with information about such injustices. See Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies*. *op.cit.* p. 38.

47 *Jane's Sentinel Newsletters*: The Gulf States. 1995. *op.cit.* p. 13. See. Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies*. *op.cit.* p. 33. See also *Al-Hayāt Newspaper*, Issues December 1992 and *Al-Sharq al-Awsat Newspaper* Issues December 1992. The two newspapers mentioned the development of the Saudi religious Scholars resignation as a view of the Saudi position on this matter. The two newspapers are controlled by and follow Saudi policy. The two episodes of the Saudi '*Ulamā*' of the Memorandum of Advice and the Committee to Defend Legitimate Rights (which was

Safar Al-Ḥawālī, one of the most famous scholars in Saudi Arabia, who was jailed in September 1994, stated in one of his orations:

If Iraq has occupied Kuwait, the Americans have occupied Saudi Arabia, and the real enemy is not Iraq but the West.

Many of the GCC states have witnessed some legislative reforms; thus Saudi Arabia has issued the Basic System of rule and established the Shūrā Council. Oman has established a new Shūrā council in 1990 and Bahrain set up one up in 1992 after dissolving the Bahraini Parliament in 1975.⁴⁸

During 1994, three years after the second Gulf crisis, many countries of the GCC, especially Oman and Saudi Arabia, revealed that they had arrested many people belonging to Islamic organisations. They accused these groups of being subversive clandestine movements that intended to cause domestic instability and bring about insurgencies in their countries. In August 1994, in a routine press release, the Omani government announced the discovery of a clandestine Islamic organisation supported from outside the country, and she claimed that certain members from some Arab countries were affiliated with this organisation. They were also accused of receiving millions of dollars from foreign quarters. The membership of this organisation was said to exceed 400 persons.⁴⁹ Sultan Qaboos of Oman, after many requests from Omani tribal sheykhs and as a result of the economic circumstances in Oman and the 25th anniversary of the Omani National Celebration, issued an order in November 1995 releasing all Omani political prisoners.⁵⁰

The government of Saudi Arabia announced in September 1994 that it had detained more than a hundred people accused of a seditious attack on national unity.

condemned by Ibn Bāz) highlighted a strong internal threat to the Saudi royal family's legitimacy and created some kind of awakening among the Saudi people's demands for rights. The Saudi government faced a real threat against its stability until it jailed some members of the 'Ulamā'. After the termination of the second Gulf war the Islamic Movement (Sunni) was affected by strong pressure from the governments of the Arab Gulf States.

48. Hardy, Roger. *Arabia After The Storm: Internal Stability of the Gulf Arab States*. *op.cit.* pp. 20-21.

49. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat Newspaper*, No. 5754, 30 August, 1994, London. p. 7, and *Oman News Agency; and Oman Radio Station* 28 August 1994, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman, also see. *Oman Newspaper*, 29 August 1994. Muscat. p. 1. See also Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma. *op.cit.* p. 567.

50. *Oman Observer Newspaper*. Issue No. 5291, Thursday 23, November 1995, Muscat. p. 1.

However a London-based Saudi opposition group pre-empted the Saudi public announcement and alleged that the member detainees actually exceeded one thousand people and that they were mainly members of the Jamā'ah al-Islāmīyyah (Islamic Group).⁵¹ The crisis between the Saudi 'Ulamā' and the government became critical following the clashes between the 'Ulamā' and the Saudi Secularists who had requested, in a memorandum issued in 1990 and signed by 40 persons, the introduction of modern Islamic law and equality between the Saudi people with more liberty for women.⁵² The Islamic group aimed to contain the secular memorandum and issued a memorandum signed by the most famous scholars of Saudi Arabia. This memorandum consisted of 12 articles, which concentrated on:

- the Creation of a Shura or Consultative Assembly empowered to debate and decide on all domestic and foreign affairs, with its members chosen from among the most competent possible candidates;
- the Islamisation of all social, economic, administrative and educational systems in the nation;
- the fundamental reform of the army, through the creation of a modern, strong and independent Islamic army on the pattern of the Prophet's armies as well as the diversification of modern arms procurement sources;
- the introduction of comprehensive social justice based on Islamic laws which guarantee equality for all the citizens without exception or exclusion;
- the punishment of all corrupt elements, whoever they are, wherever they are, without any exception of rank;
- the equitable distribution of wealth among all members of the nation;
- a total reform of the press; the creation of a strong Islamic media and of propaganda tools to be used in the service of Islam world wide; and the closure of the corrupt media;

51. *The Independent Newspaper*. Issue No. 2477, Tuesday, 27 September 1994, London, p. 5.

52. Hardy, Roger, *op.cit.* pp. 23-34.

- the preservation of the Islamic nation's interests, purity and unity by keeping it out of non-Islamic pacts and treaties; complete reform of the Kingdom's embassies abroad to bring them into line with the laws and interests of Islam;
- the Radical reform of the judicial system, particularly by the creation of a Supreme Judiciary Council to implement Islamic laws.

This group included Sheykh Safar al-Ḥawālī and Sheykh Salmān al-ʿAwdah, two of the most prominent scholars throughout the Arab and Islamic world.⁵³

During recent years Islamic fundamentalist expansion in the Arabian Peninsula has become the major domestic threat to the conservative Arab Gulf regimes. The Islamic movement in the Gulf has succeeded, during a short period of time, in unifying its forces in these countries and forming a political front against the Arab Gulf regimes. Although the Islamic movements are opposed to the Arab Gulf regimes, these movements are non-violent and are in favour of political, economic and social reform.⁵⁴

Many sources have reported that the Egyptian President Ḥusnī Mubarak and the Egyptian Intelligence have played a significant role in instigating mass detentions in the Arab Gulf region in an attempt to suppress and smother the Islamic movement in the Arab Gulf States, because the Islamic movement in the Gulf plays a significant financial role in supporting the other Islamic movements in the world.⁵⁵ The dispute between the *Wahhābīs* and the western-educated liberals intensified in the aftermath of the second Gulf war. The western-educated liberals section of society looks for a more democratic and accountable state, with many of the values of the west, such as the introduction of rights for women and universal suffrage. On the other hand the Islamic groups, especially the people of Najd (the heartland of the *Wahhābīs*), the fundamentalists and the *Mutāwwaʿ*, long at the core of the regime, demand a return

53. Haeri, Safa. "Saudi Arabia A Warning to the King" *Middle East International*. 14 June 1991, London, p. 14.

54. Al-Rashidan, Khalil. *op.cit.* p. 100.

55. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Oman, Yemen" 4th quarter 1994 EIU Country Report, November 2, 1994, p. 8.

to traditional Islamic values. The struggle between the two parties for an increased influence is certain to intensify and could result in civil disorder.⁵⁶

The opposition movements mentioned above might be called the pacific opposition. But the opposition which has arisen recently in the Gulf region, and always threatens stability, is the armed opposition. It believes in using violence to change the existing situation and it considers violence as a legal right similar to Jihad (Holy War). After the second Gulf war American military offices, training areas and troops strongholds in Saudi Arabia became targets for many bomb attacks. On 13 November 1995, a van packed with military explosives was detonated outside the office of the US Programme Managers of the Saudi National Guard in al-Riyadh. The blast, which wrecked the building and killed seven Americans and Indians, injured over 60 people. Three obscure radical Islamist groups, the Gulf Tigers, the Islamic Change Movement and the Partisans of God Fighting Organisation, rapidly claimed the attack. All the statements of these groups called for the withdrawal of American troops from the Kingdom and threatened more attacks if their demands were not met.⁵⁷

Two months after the November attacks, the Saudi government announced the arrest of four Saudi citizens for master-minding the attack. Many sources indicate that the four people were Arab Afghans who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. A second, more potent car bombing followed in June 1996 at the air base in Al-Khobar, near the area of Al-Dhahrān in the Eastern Province (the Shi'a area), in which 19 US servicemen were killed and 64 seriously injured. Saudi officials claimed that 400 people were injured in total. The bomb, like the one in November 1995, was clearly aimed against the US military presence in Saudi Arabia.⁵⁸

In the United Arab Emirates there was no political violence with the exception of a few minor accidents that might happen anywhere. These events could not be compared with those that happened in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

56. *Jane's Sentinel News Letter*: The Gulf States. Vol. 2. No.1. 1996. (ed.) Beaver, Paul. *op.cit.* p. 13.

57. *Jane's Sentinel News Letter*: The Gulf States. Vol. 3. No.1. 1996. (ed.) Beaver, Paul. *op.cit.* p. 2.

There was one important event which caused an internal dispute in the UAE and that was the attempted coup of 1987 in Sharjah, when ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Muḥammad deposed his brother Sheykh Sultan b. Muḥammad. The coup happened when the latter was in Britain. This event called into question the legality of all the rulers in the UAE. Some sources mentioned that Abu Dhabi supported the attempted deposition of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz while Dubai supported Sheykh Sultan. The other important internal threat came when the Emirates’ Army took to the streets in December 1992 to deal with the riots and demonstrations, in most of the UAE cities, of the Indian and Pakistani Muslims against the Hindus and the Indian government. This came as a result of the destruction of the old Muslim Mosque by extremist Hindus.

Sectarianism

Sectarianism in all of the GCC countries constitutes the one of most difficult problems facing them, but the governments of these countries are not willing to discuss this problem because of its religious nature). Sectarianism, or what is known in Arabic as *Al-Madhhabīyyah*, has become the most serious internal threat.⁵⁹ The region of the Gulf (i.e. the GCC countries, Iraq and Iran) contains three major sects, the *Sunni*, *Shi’i* and *Ibaḍī*. The *Sunnah* or *Sunnis* are the minority in the Gulf region, but among the GCC States they form the majority.⁶⁰

Shi‘ism is the most powerful force, in terms of population in the Gulf region. The Republic of Iran contains the majority of Shi‘a, estimated at 92% of the population. Iraq and Bahrain are the only two Arab countries which have a majority of Shi‘a. In Iraq they make up over 60% of the population and in Bahrain 65% to 70%. The state of Bahrain is the only GCC State which has a majority of Shi ‘ites. It

58. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. “Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97” *op.cit.* p .7.

59. Martin, Lenore G. *op.cit.* p. 78.

60. Martin, Lenore G. *op.cit.* pp. 77-78.

should be recorded that the Muslim population of the world was estimated, in 1986, at about 750 million, only 11% of them being Shi'a.⁶¹

The Ibādī sect is the third sect of the three major divisions of the Muslim people in the Gulf region. All the other Islamic sects and the Orientalist writers describe the Ibādīs as being a part of the *Khawarij*, but the Omani Ibādīs have rejected this definition.⁶² The Imamah, which also means supreme rulership in the Ibādī state and law, undergoes four distinctive stages, which are as follows:

Imāmat al-Zuhur, "The Stage of Emergence"

This is the first stage, which involves the establishment of a declared Ibādī government. This development comes in three stages, and after all the crucial functions of the government have been completed. Also this stage presupposes that the Ibādī society has complete freedom from all external and alien influence.

Imāmat al-Difā', "The Stage of Defence"

This is a subordinate stage to the former one. It signifies that the Ibādī followers are preoccupied with defending themselves and their property more than the goal of establishing their state.

61. Ramazani, R.K. "Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf" in: Cole, Juan, R.I. and Kiddie, Nikki R. (eds.) *Shi'ism and Social Protest*. Yale University Press, Newhaven and London, 1986, pp. 30-46. See Kavary, Benjamin *op.cit.* p. 77. In general, the Shi'a in most of the Arab Gulf States are known for their work ethic, and many are highly educated. It can be argued that their search for an enhanced role in the Arab Gulf states' political and economic life has put them in competition with the rest of society. The emergence of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran created antagonism between the Sunni (majority) and Shi'ite components of society; the Shi'a loyalty to their governments in the Arab Gulf was questioned at the time. See Ghabra, Shafeeq "Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change" *Middle East Journal*. *op.cit.* p. 368.

62. The Ibādīs, named after 'Abdullah b. Ibād, trace their history to the seventh century. They recognise only Abu Bakr al-Siddīq and 'Umar b.al-Khattāb as legitimate Caliphs. Historically sources mention that the Ibādīs migrated from Iraq to Oman in the eighth century to escape persecution by the Umayyads during the early years of the Umayyad caliphate. The Ibādīs elected their first Imam in 749 A.D. The Ibādī ideal is to restore Islam to its purest form, as it was at the time of the Prophet Muhammed. Ibādism is a minority form of Islam practiced only in the North of Oman, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. It is marked by the strict adherence of its followers to its teaching. See. Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma "The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council" *op.cit.* p. 560. And see Eickelman, Dale F "Ibādism and the Sectarian Perspective" in: Pridham, B.R. (ed.) *Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Development*. pp. 32-33.

Imāmat al-Shirā, “The Stage of Purchase”

This coincides with the second stage in defending and protecting the Ibāḍī followers. These two stages also involve diligent endeavours to depose the unjust ruler and to correct all the political situations of the Ibāḍī society and government. This goal should be achieved even though it involves violence, intrigue and sedition.

Imāmat al-Kitmān “The Stage of Clandestine”

This is the lowest grade of Jihād (Holy War and initiatives) according to the Ibāḍī sect of Islamic law in that it involves the weakening of the Ibāḍī society’s political power. In this stage people would reluctantly acquiesce to the unjust social, political and public disintegration of society under an unjust ruler, until they are able to revolt. In such circumstances, the Ibāḍī followers would be compelled to cover their activities with complete secrecy.⁶³

From the first Ibāḍī State in Oman (Imāmah) until the present time, the Ibāḍī Imāmah has undergone all four political stages, which have oscillated between strength and demise. However, they were generally very active. In spite of this Oman has been subjected to the rule of certain families who are not accredited by the Ibāḍī sect. This discrediting of their families is due to the fact that the Ibāḍī leadership should be selected and elected from amongst the heads of *Ahlu al-Ḥall Wa-‘aḳd* (the people who bind and loosen). The Ibāḍī sect does not warrant hereditary accession to supreme rulership in their state.⁶⁴ In 1955, Sultān Sa‘īd b. Taimur, through his military campaign in *al-Jabal al-Akhdar* and with the support of British troops, managed to depose the last Ibāḍī Imam, Ghālib b. ‘Alī. These events took place despite the existence of the Seeb Treaty between the Imāmate and the British signed

63. Jahlān, ‘Adun. *Al-Fikr al-Siyāsī ‘ind al-Ibāḍiyyah Min Khilāl Ara al-Shaykh Muḥammad b. Yusuf Afīsh. 1818-1914*. Maktbat al-Ḍamrī, Al-Seeb, Sultanate of Oman, 1991, pp. 149-164.

64. Despite the Ibāḍī rejection of the Khārījite movement, you can still find many similarities between them. The Khārījite and the Ibāḍīs reject primogeniture succession of the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet Muḥammad, and assert that the leadership of Islam, the Caliphate, should be exercised by an Imam elected by the community from candidates who possess spiritual and personal qualities. Ibāḍī leadership is vested in an Imam who is regarded as the sole legitimate leader and combines religious and political authority. See Mohamedi, Fareed “Oman” in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.) *op.cit.* p. 264.

1920 (for more details of this treaty see chapter 1. p.54).⁶⁵ Most Arab and Western writers maintain that the Ibāḍīs are the majority in Oman. But J.E. Peterson, the most experienced authority on the Arabian Peninsula, says, “Even though Sunnis form a narrow majority of the Omani population, the small Ibāḍī sect has provided the traditional form of government”.⁶⁶

Discrimination still plays a significant role in all the Arab Gulf States. For example, employment decisions are on the basis of an applicant’s family, tribe, region, and religious sect rather than his education or experience. In Saudi Arabia, the Najdi people are more acceptable and preferable to the Saudi royal family for joining the security departments than the Ḥijazis who are, in turn, more acceptable than the Shi’a. The Najdi tribes are considered as the top class of Saudi citizens. The concept of regional base is the main critical factor between the Najdis and Ḥijazis. In all of the other GCC countries, discrimination brings advantages and disadvantages. The important employment ranks and departments, especially for security matters, are closed until the applicant proves his identity. In most of these countries, the Shi’a people are not able to get any important ranks, especially in security departments. In all of the Arab Gulf States, sectarianism still plays a significant role as a dangerous secretive movement. It reflects on the life of the people by its social separation of religious, marriage, burial, educational, cultural and sporting matters.⁶⁷

65 Kelly, J.B. “A Prevalence of Furies: Tribes, Politics, and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman” *op.cit.* p. 130.

66. Peterson, J.E. “Security Concerns in the Arabian Peninsula” *op.cit.* p. 112.

67. Al-Anzi, Abdullah M. *op.cit.* pp. 165-167 and Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies*. *op.cit.* pp.155-156. In Bahrain the Sunni-Shi’a population is the key political faultline in the country because the majority of the indigenous Shi’a population resents the monopolisation of power of the Sunni ruling family. The Sunni ruling elite is suspicious of the Shi’a who are prevented from occupying posts in the security forces, although it has made some efforts to co-opt moderate Shi’a leaders. See also *Jane’s Sentinel News Letter*. The Gulf Newsletter. *op.cit.* p. 9.

The Economic Problem

All of the GCC countries have economies based principally on a single commodity-oil and gas revenues-estimated at 85-90% of their total revenue. Their income is therefore dependent on the export and sale of this product.⁶⁸ Both the rise and fall in oil prices have had significant impacts on Gulf societies and economies. It should be noted that the Arab Gulf states depend on developed economies to meet their needs, whether they are industrial, technological or agricultural.⁶⁹ In the decade of easy money (1975-1985) there was almost no limit on public spending in the GCC countries, and they were able to raise their standard of living almost free of charge. Oil has dominated their economies and shaped their political systems. The era of abundance came to end in the mid-1980s. The reason for this was the low oil prices (since the mid-1980s, the collapse and stagnation of oil prices has eroded the Arab Gulf States revenue), high population, military expenditure and domestic corruption, especially on the level of officials. Some sources indicate that the royal families and the ministers of the Arab Gulf States constitute the highest proportion of rich people in the world. The outcome of these developments has been a sharp fall in the standard of living in the Arab Gulf States. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 20% on average from 1981 to 1995.⁷⁰

68. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi have massive oil reserves which should last several generations, but Bahrain is expected to exhaust its reserves early next century and Qatar's crude oil production is likely to start declining next decade. Oman's rising production may also be difficult to sustain into the 21st century. A further worry is the possibility that new technologies will eventually emerge that will make crude oil redundant. This assessment is increasing the pressure for the GCC states to diversify away from oil. See *MEED*. Vol.36. No.45. 13 November 1992. p. 2.

69. See. Al-Anzi, Abdullah M. *op.cit.* p. 151. By implication, inter state trade in the Gulf is missing to a large degree. Thus liberalization of trade by itself would not create an economic integration similar to the European Economic Community, as targeted in both the GCC Charter and the Unified Economic Agreement. In all of the GCC member states, the question of integration is the problem of development, which makes economic integration more difficult than in the case of the industrialized countries. See El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah Ibrahim "Economic Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Challenges, Achievements and Future Outlook" *op.cit.* p. 77.

70. Bahgat, Gawdat. *op.cit.* pp. 5-6.

Since the end of the second Gulf war of 1991 all of the members of the GCC have been running considerable budget deficits compared with the last two decades. At first they used up their reserves to cover these deficits. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have been the states most affected by these financial pressures. Before the Iraqi invasion in 1990, the State of Kuwait's foreign reserves were estimated at over \$100 billion, and some sources estimated the Kuwaiti government's expenditure since the Iraqi invasion at \$65 billion. Kuwait also lost over \$10 billion of her overseas reserves as a result of corruption and mismanagement.⁷¹

The World Bank declared, in its annual report in 1994, that the growth rates in the Middle East and North Africa continue to decline, falling from an average of 4.3% in 1992 to 1.5% in 1993.⁷² Saudi Arabia (the largest oil producer in the world) has seen its reserves fall from \$142 billion to less than \$60 billion over the past five years, as a result of having to use these up to cover current spending. The Saudi budget witnessed a deficit of around SR30 billion (\$8 billion). In Kuwait defence spending before the Iraqi invasion of 1990 typically accounted for less than 5% of GDP. Since the invasion the defence budget has increased every year. Spending on the armed forces (including internal security) accounted for 20% of total spending in 1995/96. Defence spending increased to 12% of GDP. In Oman defence and internal security costs account for around one-third of annual government expenditure. In 1995 military expenditure accounted for some \$1.8bn (over 16% of GDP). In 1993 the World Bank criticized the Omani government for failing to reduce her spending in spite of falling oil prices. The Bank also outlined a strategy of reforms to reduce the government's role in the economy and increase long-term investment. The World Bank report came as a real criticism to the Omani government to change their

71. Kuwait: the cost of the Gulf Crisis (\$ million) Damage at least 20,000, Pledges to US military 13,500, pledges to UK 1,320, pledge GFCCG 3,684, Cost of exile 1,500, total 39,320. *MEED*. Vol.36. No.11. 22 March 1991. p.5. quoted from the US Treasury Department and UK Treasury. Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*. *op.cit.* pp. 147-148.

72. Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross "Enduring Sources of Conflict in the Persian Gulf Region: Predicting Shocks to the Systems" in: Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross (eds.) *Powder Keg in the Middle East The Struggle for Gulf Security*. American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, 1995, pp. 13-14.

economic policies, which reflect a negative side to the Omani citizens especially the low-income people, when the government cut-off most its spending ⁷³

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Arab Gulf States started to borrow money from pension funds and banks. The Saudi government for the first time in decades went to the international capital market for loans.⁷⁴ The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the direct costs of the of the Gulf war for the Saudis to be \$55 billion. During 1993 all the GCC States were planning on a deficit in their budgets: Saudi Arabia of \$7.4 billion, Kuwait of \$3.2 billion, Qatar of \$940 million, the UAE of \$708 million, Oman of \$170 million and the State of Bahrain of \$170 million.⁷⁵ Some economic sources predicted that the GCC States would suffer from Iraqi oil exports through both lower prices and lost market shares (Iraq's provisional quota from OPEC in early 1995 was only 550,000 barrels a day). The Iraqi government wants to increase its output to more than three million barrels a day, the level in 1990 before its invasion of Kuwait.⁷⁶

The GCC economic objectives were set out in five official documents, all of which have been adopted by the GCC Supreme Council. These are the GCC Charter, the Unified Economic Agreement, Common Objectives and Policies for Development plans, the Unified Industrial Development Strategy and Common Agricultural Policy. Since the establishment of the GCC, the leaders of the council have created many common regional projects to conclude an integration amongst the council members. However, the effects of these plans do not make any impression on

73. In Saudi Arabia, of the total budgeted government expenditures, official defence and security spending consumed 31-34% in 1993-95. Defence and security-related expenditure in the aftermath of the second Gulf war in 1991 was about 15% of GDP. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97" *op.cit.* p. 11. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Kuwait Country Profile 1996-97" p. 7. See. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Oman Country Profile 1996-97" p. 5, and also *MEED*. Vol.38. No.46.18.November 1994. p. 30. For details of the World Bank report on Oman see *MEED*. *op.cit.* p. 30.

74 Al- Mazidi, Faisal. *The Future of the Gulf*. *op.cit.* pp. 43-44.

75 In Bahrain the 1994/1995 demonstrations and government crack-down on the political opposition shocked a country with a well-deserved reputation for stability and calm during its 27 years of independence. The unrest coincided with a petition signed by some 25,000 people calling for the reconvening of the National Assembly, which was disbanded in 1975. *MEED*. Vol. 39. No.47. 24 November 1995. p. 26. Gregory Gause III, F. *Oil Monarchies*. *op.cit.* pp. 148-149.

76. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf" *op.cit.* pp. 58-59.

the level of the economies of the Arab Gulf states, only on the level of internal security.⁷⁷ The object of the GCC was economic co-ordination between these countries.

On 11 November 1981, the members of the council signed a Unified Economic Agreement in Riyadh. The aims of this agreement were the development and expansion of the economic links between them in terms of finance, money, commerce, the legislation of industries and the customs systems. Its ultimate aim was to provide a vehicle for the integration of the economies of the individual states into one large, regional economy. The council members would also set up a Gulf Investment Corporation (at a capital cost of US\$ 2.1 billion) to promote industrial projects between the Arab Gulf Countries. The Unified Economic Agreement of 1981 consists of a preamble and seven chapters, divided into 28 articles, which cover and contain all aspects of economic co-operation among the members of the council including:

- (1). Trade exchange (articles 1 and 7)
- (2) Movement of capital and citizens and exercise of economic activities. (articles 8 and 9)
- (3). Co-ordination of development (articles 10-13)
- (4). Technical co-operation (articles 14 and 17)
- (5). Transport and communications (articles 18 and 20)
- (6). Financial and monetary co-operation (articles 21 and 23)
- (7). Closing provisions (articles 24 and 28).⁷⁸ (for full text of the agreement see Appendices p. 477)

77. These plans can be divided into six categories: 1) Adopting Common Regional Strategies and Policies; 2) Building Institutions and Harmonizing Regulations; 3) Creating a GCC Economic Citizenship; 4) Creating Regional Infrastructures; 5) Developing Joint-Venture Projects; 6) Coordinating External Policies. For more details see El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah Ibrahim "Economic Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Challenges, Achievements and Future Outlook" *op.cit.* pp.71-80.

78. 'Ubeyd, Nāyef A. *op.cit.* p. 154. For more details over the Unified Economic Agreement between the GCC states see. El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah Ibrahim (was the former Assistance General-Secretary for Economic Affairs of the GCC) "Economic Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Challenges, Achievements and Future Outlook" *op.cit.* pp. 72-73.

Since the signature of the Unified Economic Agreement, the members of the GCC have been unable to achieve many of the basic elements of economic integration they have set for themselves. The GCC Unified Economic Agreement, which came into force in November 1981, pledged the states to apply a uniform customs tariff within five years. Discussion between the Trade Ministers did not result in any positive steps, because of the differences between these countries over the common rate of the customs tariff. The United Arab Emirates refuses to join these countries, because each individual emirate has a different system and different common rate for the custom tariff. The other GCC states also could not agree on one uniform rate for the custom tariff. The free movement of labour has also been restricted.⁷⁹ Despite the basic objectives of the GCC to bring about more economic co-operation among its members since its establishment, and although the communiqués and press releases have been about economic co-operation, the urgent discussions within the GCC have been about defence and internal security. As a consequence, the security-related activities are being pursued outside the formal structure of the organisation. The economic co-operation among the GCC members has not made a difference to the Arab Gulf States' citizens. The mutual trade, taxes, transports and customs are still restricted as a result of the lack of consensus between the members of the council.⁸⁰

Abdullah Ibrahim El-Kuwaiz summarised the obstacles and challenges facing the GCC as a group and individually, as a number of very real limitations to prolonged economic growth:

- 1) The six member nations are overly dependent on the export of crude oil.
- 2) Although the private sector has increased its share in the gross domestic product of the GCC states it is still low.
- 3) Given GCC geographic and economic constraints the group still faces a chronic scarcity of human resources, both skilled and unskilled.

79. Rathmell, Andrew "Threats to the Gulf - Part 1 " *Middle East. Jane's Intelligence Review*. Vol. 7. No. 3. London, 1995, p.120 and Nonneman, Gerd "The Gulf: Background Assessment" *op.cit.* p. 58.

80. Dietl, Gulshan. *Through Two Wars and Beyond: A Study of Gulf Cooperation Council*. *op.cit.* pp. 248-249.

- 4) If the GCC concentrates on international markets, it has to compete vigorously with the well-established manufacturers of industrial countries and other developing countries. It also has to enter into contractual agreements dealing with the very complicated subject of international trade, an area in which the GCC as an organisation, and the member states individually, does not have any acquired expertise or long-term experience.
- 5) Other than hydrocarbons, the GCC has very limited mineral resources and a scarcity of natural water.
- 6) Although almost all infrastructure facilities are in place in the Arabian Gulf, interconnection among these facilities is almost non-existent.
- 7) Industrial regulations and legislation, as well as industrial incentives, are different in nature and application in each of the member states.
- 8) The Arabian Gulf States do not have an indigenous technological base with which to encourage industrial growth and development.⁸¹

Dr Al-‘Alkīm summarised these things hindering the economic plans of the GCC states as follows: the lack of a developmental global plan to educate the national cadres and the lack of a replacement policy in the GCC states; weakness of the education levels and ignorance of technological and technical education. 3) The failure of the Private Sector to employ the national labour force; increase of fertility in the GCC states, which approaches 3%, one of the highest birth rates in the world.

Population

Despite the GCC countries complaining about their population being small compared with the regional powers of Iran (54 million) Iraq (17 million) and Yemen (13.5 million), the population increase in the GCC countries has become the main internal threat to the legitimacy of the ruling families. Manpower in the Arab Gulf States will

81. El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah I. *op.cit.* pp. 76-77. *BBC Radio* (Arabic) Interview with Abdullah El-Kuwaiz. 11-12-1995. London, see also '*AALAM AL-KHALEEJ*' No. 45. January 1997. London. p. 5.

remain scarce as long as these countries continue to fear national armies as the source of those coups which have ended monarchical rule in most of the Middle East.⁸²

The countries of the GCC have the highest population growth rates in the world. Despite this high population growth development, in all of these countries, progress has been impeded by a lack of manpower, both of skilled and unskilled workers, and this shortage remains one of the major problems in the region. The challenge of the increasing population in many of these countries has had negative effects on the economic developments during recent years as a result of the decreasing prices of oil. These problems over population will get even worse in the next decades, with a growing number of people and the increase of the young population.⁸³

Many sources indicate that almost half the national population in the Arab Gulf States are 15 years of age or younger and, with universal education, there will be an educated, but unemployed and frustrated populace in the near future. Women in these countries are becoming more educated, but their participation in both sectors of the labour force is amongst the lowest participation in the world. Since 1986 unemployment has become a major issue in the GCC countries as a result of internal corruption, stagnating oil prices, increasing population growth and the huge military budgets.⁸⁴ The following table which was issued by the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis-Population Division in 1996 , shows that the population of Kuwait and Bahrain doubled and that of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Oman increased more than threefold in just 24 years. That is among one of the highest population growth rates in the world.

82. Salamé, Ghassan "Assessing Alternative Arrangements for Regional Security" op.cit. p.75.

83. Bahgat, Gawdat. op.cit. p. 3.

Table No. 8

Population growth in the Arab Gulf States 1970-2015 (millions)(85)

<u>Country.</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>2015.</u>
<u>Bahrain.</u>	<u>0,22</u>	<u>00,55</u>	<u>00,82</u>
<u>Kuwait</u>	<u>0,75</u>	<u>01,60</u>	<u>02,48</u>
<u>Oman.</u>	<u>0,65</u>	<u>02,10</u>	<u>04,48</u>
<u>Qatar.</u>	<u>0,11</u>	<u>00,54</u>	<u>00,74</u>
<u>Saudi Arabia.</u>	<u>5,75</u>	<u>17,00</u>	<u>33,25</u>
<u>UAE</u>	<u>0,22</u>	<u>01,86</u>	<u>02,69.</u>

Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman face the greatest challenges from their population as a result of inflation and unemployment.⁸⁶

In Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer in the world, it is estimated that there are at least 1 million unemployed or underemployed adult males. According to a report published in 1992 by Birks Sinclair and Associates of the UK, there are more than 550,000 10 to 14-year-old male Saudi Arabians, compared with only 83,280 in the 50-54 age-bracket. These figures suggest that there will soon be a net increase in

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84. Bonine, Michael E "Population and Labor after the Gulf War" *Middle East Insight* Vol. XII. No. 2. January-February 1996. p. 39, and *MEED* "Special Report: Oil and Gas" Vol. 39, No. 14. 7 April 1995. p. 24
85. Bahgat, Gawdat. *The Gulf Monarchies New Economic and Political Realities*. *op.cit.* p. 5. Forecasts for the 1990s suggest that real growth will average 3-5 per cent a year for the decade. This will be accomplished by a sharp rise in regional populations. See also *MEED*. Vol.36. No.45. 13 November 1992. p. 2.
86. Oman and Bahrain are the countries in the GCC which suffer most from unemployment. Results of a 1993 census put the number of Omani nationals at 1.48 million out of a total population of 2.02 million, over 73% of the population. The EIU estimates that by the end of 1995, the total population had reached 2.16 million of which 1.55 million were nationals. A UN Development Program (UNDP) report estimated that between 1992 and 2000, average population growth rate would rise to 4.1% per year from an average 3.9% in the previous 32 years. At the 1992 growth rate, the population is set to double by 2010. The ensuing increase in the dependency ratio, whereby Omanis under 15 years of age will constitute more than 50% of the population by 2010, will coincide with declining oil reserves and depleted water resources. See. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Oman Country Profile 1996-97" pp. 6-7. In Bahrain the last census of 1991 put the total population at 508,037, of whom 63% were Bahraini nationals. A 1995 UNDP report

the male labour force of about 100,000 people a year in Saudi Arabia alone.⁸⁷ In Bahrain the demand for jobs was high on the protesters' agenda and unemployment in the state of Bahrain is much higher than suggested by the official estimate. The latest government figures claim that only 1.8% of the working population were out of work at the end of August 1995-a mere 4,409 out of a workforce of 239,000. An economic survey published by the US Embassy in June 1995 estimated unemployment among Bahrainis to be about 15%. The challenge for the government is to reduce that number, without demanding competitiveness and efficiency in the private sector. In the state of Bahrain nationals make up 90% of the public sector workforce and 28.5% in the private sector. Both rates are much higher than anywhere else in the Arab Gulf States.⁸⁸

In 1986 Oman's labour force was estimated at 467,000, of which only 167,000 (36%) were nationals. By 1995, the workforce had increased to just over 1 million, with locals accounting for 40% of the total. In the private sector, their share was only 23% while, in the public sector, their share was 43%. In view of the rapid population growth, the Omani government is under pressure to create extra jobs for young people.⁸⁹ It should be recorded that the Omani government since the mid-1980s has been under the pressure of unemployment and most of their new generation are without a job or study scholarships. This is due to the economic problem of the reduced oil price and the failure of economic plans.

In Kuwait the 1980 and 1985 censuses showed that more than 60% of Kuwaitis were below the age of 19, while one-third were below the age of nine. These numbers foreshadow the growing demands on the government to create more jobs; also, since her liberation, the Kuwaiti economy in the 1990s is not growing in proportion to Kuwait's employment needs (90% of all working Kuwaitis are employed in the government sector). With the end of the oil boom in the late 1980s,

projected that by the year 2000, the population would be around 600,000 at an annual growth rate of 2.5%. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Bahrain Country Profile 1996-97" p. 7.

87. *MEED*. Vol. 36. No.45. 13 November 1992. pp. 2-3.

88. *MEED*. Vol. 39. No.47. 24 November 1995. p. 26.

89. *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Oman Country Profile 1996-97" p. 13 and *Middle East Economic Digest*. Vol. 37. No. 10. 12 March 1993. p. 46.

new graduates began facing employment difficulties. These were exacerbated by the 1990-91 Gulf War. The expense of liberating Kuwait from Iraqi forces and assisting other Gulf economies led to cuts in social spending and subsequent drops in employment.

The dramatic growth of modern educational facilities in the Arab Gulf states since the early 1970s also carries serious political implications and challenges for these countries as larger and larger numbers of young people from the Gulf acquire modern higher education. They will then enter the job market with high expectations and with a newly-developed political consciousness. As they return from abroad in increasing numbers, they are no longer easily absorbed into the high-level political positions that they have come to expect and so they will become dissatisfied with their governments.⁹⁰

Table No. 9
Youth Population in the Arab Gulf States (000) (91)

Country	1980			1990			2000		
	Total pop.	Age group (10-34)	%	Total pop.	Age group (10-34)	%	Total pop.	Age group (10-34)	%
Bahrain	313	160	51.11	410	196	7.80	515	200	38.83
Kuwait	1,353	600	44.34	2,101	945	44.97	2,524	1,403	55.91
Oman	891	393	44.10	1,208	541	44.78	1,651	758	45.91
Qatar	237	116	48.94	330	136	41.21	425	163	38.35
S. Arabia	8,960	4,059	45.30	12,908	5,776	44.74	17,804	7,965	44.73
U.A.E	726	360	49.58	1,025	402	39.21	1,286	480	37.32

Source: Ramazani, R. K. *The Gulf Cooperation Council*. *op.cit.* p.198

90. Bill, James "The Politics of War and Revolution in the Persian Gulf" *op.cit.* p.378. The Universities are the breeding grounds of this new class and the ruling elite have come to understand that this class will cause political risks. Besides the Universities in the Arab Gulf states, the six countries have nearly 100,000 students in western Universities. These individuals will form the questioning, challenging, professional middle class of the future in the Arab Gulf countries. *op.cit.* p. 378.

91. Ramazani, R.K. *The Gulf Cooperation Council*. *op.cit.* p. 198.

Disputes Between and within Royal Families

The disputes between royal families in the Arab Gulf states present the most important challenges for the stability and internal security of the GCC. All the members of the GCC have hereditary monarchies, and the royal families are still the decision-makers. (see table p. 220). The relations between the GCC, especially the political relations, are not very consensual. From time to time these relations are shaken by differences, such as on foreign policy (a good example is the Omani relations with Kuwait during the 1970s and 1980s, the period of greatest conflict between them, border disputes (all the GCC States have this problem) and family disputes (for instance relations between Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain and Al-Thānī of Qatar).

These families are known for having internal disputes. Conflicts between brothers or fathers and sons were often provoked by the desire for power. The political history of the Gulf Emirates is distinguished by the number of assassinations among these families. This situation is explained in an amusing way by the historian Amīn al-Rayḥānī. He says that the reason for such common and familiar disputes in Arab princely families is polygamy. Hatreds arise between brothers and competition between mothers, especially if they are from different tribes. Since the creation of the six monarchies in the Arab Gulf States, they have experienced much irregularity and violence in the process of transferring power from one ruler to another, as a result of the absence of an institutionalised mechanism of change. This competition and dispute between the royal families is a very important factor in the study of the political structure in the Arab Gulf States. These families, as one political analyst indicates, represent “political parties”, especially after the discovery of oil and the increase in the size of the families which dominate all the political, economic and defence institutions within the political systems of the GCC states. A good example of such a system is the Saudi ruling family.⁹²

The difficulty faced by the ruling families in the GCC states is the increase in number of their members which will exacerbate problems between them concerning

the distribution of wealth and important posts. Thus political alliances are created between different branches of such families. This must reflect negatively on the political process and, as a result, a ruling family may lose its domination because of internal disputes.⁹³

The disputes between the royal families in the Gulf have a historical background; since the establishment of the Saudi state in Arabia, which is controlled by the al-Saud dynasty, the relations between Saudi Arabia and Oman have been unfriendly because of many differences between the two parties. The first factor, the Saudi-Omani conflict over the al-Buraimi Oasis, has been in dispute from the time of first Saudi state until the beginning of 1970. The two countries, i.e the two royal families are divided by religious and ideological differences, as the Saudis belong to the Sunni (Ḥanbalī or Wahhābī Sect)) and the Omani royal family to the Ibādī sect.⁹⁴ The same sort of border dispute has occurred, from time to time, among the other royal families of the Arab Gulf states. Since the establishment of the Saudi royal family in Arabia and as a result of the Saudi expansion in Arabia, all the royal families of the GCC countries have been affected by disputes with the Saudi royal family.

The dispute between Al-Thānī of Qatar and Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain is a good example. This affects the disputed islands of the Ḥawars and the claim of al-Khalīfah of Bahrain that Qatar was originally the motherland of the Al-Khalīfah, especially the area of Zubārah. The undeclared dispute between Al-Said of Oman and the royal families of the United Arab Emirates concerns the claims of the Omani royal family over the Omani Coastal Emirates (Greater Oman). Saudi Arabia still holds to the concept that all the royal families of the Arab Gulf States except Oman are no more than tribal sheykhs of these areas. The questions of succession frequently give rise to disputes within the royal families. In 1964, King Faiṣal removed his half-brother, King Saud and ruled the Kingdom until his assassination by his nephew Faiṣal b.

92 Al-Rumayhī, Muḥammad. *Al-Khalīj Lays Naftan*. *op.cit.* p. 103.

93 Al-Qaḥṭānī, Fahad. *op.cit.* p. 36.

94. Al-Anazi, Abdullah M. *op.cit.* pp. 34-35.

Musā'id 1975. There was also a dispute among the brothers of the royal family, when King Khālid was ill and King Fahd was Crown Prince. Fahd refused to appoint Prince Abdullah (his half brother) Crown Prince unless 'Abdullah agreed to surrender his control of the National Guard to Prince Salman (full brother of Fahd). In Oman Sultan Qaboos assumed power after a bloodless palace coup against his father.⁹⁵ The other critical dispute was with his uncle Tariq b. Taimur, the Prime Minister, who resigned as a result of his differences with his nephew in January 1972.⁹⁶ In Qatar the Al-Thānī royal family has also their disputes. In 1972 Sheykh Khalīfah b. Ḥamed, the former ruler of Qatar, seized power from his cousin Sheykh Aḥmed b. 'Alī. In 1976 this problem started again when the government of Britain discovered some weapons in London airport en route to Doḥa.⁹⁷ The dispute between the royal family in Qatar become more intense during the 1990s. Sheykh Ḥamad b. Khalīfah (the present ruler) seized power from his father Sheykh Khalīfah b. Ḥamed in June 1995. According to the Qatari police quantities of arms and ammunition were found at the home of the former Minister of Economy and he was accused of masterminding a coup attempt with the help of members of the former Amīr's (Sheykh Khalīfah b. Ḥamed) 3000-strong personal bodyguard. After the June 1996 coup the bodyguard were incorporated into the army.⁹⁸ The Qatari government hinted that Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE might have been behind the attempt. Qatari requests that the GCC meet to discuss the attempt fell on deaf ears. Only Oman was sympathetic (Oman, since the 1995 coup in Qatar, has had closer relations with her) while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE refused to convene a meeting until Qatar retracted her veiled accusations that they had been involved in the attempt. Since the bloodless palace coup of 1995 in Qatar relations between Bahrain and Qatar have entered a new stage, especially after the conference which the ex-

95. Price, David. *Oil and Middle East Security*. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, 1976, p. 18.

96. Dietl, Gulshan. *op.cit.* p. 40.

97 Price, David. *op.cit.* p. 18.

98..*MEED*. Vol. 40. No. 19, 10 May 1996. p. 2, and *MEED*. Vol. 40. No.44. 1 November 1996. p. 8. See also *MEED*. Vol. 40 No. 51, 20 December 1996. p. 35.

Amīr (ex-Prince)(Sheykh Khalīfah b. Ḥamed) of Qatar held in Bahrain. (The former Amir made many visits to all of the GCC Countries except Oman to gain support against his son.) Then he criticised his son for jeopardising GCC unity and pledged to forge closer ties with Bahrain if he regained power. In apparent retaliation, Qatari television, which is received throughout the Gulf, broadcast a 90-minute interview in which two exiled Bahraini opposition leaders were featured.⁹⁹ The dispute between the new Amir Ḥamad b. Khalīfah and his father entered a new stage when the new government confirmed that the deposed Amir (Sheykh Khalīfah) controlled a substantial portion of the country's foreign reserve which was estimated at \$3 billion.¹⁰⁰

The new systems of rule established 1992 in Saudi Arabia and in 1996 in Oman led to new conflict within the royal families in the two countries. The new system of rule in Saudi Arabia defined that the system was a monarchy and that the government is vested in the sons of the Kingdom's founder Abd al-Azīz and, as a new departure, in the sons of his sons. As the King ('Abd al-'Azīz) had about 48 sons the succession is now open to about 500 of his grandsons. This development was probably a response to pressure from the younger, better-educated princes who have been competing for influence within the Saudi family. The Crown Prince has traditionally been chosen by a consensus of the senior Princes, sometimes as a check to the King by other factions of the royal family. The new basic system of rule has now clearly become more competitive and sensitive within the Saudi royal family. The King, however, was still able both to choose and dismiss the Crown Prince by royal decree. For the present King Fahd has decided to leave the line of succession unchanged and appointed 'Abdullah as the Crown Prince, although there are a number of able and ambitious younger Princes available.¹⁰¹ The Saudi royal family does not only consist of the sons of 'Abd al-'Azīz, but also their sons and grandsons

99. *MEED*. Vol.40. No.4. 26 January 1996. p. 5, and *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Bahrain Country Profile 1996-97" pp. 5-6. See also *'AALAM AL-KHLEEJ*. Issue No. 45. *op.cit.* p. 1 and *Oman News Agency*. 17-Nov.1996. Muscat.

100. *The Economist Intelligence Unit 1996*. "Qatar Bahrain Country Profile" 1st quarter 1996. London. pp. 23-24.

and the descendants of the allied branches of the extended clan. The clan is estimated to number roughly 5,000 male members, of whom 200 to 300 are active in the government. Out of these groups, the ‘Abd al-‘Azīz group is the strongest; in fact, the line of succession does not extend beyond this group. It is made up of 30-odd sons, 100-odd grandsons and 500-odd great-grandsons of the founder King ‘Abd al-‘Azīz. The Saudi royal family also contains three other divisions who are given the title of “His Highness”: the Sa‘ud al-Kabīr, the Thunayyāns and the al-Julwis, whose still have the ambition to participate. During the era of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, Sa‘ud and Faiṣal, some members of the three divisions mentioned above played a significant role and held high ranks in Saudi Arabia especially al-Julwī (who were the Princes of the Eastern Province).

Abd al-Azīz’s sons and grandsons, who constitute the main group of the Saudi royal family, are also divided in many factions: The “Sudairi Seven”, the seven full brothers, sons of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz by his favourite wife Ḥiṣāh Bint al-Sudairī, have captured powerful positions in Saudi Arabia, and are headed by the Present King Fahd, Sultan the second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Civil Aviation, Nayif the Minister of the Interior, Salman the Governor of Riyadh, Aḥmad, Deputy Minister of the Interior, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, Deputy Minister of Defence and Civil Aviation, and Turkī, former Deputy Minister of Defence until 1978 when he was pushed out of the centre of power because of a family feud.¹⁰² The faction of Abdullah the Crown Prince, the first Deputy Prime Minister and the Chief of National Guard, are a counter-balance to the Sudairī seven. His mother belonged to the strong Shammar tribe in northern Najd. ‘Abdullāh, since becoming a Chief in the National Guard, has refused to leave the leadership of this force. The tribe in Saudi Arabia has always been a powerful variable in the political calculations of the Saudi rulers. Each of the tribes (especially Najdis) has traditionally enjoyed royal patronage on the basis of its size, leadership, military power, and geographical location. The third major group is the Al-Faisal group, consisting of the eight sons of

101. *Jane’s Sentinel Newsletter*. The Gulf States (ed.) Paul, David. 1995. London., *op.cit.* p. 7.

the late King Faisal b. 'Abd al-Azīz. The most prominent among them are Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Foreign Minister, Turki al-Faiṣal the head of the Sa'udi Intelligence Agency, Abd al-Raḥmān, the Commander of the Armoured Brigade, and Khālīd the Governor of 'Asir.¹⁰³

By the mid 1990s many questions were being raised about the 'coming succession crisis' in Saudi Arabia when King Fahd leaves the scene after his stroke. Many observers' reports mention a potential power struggle between the Crown Prince, 'Abdullāh ¹⁰⁴ on one side and 'the Sudairi Seven'. Some sources mention that there is a clandestine alliance between 'Abdullāh, the Crown Prince and the third faction of the Saudi royal family, Al-Faiṣal.¹⁰⁵

Rivalries within the individual ruling families in the United Arab Emirates are a source of instability. The historical record of the seven emirates of the UAE is full of assassinations among the ruling families of these states. Several current leaders have assumed their positions by means other than natural succession. Rivalry between the two biggest Emirates (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) has historically been the largest obstacle in the development of federal unity. During the coup attempt of 1987 in Sharjah, the two Emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, were seen to differ on the coup. Abu Dhabi was seen as supporting one side and Dubai the other.¹⁰⁶ The most important factors affecting the relations between the ruling families of the UAE, are the disputes of these Emirates over borders. These problems are complicated by the fact that no recorded data exists about where the territory of each Sheikdom begins

102 Bahgat, Gawdat. *The Gulf Monarchies*. *op.cit.* p. 18.

103. Dietl, Gulshan. *op.cit.* pp. 28-29, and *Jane's Sentinel Newsletter*: The Gulf States. *op.cit.* p. 7.

104. Abdullāh b. 'Abd al-'Aziz the Saudi Crown Prince, has been head of the National Guard since 1963 and has strong ties to the bedouin roots of the ruling family in the Najd region. See. *MEED*. Vol.40. No.2. 12 January 1996. p. 2, and *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "Saudi Arabia Country profile" 1996-97. p. 8.

105. The new Basic law of 1992 leaves the monarch free to choose his successor from among the sons and grandsons of King 'Abd al-'Aziz. He can make his selection on the basis of suitability rather than seniority, which has been the guiding principle in the past. See. *MEED*. Vol.40. No.2. 12 January 1996. p.3 and Bahgat, Gawdat. *op.cit.* p.18. For more details over the new Saudi Basic System of Government see *Middle East Economic Survey (MEES)* No.23. 9 March 1992. pp. C1-C2.

and ends, in addition to the tribal loyalties of the seven Emirates. From the 1950s and until its withdrawal in the early 1970s, Britain tried several times to solve the territorial problems among the Sheikdoms of the Trucial States, but the discovery of oil complicated the situation among these Sheikdoms and not much progress has been made on this matter. As an example of these disputes, Abu Dhabi (the biggest emirate in the federation) claims half the present territory of Dubai. Dubai asserts ownership of part of the territory of Sharjah. Sharjah also has a similar claim over Umm al-Qaiwain.¹⁰⁷

The border disputes in most of the UAE are still the main sources of internal instability hanging over the federation's future. Succession in the UAE is also complicated by the federal nature of the State. The main question here is who is going to succeed to power in the UAE after Sheykh Zayed's death? Until the present time (1997) this has not been discussed between the members of the UAE, and the temporary constitution (in April 1997 the word "temporary" was deleted and "permanent" was added) of the UAE does not give any answers to the problem. The other main factor which will aggravate again the increasing size of royal families, especially in Abu Dhabi which constitutes the main Emirate. Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan, who is over 80 years old, has many sons from different wives holding a high rank in the Union.¹⁰⁸

Oman is the only state of the GCC which is ruled by a family who follow a different religious sect (*Madhhab*). The Al-Sa'īd family of Oman are members of the Ibādī sect. Until November 6 1996 the Omani State, which had been ruled by Sultān Qaboos b. Sa'īd since July 1970, had been without any heir apparent. On 6

106. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "United Arab Emirates" Country Profile 1995-96. London, pp. 6-7.

107. Al-Baharna, Husain M. *The Arabian Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems*. *op.cit.* pp. 263-264.

108. For the situation in Abu Dhabi see *The Economist Intelligence Unit* "United Arab Emirates Country Profile 1996-97" pp. 5.6

November 1996 Sultān Qaboos b. Sa'īd issued a decree establishing the new Basic Statute of the State consisting of 81 Articles and divided into seven chapters.¹⁰⁹

The new Basic System of Rule (Chapter one) opened a new stage of conflict among the Al-Sa'īd family of Oman. Article 5 of Chapter one says that the system of government is Sultānī (Royal) and hereditary for the male descendants of Sayyid Turkī bin Sa'īd bin Sultān, provided that the chosen successor is a Muslim, judicious, of sound mind and a legitimate son of Omani Muslim parents.¹¹⁰ Sayyid Turkī b. Sa'īd is the great-grand-father of the present Sultan, Qaboos. Since the era of Sultan Faisal b. Turkī (son of Turkī b. Sa'īd) rule in Oman has passed down from father to son (Sultān Taimur b. Faisal, Sultan Sa'īd b. Taimur and the present Sultan Qaboos b. Sa'īd). Another conflict among the Omani royal family may appear since Sultan Qaboos has not named the heir apparent in the basic Statute of the State. Article 6 of the Basic System of the rule says: The Ruling Family Council shall, within three days of the throne falling vacant, determine the successor to the throne. But if the Ruling Family Council does not agree on the choice of the successor to the throne, the Defence Council shall confirm the appointment of the person designated by the Sultan in his letter to the Ruling Family Council. Sultān Qaboos said in an interview; "When I die, my family will meet. If they cannot agree on a candidate, the Defence Council will decide, based on a name or names submitted by the previous sultan. I have already written down two names, in descending order, and put them in sealed envelopes in two different places".¹¹¹ The power and the authority which is given to the Defence Council is the main obstacle for the members of the Omani royal family as it means that the Defence Council has the power to confirm the

109..*Oman Newspaper*. Issue No. 5639, Thursday 7, November 1996. Sultanate of Oman, Muscat, p. 1.

110. *Article five of the Omani Basic Statute of the State*. The document issued by the Omani Embassy in London. p. 2.

111. For more details of Sultan Qaboos' Interview see Miller, Judith "Creating Modern Oman An Interview with Sultan Qaboos" *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 76. No.3. May/June 1997. Washington. p. 17. The members of the Defence Council in Oman were appointed by the Sultan's Royal decree in 1996, and consist of the Palace Office Minister, Chief of Staff, Commander of the Royal Navy, Commander of the Royal Marines and the Chairman of the Omani Internal Security. See. *Oman*

appointment of the new Sultan. Very few people in Oman know who is going to succeed to power.

In Kuwait the royal family of Al-Ṣabāḥ have a similar dispute to the other GCC royal families. The best-known example of Al-Ṣabāḥ's history of dispute occurred when Sheykh Mubārak (the Great) assassinated his two brothers Muḥammad and Jarrāḥ. The problem of the ruling succession in Kuwait will appear in the near future as a dispute between the two branches of Al-Ṣabāḥ (as-Sālim and al-Jābir) both between the branches and within each branch. Certain factions within the al-Jābir branch have tried to limit the influence of the Al-Sīlim branch.¹¹²

Table No. 10

The Royal Families of the Arab Gulf States (113)

Emirate/ State.	Date	Ruling Family.	Tribe.	Ruler.
Bahrain	1961.	Al-Khalīfah.	Banī-Utub.	Sheykh 'Isā b. Salmān.
Kuwait.	1977.	Al-Ṣabāḥ.	Bani-Utub.	Sh.Jābir al-Aḥmed.
Oman.	1970	Al-Sa'īd.	Azdī.	Sultan Qaboos.
Saudi A.	1982.	Al-Sa'ud.	'Anazī.	King Fahd.
Qatar.	1995.	Al-Thani.	Tamīm.	Sh.Hamed b. Khalifah.
Abu Dhabi	1971	Al-Nahayyān	Banī-Yās.	Sh. Zayed b. Sultan.
Dubai	1990	Al-Maktum	Banī-Yās	Sh.Maktum b. Rāshid.
Sharjah	1972.	Al-Qasimī.	Qawasim.	Sh.Sultān b. Muḥammad.
'Ajmān.	1981.	Al-Na'imī.	Al-Na'im	Sh. Ḥumayd b.Rashid.

News Agency. November 1996 and Article 6 of the Omani Statute of the State. Oman Embassy in London. *op.cit.* p. 3.

112. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "Kuwait Country Profile 1996-97" p. 5. Also for more details over the disputes within the GCC royal families see Robin, Philip. *The Future of the Gulf Politics and Oil in the 1990s*. Dartmouth Publishing Company, Gower House, England, 1989. pp.71-74.

113 Dietl, Gulshan. *op.cit.* p. 24.

Umm al-Qaiwain.	1981.	Al-Mu'allā.	Al-'Alī.	Sh. Rāshid b. Aḥmad.
Ras al-Khaimah.	1948.	Al-Qāsimi.	Qawāsim.	Sh. Ṣaqr b. Muḥammad.
Fujairah.	1974.	Al-Sharqi.	Al-Sharqī.	Sh. Ḥamed. b. Muḥammed.

Source: Dietl, Gulshan. *op.cit.* p. 24

Conclusion of Chapters Three and Four

To judge a political experience as successful or not is a relative matter which differs from one researcher to another according to the criteria on which they depend. Since the foundation of the GCC in May 1981, the council has not been able to employ any collective security initiative. One can clearly see that the six member states continued building their own military forces individually, but the only action taken by the Council in this respect has been the Desert Shield Force (5000 soldiers). This was a symbolic force under Saudi leadership which includes all the member states. This was the first step towards the formation of a deterrent collective force but its main objective was to restore internal stability and order within the region's countries rather than to confront external aggression. Whatever the main objective, the force proved that it was not adequate, especially when facing an emergency situation like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Since the foundation of the GCC, the six states have continued to allege, at the end of each summit, that the security of the Gulf was their responsibility, in spite of the presence of the navies and military facilities they had given to the Western countries, especially the USA, Britain and France. (The proof of this is in the defence agreements concluded during the early 1990s between the GCC states and the above-mentioned).

The security of a country or region is the function of a multitude of domestic and external, material and moral factors. Security is no longer perceived in terms of armaments and weapons but rather as a social and development question.

Since the early 1970s and 1980s these countries have continued to have different attitudes towards the concept of a security policy in the Gulf region. The GCC members have disagreed on the sources of the threat. During that period there have been many sources of threats, concerning oil security or the security of the ruling system. The most famous of these have been Arab radicalism and Arab Nationalism as well as the national opposition movements and the spread of Marxism in the region (PFLOAG).

There was a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to their fear of Iraq (in the early 1970s) and a rapprochement between Oman and Iran due to their

fear of South Yemen. There was danger from Iran due to its disagreement with Iraq over the sovereignty of Shatt el-Arab, the dispute between Bahrain and Iran regarding the Iranian claim over Bahrain, and the dispute between Iran and the UAE over the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. Finally there was the international conflict between the two great powers (USA and the Soviet Union).

The states of the GCC failed during the three phases of the 1970s, 1980s, and mid-1990s to create any form of collective security, and security has always remained the responsibility of each country. These countries depend entirely on Western countries to protect their regimes against any internal or external threats, a matter which led to the following:

- (a) stabilisation of the country's sovereignty in order to sustain the relations and co-operation between the member states;
- (b) aggravation of the disputes between the council states due to the arms race;
- (c) facilitation of the foreign and regional penetration of the member states;
- (d) exhaustion of the financial resources for armament programmes.

Due to these factors the council has failed completely to assure its security functions and as a result it has not developed into a regional entity with geographical and economic characteristics that can correspond to its people's ambitions in a unified and strong way. The failure of the council to assure its security functions has had a negative influence on the performance of the council's integration functions, whereas individual sovereignty has been enhanced on account of the integral tendency in other economic and social fields.

The failure of these countries to assure security functions is due to the following reasons: the relative difference of power, population, and incomes of the council states as well as the persistence of such countries in conserving their national sovereignty due to historic accumulations, tribal conflicts and religious differences, the multiplicity of internal and external threat sources and the priorities of such threats differing from one country to another, border problems between the GCC states, foreign intervention in the affairs of the GCC states, the legal and political nature of the council, a regional organisation whose powers are only consultative though its leadership meets every year. This council is not given full power to be active politically, militarily and on the level of security.

The United States might have succeeded, by military force, in conquering Iraq after the occupation of Kuwait. However, the military force employed by the USA during the 1970s and 1980s in the Gulf, directly or indirectly through Iran as per the Nixon and Carter Doctrines, the creating of Rapid Intervention Forces and the Reagan principle of forming a Central American Forces HQ in the Gulf did not succeed in creating stable security in the Gulf region.

After the second Gulf War in 1991, the GCC reviewed the idea of collective security through the Damascus Declaration or what was known as the (6+2) form, which added a new Arab dimension to the efforts made for collective security in the Gulf. This meeting was between the six council states plus Egypt and Syria, and they decided on increasing the numbers of the Desert Shield Forces up to a hundred thousand men as mentioned by Sultan Qaboos in the military project formed after the Doha summit in 1990. But these two formulations did not succeed in activating collective security between the GCC states. After the failure of these two formulations the member states of the GCC decided on the expansion of foreign military support, though the council countries made great efforts to extend the alliance area on a bilateral basis. Since 1991 three Western countries, USA, Britain and France, continue to play the major role in supporting Arab Gulf security. Bilateral defence agreements were signed with foreign parties, according to which the GCC signed defensive, military and arms agreements with the above Western countries. In spite of the fact that several years have passed since the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the GCC states have not yet reached any common collective security formula, which means that the Western countries will remain the main protector against any internal or external threat to the conservative regimes in the Gulf region.

The dual containment policy applied by Washington against Iran and Iraq failed. It did not succeed in isolating Iran and did not overthrow the Iraqi regime of Şaddam H̄usseini. As a result of this policy Arab Gulf security has become even more threatened, because both Iran and Iraq agreed to oppose the security arrangements imposed by the USA. Both countries consider the American presence in the Gulf region as a direct threat to their national security. The disarmament of Iraq, which is insisted upon by the USA, disturbs the balance of power in favour of Iran, and this creates a kind of instability. The Pentagon argues that continued arms sales to

regional allies are necessary to provide a minimal level of defensive capability as a deterrent against aggression and as a 'leverage' to promote US interests in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia is ultimately the key to US defence strategies in the Gulf region, following the successful resolution of the Gulf crisis and the destruction of most of Iraq's military power. It is likely that the GCC states have recognised that there are no major external military threats facing them for the foreseeable future.

In an interview, 'Abd al-'Azīz Al-Rawās, the Omani Minister of Information, in answer to a question regarding the capability of such member states to protect their political systems in case of external invasion, said that there was absolutely no likelihood of external invasion, as happened in Kuwait in 1990. The Minister did not give a reason for this, but I suggested that this was due to the western military presence in the region and the military agreements reached by the council states with such countries. The Minister also stated that the American policy of dual containment had failed as the Americans themselves had recognised. The Minister added that the policy had failed to contain Iran and Iraq because of the benefits to some Western countries and oil companies.¹

The credibility of the US and Western Europe (Britain and France) as the ultimate guarantor of the security of the GCC states has been enhanced and their assurance of military response to future aggression in the Gulf region has established an effective deterrent there.

Significant internal developments in the GCC states since the early 1970s changed and challenged the main basis of internal security in these countries—developments such as the nationalist movements (the activity of PFLOAG represents the most powerful challenge) and the rise of the Shi'a since the end of the 1970s in the Gulf region, with strong support from Iran. The traditional Arab Gulf states still face many other problems, which can be summarised as follows:

- a) the existence of deep social, ethnic, and sectarian divisions;
- b) the shortage of indigenous manpower;
- c) the challenge of resurgent, populist Islam;
- d) the dramatic growth of a professional middle class;

1. Interview with 'Abd al-'Azīz Al-Rawās. *op.cit.*

- e) the existence of conspicuous corruption in many ruling circles;
- f) the intimately close relationships between Gulf elites and western governments;
- g) the huge gap between economic modernisation on the one hand and political development on the other hand;
- h) the critical issue of succession and political rulership for the future.

It should be noted that peace and stability in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf cannot be achieved unless a number of other issues are also addressed: internally (among the GCC states) over more economic co-operation, political participation, border settlements, and more integration culturally, militarily, economically, and politically, and externally (between GCC and Iran, Iraq) trustful relationships, economic co-operation and border settlements.

The GCC states concerned directly with the security arrangements should have to balance the four following factors which relate to these arrangements:

- 1) Local factors: the six conservative states should establish a collective security in their own countries and develop the force of the Desert Shield, and accept Sultan Qaboos of Oman's project of building a unified military of 100,000 men.
- 2) Arab factors: this is an indispensable aspect to the GCC countries, according to the national security criteria, and due to nationalist, geographical and cultural factors in addition to the role of Egypt and Syria in supporting the Arab Gulf countries situation.
- 3) Regional factors: particularly Iran. The six Gulf states agree that Iran should be involved in any security plans due the fact that it overlooks half the Gulf area and shares many features with the Gulf states. The past years have shown that the boycott of relations with Iran is one of the most important reasons for the lack of stability in the Gulf region.
- 4) International factors: an international cover for any regional security system is required to provide the necessary protection for the Arab Gulf states, whenever necessary, as happened during the Kuwait occupation in August 1990. The United States and Britain represent this factor as they are considered to be the main pivot of the Arab Gulf states security.

Among these four factors, the Arab Gulf states must make a balance to reach a complete, perfect security system, which includes all the advantages of these

factors and avoids the contradictions existing between them. It is a fact that Arab security for the Gulf is not enough on its own. The Middle East security, which is required by America, is not for the benefit of the region, due to the fact that it seeks to involve Israel in the security system of the Middle East. The regional security, which is required by Iran, is not balanced enough to achieve all the objectives and benefits of all the Gulf countries including Iran. The proper picture of the security arrangements is to have an important Arab role within a regional security system, which should not ignore the international factor.

In any case, massive arms sales to the Arab Gulf states may have little positive impact on security in the region. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 highlighted the fact that the GCC states are not capable of defending their countries against any external invasion coming from Iraq or Iran without external military support from the United States and the Western European countries. The importance of oil remains the thing which protects the traditional monarchies of the Arab Gulf states against any internal threats, whether Islamist, nationalist, or any internal opposition, or external threats (coming from Iraq, Iran and the Yemen).

The GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, will still be the key to United States defence strategies in the Gulf region. With the successful resolution of the second Gulf crisis, and the destruction of most Iraqi military power and the containment and boycott of Iran, it is likely that the GCC states have recognised that there are no major military threats facing them. The credibility of the United States as the ultimate guarantor of the security of the GCC states has been enhanced and the assurance of a United States military response to future aggression in the region has established an effective deterrent there. Since the termination of the second Gulf War all the GCC states have provided military facilities to the United States, Britain and France to provide against any internal or external threats to the Arab Gulf monarchies.

‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās, the Omani Minister of Information, believes that the most important internal challenges which face the GCC members are that the vital link is missing between their economic development and progress and the political development of their governments. These governments have not activated the role of governmental institutions. He stated that the Omani political pattern is a

good example of such political progress. It was associated with the economic progress witnessed by the Sultanate, when she founded the first council for Agriculture, Industry and Fisheries in the middle of 1975, and then as an advanced step, declared the foundation of the State Consultative Council in 1980 and the formation of the Consultation Council (Shura Council) in 1991, and finally the declaration of the State Council in 1997 under the umbrella of the Oman Council.²

It should be recorded that since Kuwait's liberation in 1991, the concept of security has become a new concept different from the previous ones. The main factors of the concept of security include the following: 1) priority has been given to external security rather than the internal security. 2) The domination of the military security system by each country rather than by a collective security system for the six member states, as well as the rehabilitation of their own military power and arms purchasing. 3) The subordination of the GCC's security to Western external power and the concentration of the foreign military presence in the region. This military presence is represented by the Marine and Air Force presence, as well as by the common military manoeuvres and weapons storage that were agreed to in the bilateral security agreements between the GCC states and the Western countries (particularly the USA). 4) The lack of the Arab participation in security arrangements, especially the Damascus Declaration. The military co-operation between Egypt, Syria and the council is restricted to bilateral relationships and is not achieved within the framework of the GCC. 5) The restriction of the Iraqi threat in the future through the confiscation of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the application of all international resolutions imposed on Iraq by the United States.

2. Interview with 'Abd al-'Azīz Al-Rawās. op.cit.

The GCC Internal Boundary Disputes

5

Introduction

This chapter will concentrate on the disputed borders in the Arabian Gulf-Peninsula region, as they represent a destabilising factor not only between the parties involved but for the whole region. Throughout history, states have found many reasons to make war against each other, and territorial differences have been a cause of war since time immemorial. However, with the emergence of the western state (the territorial nation-state) territory has also taken on a mythic or symbolic value. It has become incorporated into people's ideas about their own identity and has also become a token of their common political situation as co-citizens in a sovereign state. Since the French Revolution, the modern state has been defined as 'a territory over all whose inhabitants it rules and which is separated by clearly distinct frontiers or borders from other such territories'.¹

The problems of geopolitical borders are considered the most important challenges to face the Gulf region countries at present and in the future. This is mainly because borders are associated with many economic components such as oil and water, as well as the regional sovereignty of states which feel obliged to claim what they consider as their historical rights and which may have been denied by neighbours during border demarcation disputes. No doubt this insistence of each party on claiming its rights represents the greatest challenge to these states. Political efforts frequently fail to find a peaceful solution and the states resort to armed conflict.²

Boundary disputes have recently become a significant issue in the regional geopolitics of the Gulf area, between the GCC states themselves on the one hand, and

1. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. *Survival*. Vol. 35. No.4. Winter 1993, London, p. 3.

2. *Al-Ta'āwun Magazine*. Issue No.42. June 1996. p. 229.

between the GCC states, Iran and Iraq on the other.³ Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, sovereignty was not considered a matter of great importance in the Arab Gulf area. The proof of this is the increased movement among the tribes inhabiting the desert areas.

The Arab Gulf communities, before the coming of the British, enjoyed many kinds of social harmony and were composed of three principal communities, two of them sedentary and the third nomadic. One of the two sedentary communities appears in the fertile oases, along the eastern stretch of the Arabian peninsula in al-Buraimi Oasis, Ḥasā and some areas of Kuwait. The others are found in the principal cities of the Gulf area. As for the third community, they are the Bedouin: they move about in the desert in search of water and pasture. With the arrival of the British in the Gulf region and after the signing of agreements with the sheikhs of these tribes, particularly the agreements of 1820, the tribes made an attempt to control their areas of influence, and intensified their zeal towards independence.

These sheikhdoms became petty states which resembled modern states through the demarcation of geographic boundaries, the issuing of passports and the imposing of custom restrictions between them, a development unknown to the Gulf communities before the coming of the British.⁴

The real border disputes between the Arab Gulf sheikhdoms began with the participation of these countries in the era of oil concessions and the increased concern of the international oil companies, who had a great role in exaggerating the border problems in the Arab Gulf area so as to put pressure on the disputing countries to grant them greater oil concessions. For instance, in 1933, American Standard Oil of California obtained some significant concessions in the disputed areas along the previous borders.⁵

3. Schofield, Richard "Borders and territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the twentieth century" in Schofield, Richard (ed.) *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*. U.C.L Press, England, 1994, p. 57.

4. Al-Rumayḥī, Moḥammad. *Al-Khalīj Lays-Naḥṭan. Dirāsah fī-Ishkāliyyat al-Waḥdah* .op.cit. pp. 41-42.

5. Schofield, Richard. *op.cit.* p. 172.

The rivalry was acute between the United States (on behalf of Saudi Arabia) and Britain (on behalf of Muscat and the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms) in the search for oil. Likewise the disputes between the tribes in eastern Arabia became more active, particularly during the last stage of the Second World War. The border questions in the Arabian Gulf area became increasingly extraordinary and complicated, especially with the discovery of oil in the desert lands. At that time every sheikh and his tribe claimed the right to grant oil concessions in their respective areas. Oil exploration in the region prompted major American and British companies to make commercial arrangements with the rulers concerned as well as with some of the tribes in the Gulf area.⁶

In the summer of 1911, the representatives of the British and Turkish governments held long negotiations over the sovereignty and protection of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf area. These negotiations extended until 29 July 1913, when both sides agreed to conclude a convention. The 1913 convention between Britain and Turkey was the first attempt to determine the borders of the Arabian Peninsula in order to establish the political boundaries of areas subject to the control of Britain and those eastern areas subject to Turkey.⁷

The concept of regional sovereignty was not known in these areas as there had never been established sovereignty there. Instead the loyalty of the tribes depended on following a tribe or a *madhhab*, such as the Wahhābī Sunnis in Saudi Arabia, and the other Sunni schools, the Mālikis and Shāfi'īs as well as the Ibādī sect in the north of Oman. The political loyalty of these tribes depended primarily on the relationship between the tribal leaders and the rulers of the sheikhdoms in their region. It did not depend on the basis of the geographical areas which fell under the control of the rulers. Tribal loyalty was not static. Most often these loyalties either rotated between

6. Al-Shamsi, Saeed Moḥammad. *The al-Buraimi Dispute: A Case Study in Inter-Arab Politics*. Ph.D. Thesis. The American University, Washington D.C. 1986, pp. 48-49 and 172.

7. Until the establishment of the present Saudi State in 1932, the Arabian Peninsula had never known the existence of national boundaries separating one part from the other, nor the existence of any form of national identity other than that of being Arabs. The Arabian Peninsula was inhabited, even before the rise of Islam, by various Arab tribes that recognised no authority except that of the tribal Sheykhs and no limits on their movements within their traditionally recognised tribal

the various rulers or simply remained aloof from the ruling circles.⁸ Thus some of the tribes in the al-Zahira area in Oman moved to Ibn-Sa'ud and the tribes of Na'im of Zubarah in Qatar moved to the Al-Khalifah of Bahrain.

Many of the present borders in the Middle East either were drawn directly by the western powers, especially Britain, or have come about as a result of their influence over the area during the first half of this century.⁹ The British government, by the twentieth century, was playing a major role in the delineating of sovereign authority amongst the Gulf Sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (all of these Sheikhdoms being artificial British states). In addition the local British Residencies in these Sheikhdoms played a significant role in protecting these Sheikhs from any attack especially from Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Each of these countries still claims territorial rights in many of these sheikhdoms.¹⁰

The Gulf borders in the Arabian Peninsula are as artificial as any in the world. Saudi Arabia shares borders with all of the Arabian Peninsula countries as well as Iraq and Jordan. Since the British departed from the Gulf area, many Joint Committees have been established and many meetings and discussions between the Arabian Peninsula countries have been organised.¹¹

The Basic Charter of the GCC includes, in Article Ten, the establishment of a commission for the Settlement of Disputes between the members of the Council. But in fact until the present time the Commission has not held any meetings to discuss any dispute between these countries. This is in spite of the many border disputes during previous years, most of which led to violent clashes. Some political analysts

territories. See Etaibi, Ghalib Tulhab. *op.cit.* p. 164, and Kelly, J.B. *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*. Faber and Faber, London, 1964, p. 107

8. Al-Fil, Muḥammad Rashid "Mushkilāt al-Ḥūdūd bayn Imārāt al-khalīj al-'Arabī" in. Al-Rumayhī, Moḥammad (ed.) *Majallat Dirāsāt al-Khalīj al-'Arabī*. Vol. 8. Second year, University of Kuwait, 1976, p. 28.

9. Biskhu, Michael B "Iraq's claim to Kuwait: A Historical Overview" *American-Arab Affairs*. Vol. 37. 1991, p. 77.

10. Joffe, George "Concept of sovereignty in the Gulf region" in: Schofield, Richard (ed.), *Territorial Foundation of the Gulf State*, U.C.L. Press, England, 1994, pp. 85-86.

11. Al-Omair, Ali. *The Arabian Gulf: A Study of Stability and Integration in the Realm of Regional and International Politics After British Withdrawal in 1971*. Ph.D. Thesis. Claremont Graduate School, U.S.A., 1979, p. 167.

have suggested that the leaders of the GCC prefer to solve the border disputes between members of the Council individually rather than collectively because all the GCC States have the same problem with each other. Most of the GCC border disputes have been resolved or are still in progress, with mediation being led by other Arab leaders or Britain.¹²

It should be recorded that both the two wars of the Gulf, the first between Iraq and Iran which lasted from 1980 to 1988 and the second caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, erupted as a result of border disputes.

Brief Background of the al-Buraimi Dispute

Shaykh Sirḥān b. Saʿīd, the Omani historian, mentions in his book *Kashf al-Ghumamah* that al-Buraimi in 1728 was recognised as part of Oman and was known as Towwam or el-Jow. Imām Aḥmad b. Saʿīd, the founder of Oman's Al-Bu Saʿīd dynasty, controlled the area of al-Buraimi in the mid-eighteenth century. In 1800 the first Saudi State took control of al-Buraimi, after an invasion led by a Nubian slave named Sālim b. Ḥariq, and subjected the area to its control. But after just three years the Omani forces recaptured the area of al-Buraimi and drove the Saudi forces back to Najd.¹³

Lorimer, in his book *The Gazette of the Gulf*, published in 1900, describes the area of al-Buraimi as part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. He reports that the hold of the Sultan on the district was slight but that he maintained a Wālī supported by a garrison at the Al-ʿIrāqī village of al-Ḍahira. Saudi Arabia repeatedly attempted to conquer al-Buraimi and bring it under its permanent sovereignty. During the period 1800-1851 there was a total of five Wahhābī campaigns into al-Buraimi,;

12. Article Ten of the GCC Basic Charter. Commission for Settlement of Disputes of the GCC Charter. See the Basic Charter of the GCC in the Appendix p. 462 and A1- Shamsi, Saeed M. *op.cit.* p. 55.

13. Schofield, Richard "Extracts from Historical Summary of Events in the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 1928-1953" in: Schofield, Richard (ed.) *Arabian Boundary Disputes*. Vol. 19. Archive Edition, England, 1992, p. 385.

1800-1818; 1833-1839; 1845-1848; 1849-1850 and 1853-1869. The total Saudi occupation added up to forty-five years.¹⁴

The al-Buraimi Oasis lies in the plain of el-Jow on the northern edge of the al-Ẓāhirah district, and is about 37 square kilometres (15 square miles) in size. It is located approximately halfway between Soḥar in Oman and Abu-Dhabi. Al-Buraimi was the centre of trade for the tribes of the surrounding desert of the Rub' al-Khali (Empty Quarter). Al-Buraimi is the name of one oasis among the nine oases in the area. They are: Buraimi, Ṣa'arā, Ḥamās, al-'Ain, Jīmī or Qīmī, Hīlī, Qaṭṭārah, Mu'tiriḍ, and Muwaig'ī.¹⁵

The Al-Buraimi Dispute, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Abu-Dhabi (UAE)

British and Saudi Claims

The Anglo-Turkish Conventions of July 29 1913 and March 9 1914 were the first attempt to draw a border in the East Arabian area. The two sides agreed to mark the border lines between them. These came to be known as the Blue Line and the Violet Line (see map p. 241).¹⁶ The Blue Line begins on the Gulf to the west of Qatar, opposite Zakhnuniyah island, and runs due south to the Rub' al-Khālī. Its course took it roughly down the middle of the Jafrah Desert.¹⁷ After Ibn Sa'ud drove the Turks from Hasa in May 1913, he rejected the Turkish agreement with Britain, and claimed back many lands in South-eastern Arabia. In 1915 Britain signed an agreement with Ibn Sa'ud: he pledged that he would avoid any aggression or interference in the affairs of the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms, which were all under the suzerainty of Britain.

14. Phillips, Wendell. *op.cit.* p. 165.

15. Al-Buraimi has long been regarded as the northern gateway to the Sultanate of Oman, which throughout history has been on the direct route of invaders of Oman from the west. At the same time it controls the approach from the west to the coastal province of al-Bāṭinah, by way of the Wadi al-Jize. Kelly, J.B. *op.cit.* p. 33.

16. Wilkinson, John C. *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert*. I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, London, 1991, p. 57.

However, Ibn Sa'ud continued to annex many places in the Arab Gulf area. The Royal family of Saudi Arabia held the view that any lands that had been annexed by their ancestors during the first and second Saudi states should be under Saudi influence, since as such it had the right to regain these lands.

Since that time Saudi Arabia has sought the right of sovereignty over the lands situated near the al-Buraimi areas, Sabkhat Maṭṭī, Khawr al-'Udaid, some parts of Zūfār and Ḥaḍramaut in addition to some lands within the Qaṭar Peninsula. The Saudi view is that the authority of the sheikhs of the Gulf Coast is confined to the settlements in which they live, while the territory, the deserts and the oases which are between these settlements and run along the Gulf Coast, plus the interior lands which extend to the Rub'al-Khālī in the south, all belong to Saudi Arabia.¹⁸

In April 1935, the government of Saudi Arabia drew up the first of its territorial maps in which their border, which became known as the "Red Line" or "Fuad Line", was situated about 100 miles away from the al-Buraimi Oasis region. According to the Saudi Red Line the Saudi frontier ran parallel to the lands known as Majann, Sabkhat Maṭṭī, and Kufat al-Liwā, leaving the lands belonging to Kufat al-Liwā to the Sheikhdome of Abu-Dhabi and claiming the lands to the west for Saudi Arabia.¹⁹

British and Saudi Negotiations

The British government, as a compromise and after a new trend had begun in international politics, especially in Palestine, sought to develop better relations with Ibn Sa'ud. In 1936 the representative of the British government re-opened negotiations with the Saudi government. At the end of this negotiation, Britain announced a new line in eastern Arabia, which became known as the Green Line or Ryan Line. The Green Line started at the top of the Doḥat al-Salwah, going south-

17. Kelly, J.B. *op.cit.* pp. 107-108.

18. Shaker, Amīn. *Mustaqbal al-Khalīj al-'Arabī*. Al-Inmmā Publications, Beirut, 1971, p. 127.

19. Fuād Ḥamza Saudi representative in the Saudi-British delegations, originally a Druze Sheikh from Palestine, secured a job as the King's chief executive in foreign affairs, under Prince Faisal b. 'Abd-al-'Azīz. The Green Line, Red Line or Ryan Line, are different names for the same line. The Ryan line refers to Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Minister at Jeddah in Sa'udi Arabia during the thirties. See. Kelly, J. B. *op.cit.* pp. 124-125

eastward and passing by a point about 5 miles north-east of Sikāk, from this point running south in a direct line, leaving Baynūna 5 miles to the east. Saudi Arabia rejected the new British Green Line and insisted on the Saudi Red Line.

The situation on the eastern Arabian frontier between Britain (on behalf of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Abu-Dhabi, Qatar and Aden) and Saudi Arabia was suspended during the Second World War.²⁰

As a reaction to the Saudi rejection of the Green Line, the British Minister in Jeddah, on 25 November 1935, handed the Saudi government a memorandum proposing a frontier even more unacceptable to Ibn Sa‘ud than the Green Line. This new line began at the top of the Dawḥat al-Salwā and ran south-eastwards, skirting the southern tip of the Sabkhat Maṭṭī and then running eastwards along the northern edge of the Rub‘ al-Khālī.²¹

In fact the British and American oil companies played a major role in exacerbating the border disputes between the Arab Gulf States. During the Crisis over al-Buraimi the ARAMCO research department began to collect whatever historical facts were available which might support the authority or influence of the Saudis in the disputed area. On the other hand, the British Oil companies in the area followed the same method as the American Oil companies, by preparing for the coming negotiations over the disputed area, though the British government had its own well documented archives in the Foreign and Commonwealth office.²²

In the wake of the Second World War, Saudi Arabia and Britain exchanged serious letters on the al-Buraimi dispute. The British government rejected the Saudi claim; Saudi Arabia, in 1949, claimed that al-Buraimi was under the authority of its own tribal and village sheikhs, who had no treaty relationships with the British

20. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. *op.cit.* pp. 76-78.

21. Britain maintained that the only legal boundaries of its protectorate states with Saudi Arabia and Yemen were the Blue and the Violet lines that were laid down in the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions of 1913 and 1914. The Blue line defined the limit of the Ottoman territory in the Gulf, while the violet line defined the limit of the Ottoman territory in Yemen. However, between 1925 and the mid-1950s a number of other lines were proposed: in 1935 Saudi Arabia proposed a Red Line and Britain proposed the Riyadh or Ryan line. See *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* p. 462, and Kelly, J.B. *op.cit.* p. 125.

22. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. *op.cit.* pp. 78-79

government and also denied the sovereignty of Abu-Dhabi and Oman over al-Buraimi.²³

During the conferences in London in 1951 and Dammām in 1952, convened to discuss the al-Buraimi dispute between Britain (on behalf of Muscat, Abu-Dhabi and Qatar) and the Saudi Government, Saudi Arabia produced many letters from the Sheikhs of the al-Buraimi area as evidence of Saudi suzerainty in this area. The two conferences did not come to any agreements.²⁴

Saudi Occupation of Al-Buraimi

Many Sheikhs of the al-Ḥāhira area visited Riyadh in 1952, and returned to hoist the Saudi flag and started to issue Saudi travel documents. All the leading Sheikhs declared their allegiance to Ibn Sa'ūd, except for a few at the southern end of al-Ḥāhira, who were under the influence of the Sultan of Muscat or the Imam of interior Oman.²⁵ In 1952 Saudi Arabia dispatched an expedition to invade al-Buraimi under the Saudi Amir Turkī b.'Utaishān, assisted and escorted by forty men and many Sheikhs of the al-Buraimi area, especially the Al-Shāmsī chief of Ḥamāsā, Rashid b. Ḥamad. On his arrival, Turkī b.'Utaishān and his party established themselves in Ḥamāsā Oasis. The Saudi occupation represented the first Saudi attempt to occupy al-Buraimi in 83 years.²⁶ During the period of the occupation of the Ḥamāsā Oasis, Saudi Arabia obtained the signatures of 28 Sheikhs to the following statement in 1955:

*We well affirm that the land is our land, and we have expressed loyalty to our lord His Majesty the Great King. Our affairs are in his hands, and he may command us as he wishes, for he is the guardian of our affairs.*²⁷

23. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. *op.cit.* p.p. 91-92.

24. Wilkinson, John C. *op.cit.* p. 362.

25. Schofield, Richard. *op.cit.* p. 386.

26. Phillips, Wendell. *op.cit.* p. 168.

27. Sa'udi Arabia Memorial. *AL-Taḥkīm Bayn Musqat wa-al-'Arabiyyah Al-Sa'ūdiyyah*. Vol. 2. Cairo, 1955, pp. 129-269.

The Saudi claim to the al-Buraimi area was supported by the influential Sheikhs of the area who supported the Saudis in exchange for money and food.

Wendell Phillips in his book *Oman a History*, indicates that Sheikh Zayed b. Sultan, the present ruler of the United Arab Emirates, was offered some 30 million Pounds by the Saudi Agent, ‘Abdullah al-Quraishī, if he would help the Saudis to weaken the Omani position with Sheykh Shakhbūt, ruler of Abu-Dhabi at the time.²⁸ After they had occupied the area of al-Buraimi in 1952, the Saudis refused to discuss al-Buraimi as a frontier question.

British and Saudi Arbitration

Britain rejected the Saudi view on al-Buraimi, and in October 1953, Britain and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement to discuss al-Buraimi as an international case and agreed to appoint three members besides the British and Saudi representatives. By the end of 1954 the names of the members of the Tribunal were agreed as follows:

.....	Dr Charles de Visscher (Belgium)
.....	Ernesto de Dihiga (Cuba)
.....	Mohammed Hassan (Pakistan)
.....	Sir Reader Bullard (Britain)
.....	Sheikh Yusuf Yassin (Saudi Arabia)

Saudi Arabia, with documents to assure her historical right regarding the question of al-Buraimi, submitted herself to the international arbitration board. She depended on three types of documents: the first was the diplomatic correspondence exchanged between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom through her ambassador in Jeddah, in addition to the minutes of the conferences held between the two parties. The second type was the correspondence issued from tribal Sheykhs in the al-Buraimi region declaring their loyalty to the Al-Sa‘ud family, as well as some maps. The third type was the publication of the zakat (tributes) registers taken from the records of the al-Ḥasā district.²⁹

28. Phillips, Wendell. *op.cit.* p. 171.

29. The Saudi Memorial. *op.cit.* p. 139

Following the sessions held in Geneva, many events took place during the discussion of al-Buraimi: the dispute between the arbitrators, especially between the Saudi and British representatives, the Saudi influence over the al-Buraimi Sheikhs, and the attitude of the Arab nationalists against Britain.³⁰

However, other sources indicate that the most important reason leading to the final collapse of the al-Buraimi Tribunal was the incident when the Saudi member Yusuf Yassin was discovered attempting to influence witnesses and offering bribes to neutral arbitrators. The international arbitration on al-Buraimi collapsed after the resignation of the former Judge of the International Court of Justice, Dr Charles de Visscher, together with the Cuban and British members.

After the collapse of the international tribunal Britain issued a statement on the proceedings at Geneva, and claimed that Saudi Arabia had breached the arbitration agreement. However, Saudi Arabia claimed that, when the British government found that it was losing the case on al-Buraimi, it withdrew from the arbitration commission and supported the Omani and Abu-Dhabi forces in capturing the area of al-Buraimi in 1955.³¹

The U.N. and the Question of al-Buraimi

Since then the al-Buraimi dispute has become an item on the United Nations agenda known as the "Question of al-Buraimi". The Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hamarskjold appointed a special representative, Ambassador de Rissing from Sweden, to settle the problem of al-Buraimi, after British troops, with the assistance of Oman and Abu-Dhabi, had driven the Saudi force out from al-Buraimi on 26 October 1955. The British government informed Saudi Arabia that the rulers of Muscat and Abu-Dhabi had been advised to resume their former control of the al-Buraimi oasis. However de Rissing's mission failed.³² Following the British move, Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. Many of the Sheikhs from the al-Buraimi area were exiled to Saudi Arabia. Most of these Sheikhs did not return


30. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. *op.cit.* pp. 106-107.

31. Phillips, Wendell. *op.cit.* p. 172.

to al-Buraimi until the beginning of the seventies after Sultan Qaboos took power in Muscat and Sheikh Zayed in Abu Dhabi.³³

32. Kelly, J.B. op.cit. p. 205.

33. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. op.cit. p. 136.



Source: *International Boundaries Research Unit*, Department of Geography, University of Durham.

The British position over al-Buraimi

Sir Anthony Eden, the then British Prime Minister, explained the British move in al-Buraimi in the House of Commons in 1955:

The ruler of Abu-Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat have scrupulously observed the conditions of arbitration which Her Majesty's Government, in good faith, recommended to them. They have had to stand by and watch their subjects being suborned, and the outcome of the arbitration itself being gravely prejudiced in advance. A fair and impartial arbitration is not possible in such circumstances.the British government felt obliged, in the exercise of their duty to protect the legitimate interests of the ruler of Abu-Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat, to advise them that the attempt to reach a just compromise by means of arbitration has failed..

The British Prime Minister confirmed that the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi would be regarded as the Green Line, as amended in 1937. No unauthorised crossings of the line by the Saudis, either by land or air, would be tolerated.³⁴

The Saudi position over al-Buraimi

The Saudi Prime Minister, Prince Faisal (who became King in 1964) stated in November 1955:

As a result of the British armed aggression and forcible occupation of the Buraimi region, and in view of the fact that the British government justifies this armed aggression on the basis of its agreements with the Sultan of Muscat and the Sheykh of Abu Dhabi, His Majesty's Government in Saudi Arabia reasserts its full rights in that region and refuses to recognise any concessions that have been, might be, or shall be granted in the Buraimi region for any purpose to anybody, be it an individual, a company, or a government, without the consent of the Saudi Arabian government.³⁵

The al-Buraimi case became a frozen issue from the beginning of the sixties after the visit of United Nations delegates to the area. At this time security problems arose in the Gulf area, such as, the revival of the Arab nationalist trend which aggravated the tension in relations between Riyadh and Cairo during the era of Abd al-Naṣer, the outbreak of the North Yemen revolution in 1962, and the expansion of Naṣerism in

34. Kelly, J.B. *op.cit.* p. 205.

35. Joyce, Mariam. *op.cit.* p. 56.

the Arabian peninsula. This began to pose a large security challenge to Saudi Arabia, in particular, and the other Arab Gulf Sheikdoms in general. All these events were the main causes of the change in the Saudi government's stand on the issue of al-Buraimi. Since that time the Saudi government has revived its diplomatic relationship with Britain (in 1963), and Saudi Arabia agreed with Britain to discuss the issue of al-Buraimi with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.³⁶

In 1964, after the renewal of relations between London and Riyadh, Britain called for another attempt to promote a settlement of the al-Buraimi dispute. The British government proposed the establishment of a joint oil exploration area along the southern boundary of Abu Dhabi and the granting of right of access from the neighbouring area of Saudi Arabia to the Abu Dhabi coast for pipelines and roads. They also called for the return of the people of al-Buraimi under the guarantee of supervision by the United Nations. The British proposal was rejected by the Saudi government.³⁷ The al-Buraimi case was considered closely from a legal point of view, particularly for Muscat and Abu Dhabi. However, Saudi Arabia stood firm in its claim over the al-Buraimi area until the issue entered its final stage in the early seventies.³⁸

Since the British departure from the Gulf region in 1971, Saudi Arabia has continued to claim sovereignty over al-Buraimi and many parts of Abu Dhabi and Oman.³⁹ It attempted to reach a unilateral border with Sultan Qaboos of Oman during his first official visit to Saudi Arabia in December 1970.

However, the two sides failed to reach an agreement. But Sultan Qaboos's visit to Riyadh, which was followed by a joint proclamation between Muscat and Riyadh, included the Saudi recognition of three oases in al-Buraimi, namely Buraimi, Şa'ra and Ḥamāsā, as being annexed to the Sultanate of Oman.⁴⁰

36. Shahdad, Ibrāhim M. *Al-Şirā' 'al-Dākhilī fī 'Umān Khilāl al-Qarn al-'Ishrīn*. *op.cit.* p. 176.

37. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. *op.cit.* p. 118.

38. *Al-Anwār Magazine*. Issue no. 1660. 9 August 1974. Beirut. 1974. p. 10.

39. Al-Na'imī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad. *Al-Şirā' 'alā al-khalīj al-'Arabī*. *op.cit.* p. 164

40. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. *op.cit.* pp. 126-127.

The Abu Dhabi position over al-Buraimi

Sheikh Zayed b. Sultān the ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the United Arab Emirates, was under pressure during the early seventies due to teething problems faced by the new federation of the UAE, including boundary disputes between certain rulers and the question of common defence and external security. King Faiṣal of Saudi Arabia made it clear that, as his territorial demands upon Abu-Dhabi remained unsolved over the disputed area he would not recognise the legitimacy of the UAE (which was founded by the seven Sheykhdoms of the Trucial States in December 1971).⁴¹ Saudi Arabia played a significant role in dividing the Arabian Gulf Emirates Federation (which consisted of the seven Trucial States, Bahrain and Qatar) during the end of the sixties and early seventies. This proposed federation gave the Saudi government another opportunity to put forward their claims over their eastern boundary.⁴²

Under these circumstances an agreement was reached on 21 August 1974, between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi (on behalf of the United Arab Emirates) on the al-Buraimi dispute after nearly four years of negotiations between the two countries. The agreement gave Saudi Arabia access to the Khawr al-‘Udaid plus a coastal strip south of Qatar, the lines of wells through Sufuq, some of the Liwa Oasis, and much of the Zarrara field on Abu Dhabi’s side of the border.

In exchange Saudi Arabia recognised the suzerainty of Abu Dhabi over the remaining six oases in the al-Buraimi area and recognised the United Arab Emirates. In 1976 the construction of a new highway to link Abu Dhabi with Qatar was halted as it reached Sila, when the Saudis claimed that the company was working in their

41. Martin, Lenore G. *The Unstable Gulf Threats from Within*. Lexington Books, Toronto, 1984, p. 52.

42. The long-secret 1974 boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and (Abu Dhabi) UAE has now entered the public domain as a result of its recent deposition to the UN as a public document. The text confirms the agreement of the two sides to the effect that all the oil and gas located in the Shaybah-Zarrarah field, even that part of the structure on the UAE side of the border, belongs to Saudi Arabia. The main part of the field, known as Shaybah, lies on the Saudi side of the agreed boundary line, but a small part of the structure extends onto the (Abu Dhabi) UAE side where it is known as Zarrarah. See. *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Summer 1995, IBRU, University of Durham, p. 18 and see Pike, David “Cross-border hydrocarbon reserves” in: *Territorial*

territory. This resulted in renewed negotiations on the boundary in 1976 and 1977 and a new agreement was eventually reached in 1977 between the two countries. (For more details on the Saudi-Abu Dhabi agreement of 1974 see the appendix p. 489).

The Omani Position over the 1974 Agreement

In reaction to the agreement of 21 August 1974 between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, Sultan Qaboos of Oman publicly issued a rejection of it at a press interview:

Abu Dhabi has abdicated lands which do not belong to it or to Saudi Arabia; they are under the suzerainty of Oman and we are neither a partner to this agreement, nor are we aware of any discussions. We hope our brothers in Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia will rectify the mistake which has occurred. 43

The Omani stance was officially declared when the Omani representative in the United Nations handed the Secretary-General of the UN an official Omani letter dated 28 September 1993 rejecting the Saudi-Abu Dhabi border agreement. The Omani letter declared its reservation about the articles of agreement in these words:

The Omani government is unaware of any such agreement signed on 21 August 1974, between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. The purported agreement includes articles pertaining to lands which historically and legally fall under the suzerainty of Oman and are inhabited by Omani citizens and protected by the Sultanate of Oman. The Omani letter confirms that Oman has full sovereignty over all Omani lands and, as such, any interference with the Omani border will be treated as involving the internal affairs of Oman, which is not acceptable to the Omani government... that the Sultanate of Oman will not recognise anything except what is declared in the Omani-Saudi border agreement which was signed in 1990, and the Omani agreement with Abu Dhabi. Anything else aimed at breaking the authority and legality of what had been reached concerning the international border between Oman-Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, Oman will neither recognise it nor accept it and will treat such things as non-existent. 44

The border disputes between Oman and the UAE remained in *status quo*. As far as the dispute between the Omanis and the Saudis is concerned, it was resolved after the border agreement was signed in Riyadh on March 21 1990, between Sultan Qaboos of Oman and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The instruments of the Omani-Saudi border

foundations of the Gulf States" (ed.) Schofield, Richard. UCL Press, 1994, p. 190. See Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. *op.cit.* pp. 126-127 and *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries. op.cit.* p. 462.

43. Al-Na'imī, 'Abd-al-Rahmān M. *op.cit.* p. 165.

44. *Al-Hayāh Newspaper*. Issue No:11511. 24 August 1994, London, p. 4.

agreement of ratification were exchanged during the state visit of Sultan Qaboos to Riyadh in May 1991. Some sources indicate that the new Omani-Saudi border agreement coincided with a delimitation which the British government declared in 1955 on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.⁴⁵ The demarcation of the two-country border was completed. The erection of 341 concrete boundary markers took three years and required overcoming formidable geographical obstacles, including sand dunes reaching 200metres high in some places. The ceremony for the signing of the border maps took place in Riyadh on 10 July 1995.⁴⁶ (for full text of the agreement see appendices p. 492)

Abu Dhabi, as a responsible party to the 1974 agreement with the government of Saudi Arabia, attempted several times to open discussions with the latter in order to reach an amicable settlement in respect of that agreement. The Saudis promised to discuss and decided to deposit the 1974 agreement with the United Nations, but refused to have any further discussions with Abu Dhabi on this issue. Privately, Abu Dhabi officials continued in 1992 to express unhappiness with the 1974 border agreement with Saudi Arabia, which they regarded as having been imposed upon them.⁴⁷

The Political Developments of the al-Buraimi Dispute (the Omani position)

The al-Buraimi question, which represented the greatest political dispute in the Arabian Peninsula during the fifties and sixties, is considered to be the most complicated political boundary question between the Sultanate of Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Abu Dhabi). The 1974 Treaty or Jeddah convention between

45. *Geographic Notes*. Winter 1992.1993. Vol. 2. No. 4. US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington ,DC, pp. 1-2

46. *Oman Daily Observer*. Vol.14. No.205. Tuesday 11 July 1995. Sultanate of Oman, Muscat. p.1 and *Boundary and Security Bulletin*. Summer 1995. p.19. Copies of maps of the International borders between the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia were deposited at the Arab League on 15 November 1995 in accordance with the border agreement signed in March 1990. *Oman Daily Observer*. Issue No. 15. No.2, Thursday 16 November 1995. p. 1.

47. Schofield, Richard "Border and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* p. 66.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Abu Dhabi) represented political differences between all three countries, especially after the publication of the treaty in 1992. Up till then it remained confidential between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The attitude of the Sultanate of Oman was clear from the memorandum of protest and non-recognition of this treaty which Oman submitted with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the Arab League and the United Nations.

The Omani attitude came as a result of the Saudi submission of the treaty to the United Nations. This was a step which Saudi Arabia had not taken in the past, but their documentation of this treaty arose as a result of the second Gulf war, and was in addition intended to counteract the repeated demands by the UAE to reformulate the 1974 treaty. The UAE thought that the treaty of 1974 was unfair and was a result of the political circumstances of the time, which had led to the creation of the UAE federation. Saudi Arabia continued not to recognise the new federation until the settlement of the boundary problem between the two parties.

On 28 September 1993 the Sultanate of Oman submitted to the UN a memorandum of protest against the 1974 treaty, after the treaty had been registered by the United Nations on 9 September 1993. (We have to note that the documentation of this treaty has not yet been achieved because the legal procedures, terms and conditions of registration have not yet been satisfied.)

On 27 November 1993 the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the Omani Consul in Abu Dhabi and submitted to him the response of the UAE regarding the Oman protest memorandum; the UAE attitudes included the following:

- the UAE recognised the right and the situation of Oman regarding the 1974 treaty. Saudi Arabia had been informed about this situation by the UAE on many occasions since 1975;
- the UAE confirmed its observance and recognition of the treaties made in 1959 and 1960 between Sultan Sa'īd b. Taimur and Sheykh Shakhbūt b. Sultan.

On 20 April 1994 the representative of the UAE at the United Nations submitted a memorandum stating that the UAE had since 1975 persisted in informing Saudi Arabia that the 1974 treaty conflicted with two treaties signed between the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Sheykh of Abu Dhabi in 1959 and 1960. It

stated that the boundary treaty signed between Oman and Saudi Arabia in 1990 had deleted the dispute over the treaty of 1974, and therefore it was possible for Saudi Arabia to amend the treaty of 1974.

The UAE's representative claimed that Saudi Arabia should carry out the amendment of the 1974 treaty before the application of the registration of the treaty as per article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

On 14 June 1994, the Sultanate of Oman received a memorandum from the foreign ministry of Saudi Arabia in response to the Omani protest memorandum confirming that she was ready to discuss the matter with the other two countries; it was however noted that the Saudi memorandum was not as clear as the UAE memorandum dated 24 November 1993 and did not demonstrate any real wish to solve the problem. The Saudi memorandum suggested that any conflict between the boundary treaties of 1959 and 1960 between the Sultanate of Oman and the UAE and that of 1974 between Saudi Arabia and the UAE should be negotiated by the three countries. However no practical steps were taken by Saudi Arabia. The situation regarding the 1974 treaty became more complicated and more doubtful when Saudi Arabia submitted a memorandum on 17 October 1994 in response to the Omani memorandum to the United Nations. The Saudi memorandum angered Oman, which described the Saudi memorandum as compositional, and as political marketing more than legal. The Saudi memorandum gave many unreasonable interpretations according to the Omanis who accused the Saudis of intending to mix papers mysteriously from the very beginning. The Omani government thought that Saudi Arabia might wish to re-negotiate the content of the boundary treaty signed by the three countries, including the boundary treaty signed on 21 March 1990 between Oman and Saudi Arabia, but this would never be accepted, as the Oman government believed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE ought to correct the 1974 treaty in a way that does not conflict with the boundary treaty signed between the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia on that day.

Oman became more doubtful about Saudi Arabia and the UAE, particularly after the withdrawal by the Emirates of the application regarding the circulation of the protest memorandum dated 20 April 1994. The Emirates only demanded the

registration of the memorandum's content and its documentation. This meant that the Emirates had become more relaxed and flexible, and this seemed to suggest that boundary negotiations between the Sultanate of Oman and the UAE were not going well.

As shown by the protest memoranda and the content of the 1974 treaty, Oman became more and more dissatisfied with it. Oman confirmed that the 1974 agreement incorporated some lands that were and still are under Omani sovereignty (for example Maḥaḍah, al-Buraimī, Ḍhank and al-Sunaynah). The Omani government considered this agreement to be a serious violation of Omani sovereignty, a matter which was unacceptable even if the boundary question had been solved between Oman and Saudi Arabia as per the agreement signed on 21 March 1990. Oman could not complete the legal procedures to document the two treaties of 1959 and 1960 between the Sultanate and the UAE; this made the Omani situation weaker regarding its frontiers with the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, since Abu Dhabi (UAE) had signed an international boundary treaty with Saudi Arabia including some Omani territories assigned by Abu Dhabi to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The Omani position regarding the 1974 treaty was the following: (a) the UAE should correct the 1974 treaty in a practical way, because it violates Omani territories; (b) the Sultanate of Oman confirms its protest at the UN in response to the Saudi memorandum including the Saudi reaction to the Omani memorandum submitted in 1993; (c) regarding the signature of a boundary treaty between the Sultanate and each of the seven Emirates, in this case Oman confirms that she might face some difficulties in dealing separately with each Emirate, without any intervention on the part of the federal government. Oman did not want the UAE to have doubts as to the permanent Union.


Regarding the development of the 1974 treaty the Qatari government protested on 8 November 1994 against it after she was informed about the Sultanate of Oman's protest. Qatar also claimed she had some rights and obligations which Abu Dhabi

had abdicated by the treaty of 1969 (between Qatar and Abu Dhabi). She also declared that she had reservations regarding all her legal rights. 48

Some writers suggest that the reactivation of the boundary disputes since the second Gulf war was the means on which Saudi Arabia depended to assure her regional domination. The evidence for this view is that Saudi Arabia has continued to escalate disputes at different levels with both Qatar and Yemen and has documented most of her previous boundary treaties. This is an unusual Saudi policy. For this reason the relations between Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council were always regarded with suspicion by these countries, especially concerning boundary issues.⁴⁹

48. Private Source. This document is still not published.

49 Khadir, Bishāra. *Ūr ūbā wa-Būldān al-Khalīj al-'Arabiyyah al-Shurakā' al-Abā'id*. Unity Studies Center, Beirut, 1996, p. 35.



The Saudi-Qatari Border Disputes

Historical Background

The historical background to the border disputes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar includes most of the historical events which we have mentioned earlier when discussing the border dispute in the south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula, and in particular, the case of al-Buraimi. As such, the border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar may be considered as one of the aspects of those issues between Britain, on behalf of Oman, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and the Aden Protectorates, on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other hand.

The border issue between Saudi Arabia and Qatar began during the occupation of al-Ḥasā by Ibn Sa‘ud in 1913. He considered the Peninsula of Qatar as part of a Saudi Administrative division. To Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms were no more than a dynasty of petty squabbling Sheikhs, continually assassinating each other and incapable of shouldering any effective rule.⁵⁰

The British-Turkish agreement of 1913 and 1914, which divided the influence of the two countries in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the agreement of 1916 between the Sheikh of Qatar and Britain, protected the Sheikh of Qatar from the attacks and threats of the Ikhwan of Ibn Saud and the Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain.⁵¹

In 1934, Ḥajjī ‘Abdullah Williamson, an English Muslim Employee of the Anglo-Persian oil company, said that Ibn Thānī was a part from the sixty-odd members of his own family. There were a few scattered semi-nomads of the Na‘īm tribe on the peninsula dating back to the time of the Banī Musallam, who were the rulers in Qatar before the Thānī family. Ibn Thānī depended on men drawn from the Banī Hājir and the Banī Murra, two of the three tribes pasturing along the border of Qatar, for his fighting force. The third tribe was al-Manaṣīr. Ibn Thānī was definitely

50. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* p. 32.

51. Kelly, J.B. *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*. *op.cit.* p. 124.

the goodwill of Ibn-Saud and his Governor, Ibn Jalwī, for the safety of his lands from the raids of the Najdi tribes, especially from the Manāṣīr.⁵²

The British position over Qatar

After Ibn Sa‘ud occupied al-Ḥasā in 1913, he claimed the Peninsula of Qatar as part of Saudi Arabia. Britain, as the protector of the interests of the Sheikh of Qatar, rejected the Saudi view and in 1916 concluded a protectorate agreement with the Sheikh of Qatar, for him to subject all Qatari lands to British protection against Ibn Saud and Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain, who laid claim to many areas disputed by Al-Thānī of Qatar.

Britain, in her turn, considered that the border between Saudi Arabia and Qatar was that which was contained in the aforesaid Blue line and Violet line from the agreements between Britain and Turkey in 1913 and 1914. However the Saudi government refused to accept the British view on this dispute, which was entirely separate from the Buraimi issue already discussed between the two sides.⁵³

Since the Saudi occupation of al-Ḥasā in 1913, the border issue between the two sides has remained an issue of contention and dispute. The Sheikh of Qatar claims that his border started at Ghar al-Baried on Dawḥat Salwā then extended eastward across the three axes of Ḥazām, Sudāt-Nathīl, and ‘Uqlat al-Manāṣīr to the point situated on the western coast of Khawr-al-‘Udaid. Qatar also retains an area 25 miles wide, which lies at the base of Qatar Peninsula and which was a claim already included on the Saudi agenda.

The Agreement of 1965

However, Saudi Arabia rejected the border demands of the Sheikh of Qatar. Thus the border issue remained in *status quo* till the two sides reached a bilateral agreement, without British consultation, in 1965, which extended the border between the two

52. Schofield, Richard. *op.cit.*, p. 32.

53. Kelly, J.B. *op.cit.* p. 113.

countries from the head of Khawr-al-‘Udaid, Sudāt-Nathīl and from there in a western direction towards the head of Salwā Bay.


The 1965 agreement conceded the Khawr-al-‘Udaid to Saudi Arabia in exchange for additional territory for Qatar at the base of its Peninsula. The agreement also delimited the Continental shelf boundary on the western side of Qatar in the Bay of Salwā. In accordance with the 1965 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and the 1974 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Abu-Dhabi (UAE), Saudi Arabia was able to gain the Khawr-al-‘Udaid and the surrounding areas.

Thus Saudi Arabia became the only country lying to the south of Qatar. As a result of this, there were no common borders between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.⁵⁴ Some sources indicate that Qatar abdicated its border strip near Khawr-al-‘Udaid to Saudi Arabia. Her aim was to bring Saudi Arabia to her side in her border dispute with Bahrain over the two islands of Ḥawār and Fisht al-Dibal. ⁵⁵ (for full text of the agreement see appendices pp 487 and 488).

54. El-Rayyis, Riyad Najīb. *Riyāḥ al-Sumūm, al-Sa‘ūdiyyah wa-Duwal al-Jazīrah Ba’d Ḥarb al-Khalīj 1991-1994*. *op.cit.* pp. 305-306. Some sources indicate that the border dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia over the al-Khufus area appears as a result of the 1974 border agreement between Saudi Arabia and UAE (Abu Dhabi), in line with which the UAE (Abu Dhabi) ceded some land to Saudi Arabia, including that the road between the UAE and Qatar ran through Saudi Arabia territory. Qatar accused the Saudi government of unilaterally demarcating the border and preventing the passage of trucks unless they pass through Saudi territory. See *Jane’s Sentinel Newsletter*. “The Gulf states” Vol.2. No.12. p. 8.

55. Al-Na‘īmī, ‘Abd -al-Raḥmān M. *op.cit.* p. 16.

Map No. 11.



Source: *Geographic Notes*. Winter 1992-93. Vol. 2. No. 4. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Washington. D.C. 12-92 STATE (INR/GE)

The Incident of al-Khufus

The situation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia worsened, when a border crisis exploded between the two countries in September 1992 and the Saudi border guards attacked one of the Qatari border stations, called al-Khufūs. Al-Khufūs is situated on the south of the Qatar peninsula some 130 km south east of the Qatari capital and only one kilometre from the Khawr-al-‘Udaid.

The clash between the two sides resulted in the killing of two Qatari soldiers and the injuring of many others. However, the Saudi government claimed that the al-Khufus incident of 1st October 1992 took place between the Bedouin and the Qatari border guards. According to the Saudi position, it was the Qatari border units who fired at the Bedouin. The Saudi added that a local tribal leader named Muḥammad b. Shuryān of the Murrā clan was killed in an act of revenge when he went with his men to investigate whether his followers had destroyed the border post the following day. Saudi Arabia accused the government of Qatar of exploiting the outbreak of the second Gulf crisis and thereby extending her borders about 14 km into Saudi territory. The Sa‘udi declaration rejected the Qatari ministerial decision to suspend the 1965 border agreement.⁵⁶

The Qatari reaction to the incident resulted in the unravelling of the political position with Saudi Arabia, such that Qatar announced her unilateral revocation of the 1965 border agreement and launched a fresh political campaign against Saudi Arabia. This was championed by the Qatari foreign minister Ḥamad b. Jassim b. Jaber Al-Thānī, who threatened to withdraw from the GCC and pull back Qatari troops who were stationed in Saudi Arabia as part of the Peninsula shield force, and boycott all the GCC meetings.⁵⁷

56. Jaber, Nadim "Qatar and Saudi Arabia So Much For "Brotherhood" *Middle East International*, Vol. 9.October.1992.London..p. 5. See also Shaḥātah, Muḥammad M "al-Ḥūdūd al-Sa‘udiyyah Ma‘a Duwal al-Khalīj" in: Ḥarb, Usāmah Ghazālī (ed). *al-Siyāsah al-Duwalīyyah*. Issue No:111, January 1993, Cairo, p. 224.

57. El-Reyyes, Riad N. *op.cit.* p. 301

The Iranian Position over the al-Khufus Incident

At the regional level Qatar established congenial relations with Iran and announced many large economic contracts with her, in particular involving gas and the supplying of Qatar with fresh drinking water from Iran through a pipeline crossing the Gulf. Iran actually exploited the Qatari-Iranian rapprochement and the *Tehran Times* offered to come to the defence of any Gulf States threatened by "Saudi aggression".

Iran found the Saudi-Qatar border dispute a golden opportunity and went as far as signing a security agreement with Qatar (a kind of agreement which Qatar had not signed with Arab States).⁵⁸

Independent Policy of Qatar

After the explosion of the border dispute between Doḥa and Riyadh, Qatar set its own political agenda, which differed from the other members of the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia. During the Yemeni crisis, which broke out in May 1994, Qatar announced her rejection of and reservations about all the decisions and declarations of the GCC states concerning Yemen, whereas the stand of the other GCC States was to assist and approach the ex-South Yemeni leadership rather than the Ṣan‘ā leadership.

Qatar announced that it supported the cause of the unification government in Ṣan‘ā.⁵⁹ Qatar also, during the border crisis with Saudi Arabia, resumed diplomatic relations with Iraq, which had been broken off during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in

58. Jaber, Nadim, *op.cit.* p.6. Reportedly, Iran offered to conclude a joint defence treaty with Qatar and to supply 30,000 soldiers. Iran sees Saudi Arabia as being behind her problems with the GCC. Iranian Scholars tirelessly point to the fact that the GCC is a vehicle for Saudi dominance, that the Saudis use the 'Iranian threat' to strengthen their position on the GCC states. In light of the growing Saudi-Qatari dispute towards the end of 1994, and Qatar's refusal even to attend the GCC's Interior Ministers' meeting to discuss the internal security agreement, the Saudi media reacted sharply to Iran's exploitation of the border dispute with Qatar, attacking the Iranian regime for 'searching for any superficial, emergent dispute within the GCC in an attempt to disturb the fraternal relations existing between the GCC states'. See Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Iran, Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" *op.cit.* pp. 35-36.

59. Al-Na‘imi, ‘Abd-al-Rahmān M. "Border Conflicts and American Machinations" *Arab-Review*, London, Vol. LIV, 1993, p. 24.

1990. The Iraqi government announced her support and encouragement of countries in the territory.

There have been no more details released on the demarcation of borders by the government of Qatar against the Saudi aggression.⁶⁰ On the Arab front, the foreign minister of Qatar announced that Qatar's policy on Israel was not against any Arab countries and that it had an independent policy, which differed from the GCC states in many aspects. Thus the foreign minister held a meeting in January 1994 with the Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres in London, and announced the revocation of the second boycott against Israel.⁶¹ Moreover, the Qatari minister confirmed that he had concluded a contract with the Israeli minister to supply natural gas to Israel.

The Qatari change of view came as a result of the encouragement given by the American foreign secretary Warren Christopher to his Qatari counterpart when he said:

I will encourage him to take decisions to weaken the effects of the Israeli boycott by establishing economic and cultural relations between Qatar and Israel as a foundation to a real peace in the Middle East.

Some sources indicated that the new Qatari policy towards Israel aimed at establishing a strong relationship with the United States, in the belief that the way to Washington led through Israel.⁶²

60. The state of Qatar was the first anti-Iraqi coalition country to re-establish relations with Iraq as a reaction to the Saudi Arabian position in the incident of the al-Khafus border area. See *MEES*. Vol.XXXVI No.5. 2 November 1992. p.C1. *MEES's* claim that the possibility that the Qatari normalization of relations with Iraq might encourage others to break ranks in a similar fashion can therefore only increase the already high level of concern felt in Riyadh and elsewhere in the Gulf at Qatar's maverick behaviour. *MEES*. *op.cit.* p.C1. and see Shḥātah, Moḥammad M. *op.cit.* p. 225.

61. Al-Rumayḥī, Moḥammad (ed.) *Majallat Dirāsāt al-Khalīj al-'Arabī* Vol. 8. Second year, University of Kuwait, 1976, p. 28.

62. El-Rayyis, Riyād N. *op.cit.* pp. 299-300.

Egyptian Mediation

The Egyptian President Ḥusnī Mubarak's negotiations with the two leaders of Saudi Arabia and Qatar succeeded in bringing them together in al-Madinah al-Munawwarah in December 1992. The precise terms of the accord were not made public, but the two sides agreed to produce a final border map, which was expected to be completed within a year. The accord also reportedly upheld Qatari sovereignty over the al-Khufus area.⁶³

According to the report from Reuters, the Saudi-Qatari accord of December 1992 states:

a) In implementation of the border agreement concluded between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar on 11th Sha'ban 1385 AH corresponding to 4th December 1965 AD, it was agreed to append a map signed between the two sides showing the final border line to which both sides shall be committed. b) The formation is agreed of a joint Saudi-Qatari committee in accordance with Article 5 of the agreement, to be entrusted with the task of implementing the 1386 AG/ 1965 AD agreement with all its provisions and articles and the contents of this joint statement. This committee shall embark upon placing the border demarcations in accordance with the appended map.⁶⁴

The GCC Role over the al-Khufus Incident

In fact the GCC was not able to solve the border disputes between the council members, because all these States have similar disputes with each other. The GCC, during the Saudi-Qatari border dispute, did not take any significant action, except that it called the two sides to solve this problem through negotiation.⁶⁵

63. Jarrah, Najm "The GCC, A Dispute Resolved" *Middle East International*. Vol. 8, January 1993, London, p. 12.

64. Schofield, Richard, *op.cit.* p. 66.

65. Shaḥātah, Muḥammad M. *op.cit.* p. 266.

Oman tried to mediate between Doḥa and Riyadh, but failed. Diplomatic sources in Abu Dhabi said that the Egyptian proposals were similar to those proposed by Oman when it tried to mediate between the two sides.⁶⁶

The Qatari movement towards Iran and Iraq angered Saudi Arabia, who then increased her pressure on Qatar in two ways: a sea blockade in the form of Saudi naval patrols during the months after the al-Khufus border incident, in Qatari territorial waters, when ships heading towards Qatar were frequently intercepted, and by cutting the road leading from Qatar to Abu Dhabi and diverting it to the new international road, adding more the 200 km to the land route between Qatar and the UAE.

The Saudi control posts intensified their duties on imports and exports on this road, and this caused strong popular resentment in Qatar towards Iran and Iraq. Saudi Arabia encouraged the Bedouin tribes to create problems against the Qatari government. The most important Saudi reaction came when the Saudi government moved towards establishing a military base at Khawr-al-‘Udaid near the Saudi-Qatari border.⁶⁷

On 7 April 1996, Saudi Arabia and Qatar reached an agreement on the demarcation of the borders between them and on the resumption of the works of the joint technical committees within the following two weeks, which they would select an international surveying company to carry out the survey and to fix the border points between the two countries.⁶⁸

66. Jarrah, Najm *op.cit.* p. 12.

67. *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.1. 5 October 1992. p. C3. See also Al-Na‘īmī, Abd-al-Raḥmān M. *op.cit.* p. 24.

68. *Al-Ta’āwun Magazine*. Issue No.42. Eleventh Year, June 1996, p. 229.

The Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Border Dispute

The Offshore Dispute

Bahrain is an island state which has no onshore boundaries with Saudi Arabia or any other country in the Gulf area. Bahrain is a term used to indicate a group of more than 30 small islands. The offshore limits of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain do not exceed 15 nautical miles in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf waters, though Bahrain is very close to the Eastern Province beaches of Saudi Arabia.⁶⁹ The offshore dispute between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain was concentrated on the shallow area known as the "Fisht abu-Sa'afah", on which lie two islands. The main one is known as the Greater Lobainah, the other as the Lesser Lobainah.

The British and Saudi Claims

The real dispute between the two countries began when the government of Bahrain, in 1941, awarded an oil concession to a British oil company in the Abu-Sa'afah area. However Saudi Arabia objected to this concession as she considered that the area belonged to her.⁷⁰ Discussion between the two countries began and the first meeting was held in London in 1951. The British delegation, representing the ruler of Bahrain, proposed that Bahrain take possession of both Greater and Lesser Lobainah, in exchange for the island of Abu-Sa'afah which would be given to Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi delegation refused to accede to this and demanded the annexation of Abu-Sa'afah and Greater Lobainah to Saudi Arabia, leaving only Lesser Lobainah to Bahrain. Saudi Arabia, at that time, did not want to engage in any further discussions with Britain on behalf of Bahrain until the Buraimi dispute had been dealt with.

69. Shaḥātah, Muḥammad M "Al-Ḥūdūd al-Sa'ūdiyyah ma'a Duwal al-Khalīj" *op.cit.* p. 233.

70. Charney, Johnathan I and Alexander, Lewis M. "International Maritime Boundaries" Vol. II. *The American Society of International Law*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London, p. 1490.

The Agreement of 1958

The situation of the offshore border between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain remained unchanged between the two parties and there was no progress till 1954, when Saudi Arabia agreed to divide Abu-Sa'afah and distribute the oil extracted from there equally between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Both countries signed an agreement in this respect on 22 February 1958. Bahrain acquired half the turnover of the oil revenue extracted from the island of Abu-Sa'afah, which was located in Saudi waters, and abdicated her claim to sovereignty over Fisht Abu-Sa'afah. Saudi Arabia acquired Greater Lobainah, while Bahrain acquired Lesser Lobainah without there being any continental shelf between them.

The Saudi Arabia-Bahrain agreement was the first delimitation of submarine areas between two states in the Gulf region. The first article of the agreement provided for a "boundary line between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to be established on the basis of the median line". The agreement did not provide for territorial seas for the islands of the two Lobainahs, which represented points on the boundary line. The delimitation appears to be based generally on equidistance, with some deviations possibly due to the existence of a number of shoals, low-tide elevations and islets in the area.⁷¹ The ratification of the 1958 agreement was exchanged on February 26 1958 and the agreement then came into force.

It should be noted that the Bahraini-Saudi agreement of 1958 was the first delimitation agreement signed in the Gulf.⁷² As recently as December 1992, the Bahraini minister of Finance and National Economy announced that Saudi Arabia had agreed to allow Bahrain to increase her share of the output from the Abu-Sa'afah field from 70,000 to 100,000 barrels per day (that is, from a 50% share to a 71.4%


71. The offshore boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain was not only the first offshore boundary in the Gulf, but also the first in the world to incorporate the sharing of revenues from seabed resources. See Blake, Gerald "Shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf states" *op.cit.* p. 205 and Bundy, Rodman R "Maritime delimitation in the Gulf" in: Schofield, Richard. (ed.) *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States* UCL Press, London 1994. p. 177. See also Amin, S.H. "Law of the Continental Shelf Delimitation: The Gulf Example", *op.cit.* p. 344.

72. *International Boundary Study*. Series A Limits in the Seas. Continental Shelf Boundary Bahrain-Saudi Arabia. No.12. March 10, 1970. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC, p. 1.

share of the average total daily production figure of 140,000 b/d).⁷³ The Saudi-Bahraini accord of 1958 stated that the oil revenues would be awarded to the ruler of Bahrain and not the State Treasury. ⁷⁴ (for full text of the agreement see appendices p. 523).

73. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula During the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* p. 55. See also *MEES*. Vol. XXXIX No.30, 22 April 1996, p. A8.

74 Al-Mājid, Majīd. *op.cit.* p. 46.



The 1958 Bahrain - Saudi Arabia maritime boundary and the Fasht Bu Saafa Hexagon.

Source: *International Boundaries Research Unit*. Department of Geography. University of Durham. England. 1996.

Saudi-Kuwaiti Border Disputes

Historical Background

When the Ottomans ruled the Arabian Peninsula, the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was virtually an uninhabited desert area, which was the historic route for the Arabian tribes to move to the northern part of the fertile lands of Baṣra and the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq. However, with the decline of Ottoman authority in these areas during the early 1920s, the Ikhwān of Ibn Sa‘ud took the opportunity to invade almost all the territory of the Sheikh of Kuwait. According to the secret agreement of 1899 with Sheikh Mubārak, Britain entered into a discussion on behalf of Al-Ṣabāḥ with Ibn Sa‘ud concerning the settling of the frontier dispute between the two sides. However, Ibn Sa‘ud at that time refused to recognise or discuss the sovereignty of the Sheikh of Kuwait as ruler of the area.

The al-‘Uqair Convention

The British Political Resident in the Gulf, however, rejected Ibn Sa‘ud’s claim. This led to the treaty of Muḥammarah, which was signed in May 1922. This was the first attempt to define approximate territorial limits in northern Arabia between Iraq, Najd (Saudi Arabia) and Kuwait.⁷⁵ On December 2 1922 as a consequence of the Muḥammarah treaty, Britain (on behalf of Sheikh of Kuwait) and Ibn Sa‘ud convened the al-Uqair conference, where a border agreement was reached known as the al-‘Uqair protocol. This settled the frontier dispute. Many sources indicate that the Sheikh of Kuwait lost about two-thirds of the territory included within the British (Green) line as the result of a compromise when Ibn Sa‘ud claimed territory which

75. Kelly J.B. *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*. *op.cit.* p. 114.

extended to the Sa'udi (Red line.) Some sources mention that Kuwait lost around 40% of her claimed territory to the expanding Sa'udi state during the 1920s.⁷⁶

The Al-'Uqair protocol created for the first time in the Middle East what was known as a Neutral Zone between Najd (Saudi Arabia) and Kuwait. This zone consisted of some 2,500 square miles (6,500 sq. km) of desert with a coastline about 40 miles (64 km) long on the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. The al-'Uqair convention defined the territory of the Neutral Zone as follows:

*"The portion of territory bounded on the north by this line (i.e. "the indisputable southern frontier of Kuwait") and which is bounded on the west by a low mountainous ridge called Ash Sharq, and on the east by the sea and on the south by a line passing from west to east from Ash Sharq to Ayn al-Abd and thence to the coast north of Ras al Mish'āb. In this territory the government of Najd (Saudi Arabia) and Kuwait will share equal rights until through the good offices of the government of Great Britain a further agreement is made between Najd (Saudi Arabia) and Kuwait concerning it."*⁷⁷

During the 1930s the Neutral Zone became very important following the discovery of oil in southern Kuwait. Since 1953 oil production in the Zone has created strains and stresses for workers and oil companies there. The area is jointly administered by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and there are over 4,000 workers. There were accusations by Kuwait that the Saudis treated the entire workforce as though they were under Saudi law. After a Kuwaiti protest, Saudi Arabia proposed the creation of a proper joint administration for the neutral Zone headed by a council of four persons from the two countries. However, Kuwait refused the Saudi proposal.⁷⁸

The Agreement of 1965

As a result of the administrative problems caused by the construction of oil installations and the increased number of workers in the Zone in the late 1950s, both

76. Blake, Gerald "Shared Zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf States" in: Schofield, Richard (ed.). *Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States*. UCL Press, London, 1994, p. 202.

77. Day, Alan J. *Border and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* pp. 251-252 see also *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* p. 346.

78. The Saudi-Kuwaiti (Neutral Zone) contains reserves currently estimated at 5 billion barrels. See. Pike, David "Cross-border hydrocarbon" *op.cit.* p.189 and see. Blake, Gerald. *op.cit.* p. 204.

countries agreed, in 1960, to divide up the Neutral Zone area equally. On July 7 1965 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait signed an agreement in Jeddah to divide it into two geographical areas, annexing them equally between the countries. The two parties agreed for the Neutral Zone and its resources to be divided equally between them, and established a Survey Committee for that purpose.

The two states agreed that a six Nautical Mile belt of sea should be annexed to the respective parts of the Zone, and that the offshore boundary should also be fixed by agreement. The 1965 agreement did not specify the territorial sea boundary between the two states and in the meantime, the provision for joint exploitation of the offshore areas applies. (for full text of the agreement see appendices pp.482 and 483).

The boundary question is still more complicated by the proximity of two offshore oil fields, the first called Safāniya (on the Saudi Shelf) (possibly the largest offshore oil field in the world) and Khafjī (lying offshore of the Neutral Zone). The agreement was ratified by the two countries in Jeddah on July 25, 1965.⁷⁹

The Islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are still disputing the two islands known as Qaru and Umm al-Maradim, situated some 16 miles (26 Km) off the coast of the northern part of the Neutral Zone adjacent to the outer zone of Kuwaiti authority.

Lorimer in his book *The Gazzatte of the Gulf*, mentioned the two islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim as maritime possessions of Kuwait. These two islands were included in the fifth article of the Anglo-Turkish convention of 1913, in which it is stated that these two islands, along with the other islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Mashjan, Failakah, Awhah and Kubr, belong to the Sheikh of Kuwait. The British government (which was responsible for the conduct of Kuwait's international relations until 1961) have always taken the view that the two islands do not pertain to the Neutral Zone, because they were not subject to the dispute for the settlement of

79. Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf" in: Johnston, Douglas M and Saunders, Phillip M. (eds.) *Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and Developments*. Croom Helm, London, 1988, p. 217. See Day, Alan *op.cit.* p. 251. and El-

which the Neutral Zone was created under the above mentioned 'Uqair Convention of 1922.⁸⁰ Further, during the exchange of the border letters of 1923 and 1932 between Iraq and Kuwait it was stated that these islands belonged to Kuwait. Saudi Arabia however claimed that the islands should be subject to co-sovereignty to reflect the Saudi position in the Neutral Zone.

It should be noted that the median line between the Neutral Zone and Iran still needs to be determined as well. The issue between the three parties appears to revolve around the effect of various islands, including the island of Kharj (Iran) and the two islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim.⁸¹

No development took place during the 1960s and early of 1970s over the two islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim. However in June 1977, Saudi Arabia, as a result of the improving relations between Kuwait and the former Soviet Union, appears to have forced the issue by occupying the two islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim. The object of the Saudi action was to put pressure on the Kuwaiti government to keep those Soviet advisors out of Kuwait who were brought in as a result of the Kuwait-Soviet military agreement of 1976.⁸²

The two countries of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are still in dispute with Iran over the offshore boundary of the Neutral Zone. In 1966 the three countries, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran on the other, held negotiations to resolve this

Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1979, p. 108.

80. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the twentieth century" *op.cit.* p. 43 and the *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries* *op.cit.* p. 346, and on a Kuwaiti offer to share income from oil production on the islands, see. El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. *op.cit.* pp. 109-110. On the Saudi refusal see Day, Alan. *Op.cit.* p. 251.

81. Day, Alan. *op.cit.* p. 251. See also Gault, Ian Townsend. *op.cit.* p. 218 and Al-Baharna, Husain M. *The Arabian Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems*. *op.cit.* pp. 296-297.

82. Martin, Lenore G. *The Unstable Gulf Threats From Within*. *op.cit.* p. 53. In 1976 the Kuwaiti government concluded a military agreement with the Soviet Union. The agreement included Soviet advisors for training the local Kuwaiti forces in the use of the sophisticated equipment in the £400 million arms package. See. Martin, Lenore G. *op.cit.* p. 54.


dispute. But the three parties did not reach agreement, due to the existence of some islands on both sides. 83

After the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait entered into serious negotiations over the two disputed islands. But, until the present time the two countries have not issued any official declaration about them. In March 1996 the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Sheykh Şabāḥ Al-Aḥmad, announced that the issue of the sea border demarcation with Saudi Arabia was physically accomplished but there were still a few marginal processes to complete.⁸⁴

83. El-Hakim, Ali A. *op.cit.* p. 111.

84 *Al-Shuruq Magazine*. Vol.21, No.15-21 April 1996, Sharjah, UAE, p. 5 and see the *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Spring 1996. *op.cit.* p. 32

Map No. 13.



Source: *International Boundaries Research Unit*, Department of Geography, University of Durham, England, 1996.

The Bahrain and Qatar Border Disputes

Historical Background

Until the middle of the nineteenth century Bahrain included most of the Qatar Peninsula. During the agreements concluded between Britain and the other Sheikdoms in the Gulf Area, Qatar was treated as a part of the Bahraini–British agreement of 1820. The agreements concluded with Britain in 1866 by the Sheikh of Qatar, Muḥammed b. Thānī, the alliance with the Saudi Amir Faisal b. Turkī (of the second Saudi state), and the request for protection from the Turks in 1871 contributed towards the protection of the Sheikh of Qatar from the threat posed by Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain. This was the first stage in the separation and independence of Qatar from Bahrain. However, the Al-Thānī controlled the eastern coast of Qatar, though they were not able to control the entire Qatar Peninsula, in particular the northern coastal region of Zubarah, which was inhabited by tribes who were clients of Al-Khalīfah.⁸⁵

The British stand on the Al-Khalīfah claim to the Qatar Peninsula has moved, since 1873, in favour of the Sheikh of Qatar, as Britain considered the Sheikh of Bahrain to have no claim whatsoever to suzerainty of the Qatar Peninsula. The final British decision came in the agreement signed in 1913 between Britain and Turkey, which decided, in one article, that the Sheikh of Bahrain would not be allowed to get involved in the internal affairs of Qatar. As a result of the Al-Khalīfah claim over Qatar, Britain subjected Qatar to her control through the 1916 agreement signed with the Sheikh of Qatar. Since that time the British political resident in the Gulf has attempted to draw the offshore boundary between the two sheikhs, but with no success.⁸⁶

85. Al-‘Aẓamī, Walīd Ḥamdī. *Tarsīm al-Ḥūdūd Bayn al-Baḥrayn wa-Qaṭar fī al-Wathā’iq al-Bariṭāniyyah*. (Demarcation of Boundaries Between Bahrain and Qatar in British Archives). Al-hānī International Book, London, 1992, pp. 11-16.

86. Kelly, J.B. *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*. *op.cit.* pp. 111-113.

The Dispute over Zubarah

Bahrain and Qatar have two long-standing territorial disputes. The first dispute concerns the former Bahraini settlement of Zubārah, which lies on the north-western coast of the Qatar peninsula. The second dispute involves the Ḥawar islands and many small fashoot (small islands) like al-Dibel, al-‘Aẓam and Jaradah.⁸⁷

The dispute over the area of Zubarah constituted the first dispute between the two families of Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain and Al-Thānī of Qatar. The area of Zubārah had been controlled by Al-Khalīfah since 1766. The rulers of Bahrain have continued to make demands and claims over Zubārah till the present time, and this dispute may be considered the prime cause of differences between the two royal families.

Most of the tribes settled in the Zubārah area, especially the Na‘īm tribes, entrusted their loyalty to al-Khalīfah of Bahrain; the evidence of this is that the Na‘īm tribes submitted their complaints to the ruler of Bahrain when the Sheikh of Qatar built a customs post in the Zubārah region in 1937. During the same period (the end of the thirties), the British political resident invited both sides to settle their dispute. However, no amicable settlement was reached between the two Sheikhs. The dispute over Zubarah resumed between the two sides when Bahrain rejected any internal control by the Qatar sheikh of the tribes of Na‘īm, but the British political resident proposed a suggestion which was agreed to by the sheikh of Bahrain. He agreed to not make any demands over any oil discovered in the Zubārah area if the sheikh of Qatar would agree not to get involved in the affairs of the Na‘īm tribes, who were his subjects. But there was no official agreement signed between the two parties. In 1953, the Zubarah issue entered a new phase when the British Political Resident abandoned hope of reaching a compromise to resolve the issue and left it in

87. Martin, Lenore G. *The Unstable Gulf Threat from Within*. *op.cit.* p. 62. This group of islands consist of a large island, length 11 miles and width 2 miles, with a surface area of approximately 17 square miles, and a number of smaller rocky islands surrounding it. There are two villages on Hawar island, one in the north and the other in the south, consisting of some twenty houses made of stone, whose inhabitants depend on rain water or during drought, water brought by boat from Bahrain. Most of the inhabitants are from the tribes which settled in Bahrain. The former rulers of Bahrain were accustomed to visit the Hawar islands every year. All disputes between the islanders are subject to the jurisdiction of Bahrain. Al-‘Aẓamī, Walīd Ḥ *op.cit.* pp. 43-44.

the hands of the disputing countries. The situation continues to be unsettled between the two countries until the present time.

The rulers of Qatar (Al-Thānī) did not assert any sovereignty over the Zubarah area until 1937, when they did so despite the protest of the al-Khalīfah of Bahrain who maintained their rights to the area of Zubārah, because it was their ancestral home- land and the al-Na‘īm tribes had paid allegiance to them.⁸⁸

The Dispute over the Hawar Islands

The second dispute between Bahrain and Qatar is over the Ḥawār islands (which lie one kilometre off the Qatari coast and 12 kilometres from the Bahraini coast). The dispute became prominent during the period of oil discovery in the Arabian Gulf. In 1938, the sheikh of Bahrain granted an oil concession on these islands to a British oil company, but the sheikh of Qatar rejected the Bahraini concession and claimed that the Ḥawār islands were subject to Qatari sovereignty. Britain, in her attempts to please the sheikh of Bahrain and as a compensation for the Zubārah area, granted the Hawar islands to him.

Most of the British documents, especially the letters of the British political agent in Bahrain, indicate that the Ḥawar islands fell under the sovereignty of Bahrain. The most important recognition was the letter which was dispatched in 1939 to the two sheikhs of Bahrain and Qatar confirming that, having considered the claim, the British government had decided that the Ḥawār islands belonged to Bahrain and not to Qatar.⁸⁹

88. Al-A‘zamī, Walīd Ḥ *op.cit.* p. 38.

89. Day, Alan J. *Border and Territorial Disputes. op.cit.* p. 228.

The Dispute after the British Withdrawal

When the British controlled the area of the Gulf and acted as protector to both these Sheikhdoms, no action was taken by either side. Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early 1970s, followed by the independence of Qatar and Bahrain, the two sides accepted Saudi mediation.

During the early 1970s, Qatar attempted to settle amicably the issue of the Hawar islands while retaining the historical rights. Bahrain, however, upheld the British decision and asserted its right over these islands.⁹⁰ Bahrain and Qatar's disputes over the Hawar islands and the Zubārah area was the main cause for the collapse of the Union of Nine in 1971 between the seven sheikhdoms of the Trucial States, Qatar and Bahrain. The historical rift between the two sides, owing to territorial, tribal and dynastic disputes, spilled over into their attitudes and behaviour towards each other during the federation negotiations at the end of the sixties and early seventies.⁹¹

The political development of the dispute became more intensive after the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early 1970s. Both Qatar and Bahrain tried to open a new chapter in their relations in order to find a solution for the disputed islands. The Qatari government suggested to the government of Bahrain to construct an island in Bahraini regional waters opposite the concession to Hawār island, which is claimed by Doḥa. The Qatari government also suggested forming an economic co-operation agreement in the field of oil discovery within the disputed regions along with the right of sovereignty for each country to reach a complete and final agreement governed by the provisions of international law. Qatar also suggested to Bahrain that they construct a bridge connecting the two countries.⁹²

90. Day, Alan J. *op.cit.* p. 230.

91. Khalifah, Ali Mohammed. *The United Arab Emirates*. Croom Helm, London, 1979, p. 34.

92. Abu- al-Faḥal, Muḥammad "Mushkilāt al-Ḥūdūd al-Mā'iyyah Bayn Qaṭar wa al-Baḥrayn" *AL-Majallah Magazine*. Issue No. 870. 13-19 October 1996, London, p. 20.

Saudi Mediation

Saudi mediation tried to freeze the dispute until 1978 when the two countries agreed to a set of principles proposed by Saudi Arabia to guide relations between them until a final solution could be found. Both sides undertook (1) to refrain from any action which would strengthen their respective legal positions, weaken the position of the other party or change the *status quo* in the disputed area; and (2) to refrain from any action which would block negotiations between them or harm the brotherly atmosphere necessary to achieve the aim of the negotiations.⁹³

Saudi Arabia, also in 1980, mediated between the two countries in order to prevent the dispute from worsening and asked officials in the two countries not to allow the media to exacerbate the situation. Saudi mediation, since the early 1970s, has hardly helped to resolve the dispute between Bahrain and Qatar. ⁹⁴

Dispute and Escalation

In March 1980 the government of Bahrain declared that the Hawar islands were governed by a concession agreed between Bahrain and a group of United States companies who were planning to drill a new experimental well in search of oil. Qatar rejected the Bahraini action and claimed, in the same month in 1980, that "all these islands constitute an indivisible part of Qatar, since they are situated within its territorial waters". The Qatari government added that Bahrain had nothing to support its claim of sovereignty over these islands except the British decision made in 1939, which Qatar considered "null and void" as it contradicted "the basic norms of international law governing such matters" and also "the established geographical, material and historical facts."⁹⁵

93. Day, Alan J. *op.cit.* p. 230.

94. Schofield, Richard "Border and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* p. 48.

95. Day, Alan J. *op.cit.* p. 230.

The issue of Qatar and Bahrain's offshore dispute was further complicated when the sheikh of Bahrain claimed rights in the Zubārah area, on March 4 1982. The Qatar government condemned and protested against Bahrain's decision to name a new warship the Ḥawar and condemned Bahraini military manoeuvres in the Fisht al-Dibel.⁹⁶ The Qatari-Bahraini offshore dispute was the first challenge to the GCC, which had been established one year before. The GCC Ministerial council, held in Riyadh on March 7-9 1982, requested that Saudi Arabia continue her efforts to resolve the dispute. According to a statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting, both sides agreed "to freeze the situation and not to cause an escalation of the dispute" and to continue their fraternal relations on the basis of a return to the *status quo ante*.⁹⁷

Qatar captures Fisht al-Dibel

In October 1984, Bahrain declared its intention of surveying the area of the Fisht al-Dibel and al-ʿAẓam in order to build a new settlement containing up to 70,000 people. But when Qatar protested, Bahrain suspended her survey. The situation between the two parties became complex when the government of Bahrain also announced that it would keep the area of Fisht al-Dibel, which lies 20km from Qatar and 25km from and the Ḥawār islands for military exercises, thus permanently prohibiting any settlement in this area.

The dispute did not appear in the media headlines until 16 April 1986 when a Qatari force captured Fisht al-Dibel (up until this point dominated by Bahrain) and arrested 30 contractors from a Dutch company (most of them Asian workers) who were engaged in the construction of a Bahraini "coast-guard station". Bahrain condemned the Qatari operation and strengthened its military garrison on the Ḥawār islands. The government of Qatar then declared all the area of Fisht al-Dibel, Jarādah

96. Al-Nufaysī, ʿAbdullah Fahd. *op.cit.* p. 47.

97. Schofield, Richard. *op.cit.* p. 48.

and the Ḥawār islands to be military zones and mobilized her considerably superior firepower.⁹⁸

The GCC Role in the Dispute

After tension between the two sides during the incident of April 1986, the GCC attempted to contain the dispute and Saudi Arabia began her intermediary role, whereby she managed to convene a meeting between the foreign ministers of Bahrain and Qatar in May 1986. Saudi Arabia submitted a plan of action which consisted of the following:

- 1) to return to the position prior to 26 April 1986.
- 2) to undertake not to resort to the use of military force so long as they endeavoured to reach an amicable settlement.
- 3) to create a team to supervise and monitor the military withdrawal to the previous situation.
- 4) to scrutinise all border disputes between the parties in respect of law and history and to submit all such documents which would contribute towards the improvement of the disputes between the parties in respect of law and history.

As a result of this accord between the two parties, Qatar withdrew her military force on 15 June 1986. The GCC had set up a monitoring team to ensure that the two sides implemented the accord. The accord, which was signed by the two foreign ministers of Bahrain and Qatar, included also that only Bahraini fishermen and coast-guards were allowed to enter the Fisht al-Dibel and Ḥawār islands, so that there would be no change in the status quo in the islands.⁹⁹

Saudi Arabia acted as a mediator, but following the May 1986 accord between Qatar and Bahrain, took no more steps to settle the dispute between the two countries. The Sultanate of Oman, the UAE and Kuwait attempted, individually, to mediate between the two countries, however without result. During the second Gulf

98. Al-‘Azamī, Walīd Ḥamdī. *op.cit.* p. 18.

99. Abu-al-Faẓel, Muḥammad “al-Nizā’ bayn Qaṭar wa al-Baḥrayn” in: Ḥarb, Usāmah Ghazālī (ed.) *al-Siyāsah al-Duwalīyyah*. (International Politics) Issue No.111, Cairo, January, 1993, p. 229.

crisis, relations between Doḥa and Manamah continued to be tense, such that both sides clung to their rights over the islands. Once again Saudi Arabia attempted to bring together the foreign ministers of Bahrain and Qatar on 25 December 1990. Both sides agreed on the following principles:

- 1) to continue the Saudi initiative, so that both parties would begin to bring the matter to the International Court of Justice, according to the Bahraini formula, which was accepted by Qatar.
- 2) to confirm what had been reached in the previous accord.
- 3) to withdraw the case from the arbitrator if the matter proved impossible to settle on the basis of mutual brotherhood.¹⁰⁰

Following the incident with Saudi Arabia in September 1992, Qatar preferred Saudi Arabia not to be the mediator in the dispute with Bahrain over the Ḥawār islands. Qatari officials saw the balance of the Saudi mediation as being against them and closer to Bahrain. After the failure of the Saudi mediation, Qatar tried to get out of the conflict. She announced unilaterally on 8 July 1991 that she had submitted a request to the International Court of Justice to decide on the sovereignty of all disputed areas with Bahrain. However, Bahrain expressed her disapproval of the Qatari unilateral decision and emphasised the need for a mutual decision between the two countries.¹⁰¹

As a result of the Ḥawār islands dispute with Bahrain, Qatar issued a decree on 16 April 1992, extending her territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and claiming a further adjacent area of 12 miles outside that, over which the state would exercise all the rights provided for in the provisions of international law.¹⁰²

100. The Saudi mediation, in this case from 1971 to the turn of the 1990s, was successful on two counts: ensuring that the disagreement never developed into open hostilities and paving the way for a referral of the case to the international courts. Schofield, Richard "Mending Gulf Fences" *Middle East Insight*. Vol. XII. No.3. March/April 1996. p. 40 and Abu-al-Faḥal, Muḥammad. *op.cit.* p. 230.

101. Al-Naimi, Abd al-Rahman M "Border Conflicts and American Machinations" *op.cit.* p. 24.

102. Schofield, Richard. *op.cit.* p. 49. See also *MEES*. Vol.XXXV No.30. 27 April, 1992, p. A7. The Qatari decree asserts control over much of the disputed area, particularly the Ḥawār Islands as well as the two coral reefs of Fisht al-Dibel and Qiṭ'at Jarādah.

On 17 April 1992, Bahrain issued a decree rejecting all Qatari claims and demanded that they stick to resolving the dispute through the effort of the Saudi mediators and, in the meantime, demanded joint submission of the case to the International Court of Justice.¹⁰³

During the Ḥawār islands crisis of 1986, Bahraini officials launched a campaign against Qatari sovereignty in the Zubārah area and renewed the Bahraini royal family's allegations that Zubārah was a part of Al-Khalīfah sovereignty. The Bahraini strategy was to pressurise Qatar to confirm Bahrain's sovereignty over the Ḥawār islands.¹⁰⁴

International Arbitration

The dispute between Qatar and Bahrain became international on 8 July 1991, when Qatar submitted an application to the International Court of Justice claiming its sovereignty over the disputed areas. Bahrain objected to this action and thus demonstrated the necessity of the two countries submitting a joint application.

The International Court of Justice agreed on a hearing for the case after six Judges approved and four Judges objected to a resolution. Qatar and Bahrain have different perspectives on the border dispute. Qatar believes the following:

- a). Qatar should have sovereignty over the islands of Ḥawar, Fisht al-Dibel and Jaradah.

103. Al-‘Azamī, Walīd Ḥamdī. *op.cit.* p. 14. A Foreign Minister spokesman in Manama said that his government “totally rejects what is implied in the decree about extending the territorial waters of the state of Qatar, “and that Bahrain reserves the right to take any legal measures which are necessary to preserve its rights”. The Amir of Bahrain sent a cable to President George Bush on 22 April 1992, proposing that both parties take the issue to the ICJ for adjudication and thanking the US President for his “positive” stand. See. *MEES*. Vol.XXXV. No.30. *op.cit.* p. A8. One year after the Qatari decree, the Crown Prince of Bahrain issued a decree on 20 April 1993, defining the Bahraini territorial waters at 12 nautical miles and an adjacent area of another 12 nautical miles over which Bahrain would exercise its rights to sovereignty and authority as prescribed in contemporary international law. See. *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.32. 10 May 1993. p. A13.

104. Litwak, Robert. *Security in the Persian Gulf 2: Source of inter-State conflict*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower Publishing Company Limited, England, 19481, p. 49.

- b) The division line must pass at an equal distance from her territories and Bahrain's.
- (c) The arbitration of the disputed islands must be carried out only by the International Court of Justice.
- e) There must be successful mediation before withdrawing the case from the International Court of Justice.

The point of view of Bahrain includes the following:

- a) Rejection of Doha's claims on the three islands based on their geographic location close to Qatar. Some islands are near one country but are subject to the sovereignty of another, as in the case of Turkey and Greece.
- b) Britain, as the mandatory power, codified the policy regarding the borders, a matter which emphasises her actual ownership of the three islands.
- c) The discussion of the problem by the International Court of Justice should concentrate on the water line and marine borders between the two countries, considering the historical existence of Bahrain in the Zubārah area.
- d) The case should first be withdrawn and then solved within the GCC States.

Political Developments of the Dispute

Since the second Gulf War of 1991, mass-media campaigns have aggravated the tension between the two countries, a matter which has hindered mediation. Generally, the border dispute between Qatar and Bahrain has started to have a negative impact on the area, particularly within the GCC.

The government of Bahrain boycotted all the GCC meetings held in Doha in 1996. There was no precedent for such an action in the history of the Council. It came in response to what it called the Qatari provocations against Bahrain. The absence of Bahrain from the Doha summit in 1996 was explained by the Bahraini Information Minister, who said:

The Gulf Summit in Doha was due to certain reasons mainly the resentment of Bahrain towards the aggravation of the dispute between Bahrain "Bahrain usually does not practice this type of pressure, but we claim our right clearly and ask for the activation of the Gulf Co-operation Council role in resolving such problems between the member states and that our problems should be resolved within the Gulf brotherhood only.the absence of Bahrain from the and Qatar without any decisive action on the part of the Gulf Co-operation Council to solve it and without any activation of the Co-operation

Council mechanism or systems to find a radical solution for such a dispute amicably.

Due to the aggravated relations between Qatar and Bahrain, there were series of events and mass-media campaigns between Doḥa and al-Manamah in 1996. The Bahraini media launched a campaign against Qatar before the holding of the Gulf Summit, which was held in Qatar in December 1996. Bahrain officially declared the arrest of two Qataris in Manamah and accused them of spying, and started proceedings against them.

On 11 December 1996 Qatar accused Bahrain and her Crown Prince, Ḥamad b. ‘Isā al-Khalīfah, of being involved in an abortive coup d’etat attempt in Doḥa in February 1996, as well as the smuggling of arms and explosives into Qatar. Relations deteriorated when Bahrain declared the arrest of a similar group of Qataris at the beginning of 1987; therefore Qatar made similar accusations against Bahrain for the first time. After issuing a condemnation for spying in December 1996, Bahrain issued a general amnesty to reduce the tension with Qatar, but this initiative collapsed after the escape of one of the Bahraini ruling family members with a fighter plane to Qatar asking for political asylum.¹⁰⁵

The Bahraini situation changed when it accepted on 30 September 1996 the arbitration of the International Court of Justice, and submitted a motion including its evidence and documents of dispute, for the judgement of the International Court of Justice on 1 February 1996.

On the 2 October 1996 the International Court of Justice declared 31 December 1997 to be a date on which the written responses to motions submitted by Qatar and Bahrain would be given.¹⁰⁶ It is of note that the border dispute between Qatar and Bahrain was the first in the Gulf area to be submitted to the International Court of Justice. These serious precedents in relations between the GCC States aggravated the


105. Salmān, Muḥammad “Al- Taqnīn al-Mu‘assasī lil-Khilāfāt al-‘Arabiyyah” *Taqdīrāt Istrāṭījyah*. Issue No.43. January 1997, Cairo, p. 31.

106. Sālim, ‘Allā “Al-nizā’ al-Ḥūdūdī al-Qaṭarī-al-Baḥraynī Hal Tusāhīm al-Taṭawwūrāt al-Akhīrah wa-Juhūd al-Wasāṭah fi-Khal-khalteh?” Issue No.40. November 1996, Arab Studies Publication, Cairo, p. 185.

dispute between Qatar and Bahrain to such an extent that the dispute represented a substantial threat to the existing political systems in the Arab Gulf States.¹⁰⁷

107. Salman, Muḥammad, op.cit. p. 31.

Map No. 14.



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Source: *The Economist Intelligence Unit 1996*. Country Report 4th quarter 1996, London.

The Omani-United Arab Emirates Border Disputes

Political Description of the Dispute

The Border dispute between the Sultanate of Oman and the confederation of the UAE is the most difficult and complicated one in the Arabian Peninsula due to the boundary overlaps between the frontiers of the Emirates and the Sultanate. These boundaries extend from the Musandam area, which overlooks the Strait of Hormuz in the north of Oman and is separated from the rest of Oman by a part of the UAE up to the al-Buraimi area in the west. This area (al-Buraimi) witnessed the most serious political border dispute during the fifties and sixties between Britain (on behalf of Muscat and Abu Dhabi) and Saudi Arabia (with the support of the United States)¹⁰⁸ The border question between the two parties has a historical and geographical aspect. Oman is a state with historical and geographical claims on what was called until recently the Coast of Oman or the Trucial States.

Many Nationalist Arab Parties, either in Oman or in the other Arab countries, believe that what was called the Oman Coast Emirates, before the seventies, and what is now called the United Arab Emirates, is a natural extension of Omani territory, both geographically and historically. The separation of these Emirates from the mother country was due to British imperialism in the nineteenth century, which aimed to divide up the Omani Empire.

Riyadh al-Reyyes, in his article *Oman's rule in the GCC and the Region*, claims that all the states which now form the components of the UAE (considered by many Omanis to be an artificial state created out of political convenience) had, before independence, the word 'Omani' describing the nationality of their citizens, in every passport issued. Al-Reyyes adds that Oman watches carefully over developments in

108. The boundary between the two countries is divided into two sections. One crosses the Musandam Peninsula from the Arabian (Persian) Gulf to the Gulf of Oman while the other, forming the western border of mainland Oman, extends from the Gulf of Oman some 10 miles (16-km) south of Kelba to the boundary tripoint with Saudi Arabia at Umm az Zamul. There are also enclaves of the Sultanate within the UAE, and of the UAE within Oman. See *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* p.413 and also Al-Na'imī, 'Abd al-Rahmān. *Al-Širā' fī al-Khalīj al-'Arabī*. *op.cit.* p. 164.

the UAE in the same way that Syria watches over affairs in Lebanon, particularly in the matter of security.¹⁰⁹

The ability of Oman to pursue her territorial claims against the UAE has been conditioned by the complex interplay between the internal and external political environment especially from Saudi Arabia and Iran. The royal family of Al-Sa'īd in Oman, which rose to power in 1749, has the desire to join the Omani Trucial States to the motherland of Oman under the flag of 'Greater Oman'.¹¹⁰

British Mission in Oman and the Trucial States

The delimitation of the border dispute between Oman and the UAE started in the early 1950s, when the British government appointed Julian Walker to investigate the various boundaries between the Trucial States (Sheikhdoms) on one side and between the Trucial States and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman on the other side. Oman was split into three parts by the territories of the Trucial States. The routes between Sultanate territory in Buraimi and Muscat, and from Buraimi to 'Ibrī, ran across land belonging to Abu Dhabi and the Peninsula of Musandam, which are divided from the rest of Oman. The political borders between the two countries are divided into many geographical regions both offshore and onshore:

1. the borders between Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate;
2. the borders of the Sultanate with Dubai and Ajman Emirates;
3. the borders of Oman (in the Musandam Peninsula) with the northern Emirates;
4. the borders of Wādī Madhā region;
5. the borders of the Sultanate of Oman with the Qawasim in the south.¹¹¹

109. El-Reyyes, Riyad N. "Oman's Rule in the GCC and the Region" *op.cit.* p. 205.

110. Litwak, Robert. *op.cit.* p. 60.

111. Walker, Julian. "The United Arab Emirates and Oman Frontiers" *op.cit.* pp.179-182, and Hay, Sir Rupert. "The Persian Gulf States and their Boundaries Problems" in: *The Geographical Journal*. Vol. CXX. January to October. London, 1954, p. 438. For UAE details see Al-Alkim, Hasan H. *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*. *op.cit.* p. xix. For more details of the

The borders between Oman and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi represent the larger part of the eastern borders of the UAE with Oman, being about 300km in length. At the beginning of the fifties, especially after the international arbitration process regarding the al-Buraimi case, which was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, oil companies were very active both in Oman and the Trucial States, especially in Abu Dhabi. This led to more complications concerning the claims of each party over the borders and loyalty of the tribes.

In 1959 (as the result of British mediation) Sultan Sa'īd b. Taymur of Muscat and Oman and Sheykh Shakhbūt b. Sultan of Abu Dhabi agreed on a settlement of the borders and signed the 1959 convention. This convention was based on the fact that the Na'im, Shawāmis, and Banī Qattab tribes belong to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Thus the border line between the two parties starts to the north of the al-Buraimi Oasis west of Simini mountain, extends to the south, and is separated by the Bani Ka'ab tribe from the Banī Qatab and al-Dhwāher tribes; this line passes between the two Jeefar wells, the east well belonging to the Bani Ka'ab and the west to al-Dhwāher. In the al-Buraimi area the line runs between the al-Dhwaher tribe in Abu Dhabi and the al-Na'im and al-Shawāmis in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. To the south of al-Buraimi, the line separates the al-'Awāmir tribe from the al-Shawāmis tribe, and also separates the al-Durū ' and al-'Awāmir tribes.¹¹²

During the mid-1960s, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Sheykh of Sharjah were able to reconcile their territorial grievances.

A neutral zone was defined between Oman and Sharjah west of the Ḥajr mountains, and a second along the Wādī Ḥadf to solve a 'Ajman-Oman dispute that had hitherto proved incapable of settlement.¹¹³

Another enclave problem between Oman and the UAE concerns the village of Dibā. The disputed area of Dibā is located at the juncture of Oman's boundaries with

Omani-UAE's tripoints and lines boundaries, see. *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. op.cit. pp. 413-414.

112. Abdullah, Muḥammed M. *Dawlāt al-Imārāt al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttaḥidah wa-Jirānuha*. Dār al-Qalam, Kuwayt, 1981, pp. 417-418, and Hay, Sir Rupert op.cit. p. 438.

the Emirates of Fujairah and al-Sharjah. Historically the area was inhabited by tribes who paid allegiance to the Sultanate of Muscat. However, during the early 1970s, the people of this area became affected by the prosperity brought about by the development policies of each state. At the same time there was an absence of development in Omani-administrated territories in the area strongly contrasting with the efforts made by the other two states, Fujairah and Sharjah, to improve the conditions in their parts of the disputed area.¹¹⁴

The Dispute of 1977

Both Oman and the UAE tried to buy the loyalties of the border tribes in order to further their territorial claims. Between 1966 and 1974 Abu Dhabi offered Oman several hundred million dollars in direct assistance and offered the sultan of Oman millions more to help secure the allegiance of the Shiḥūḥ and Ḥabūs tribes in Oman's Musandam region as well as in Dibā.¹¹⁵ The most important disputed area between Oman and the UAE was between Oman and the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah. The disputed area of 1977 centred on a 10-mile coastal strip in the border area separating the Omani enclave of Ras Musandam from the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah.¹¹⁶

This dispute was a result of the long struggle between the Qawāsim and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman during the nineteenth century. The area of Rus al-Jibāl (Musandam) forms the northern tip of the promontory of the Trucial States, defined to the south-west by an approximate line between Dibā on the Gulf of Oman and the headland of al-Qir, north of Sha'am on the Gulf. It is inhabited mainly by

113. Schofield, Richard. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* p. 28.

114. J.C. Wilkinson, "The Oman Question" The Background to the Political Geography of South-East Arabia" *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 137, part 3, September 1971, p. 361.

115. Cordesman, Anthony H. *op.cit.* p. 109.

116 Murad, Nasrin Abdul Rahman . *Territorial Disputes in the United Arab Emirates*. Ph.D. Thesis. Department of Politics, University of Lancaster, 1990, p. 101.

Shihūh and Dhwaheer tribes who pay allegiance to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.¹¹⁷

Developments in the disputed area became more critical in December 1977 when Sultan Qaboos sent a letter to Sheykh Zayed, the President of the UAE, complaining that Ras al-Khaimah was drilling for oil in areas which it considered as part of its territory. The dispute over the 10-mile coastal strip led to a complex situation, with an escalation of tension when the troops of the two countries moved to the disputed area. Unconfirmed reports claimed that the armed confrontation between the two parties ended like a “comic opera”. According to Cordesman, this was because a large number of Omanis in the Ras al-Khaimah forces refused to fight Oman’s forces.¹¹⁸


In the early 1970s, Oman did not take part in any action in the disputed areas with the UAE. The reason for this was that the UAE, especially Abu Dhabi, was the main source of financial assistance to the government of Oman in its war with the Dhofari revolutionaries. However, after the Dhofar revolution subsided in December 1975, the Government of Oman was in a better position to direct its attention to the north. During 1978, Oman threatened to expand her claims on the Musandam borders issue with the UAE and include the larger area within the historical “Greater Oman”. She also took some actions which indicated that she would revive her claim over the al-Buraimi area. In January 1978 she put into circulation a memorial coin bearing a picture of the Sultan’s old palace at the al-Buraimi Oasis. Later that year it was reported that Oman had massed 300 mechanised military vehicles in the vicinity of al-Buraimi.¹¹⁹

117 Abdullah, Muhammed M. *op.cit.* p. 296.

118. Cordesman, Anthony H. *op.cit.* p. 418.

119. Murad, Nasrin A. *op.cit.* p. 107. See also Martin, Lenord. *op.cit.* p. 62.

Map No. 15.



Foreign Intervention

The Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah resisted Omani pressure by obtaining support from Kuwait (it should be noted that during that time, relations between Oman and Kuwait were poor because of the security situation in the Gulf), who backed her plan to establish an oil refinery in the disputed area.¹²⁰ The Soviet Union became involved and declared her support for Ras al-Khaimah against Oman in 1978, presumably because of Oman's western orientation and also her establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking.¹²¹

The Mediation of Sheykh Zayed

In an attempt to contain and settle the disputed area peacefully, Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan, the President of the UAE, flew to Muscat on 29 December 1977. After this, three high-ranking UAE delegations visited Oman in April 1978 and held talks with Sultan Qaboos of Oman over the area disputed with Ras al-Khaimah.

On 7 April 1979 the Emirates News Agency, citing a responsible source in the office of the UAE Prime Minister, said that Oman and Ras al-Khaimah had agreed to 'adopt specific bases in the demarcation of the border between the two sides. Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan played a significant role in resolving the dispute'.¹²²

The outbreak of the Iranian revolution had accelerated the attempts of the two parties to settle the problem. Thus the Iranian threat had pushed the two countries into a new alignment.¹²³ During the talks between the Omani and UAE delegations, Oman mentioned that the disputed area was populated by the Shihūh and Ḥabūs tribes and had been administrated by Oman for centuries. Moreover, the Omani government accused Sheykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah of having initiated the process of territorial encroachment in 1951, when he occupied the village of Rims. In order to

120. Murad, Nasrin A. *op.cit.* p. 107.

121. Chubin, Shahram, "Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf" *Adelphi Papers*, No.157, IISS, London, Spring 1980, P. 38.

122. Al-Alkim, Hasan H. *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*. *op.cit.* p.50, and see Schofield, Richard. *Arabian Boundary Disputes*. Vol. 19. *op.cit.* p. 53

123. Martin, Lenore. *op.cit.* p. 62.

bolster their contending territorial claims, both Oman and the UAE sought to obtain some pledge of allegiance from the local people, and it was reported that, in 1975, some of the Shihūḥ and Ḥabūs accepted an offer of citizenship from Ras al-Khaimah.¹²⁴

Sheykh Ṣaqr b. Sultan of Ras al-Khaimah, in an interview, claimed that:

I am really surprised that Qaboos lays claim to this area and its oil when it is 17 km away from the Omani motherland. They are undoubtedly mistaken. We have documents signed by Qaboos's grandfather which show that the Omani national frontier ends at North Khassab.

However, Sheykh Ṣaqr b. Sultan was not satisfied with the settlement which was reached through the pressure of the federation government of UAE.

The dispute has been quiet since the mediation of 1978. Nothing specific has been reported during recent years. Some official sources in the two countries claim that the process of demarcating the boundaries is making progress, but nothing official has been released yet.¹²⁵

Some Gulf affairs specialists believe that the government of Oman, particularly the ruling family of al-Saʿid, wishes to annex the Emirates to the Sultanate of Oman under the so-called "Greater Oman plan" but in secret, in order to avoid provoking either Iran or Saudi Arabia, the two big powers in the region. These specialists offer, as proof of this the fact, that the Sultanate of Oman has not established any diplomatic relations with Abu Dhabi since the creation of the federation in December 1972, despite the persistent demands by the UAE government for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Since the creation of the UAE, Oman has refused to recognise the union at any official diplomatic level. The UAE is represented by a Consul in Muscat but Oman has no diplomatic representation in Abu Dhabi. The two countries did not establish full diplomatic relations until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when they agreed to establish official diplomatic relations. The diplomatic representation between the

124. Litwak, Robert. *op.cit.* p. 59. Also see. Murad, Nasrin A. *op.cit.* p. 109.

125. Murad, Nasrin A. *op.cit.* p. 108.

Sultanate of Oman and the UAE was at the level of Minister and not at the level of Ambassador; this was due to the demand of Oman for that level.¹²⁶

In May 1991 the two countries set up a joint high committee to discuss bilateral issues including the border dispute. The Omani government's policy towards the border disputes with the UAE has been to discuss the issues of the borders individually with every Emirate. On 9 April 1993, the Omani foreign minister issued a statement declaring that "the frontier disputes between Oman and the UAE are completely settled, following the signature of a lasting agreement between the two states".¹²⁷ (Until the end of 1996, the two countries had not mentioned a formal frontier demarcation agreement over the 410-km boundary).

The most important political evolution came in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This was the fear that the border problems felt by the GCC States would escalate. For example the UAE feared that the Sultanate of Oman, a member of the GCC, might take steps to invade parts of the UAE territories particularly in the northern areas which border with Musandam, where tribal problems occur frequently between the inhabitants of the Omani area and those of the northern Emirates. The fears of the UAE became clear when they demanded that the Egyptian and Syrian governments station some of their armed forces on the Emirates borders with the Sultanate of Oman. Some sources mention that the British government mediated between Oman and the UAE to calm the situation, especially after Oman denounced the steps taken by the government of the UAE. We should note that after Egyptian forces were stationed on the Omani-UAE border, Omani-Egyptian relations cooled distinctly. Some of the mass media mentioned that the Egyptian President was paid to visit Muscat in 1990 after it was rumoured that the

126. El-Reyyes, Riyad N "Oman Rule in the GCC and the Region" *op.cit.* p. 205. Al-Na'imī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān M. *op.cit.* p. 168.

127. Schofield, Richard. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* pp. 56-57. Although there is an official agreement delineating the complex borders, armed clashes between tribesmen of both countries have frequently occurred. These arose because various UAE nationals have sought to gain oil concessions in territory claimed by Oman. Military forces have been deployed on many occasions to support the Omani claims. Between 1992 and 1994 the disputed areas in Musandam witnessed many armed clashes between Omani and UAE tribesmen. On 11 November 1992, the armed clashes resulted in the

Omani government, which has good relations with Egypt, had criticised the Egyptian government for this step.¹²⁸

It should be recorded that the government of the Sultanate of Oman still reminds the rulers of the UAE that the UAE was once a part of Greater Oman, especially after the discovery of oil in the UAE in several locations. The two countries have not arrived any formal agreement concerning their disputes over the offshore and Continental Shelf boundaries.¹²⁹

Regarding the reasons that hindered the signature of a global border agreement between Oman and the UAE, the Omani Minister of Information said that Oman and the UAE have taken advanced steps to reach this, while the special historical background and the overlapping of the regions played a large part in delaying it. Most of the border regions between Oman and the UAE, with the exception of Sharjah, were on the point of reaching a global border agreement; the Minister stated that Abu Dhabi was about to sign a border agreement with Oman, and that there were no political obstacles between the two countries. He explained, however, that there were some social obstacles between the tribes that live along the borders. Finally he confirmed that his aim was to reach a border agreement and have tighter relations and not create ruptures.¹³⁰

Hassan Al-‘Alkim summarised the main reasons for that as follows: 1) The border problems between the two countries are complicated because of the geographical overlapping and tribal alliances on who the loyalties both countries depend. 2) The border problem between the two countries sometimes involves other neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia. 3) The federal nature of the UAE prohibits the signature of any border agreement regarding any Emirate with another

deaths of at least six persons from both sides. See Al-‘Alkim, Hassan Hamdan. *The GCC States in an Unstable World Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of Small States*. *op.cit.* p. 84.

128. Al-Na‘imī, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān M. *op.cit.* p. 168.

129. Al-Anzi, Abdullah M. *op.cit.* p. 34, and El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1979, p. 105.

130 Interview with ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās. *op.cit.*

country without the consent of the concerned Emirate, a matter which hinders Federal Union initiatives in any negotiations.¹³¹

¹³¹ Interview with Ḥassan Al-‘Alkīm. op.cit.

Map No. 16.



Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA) Year Book, 1996. Washington, D.C.

The GCC External Boundaries Disputes



The Saudi-Iraqi Border Disputes

Introduction

After the British recognition of Ibn Sa‘ud as ruler of Najd and Ḥasā under the 1915 treaty of al-Qaṭif, he sought to take control of Ḥā’il from Ibn al-Rashid. Thus in 1921-1922 Ḥā’il came under the control of Ibn Sa‘ud following the defeat of the pro-Ottoman Al-Rashid in Jabal Shammar by the Ikhwān (brotherhood) of Ibn Sa‘ud. That spread the Saudi area of control right up to the borders of Transjordan and Iraq in the north of Najd. Ibn Sa‘ud's expansion north of Najd, following the collapse of Ottoman authority in those areas after their defeat in the First World War, was a result of the competition between Ibn Sa‘ud and the Hashemites of Iraq. Furthermore, there were no defined borders in the desert territories between Najd and Iraq.¹

The British Role in the Demarcation

The Iraqi-Saudi border was drawn during the British control over Iraq. The British influence over Iraqi affairs came about through a League of Nations mandate after the First World War. The raids and attacks of the Ikhwān of Ibn Sa‘ud on the border areas of Najd and Iraq forced the British authorities to start negotiations with Ibn Sa‘ud in order to resolve the problems between the tribes of the region. On May 5 1922 the then British High Commissioner for Iraq, Maj-Gen. Sir Percy Cox, was able to conclude an agreement at al-Muḥammarah (Khorramshahr of today) with Ibn Sa‘ud.² However, this agreement did not define the boundary between Iraq and Najd.

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1. Kelly, J.B. *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*. *op.cit.* pp. 112-113 and the *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* p. 307.
 2. Finnie, David H. *Shifting Lines in the Sand Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq*. Tauris and Co Ltd. London, 1992 pp. 57-61. The Treaty of Muhammara did not resolve the entire problem of the boundary dispute because of Ibn Saud's suspicions of British intentions. The negotiations were difficult because international boundaries had never existed in Arabia; the British officials dealt

The only thing achieved was the division of the loyalties of the border tribes between the two sides. Ibn Sa'ud, later in the same year, refused to ratify the agreement unless the other side agreed to the condition that the wells and watering places near the frontiers would not be used for military purposes and that the Najdi tribes would not be refused access to watering places on the Iraqi side of the border.³

The Al-Uqair Protocol

After accepting Ibn Sa'ud's conditions, the British High Commissioner for Iraq entered into new negotiations with Ibn Sa'ud and Iraq. Finally, the two countries reached an agreement at al-'Uqair on December 2 1922. This convention consisted of two protocols. The first protocol concentrated, in its articles, on the Neutral Zone with equal rights between the two sides for all purposes. The Neutral Zone between Najd and Iraq was a diamond-shaped zone which began at the extremity of Kuwait's western frontier at the junction of the Wādī (Valley) al-'Audja and the Wādī al-Bāṭin, its northern border with Iraq running for some 119 miles (190 km) and the southern border with Saudi Arabia for some 125 miles (200km); at its widest north-south point the zone measured about 40 miles (65 km) in length and had a total area of 2,500 square miles (6,500 sq. km). The second protocol was concerned with the tribes of the region, and the two countries agreed that if "any tribe, or section of a tribe which is outside the boundaries not subject to either government, desires to give allegiance to one of them, they will not prevent it from doing so." The two sides mutually agreed not to use the watering places and wells situated in the vicinity of the border for any military purpose, such as building forts on them, and not to concentrate troops in their vicinity.

Many sources indicate that the convention of al-'Uqair between Iraq and Najd cost the sheikh of al-Kuwait the loss of about two-thirds of the territory within the

with the tribes not as a community but as territorial unit, and the tribes refused any kind of boundaries that might block their freedom of movement. See. Al-Asha'al, 'Abdullah. *op.cit.* p. 57.

3. Martine, Lenore G. *The Unstable Gulf Threats from Within.* *op.cit.* p. 42.

outer zone bounded by the 1913 borders convention.⁴ The December 1922 convention of the al-‘Uqair borders between Najd and Iraq did not settle the deep rivalry between the two sides and the situation became more complicated when Ibn Sa‘ud defeated the Sherif of Mecca and proclaimed himself the King of Najd and al-Hijaz on January 8 1926 (for full text of the agreement see appendices p. 483.)

Iraqi and Saudi Harmony

The situation became critical during the conflicts between the Ikhwan and the other tribes of Iraq, Syria and Transjordan, when the Ikhwān refused to suspend their raids and attacks in these areas. Relations between Ibn Sa‘ud and Iraq did not improve until Ibn Sa‘ud dissolved the power of the Ikhwān in 1928-1929. The Iraqi authority, supported by the British Agent, handed the leaders of the Ikhwān to Ibn Sa‘ud after they had fled to Iraq during their war with him. As a result of the meeting, on board ship, between Ibn Sa‘ud and King Ghāzī of Iraq the two countries concluded in April 1931 a Friendship and Good Neighbour treaty.⁵

After 1932, relations between Iraq and the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia improved and there were no serious incidents between them. This was due to the growth of the oil industry in both countries. In 1936 Ibn Sa‘ud and King Ghāzī of Iraq concluded a treaty of Arab Brotherhood and alliance.

4. Day, Alan. J. *Border and Territorial Disputes*. op.cit. p. 249, and *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. op.cit. p. 307.

5. Blake, Gerald "Shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf States" op.cit. p. 203.

The Neutral Zone

The situation in the Neutral Zone was settled when the two countries signed an agreement in 1938, providing for a joint administration between the two countries of the Neutral Zone.⁶ The relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia became critical after the events of 1968, when the Ba'ath Party took control of the country, launched a propaganda war against Saudi Arabia and signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1972. But after many events such as the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq in the early 1970s, which was supported by the Shah's regime in Iran, Iraq concluded a border agreement with the Shah of Iran in 1975. Iraq sought a similar dynamic balance of power with Saudi Arabia.

On July 2 1975 Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi government reached an agreement on an equal division of the Neutral Zone by drawing a line as straight as possible across the zone. But the agreement apparently remained un-ratified, because of the differences between the two countries over security priorities in the Gulf region.⁷ The Neutral Zone border between the two countries remained unsettled during the 1970s, but the Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel in 1978, and the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1979, led Saudi Arabia and Iraq to approach a tactical alliance and develop a good relationship. In September 1979 it was reported that the two countries had concluded a security agreement which included plans for intelligence co-ordination.

The Outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War

Following the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war in September 1980, Saudi Arabia and Iraq decided to work more closely together against the Iranian revolution. Saudi Arabia exploited this to settle the border dispute over the Neutral Zone. Talks on these matters had a positive outcome on December 26 1981, when the Interior Ministers of Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in Baghdad settling all

6. Rubay'ī, 'Abdullāh Fu'ād. *Qaḍāyā al-Ḥudūd al-Siyasiyyah li-al-Sa'ūdiyyah wa-al-Kuwayt Mābayn al-Ḥarbayn al-'Alamiyyatayn*. Madbūlī Publications, Cairo, 1990, pp. 55-56.

border disputes between the two countries. This agreement was followed by the announcement of two protocols over tribal movement and border administration in February 1982.

The Saudi minister of the interior, Prince Nayif, said that the new border agreement "defined and fixed" the borders between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and also provided for the division of the Neutral Zone with the result that the frontier between the two states had been 'stabilised'. The relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia improved during the Iraq war with Iran, and Saudi Arabia became the main supporter of Iraq beside Kuwait until the war was suspended in 1988. There are no active disputes between the two countries regarding the alignment of the boundary. The boundary between the two parties was marked on maps but never physically demarcated.⁸

7. Day, Alan G. *op.cit.* p. 249.

8. Allocke, John. B. *Border and Territorial Disputes*. 3rd Ed. 1992. *op.cit.* p. 394, Martin, Lenore *op.cit.* p. and the *Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* p. 307. Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the validity of the 1981 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq has not been questioned by either of the parties. See Allocke, John. A. *Border and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* p. 395.

Map No. 17.



Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA) Year Book. 1996. Washington. D.C.

The Saudi-Yemeni Border Dispute

There is a story, probably apocryphal, that King Abd al-Aziz, the founder of the modern Saudi State, gathered his eldest sons around his death bed and told them "the good or evil for us will come from Yemen."

Early Period of Saudi-Yemeni Relations

The modern history of Saudi-Yemeni relations begins in 1803, with the expansion and attacks of the *Wahhabī* forces against the territory of the *Zaydī* Imāmate. The Saudi forces defeated the Imam's forces and retained an influence in the area of Tihāmāh until the destruction of the first Saudi state by the forces of Moḥammed 'Alī Pashā in 1818. After that time the area, which many Arab families disputed, was under nominal Ottoman sovereignty along with Yemen and Saudi Arabia ('Asīr, Tihāmāh and Najrān).

The dispute over the three areas above entered a new stage following the departure of the Ottomans after the First World War. Both Ibn Sa'ud and Imām Yaḥyā of Yemen laid claim to the area of 'Asīr. The Imām of Yemen quickly moved to assert control over those adjacent border areas (of 'Asīr, Tihamah and western Aden) which he considered to be part of "Greater Yemen". Britain rejected the Imam's action and claimed that the latter area was part of her western Aden protectorate. British troops then moved and occupied the area of al-Ḥudeidah in 1919 as a reaction to the Imām's action.

Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, Asir remained the focal point of Saudi-Yemeni hostility, with each side lending assistance and political backing to her favoured faction of the Idrīsī family (which was in control of 'Asīr).⁹ The evolution of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary dispute goes back to the early 1920s when the Saudis were able to occupy the area of 'Asīr. After Ibn Saud secured his position in the Ḥijāz, the Saudi Army advanced into Tihāma and 'Asīr. With the Saudi victory in these areas and the collapse of the families which controlled them, the Saudi boundary reached right up to the Yemeni borders. In 1933, war erupted between the

two countries and Saudi forces succeeded in capturing many disputed areas, including Najrān, which up until then had been outside the Saudi domain. Saudi forces also advanced into North Yemeni territories and occupied many areas such as al-Ḥudeidah. The Saudi Arabia-Yemen boundary extends 906 miles (1,458km) from the Red Sea to a tripoint with Oman. Of this length some 75% is clearly disputed between the two countries, representing one of the world's longest undefined boundaries and one of the most serious boundary disputes in the Middle East. From the terminus of the Ta'if line south and east-ward there is no agreed boundary between the two states up to the tripoint with Oman in the Empty Quarter. The two countries have different views over their claims in practice or on their political maps.¹⁰

The Western Powers' Involvement

The European powers-Britain, France and Italy-intervened and became involved in the Saudi-Yemeni conflict after the Imam of Yemen appealed for outside aid. None of the three European powers wanted to see the Saudis so close to their colonies in Aden (British), Djibouti (French) and Eritrea (Italian). No progress was made towards demarcating the border of Saudi Arabia and South Yemen during the negotiations between Britain (on behalf of Aden and her dependencies) and Saudi Arabia. No Anglo-Ottoman treaties on the Arabian Peninsula borders had taken place to settle these boundaries and nothing was ratified between the two parties because of the outbreak of the First World War.

The Treaty of 1934

As a result of the war between the two countries, on 20 May 1934 Ibn Sa'ud and the Imām of Yemen formulated the Treaty of Muslim Friendship and Arab Fraternity. This was concluded at Tā'if and confirmed the Saudi control over the disputed 'Asīr

9. Litwak, Robert. *op.cit.* p. 86.

10. Abu-Dawood, Abdul-Razak and Karan, P.P. *op.cit.* pp. 35-36 and see Peterson, J.E. "The GCC and Regional Security *op.cit.* p. 181.

and Najrān territories as well as the return of the port city of al-Ḥudeidah to Imām Yaḥyā of Yemen and the withdrawal of Saudi forces from Yemeni territories.¹¹ The treaty of Tā'if settled the border dispute over the areas of 'Asīr, Najrān and Jizān in 1934, while leaving the most important potentially oil-rich areas in dispute. The Treaty of Tā'if was renewed between Ṣan'ā and Riyadh in 1954 and 1974, and was up for renewal again in 1994. But the deterioration of relations between the two countries following the unification of Yemen and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, as well as the conflicts over the disputed areas in the eastern part of North Yemen and the northern area of South Yemen where oil companies were operating under concessions granted by the Yemenis, were the main reasons for suspending the renewal of the Tā'if Treaty between the two countries.¹²

The External Powers' Intervention

The Saudi-Yemeni border dispute entered into a new conflict in the early 1960s, when the royalist Yemeni regime came to an end after a military coup in North Yemen in November 1962. This led to a civil war between the pro-Republican and anti-Republican factions. The internal conflict became more intense when Saudi Arabia and Egypt intervened militarily. 'Abd al-Naṣer adopted a pro-Republican policy while Saudi Arabia supported the Royalists. The conflict became international and the two sides sought external support from the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus the Yemeni civil war became the dominant feature of Arab politics from 1962 to 1967.¹³

11. Litwak, Martin. *op.cit.* p. 86 and see Gause Grogory III, F. *op.cit.* pp. 57-58. The western section of the boundary, governed by the Treaty of Taif, starts from the Red Sea coast at Oreste, a point just north of the Yemeni town of Maydi, and extends over approximately 215 miles (345 km.). Since 1936 there have been recurrent calls by Yemeni nationalists for the return of the "lost province" of Asir and Najran. See *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* pp. 463-464. The Yemeni-Saudi border is one of the longest undemarcated frontiers in the world. Only a small part of it-at the extreme western end--has ever been defined. The absence of an agreed border has become increasingly problematic because of attempts to explore for oil in the area and there have been a number of military incidents. See Whitaker, Brian "Progress on the Saudi border" *Middle East International* . 26 September 1997. p. 13.

12. Katz, Mark N "External Powers and the Yemeni Civil War" *op.cit.* p. 82.

13. Peterson, J.E. "The GCC and Regional Security" *op.cit.* p. 181.

The main reason for President ‘Abd al-Naṣer’s 1962 military intervention in Yemen was to improve his position in the Arab world and his international standing, after suffering the humiliating secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic.¹⁴ The Egyptian President accused the two royal families of Saudi Arabia and Jordan of conspiring to finance the sabotage of his union with Syria. According to him, peace between conservative and revolutionary Arab States was impossible:

We made the mistake of making peace with reaction. We must rid ourselves of this dangerous illusion in order to protect the people’s struggle. We must fight imperialism in the palaces of reaction. We must fight reaction in the arms of imperialism.

During the early 1960s King Faiṣal sought, at all costs, to avoid a direct confrontation with the Egyptians. He supported the royalists as the only practical impediment to Egyptian advances, while seeking time to secure the Kingdom’s own domestic front. He broke diplomatic relations with Cairo on November 6 1962 after the first Egyptian attacks on Saudi territory. From early November 1962 Egyptian planes and warships conducted bombing raids on royalist bases in Saudi Arabian territory. The events in Yemen shook the political foundation of the Saudi regime. The military appeared to be more loyal to ‘Abd al-Naṣer than to the Saudi regime, as between October 2 and October 8 1962, four Saudi aircraft crews defected to Egypt with plane-loads of arms intended for the loyalists.¹⁵ The presence of thousands of Egyptian troops in North Yemen posed a number of internal and external threats to the Saudi regime and other Sheykhdoms in the Arab Gulf. The Egyptian troops could use their new base in North Yemen to extend material support to opposition forces throughout the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in South Yemen, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi rulers had always considered Yemen to be of immense importance to their national security. The Saudi royal family were convinced that the Egyptian

14. Gerges, Fawaz A “The Kennedy Administration and the Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in Yemen: Co-opting Arab Nationalism” *The Middle East Journal*. Vol.49. No.2. Spring, Middle East Institute, 1995, London, p. 293.

15. Gregory Gause III, F. *op.cit.* p. 60.

President's objective was to "overthrow the Saudi monarchy and gain control of the vast oil resources which she possessed"¹⁶

In August 1962, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with assistance from Iran and the west, formed a joint command and developed mechanisms for closer economic and military co-operation to counter the Egyptian presence in Yemen and support the pro-Royalists in their civil war with the pro-Republicans.

Internal and External Initiatives

The Egyptian-Saudi conflict over Yemen led to serious peace proposals. The United Nations Secretary-General U-Thant supported the first step initiated by the Americans on April 30 1963. The plan called for the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign forces and an end to outside aid. The United Nations agreement was unsuccessful as a result of the two countries' unwillingness to implement it. The second step was the Alexandria Arab Summit in September 1964 where Abd al-Nāṣer and Faiṣal announced an agreement to seek a peaceful solution to the Yemeni conflict.

The two countries, with the delegations of the Republicans and Royalists, held a reconciliation meeting in Sudan on October 30-31 1964. However, the negotiations over the Alexandria agreement in Sudan failed to bring an end to the conflict. The third step took place in Jeddah on August 24, 1965 during Abd al-Nāṣer's visit to Saudi Arabia. The two countries announced what became known as the Jeddah agreement to end the fighting in Yemen. But the negotiations, which took place at the conference of Ḥaraḍh between November 23 and December 25 1965, failed to reach any settlement of the Yemen conflict between the Republicans and Royalists.¹⁷

16. Gerges, Fawaz A. *op.cit.* p. 299.

17. Groegory Gause III, F. *op.cit.* pp. 64-68 and Gerges, Fawaz A. *op.cit.* pp. 305-306.

Soviet and American Involvement

In October 1962, the Soviet Union was the first non-Arab State to recognise the Republican government in North Yemen. The Kremlin went beyond the stage of implicit support by supplying aid to the revolutionaries in North Yemen and to the Egyptian troops. The Soviet and the American recognition of the North Yemen Republic regime was seen by 'Abd al-Naṣer as a political gain for Cairo's interventionist role and a political setback for the Saudi regime.

In response to increased Saudi aid to the royalists, Egyptian troops escalated the confrontation by sending their air force to bomb Saudi border towns, which were being used as training grounds and staging posts for the royalist forces and the Saudi, Jordanian and Iranian Command areas near the Saudi-Yemeni borders. After the British announcement in February 1966 of their intention to withdraw from the south of Arabia by 1968, the Egyptian President adopted a new strategy to consolidate his position in North Yemen. The new strategy was accompanied by a more active hostile stance against Saudi Arabia. Propaganda attacks were stepped up and a welcome was offered to ex-King Sa'ud and the Free Princes Movement in Cairo. They then broadcast on the Voice of the Arabs against the monarchical regimes in the Arab world, especially those of Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

After the death of Kennedy and his replacement by Lyndon Johnson, the United States, with the support of Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, played a significant role in supporting the royalists in Yemen, and a squadron of United States fighter aircraft was stationed in Saudi Arabia to protect the Saudi regime against any internal or external threats.¹⁸

The War of 1967

The series of conflicts over North Yemen came to an end during 1967. The solution in favour of Saudi Arabia, which she could not bring about on the battlefield or at the negotiating table, was finally imposed upon Egypt from outside. 'Abd al-Naṣer's ambitions in Yemen became more critical after the five-day war of June 1967 with

18. Gerges, Fawaz A. *op.cit.* 307.

Israel, which made the Egyptian position in Yemen untenable. The Saudi government's willingness to provide financial assistance to Egypt in the wake of her defeat was made contingent upon a complete withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from Yemen.

The last Egyptian soldier left North Yemen in early December 1967. Saudi Arabia formally recognised the Yemen Arab Republic on July 27 1970, two months after the compromise agreement between the two countries.

The Saudi Role in Yemen

The Saudi objective in this action was to consolidate her relations with the North Yemen regime in order to counter the left-wing South Yemen regime. The Saudi policy towards the regime of North Yemen was to maintain military and financial assistance to her and yet maintain pressure on the regime by military assistance to tribal federations in North Yemen and the frontier regions. These could threaten to bring down the regime or revive civil strife. Since the early 1960s Saudi Arabia's foreign policy towards North Yemen has been based on the principle of "Riyāl Politik" using her wealth to buy the loyalties and alliances of the Yemeni tribal Sheykhs

It should be noted that the northern tribal federations constitute approximately one-third of North Yemen's population. Saudi Arabia had subsidised the North Yemen tribes annually at an estimated cost of \$300 million, whereas Saudi subsidies to the North Yemen regime approached \$400 million. The Saudis also directly subsidised economic development projects within North Yemen at an estimated rate of approximately \$300 million annually. The purpose of the Saudi aid was make the regime in North Yemen economically dependent on her in order to counter North Yemen's interest in obtaining military assistance from the Soviet Union and pursuing unification negotiations with South Yemen.¹⁹

Saudi Arabia and South Yemen did not establish diplomatic relations until March 1976, but no mention was made of any negotiation or agreement over their

19. Lenore, Martin. *op.cit.* p. 56 and Gause Gregory III, F. *op.cit.* pp. 70-82.

boundary. During the early 1970s, South Yemen increased her attacks on the Saudi border. These attacks came as a response to an abortive attempt by Saudi Arabia to extend control over Ḥaḍramaut and establish that region as a buffer zone. Another clash at the frontier was reported in 1973. Since the early 1970s the Saudi government retained a number of effective internal policy instruments in her dealings with the North Yemen regime or with the heads of the big tribes.

Some sources indicate that Saudi Arabia played a major role in the assassination of President Ibrāhīm Al-Ḥamdī on the eve of his scheduled journey to Aden to discuss possible steps towards unification. Saudi policy in Yemen permitted tribal dissidents, Nationalists and ex-Sultans from Ḥaḍramaut to use her territory as a base for operations against the Aden government or any progress towards unification.²⁰

Clashes Between the Two Countries

No political development took place on the question of the border dispute during the 1980s. Many press reports state that the border dispute deteriorated into armed confrontations in early 1980, 1983, 1984, 1988 and the early 1990s on many occasions. In November 1984 a Saudi airliner was hijacked by North Yemeni nationals and flown to Tehran. They were protesting against what they alleged was Saudi “interference” in the internal affairs of North Yemen.²¹

The Dispute of the Southern Boundary

The two countries have not had any legally-defined border since the Treaty of Tā’if of 1934, which defined only a small part of the frontier in the populated area of the north-western corner. The remaining 1,000 miles or so have never been agreed. Since this undefined section runs mostly through desert on the fringes of the Rub’ al-Khālī (Empty Quarter), its precise location had little importance until the mid-1980s when

20. Litwak, Robert. *op.cit.* pp. 88-89 and see. *Jane's Sentinel Newsletter* :The Arab Gulf State. *op.cit.* p. 9.

21. Alan, Day J. *op.cit.* p. 253.

Yemen discovered oil close to the notional line.²² The Treaty of Tā'if did not grant 'Asīr, Jizān and Najrān as permanent areas under Saudi authority, but only for a twenty-year renewable term. As a result of these confrontations and skirmishes on the borders between the two countries as well as the unification of Yemen, Saudi Arabia regarded this as a threat to Saudi internal and external security. Since that time she built strong military bases near the Saudi-Yemeni borders, namely the Khamīs al-Mushaiṭ base in the 'Asīr area and the Sharura base near her border with the former South Yemen in the Rub'al-Khālī. She maintains large numbers of troops there. The Saudi royal family also saw the free elections and press in Yemen as an unwelcome development, which could destabilise the Saudi Kingdom.

Many observers noted that the Saudi leadership regarded democratisation in Yemen as highly threatening since it might serve to fuel demands for political change in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has apparently rejected recent moves by Egypt and Syria to establish an independent control regime on the Saudi-Yemeni border. Sultan b. 'Abd al-'Azīz, the Saudi Minister of Defence, said that there were already plans for a joint Saudi-Yemeni Military Committee to monitor the border.²³

22. Whitaker, Brian "Yemen and Saudi Arabia Crisis over the border" *Middle East International* 20 January 1995, London, p. 11.

23. Peterson, J.E. "The GCC and Regional Security" *op.cit.* p. 181 and *Jane's Sensentinel Newsletter*: The Arab Gulf States. *op.cit.* p. 5.

Map No. 18.



Schofield, Richard "Border Disputes in the Gulf Region" in *The Middle East and Europe* The Search for Stability and Integration. (ed.) Nonnemen, Gerd. Federal Trust for Education and Research. London, 1993.

The Unification of Yemen and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

During the early 1990s, the political relations between Ṣan‘ā and Riyadh worsened after North and South Yemen merged into one country called the Republic of Yemen; the second issue was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The Yemeni position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait opposed Saudi policy on the Gulf crisis. Relations were seriously disrupted at the Arab League Conference on the invasion, when the Yemeni President, ‘Alī ‘Abdullah Ṣāleḥ, voted against condemning Iraq. Relations further soured when the Yemeni government representative in the United Nations abstained from voting on various UN Security Council resolutions against Iraq. In addition, demonstrations were held in most Yemeni cities supporting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.²⁴

The Saudi Reaction

The Saudi reaction to the Yemeni government position over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was to exert real political pressure on the unification government. During the second Gulf war, the Saudi government expelled and sacked some 700,000 persons of Yemeni origin. ‘Alī ‘Abdullah Ṣāleḥ announced, on 23 November 1990, that 817,000 Yemenis had returned to Yemen from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.²⁵

Since early 1990, Saudi Arabia has cut off all aid to Yemen and forced the other members of the GCC to impose sanctions on her. During the early 1990s there were many skirmishes over the Saudi-Yemeni borders resulting in the death of many soldiers from both sides. In 1992, Saudi Arabia warned western oil companies not to accept Yemeni oil exploration contracts in a disputed area of the seabed in the Red Sea.²⁶

24. Kechichian, Joseph. *Political Dynamics...* *op.cit.* p. 64.

25. Whitley, Andrew “Minorities and the Stateless in Persian Gulf Politics” *op.cit.* p. 24, and Kechichian, Joseph A. *Political Dynamics* *op.cit.* p. 64.

26. Pike, David “Cross-border hydrocarbon reserves” *op.cit.* p.193 and *MEES*. Vol. XXXV. No.35 1 June 1992. p. A3, see. *MEES*. Vol. XXXV. No.32. 11 May 1992. p. A5. See also Burrowes, Robert D “The Yemeni Civil War of 1994: Impact on the Arab Gulf States” in: Al-Suwaidi Jamal S (ed.) *The Yemeni War of 1994 Causes and Consequences*. The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 1995, Abu Dhabi, pp. 73-74.

In June 1994, during the civil war in Yemen, the Saudi government, together with all the GCC except Qatar, sided with and supported the southern forces led by the ex-Marxist Vice-President 'Alī Sālim al-Baiḍ. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait played a significant role in supporting these forces financially and militarily against the unification government of Ṣan'ā. The Saudi and Kuwaiti purpose was to destroy Yemeni unification. Unification meant, to Saudi Arabia, real internal and external threats to Saudi stability. For Kuwait this was a revenge on Yemen for her position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which was directed against the royal family of Kuwait. In July 1994, King Fahd condemned the victorious Northern Leadership for its "insistence" on continuing the civil war despite pleas from the UN special representative to agree a permanent cease-fire.

Saudi efforts to achieve a cease-fire were perceived in Ṣan'ā as an effort to aid the Southern leaders: if a cease-fire had taken hold, the Southern government would have had a greater opportunity to consolidate its independence. Towards the end of the civil war in Yemen, Riyadh reportedly attempted to persuade other Arab governments, especially the GCC States, to recognise the independence of the former South Yemen.

Towards the end of the conflict, the Kuwaiti foreign minister openly talked about granting diplomatic recognition to the South.²⁷ There are numerous, unsubstantiated reports of Saudi military aid being given to the Southern leaders and it is clear that the Saudis took diplomatic action to help prevent them from being overrun. When the senior leaders of South Yemen fled into exile, they were allowed to form an opposition movement in Jeddah and given support in an international campaign to oppose the North Yemen regime. During December 1994 and January 1995 border clashes broke out between the two countries.²⁸

27. Katz, Mark N "External Powers and the Yemeni Civil War" in: Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S (ed.) *The Yemeni War of 1994 Causes and Consequences*. The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, 1995, pp. 82-87

28. *Jane's Sentinel Newsletter*: The Arab Gulf States. *op.cit.* p.8. For more details over the Saudi position on the border dispute with Yemen see. Report published by *Al-Quds al-'Arabī*. Issue No.2702. Date 17-January, 1998, London, pp. 3-4.

Saudi Ambitions in Ḥaḍramaut

It should be recorded that the Saudi royal family had long-term strategic aims to extend their sovereignty to the Arab Sea (Indian Ocean) in the south of Arabia, in the Dhofar region in Oman or in Ḥaḍramaut and al-Mahrah in Yemen. Saudi Arabian oil exports are vulnerable to blockade since tankers have to pass through one of two narrow waterways, neither of which the Saudis directly control: the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf Region and Bāb al-Mandab in the Red Sea. During the late 1960s, Saudi Arabia supported the Sultans of the South Arabian states with the formation of dissident armies especially for the Ḥaḍramī opposition, and encouraged the Ḥaḍramī merchants (most of the big merchant families in Saudi Arabia originate in Ḥaḍramaut) to play a significant role with dissidents in establishing a puppet government in Ḥaḍramaut and al-Mahrah. This would then give Saudi Arabia a safe corridor to the Arab Sea. During the civil war in Yemen of 1994, she tried to revive the old Saudi idea of establishing the state of Ḥaḍramaut and al-Mahrah, but the idea failed after the North Yemeni victory in the war. After the termination of the civil war in 1994, the Saudi government naturalised most of the former South Yemen people, particularly the people of Ḥaḍramaut and al-Mahrah, in order to use these people to exert a pressure on the unification government.²⁹

The Memorandum of 1995

In February 1995, as a result of American pressure on the Saudi government, the two countries entered into talks, which resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in Mecca. The memorandum contains the establishment of several committees on disputed issues, like the border disputes, military clashes, economic co-operation and preventing troop movements near disputed areas. However, the Saudi government was not keen to stabilise relations with Yemen. During the talks the Yemenis seem to have conceded the possibility of settling the border issue in more than one stage.

29. Whitaker, Brian. *op.cit.* pp. 11-13, and *MEES*. Vol. XXXV No.32. 11 May 1992. p. A5.

The Saudis have given ground on the question of military supervision and have accepted the principle of arbitration if no mutual agreement on the border is reached. It should be noted that the Yemeni position on the Tā'if treaty concentrated on its renewal. The treaty of Tā'if was signed in 1934 and expired in December 1992.³⁰ Until the end of 1996, the two countries held more than thirteen rounds of talks without result on the issue of border disputes. Some Yemeni leaders, nonetheless, were saying unofficially in the autumn of 1992 that they would be willing to relinquish claims to the areas of 'Asīr, Najrān and Jizān if the Saudis were forthcoming and generous regarding Yemeni territorial claims in the east and north of Ḥaḍramaut (for full text of the memorandum of 1995 see appendices p. 514.)

The Military Incidents

On January 10 1996, a further incident was reported on the Yemeni-Saudi border. Saudi troops reportedly hoisted the Saudi flag inside Yemen territory. Yemeni troops retaliated by launching a counter-offensive to recapture the territory. Yemen's President 'Alī 'Abdullah Ṣāleḥ, discussed the incident with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. On January 15 1996 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republic issued a statement indicating that recent tension on the border between the two countries had been contained and that an agreement had been reached not to resort to violence. Both countries looked forward to resuming talks to resolve difficulties

30. The February Memorandum was ratified by both countries in May 1995, and *MEES*. Vol. XXXVIII. No.34. 22 May 1995. p. A15. On 25 May 1996, the Saudi government announced that it was ready to sign a security pact with Yemen, as envisaged in the memorandum of understanding signed by the two countries in February 1995. The Saudis claimed to be waiting on Yemen's approval of the final draft, but no details of the pact were revealed. See *Boundary and Security Bulletin* Summer 1996, IBRU, University of Durham. p. 31. For more details see Al-Dulaymī, Muḥammad 'Alī . *Al-'Alam Newspaper*. Issue No.588. 27 September pp.17-19. On Yemeni desire to negotiate, see *MEES*. Vol. XXXV. No.29. 20 April 1992. p. A5. On 30 April the Yemeni government called on the foreign powers (US, UK, France and Canada) whose companies were operating in the disputed border areas with Saudi Arabia to help mediate the dispute between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. *MEES*. Vol. XXXV. No.32. 11 May 1992. p. A5. See also Whitaker, Brian "Yemen and Saudi Arabia Limited agreement" *Middle East International* 3 March 1995, London. p. 15.

concerning the border.³¹ On January 27 1996, conflicting reports again pointed to a build-up of Saudi troops on the border with Yemen.

The President of Yemen confirmed the existence of Saudi military concentrations and said that they had intensified since 25 January in order, he thought, to guarantee the *status quo* regarding border demarcation. He indicated that so far, there had been no substantial progress in the talks taking place in Riyadh (during the visit of ‘Abdullah Al-Aḥmar, the Speaker of the Yemeni House of Representatives, on 22 January 1996).³² On 26 February 1996, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the two countries in which they affirmed their commitment to the Tā’if accord of May 1934. They agreed to establish a joint committee within a period of 30 days, charged with re-establishing the border signs in accordance with the reports appended to the Tā’if accord. The Committee would continue its work to decide on measures to demarcate the remaining parts of the border. A joint committee would be established to determine the maritime boundary in accordance with international law, and a military committee would be formed by the two sides to ensure the prevention of military incidents between the two countries. On 5 November 1996, the Saudi-Yemeni joint committee on the demarcation of the border began four days of discussions in its first session in Ṣan‘ā. At the conclusion of talks, the committee issued a statement saying that the two sides had agreed to start implementing the timetable of technical field work to demarcate the border.³³

31. The two countries, on 28 September, held border talks in Riyadh (on the level of experts). These talks were the first to be held between the two countries since 1974. Since then the two countries have held many rounds of talks but without progress. See, *MEES*, Vol. XXXVI, No.1, 5 October 1992, p.A4. The most important talks over the border disputes between the two parties were held in Geneva on 20 July 1992 on the ministerial level. *MEES*, Vol. XXXV, No.43, 27 July 1992, p.A3. The Yemeni Foreign Minister Muhammed Salim Basandawah in July 1992 was the highest ranking Yemeni official to visit Saudi Arabia since relations were strained by Yemen’s stand during the second Gulf War. See, *MEES*, Vol. XXXVI, No.43, 26 July 1993, pp. A9-A10.

32. Many sources indicate that Sheykh ‘Abdullāh Al-Aḥmar (Sheykh of Ḥashid federation, the big federation in Yemen) has strong relations with the Saudi government and is considered to be a Saudi strong man in Yemen. See, *Reuter News Agency*, News dated on 25/5/96 and 5/6/96. See also *Rusi International Security Review 1996* “The Gulf: International Security and External Threat” *op.cit.* p. 256.

33 *Rusi International Security Review 1996* “The Gulf: International Security and External Threat” *op.cit.* pp. 257–271, and IBRU *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, University of Durham, p. 24.

The Yemeni Position over the Border

‘Abd al-Karīm al-Iryānī, the Yemeni Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, described the Yemeni-Saudi border dispute as a most complicated one, which could not be solved by the few mutual visits paid by the officials of the two countries. Al-Iryānī explained in an interview published by the *Weekly Yemen Times* that the Memorandum of Understanding was signed two years ago regarding borders and the determination of border relations without reaching until now any agreement on the fixation of a first border point on the border line. This had been planned in accordance with the Tā’if agreement, which starts from a point between the two regions, on the western beach looking over the Red Sea, up to Al-Thār mountain in the north-west of Yemen. Al-Iryānī justified the disagreement on the fixation of this point by the fact that nobody had put up any border signs in 60 years, which indicated the complicated nature of the problem. Regarding the concept proposed for the planned border line between the two countries, it starts at the 23rd latitude in the North and is directed towards the east curving slowly to the south. Al-Iryānī said, “we have changed the curve line many times, given the complaints about violations of regions by both parties.” He also emphasised that Yemen has raised more complaints than the other party regarding border violation.

The Yemeni Foreign Minister issued a statement saying that the Yemeni-Saudi sides had now solved 40% of the border disputes in their quest to find a final solution for their 60-year old disputes.³⁴

Some sources indicate that the Saudi-Yemeni negotiations have reached an impasse despite the agreement concluded between the two parties in Mecca in 1995. The two parties have exchanged accusations of hindering the negotiations, and some of the Yemeni opposition sources have stated that one of the reasons for the aggravation of differences between Ṣan‘ā and Riyaḍh is that Saudi ‘Arabia insists on bringing about a reconciliation between the Yemeni government and the leaders of the separation in the South Yemen before the signature of the border agreement.

34. *Al-Watan Newspaper*. Issue No.4982. The 27th year. Saturday 22 February 1997, Sultanate of Oman, Muscat, p. 1.

Sa‘udī ‘Arabia considered national reconciliation as a necessary condition to normalise relations between the two countries and settle the border problems. She also wanted the leaders concerned to share the power. Some of the political leaders in Şan‘ā explained clearly that they would have recourse to arbitration in case of the insistence of Sa‘udī ‘Arabia upon her rights.³⁵ Some political analysts summarise the reasons that hindered the progress of negotiations between the parties as follows:

- (a) The insistence of Sa‘udī ‘Arabia on the national reconciliation between the Yemeni government and the separation Southern leaders. This is imposed as a condition on Şan‘ā in order to reach a global border settlement and to normalise the relations between the two countries, as well as the sharing of power with such leaders.
- (b) Yemen claims the negotiations should recover the Yemeni territories occupied by Sa‘udī ‘Arabia in 1969 in the Eastern border region (Wadī‘ah and Sharurah) and include Saudi demands for a sea passage on the Arabian sea through Yemeni territory crossing the Ḥaḍramaut or Al-Mahra region, close to the Omani border with Yemen.
- (c) Sa‘udī ‘Arabia tried to impose the policy of *fait accompli de facto* regarding the demarcation of the borders, particularly the borders with the former South Yemen which have been undefined since the British presence in that area. (For a good example of this see the Saudi map on page no. 2)

³⁵ *Al-Quds Al-‘Arabī*. Issue No. 2674. December 1997, London. p. 4.

Map No. 19.



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Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA) Year Book. 1996. Washington. D.C.

The Iraqi - Kuwaiti Border Disputes

Early Background

Kuwait, as a sheikhdom, was founded in the early eighteenth century by three clans of the 'Anīza tribe, namely Al-Ṣabāḥ, Al-Khalīfah, and Al-Jalahimah, who migrated from central Arabia. In 1716 the heads of the three clans agreed to give the Al-Ṣabāḥ pre-eminence in government affairs, subject to consulting the Al-Khalīfah in commercial affairs, and the Al-Jalahimah in maritime affairs (see Chapter 1, p. 17). The Banī Khālīd tribe dominated the area of Kuwait before the federation of these three tribes. Since the early eighteenth century Al-Ṣabāḥ has become the dominant family in the territory after the emigration of al-Khalīfah to Zubarah in the Qatar Peninsula.³⁶

However, in the early 1870 the Sheikdom of Kuwait came to be a part of the Ottoman Empire, during her expansion in the Arabian Peninsula. Sheykh Abdullah Al-Ṣabāḥ of Kuwait was appointed as *qā'immaqām* (sub-governor) as a reward for his assistance during the Ottoman forces' intervention in the Arabian lands. In 1875 Kuwait and the newly-conquered territories of eastern Arabia, Ḥasā and Qaṭīf, along with Baṣra, Nāṣiriyyah, Qurna and al-'Amāra, were grouped together into a newly constituted autonomous Ottoman Wilāyah under the Wālī of the Muntafiq. But in 1884 the territories of Faw, Qurna and Kuwait were brought under the control of the Basra province. Kuwait, from that time, was administered as part of the Ottoman province of Baṣrah. British influence in Kuwait came as a result of her competition with the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Peninsula during the 1870s. The scheme for the Berlin-Baghdad railway was the most important incentive for the British government to support the Sheykh of Kuwait's authority over the territory of Kuwait in order to deny any opportunity to the Germans and Russians for the development of a railway terminus in the Umm Qaṣr / Khawr al-Zubair area.

36. Mendelson, Maurice and Hulton, Susan "Iraq's claim to sovereignty over Kuwait". in. Schofield, Richard (ed.) *Territorial foundations of the Gulf States*. UCL Press, 1994, London, p. 119.

The Treaty of 1899

The British position in Kuwait became stronger after they supported Shaykh Mubārak in seizing power in the sheikhdom after he had murdered his pro-Turkish brothers Muḥammad and Jarrāḥ. Shaykh Mubārak sought British protection when the Turks refused to recognise his authority over the Sheikhdom of Kuwait.³⁷ In 1899 Mubārak, who is known as “the Great”, concluded a secret agreement with Britain, without the approval of the Ottoman Sultan, in which Mubārak himself, his heirs and his successors agreed not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory, to the government of any power without the previous consent of Her Majesty’s Government.³⁸

The 1899 secret agreement provided that Britain would not establish a formal protectorate over Kuwait unless the Ottomans intervened militarily in the Sheykhdom. The most important reason that had prompted Britain to conclude this secret agreement was the successive plans of the Germans and Russians to run a railway to the Gulf on Kuwait Bay. However, this agreement did not change the *status quo* of the Ottoman control over the Sheikhdom of Kuwait.

The Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913

After 1899 Britain became the controller of the Sheykhdom’s foreign affairs. Between 1911 and 1913, Britain and Turkey, the two authorities which dominated Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, engaged in talks over their influence over Arabian boundaries and the Baghdad railway question. After long discussions they reached an agreement on 29 July 1913, which formally defined the respective spheres of influence of the two sides in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. But the 1913 agreement was not ratified because of the outbreak of the First World War. The 1913 agreement was the first attempt to settle border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula. It caused the territory of Kuwait to be defined and divided into two zones, in which the Sheykh of

37. Finnie, David H. *Shifting Lines in the Sand Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq*. *op.cit.* pp. 5-13.

38. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. Middle East Programme, London, 1993, 2nd, p. 17.

Kuwait was recognised as having varying degrees of authority. Within a semi-circle radius of approximately 40 miles from Kuwait town, the complete administrative autonomy of the ruling family of Al-Ṣabāḥ was recognised. The islands of Warbah and Bubiyan 39 (as well as of Mashjān, Failakah, Awhah, Kubr, Qārū, Maqtah, and Umm al-Marādim) were included within this zone. Within an outer zone, bounded by a “Green Line”, which was occupied by tribes recognised as being dependent on the Shaykh of Kuwait, the latter was to continue to collect their tithes, as in the past, and to exercise the administrative rights belonging to him in his capacity of *qāmmaqām* under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. The Sheykh of Kuwait was to continue to hoist the Ottoman flag, as in the past.

The agreement also provided Ottoman recognition of the 1899 secret agreement between Britain and the Sheykh of Kuwait.⁴⁰ The Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier was defined by a large notice board during the British presence in Iraq and Kuwait, but its actual location moved from time to time, which means that the border itself was unclear and ambiguous in definition.


39. Schofield, Richard “The Kuwaiti Islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, and Iraqi Access to the Gulf “in: Schofield, Richard (ed.) *Territorial foundations of the Gulf States*. UCL Press, 1994, London, p. 157. The two islands lie in the north-west corner of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf very close to each other and to the mainland of Kuwait and are less than a mile from Iraq’s 10-nautical mile border zone and are virtually uninhabited. The importance of the two islands lies in the fact that they dominate the channel between Iraq’s main port on the Gulf (Umm Qasr) and the Gulf itself, and thus command the narrow maritime lane through which Baṣrah-bound shipping has to pass. El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. *op.cit.* p. 118.

40. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* pp. 40-46.

Map No. 20.

Map showing the Red (inner) and Green (outer) lines of diminishing Kuwaiti territorial authority as defined by the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention.

Source: Map produced by the Foreign Office Research Department in May 1954



Source: International Boundaries Research Unit. *Boundary and Security Bulletin*. Vol. 2. No. 3.

October 1994. Department of Geography. University of Durham. England, 1994.

Iraq Under the British Mandate

The Iraqi claims on Kuwait are on two levels: the first level focuses on the historical claim, that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraqi territory belonging to the Baṣrah province. This was argued by King Ghāzī of Iraq and the Iraqi foreign minister Tawfiq al-Suwaidi (1938), Nurī al-Sa‘īd (1958), ‘Abd al- Karīm Qāsim (1961) and Ṣaddām Ḥussein (1990). The second claim concerns the boundary between the two countries, especially the two strategic islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Since Iraq became independent in 1932, it has been sensitive about its narrow frontage on the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, a mere 20 kilometres. An example of this level of the Iraqi claim is the correspondence of 1923, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti agreement of 1932 and the agreement of 1963 between ‘Abd al-Salām ‘Arif and the Sheykh of Kuwait.⁴¹

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Mesopotamia (the Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Mosul and Baṣrah) became independent and as a result of the San Remo Conference decisions of 25 April 1920, Britain became the High Mandatory of Iraq. As Mandatory of Iraq on the one hand, and protector of the sheikhdom of Kuwait on the other, Britain decided to settle the border dispute between the two sides according to the 1913 agreement (un-ratified).

Sir Percy Cox, the Iraqi High Commissioner, following on from the al-‘Uqair protocol of 1922 between Najd and Iraq on the one hand and between Najd and Kuwait on the other, suggested that the "Green Line" of the 1913 agreement be confirmed as the Iraqi - Kuwaiti boundary. The border between Iraq and Kuwait was first defined when Sir Percy Cox exchanged, on April 4 and April 19 1923, letters with the British Political Resident in Kuwait and the Sheykh of Kuwait. The border between Iraq and Kuwait still remained in the position of the 1923 letters until the early 1930s. However, when Britain decided to end her mandate over Iraq and to accept it as a member of the League of Nations in 1932, and subsequent to the letters exchanged in 1923 through the mediation of the British government, the Sheykh of Kuwait, Aḥmad Al-Ṣabāḥ, and the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nurī al-Sa‘īd, exchanged

letters dated July 21 and August 10 1932 accepting the demarcation of the frontier between them on the basis of the 1923 letters. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Mushkān or Mashjān, Failakah, Auhan, Kubbar, Qārū and Umm al-Marādīm were declared Kuwait territory 42 (for full text of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti letters reaffirming the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary in 1932 see appendices p. 486)

The Iraqi Claim During the Monarchical Era

Since Iraq became independent in the early 1930s, it has been sensitive over the narrow coastal strip at Umm Qaşr on the Gulf, a mere 20 kilometres, and with the discovery of oil in Kuwait it has felt that, as a large country with a fairly large population, it has been squeezed out of the Gulf because of the boundaries drawn by British colonial officials after the First World War.⁴³ The Iraqi officials launched a campaign during the 1950s calling for the annexation of Kuwait as a part of the former Ottoman territory. King Ghāzī of Iraq began broadcasting from a private radio station called Qaşr al-Zuhūr demanding the annexation of Kuwait and depicting the Sheikhdom's ruler as "an out-of-date feudal despot", dependent upon Britain's support.

During the reign of King Ghāzī relations between Iraq and Kuwait were unsettled, particularly after the fleeing to Iraq of a number of Kuwaiti nationalists who called for closer relations with Iraq after the failure of the two Kuwaiti experiments with a legislative assembly. According to British Military Intelligence, Iraq sent some troops to the Zubair area in the south of Iraq and there was a plan to invade Kuwait, but the operation did not take place. Iraqi media on the other hand launched a big campaign for the incorporation of the Sheikhdom of Kuwait within

41. Al-Sarjānī, Khālīd "Tarsīm al-Ḥudūd al-'Irāqīyyah-al-Kuwaytiyyah Ba'd Azmat al-Khālīj al-Thānīyah" *Al-Siyasah al-Duwalīyyah (International Politics)* Issue No.111, January 1993, Cairo, p. 234.

42. Day, Alan J. *Border and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* p. 245 and Bishku, Michael B "Iraq Claims to Kuwait: A Historical Overview" *American-Arab Affairs* Vol. 37, 1991, p. 79.

43. Jansen, G.H "The Iraq-Kuwait. boundary The Umm Qasr time bomb" *Middle East International* - 6 March, 1992, London. p. 9.

the Hashemite Kingdom, concentrating on the historical link between Mesopotamia and Kuwait.⁴⁴

Tawfīq Al-Suwaidī, the Iraqi foreign minister, in a speech before the Iraqi parliament in 1938, referred to Kuwait as an inseparable part of Iraq and Iraq's natural outlet to the sea. He declared that the Shaykh of Kuwait was an Ottoman *Qāimmaqām* and he acknowledged that in 1932, the prime minister of Iraq, Nurī Al-Sa'īd, had written a letter recognising a certain line as being the frontier, but stated however, that the reaffirmation of this frontier could not be held to have brought any change to the status of Kuwait.

In Geneva on September 28 1938, Al-Suwaidī handed the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs an aide-memoire stating firmly: "The Iraqi Government, as the successor to the Ottoman Government in the Wilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, considers that Kuwait should properly be incorporated in Iraq. If incorporation should take place, Iraq would agree to maintain the local autonomy of Kuwait.⁴⁵ The foreign minister of Iraq explained the Iraqi purpose to control Kuwait as being not only to control smuggling into Iraq (a major issue at the time), but also because the government of Iraq was thinking about "the extension of the Iraq railway to Kuwait Bay, in order to provide Iraq with a port on Gulf Waters.⁴⁶

The British Government did not take the Iraqi foreign minister's claims very seriously, but the two sides held talks in London in October 1938, without any development relating to the Iraqi claim over Kuwait. But after the meeting in London in 1938, the Iraqis continued to demand that the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan be ceded to them. As Britain was a protector of the Sheykhdom, the Foreign Office presented a note dated 6 October 1938, which claimed that:

The Sheykhdom of Kuwait was, for a considerable period, in an anomalous state of semi-dependence on the Ottoman Empire; His Majesty's Government have nevertheless been in treaty relations with the Shayks of Kuwait since 1841; and Kuwait finally became completely independent of Turkey and

44. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* pp. 74-76. See also Bishku, Michael B. *op.cit.* p. 79.

45. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* p. 77.

46. Finnie, David H. *op.cit.* p. 114.

*Kuwaiti nationality finally came into existence on the same date as Iraq and Iraqi nationality.*⁴⁷

During the early 1930s Iraqi officials made many demands to Britain and the Kuwait Sheykh for the cession of the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Some sources indicated that the Iraqi Defence Minister, Ja'far al-'Askarī, expressed strong reservations on the Nurī al-Sa'īd accord of 1932 which admitted Kuwaiti sovereignty over the two islands.⁴⁸ The Iraqi monarchy refused to make any demarcation of its border with Kuwait unless it received the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. On the other side the Kuwaiti Sheykh also refused to cede or lease the two islands until the boundary between the two countries had first been securely demarcated.⁴⁹

After Iraq became a member of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the Iraqi government sought closer relations with Kuwait. During the last six months of Hashemite rule in Iraq in 1958, Nurī al-Sa'īd, the Iraqi Prime Minister, as a result of the establishment of the Hashimite Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan, proposed that Kuwait should be a member of this Union. The Kuwaiti Sheykh was invited to Baghdad to discuss the proposal. The Iraqi Prime Minister's aim in this was to exploit the massive Kuwaiti oil wealth to support the Jordanian economy under the protection of Baghdad. The British reaction was frosty after the Iraqi Prime Minister's discussions in London on July 20, 1958.⁵⁰

The Coup of 1958

The Hashemite Arab Union and the Hashemite royal regime ended on 14 July 1958 after the bloody military coup when a group of nationalist Iraqi officers overthrew the monarchy. This group was headed by Major-General 'Abd al-Karīm Qasim. The Sheykh of Kuwait congratulated the new Iraqi regime and visited Baghdad in

47. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. op.cit. pp. 77-78.

48. Schofield, Richard "The Kuwaiti Islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, and Iraqi Access to the Gulf" op.cit. p. 162.

49. Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p. 87.

50. Finnie, David H. op.cit. p. 124.

November 1958.⁵¹ During the three years 1958 to mid-1961, the Iraqi regime positively improved her relations with Kuwait and encouraged any steps which Kuwait took to assert her independence from Britain. The Iraqi government also, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, supported the Sheykhdom of Kuwait's membership in many international organisations.⁵²

The Independence of Kuwait


No development in the frontier demarcation had taken place between Kuwait and Iraq during the three years 1958-1961, despite Kuwaiti requests to set up a committee to settle the boundaries. On June 19 1961, Kuwait achieved full independence by an exchange of notes between Sheykh 'Abdullah of Kuwait and the last British Political Resident, Sir William Luce, and the government of Kuwait issued a statement that day giving the text of the agreement. The correspondence contained the following provisions:

1. The agreement of January 23 1899 shall be terminated as being inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait.
 2. The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a spirit of close friendship.
 3. When appropriate the two governments shall consult together on matters which concern them both.
 4. Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's Government to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter request such assistance.
- The two countries also concluded a defence agreement for ten years.⁵³

51. Al-'Aqqād, Ṣalāḥ. *al-Tayārāt al-Siyāsiyyah fī al-Khalīj al-'Arabī Min Bidāyat al-'Usūr al-Ḥadīthah Ḥattā Azmat 1990-1991*. *op.cit.* p. 379.

52. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* pp. 102-103.

53. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* pp. 105-106.



Source: International Boundaries Research Unit. *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 3.

October 1994. Department of Geography. University of Durham. England, 1994.

Qāsim's Claim Over Kuwait

Six days after Kuwait had gained independence, in June 1961, the Iraqi Prime Minister Major-General, 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim, held a conference in which he stated:

The Republic of Iraq has decided to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait and to demand the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs to Iraq as part of the province of Basrah... We shall, accordingly, issue a decree appointing the Sheykh of Kuwait as a qāimmaqām of Kuwait, who will come under the authority of the Basrah Wilāyat. The Iraq Republic will never cede a single inch of this land. When we say this, it means we can execute it. 54

The Iraqi claim to Kuwait was based on two issues, the first issue being the historical connection of Kuwait with the Ottoman Empire and the second the succession of the new State of Iraq to the territorial sovereignty of that empire over Kuwait.⁵⁵

The Kuwaiti Reaction to Qasim's Claim

The Kuwaiti government as a reaction to General Qāsim's claim, declared that the Sheykhdom of Kuwait was an independent Arab State with full sovereignty, recognised internationally. The Kuwaiti declaration added that Kuwait had signed the 1899 agreement with Britain as an independent entity, while it was emphasised that Iraq had aided Kuwait's successful applications for membership of international organisations during the end of the 1950s and early 1960. The Kuwaiti declaration asserted that it had never been subjected to direct Turkish interference, that it had been controlled by the al-Ṣabāḥ dynasty since 1756 and that the title of *qāimmaqām* was never used in Kuwait.⁵⁶

Many sources indicate that the purpose of Abd al-Karīm Qāsim's claim over Kuwait was to rally domestic support for a foreign adventure that would alleviate Qāsim's problems in maintaining internal stability. Others pointed to the massive oil wealth of the Al-Ṣabāḥ Sheykhdom, which, by 1960, was the world's third largest oil

54. Al-Samarrai, Bashir. *Military Build up and Political Instability in the Gulf: 1965-1974*. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Denver, 1978, p. 45.

55. Al-Baharnah, Husain M. *The Arabian Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and Their International Problems*. *op.cit.* p. 252.

56. Day, Alan J. *op.cit.* p.246 and al-Baharnah, Husain. *op.cit.* p. 252.

producer. Kuwait's annual production, at over 620 million barrels, was nearly twice that of Iraq, while proven Kuwaiti oil reserves were estimated at around a quarter of the reserves in the world.⁵⁷

Kuwait Requests British Troops

Five days after Qāsim had laid claim to Kuwait and moved his troops to the Baṣrah province in the south of Iraq, Sheykh 'Abdullah of Kuwait delivered to the British Political Agent in Kuwait, Sir John Richmond, the following note:

In view of the military movements which have been undertaken by the Iraqi government on the borders of Kuwait and which threaten the security of Kuwait, I have decided to submit a request for military assistance to Her Majesty's Government in accordance with the notes which I exchanged with Sir William Luce on June 19, 1961. ⁵⁸

The Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute became the most explosive issue in the region during the early 1960s, and involved the regional powers in conflict. Britain, at Kuwait's request, responded by sending 7,000 British troops backed by 3,000 more on standby and auxiliary duties in the British bases in Kenya, Aden, Bahrain, Sharjah and Muscat. The British operation, which was known as "Operation Vantage", was until the second Gulf War the largest British military operation in the Arab world since the Second World War. Saudi Arabia also hurried to send some 2,000 troops to Kuwait to support the Kuwaiti troops, which were estimated at between 2000 and 3000 men compared to the Iraqi total of 60,000 armed men.⁵⁹

The UN and the Iraqi Claim

The issue of the Kuwaiti dispute with Iraq was discussed at a special meeting of the United Nations held on July 2 1961. The two countries' representatives in the United Nations, Britain (on behalf of Kuwait) and Iraq argued their claims over Kuwait. However, the discussions remained unresolved.

57. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. op.cit. p. 108.

58. Shwadran, Benjamin. *The Kuwaiti Incident in Middle East Affairs*, January 1962, New York, p. 10.

59. Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p. 83.

‘Abd-al-Nāsser and the Arab League

The United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) which supported Kuwait's independence but also opposed the British intervention, called for the problem to be resolved within the Arab League.⁶⁰ Discussions over the Kuwaiti crisis ended in deadlock when the Soviet Union voted against the Kuwaiti application for full membership in the United Nations. The Soviet representative accused Kuwait of not being fully independent and still being subject to continuing political and military domination of the British government.⁶¹ The Arab League Council engaged in discussions over the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute on 5 July 1961 and, as a result of a draft produced by Morocco and Saudi Arabia, the members of the Arab League voted unanimously to admit Kuwait as a member of the Arab League, despite strong protests from Iraq who withdrew from the League and declared, in many communiqués, that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq.

The Arab league adopted on the issue of the Kuwait crisis the following points:

1. (a) The government of Kuwait undertakes to request the withdrawal of British forces from Kuwait territory as soon as possible. (b) The government of the Republic of Iraq undertakes not to use force in the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq.
2. The Council undertakes to support every wish Kuwait may express for union or a federation with other countries of the Arab League.
3. The Council decides to welcome the State of Kuwait as a member of the Arab League.
4. The Council decides to assist the State of Kuwait in joining the United Nations.
5. The Arab states undertake to provide effective assistance for the preservation of Kuwait's independence, upon its request, and the Council confers upon the Secretary-

60. Reaction from the Arab world was overwhelmingly pro-Kuwait. Egypt's Nasser, politically at odds with Qasim of Iraq, publicly expressed support of the Al-Ṣabāḥ, and Saudi Arabia sent troops to Kuwait. The Arab and International support (especially from Britain) for Kuwait persuaded the Iraqi regime not to invade Kuwait. See Kechichian, Joseph A. *Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations*. op.cit. p. 9. See also Al-'Aqqād, Ṣalāḥ. op.cit. p. 380.

61. Litwak, Robert. *Security in the Persian Gulf 2: Sources of Inter-State Conflict*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower, London, 1981, p. 27.

General the power to take the necessary measures for the urgent implementation of this resolution.⁶²

With the acceptance by the Kuwait government of the Arab League decisions, 3,000 men headed by a Saudi commander and consisting of troops from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic arrived in Kuwait by mid-September to replace the British troops there. Britain completed her withdrawal in October 1961.⁶³

The Coup of 1963 and the Iraqi Recognition

The dispute between Iraq and Kuwait did not witness any development until the overthrow of the Qasim regime on 8 February 1963. This was replaced by a new military group headed by 'Abd al-Salām 'Arif. Relations between Iraq and Kuwait improved and the new Iraqi regime agreed to conclude an agreement with the Sheykh of Kuwait. On 4 October 1963 a document confirming Iraqi recognition was signed in Baghdad by Sheykh Şabāḥ Al-Sālim Al-Şabāḥ the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and heir apparent, and Major-General Aḥmed Ḥasan al-Bakr, the Prime Minister of Iraq. The two countries agreed on the following accord:

1. The Republic of Iraq recognises the independence and complete sovereignty of the state of Kuwait and its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21.7.1932 and which the ruler of Kuwait, in his letter dated 10 August 1932, accepted.
2. The two Governments shall work towards reinforcing the fraternal relations subsisting between the two sister countries, inspired by their national duty, common interest and aspiration to complete Arab Unity.
3. The two Governments shall work towards establishing cultural, commercial and economic co-operation between the two countries and the exchange of technical information.

62. Lauterpacht, E and others (eds). *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents*. Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge, 1991, p. 55.

63. Bishku, Michael B. *op.cit.* p. 85.

4. In order to realise all the foregoing objectives, they shall immediately establish diplomatic relations between them at the level of ambassador.⁶⁴

Some sources indicate that Iraq's charge to Kuwait for its recognition and territorial definition was an interest-free loan to be repaid over 25 years. Even the size of the loan is in dispute, with figures ranging between \$15 million, \$85 million and 30 million Kuwaiti dinars.⁶⁵

Iraq Requests Warbah and Bubiyan

Despite the recognition and territorial definition agreement of 1963 between Iraq and Kuwait, the Iraqi recognition did not extend to acceptance of a precise delimitation of the boundary. The two countries did not reach any solution to the Iraqi request to cede or lease the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. The Kuwaiti government rejected any discussion over the two islands until the government of Iraq had demarcated the boundary with Kuwait.

Until the crisis of 2 August 1990, Iraqi governments refused to draw the boundary with Kuwait until it ceded or leased the two islands (it should be noted that no Iraqi official council had ratified the agreement of 1963 between Kuwait and Iraq).⁶⁶ Kuwait became the 111th member of the United Nations on May 14 1963 after her first two attempts were vetoed by the Soviet Union. Relations between Iraq and Kuwait improved in many aspects, especially when Kuwait asked the Arab League to withdraw its force in 1963. The two countries established many committees to deal with different affairs, particularly the boundary between them. However, the two countries did not reach any compromise on the frontier position.⁶⁷

64. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* pp. 111-112.

65. Kelly, J.B. *Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. p. 277, and al-Baharnah, Husain. *op.cit.* p. 252 and al-'Aqqād, Ṣalāḥ. *op.cit.* p. 382.

66. Schofield, Richard "The Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, and Iraqi access to the Gulf." *op.cit.* pp. 166-169 and Bishku, Michael B. *op.cit.* p. 87.

67. Finnie, David H. *op.cit.* pp. 149-150.

The Coup of 1968

On 30 July 1968, the ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Arif regime was overthrown by a faction of the Ba’thist party. The new regime did not change the *status quo* towards the dispute with Kuwait, because of the confrontation with Iran over the Shatt el-‘Arab. But the Iraqi claim to the two islands continued during the early 1970s. As a result of Iranian pressure on the Shatt el-‘Arab at the end of the 1960s the Iraqi Defence and Interior Ministers visited Kuwait and requested to be allowed to control the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan to protect the Iraqi port of Umm Qaşr. The Iraqi Foreign Minister Murtaḍā ‘Abd Al-Bāqī made a visit to Kuwait, and presented a scheme for the settlement of the border question. The Iraqis proposed to recognise a boundary delimitation based on the 1932 and 1963 agreements, on condition that Kuwait recognise cession of the two islands in favour of Iraq. However, the Kuwaiti government rejected the Iraqi proposal.⁶⁸ Later in 1972 and in 1973, the Iraqi government returned to their demand that Kuwait should cede Warbah and Bubiyan.

Kuwait Rejects the Iraqi Requests over the Two Islands

The Kuwait government rejected all the Iraqi demands on the two islands and declared that it was not prepared to demarcate any boundary with Iraq other than that set out in the 1932 and 1963 agreements.⁶⁹ In an interview given by the Iraqi foreign Minister ‘Abd Al-Bāqī to Lebanese journalists and as a reaction to the Kuwaiti rejection of ceding or leasing the two islands to Iraq, he claimed that:

the whole of Kuwait is a disputed area. There is a document saying that Kuwait is Iraqi territory. There is no document, which says it is not Iraqi territory....We are giving up Kuwait for the sake of the two islands (Warbah and Bubiyan) Iraq should be a Gulf State.

68. Kelly, J.B. *op.cit.* p. 282.

69. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes.* *op.cit.* pp. 116-117.

Iraqi Troops on Kuwait Border

On 20 March 1973 Iraqi troops attacked a Kuwaiti police station at al-Şāmitah--about two and half miles from the two countries' *de facto* borders, which resulted in the death of some Kuwaiti and Iraqi border guards.⁷⁰ It was reported that up to 3,000 Iraqi troops were positioned in Kuwaiti territory south of Umm Qasr at the time of the al-Şāmitah attack. However, the Iraqi troops withdrew from al-Şāmitah on 5 April 1973, after a strong protest from Kuwait, an angry public reaction in the Arabian peninsula and also Soviet advice that the dispute be settled peacefully. After the incident of al-Şāmitah, the relationship between the two countries had deteriorated and the border remained closed.

Saddam's Proposal over the Two Islands

On August 1973, the Iraqi vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council, Şaddam Ḥussein, made a proposal that Kuwait should cede Warbah and a two-mile strip of a land from al-'Abdalī east to the Khawr al-Zubair, and half of Bubiyan island, in full sovereignty to Iraq in exchange for Iraqi recognition of the demarcation of the boundaries between the two countries. The Kuwait government's reaction to the Iraqi proposal was negative, and it declared that there would be no discussion over the two islands until the government of Iraq re-demarcated the boundary.⁷¹ Talks on the delimitation of the border made little progress over the following years and the relations between the two countries did not improve until Iraq changed her policy towards the Arab Gulf States after Şaddām Ḥussein signed the Algiers accord with the Shah of Iran in March 1975. This settled the conflict between the two countries over the Shatt el-Arab.

Throughout the mid-1970s Iraq adopted a new policy of expanding her economic and political influence to play a greater political role within the Arab Gulf

70. *MEES*. No.22. 23 March 1973, London, p. 16, and *MEES*. Issue No.23. 30 March 1973. London, p. 14. El-Hakim, Ali A. *op.cit.* p.250, and Bishku, Michael B. *op.cit.* p. 87.

71. Schofield, Richard. *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* pp. 117-119.

States. The relations between Iraq and Kuwait particularly improved following a number of conciliatory statements. Various joint committees were set up to deal with many problems, especially the border question. In 1975, Iraq proposed another plan to cede Warbah Island and lease half of Bubiyan island to Iraq for 99 years in exchange for fresh water for Kuwait from the Shatt al-Arab. The Kuwaiti government stressed in December 1976 that both the two islands belonged to Kuwait as defined in the 1932 exchange of letters and in the 1963 agreement.⁷²

During the period of 1977-1980, Kuwait tried several times to demarcate the boundary with Iraq but without any result. By two agreements in November 1979 and May 1980 Iraq secured access to deep-water facilities for trans-shipment purposes at Mina Shuwaikh in Kuwait Bay. The outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in September 1980 led to a revival of the Iraqi claim to Warbah and Bubiyan islands, when the Iraqi president Ṣaddām Ḥussein repeated the Iraqi proposal of 1975 and demanded that Kuwait cede Warbah and lease Bubiyan.⁷³

Iranian Threats

The state visit of the Kuwaiti crown prince Sheykh Sa'd Al-'Abdullah to Baghdad in November, 1984 resulted in the formation of a common boundary committee. Iranian Radio claimed that Kuwait had reached an agreement with Iraq under which Iraq obtained the use of Bubiyan and two other islands in the Gulf. The broadcast also quoted a speech by the Iranian Parliament Speaker (later the Iranian President) Hashemī Rafsanjāni warning Kuwait "not to play with fire". He threatened that, if Iran were to capture Bubiyan, Kuwait would have no territorial claim to the island. Kuwait as a reaction to the Iranian threat deployed a Kuwaiti force on the island of Bubiyan on 2 December 1984.⁷⁴

72. Bishku, Michael B. *op.cit.* p.87 and Day, Alan J. *op.cit.* p.225 and *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* p. 305.

73. Litwak, Robert. *op.cit.* p. 32.

74. Day, Alan J. *op.cit.* p. 247.

Kuwait Supports Saddam

As a result of the Kuwaiti support for Iraq (which was estimated at over \$10 billion in cash and the provision of 125,000 barrels a day during the Iran-Iraq war, the two governments of Iraq and Kuwait held many meetings to settle the border dispute between the two countries. Iraq, in fact, did not take seriously any discussions to demarcate the boundary unless Kuwait agreed to cede to her the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, especially in light of the Iranian attack on the Iraqi ports on the Gulf and the occupation of the Faw peninsula in 1986. By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, after Iran's acceptance of United Nations resolution 598 in 1988, many official visits were held between Iraq and Kuwait. Kuwaiti officials were reportedly hopeful that Iraq might go a long way to solve the border issue in recognition of the massive financial aid which had been provided from Kuwait during the war with Iran.⁷⁵

Iraq's Claim over Kuwait and the UAE

Relations between Iraq and Kuwait, following the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran in 1988, remained in the same position without any progress in settling the border dispute. The Iraqi President Ṣaddām Ḥussein, in preparation for the invasion of Kuwait and to win over Arab public opinion declared on 2 April 1990 that Iraq was capable of destroying half of Israeli territory. Ṣaddām also, during the Arab summit conference which was held in Baghdad in May 1990, was able to make known his demands after his war with Iran, which had been fought on behalf of all Arabs. He claimed that every one-dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil meant a loss of \$1 billion a year for Iraq, and Ṣaddām accused some Arab countries in OPEC of adopting a quota-busting policy within the organisation.

On 15 July 1990, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and foreign minister Tārīq 'Azīz delivered a memorandum to the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Chedli Klibi, complaining bitterly that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were operating

75. After the termination of the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, Iraq was left with a debt of \$16 billion to Kuwait. See *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries*. *op.cit.* p.306, and Schofield, Richard *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* pp. 121-124.

quota-busting policies within OPEC and accusing Kuwait of having extended into Iraqi territory and stolen \$2,400 million worth of Iraqi oil from the Rumailah field during the Iraqi war with Iran.

Kuwait Rejects the Iraqis' Claim

The Kuwaiti government rejected the Iraqi accusation and called, in a memorandum, for the solution of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute by an Arab committee, and stated that Kuwait had attempted to demarcate the boundary with Iraq for a long time without any positive answer from the Iraqi side. Kuwait also stated that the decrease of the oil price was as a result of the international economic situation without any intervention from Kuwait.

The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

After many unsuccessful initiatives to contain the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait by the Saudi Arabian King, the Egyptian president, the King of Jordan and the chairman of the PLO, Iraqi troops estimated at 300,000 invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 with the help of what the Iraqis claimed to be a group of Kuwaiti revolutionaries, and overthrew the Al-Şabāḥ monarchy. The Iraqi government later claimed that Kuwait was a part of Iraq and announced that Kuwait was the nineteenth province, to which they gave the title of Kazimah.⁷⁶

76. Al-ʿAqqād, Şalāḥ. *op.cit.* pp. 430-436.

The Arab Summit in Cairo

The Iraqi invasion was condemned by the UN Security Council and, on the Arab side, the majority of Arab countries. At an emergency summit held by the Arab League in Cairo on 10 August, Egypt, Syria and Morocco backed a resolution to send a pan-Arab force to defend Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states against attack. They also voted in favour of imposing economic sanctions against Iraq. Many Arab countries such as Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Algeria and Mauritania entertained reservations about the Arab League decisions on Iraq. Libya, the PLO and Iraq rejected the resolution. Tunisia was the only Arab country not to attend.⁷⁷

Şaddam accepts the Treaty of 1975

On 8 of August the Iraqi president, to secure his borders with Iran, agreed to accept the Iranian conditions for a permanent cease-fire and to withdraw from Iranian territory, to exchange prisoners and to share the sovereignty of the Shatt el-'Arab-the main reason for the Iran-Iraq war, which had continued for eight years.⁷⁸

International Coalition

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait continued until February 1991, when the American troops with the international coalition troops, liberated Kuwait in the operation called "Desert Storm". The UN Security Council, with the support of the United States, issued more than twenty resolutions against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait.⁷⁹

The International Commission

On 2 May 1991 the UN Secretary-General set up an independent commission as a result of resolution 687 which was adopted by the Security Council on 3 April 1991,

77. *Britain and the Gulf Crisis*. HMSO Publication Centre. London, 1992. p. 9.

78. Bahbah, Bishara A " Why Saddam Invaded Kuwait" in: Bennis, Phyllis and Moushabad, Michel (eds.) *Beyond the Storm A Gulf Crisis Reader*. Canon Gate Press, London, 1992, p. 53

79. Weller, M. *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath*. Grotius Publications Limited, London, 1992, p. 435.

to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. The commission consisted of three independent expert members besides the two members from Iraq and Kuwait:

Mukhtar Kosoma-Itmada	Indonesia	President.
Ian Broke	Sweden	Member.
William Robinson	New Zealand	Member.
Riyadh al-Qaisi	Iraq	Member.
Tariq Razoqi	Kuwait	Member.

Since being set up in May 1991, the Commission has held five sessions and most of its operations have been dependent (in its delimitation) on the previous documents of the 1913 agreement which was not ratified the exchanged letters of 1923 and 1932, and the Iraq-Kuwait accord of 1963. The President of the committee formed by the Secretary-General (Butrus Ghālī) resigned after seven months from the date of his nomination, on 20/1/1992. Kuwait sources mentioned that the reasons for resignation were personal. A Greek Jurist Nicolas Flinikos, was nominated to replace the Indonesian diplomat. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on 27 May 1993 to approve the 20 May 1993 final report on the Demarcation of the International Boundary between Iraq and Kuwait by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission. On 16 of April the committee members had ratified the following decision on the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq, the representative of Iraq not participating in the vote:

1. That the boundary monument on the Iraq-Saudi Arabian border, Pillar no. 1, shall be the starting point for the boundary along the Thalweg of Wādī al-Batin, and therefore, the tri-point of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;
2. That the boundary south of Şafwān shall be located at a distance of 1,430 metres from the south-west extremity of the compound wall of the old customs post along the old road from Safwan to Kuwait;
3. That the boundary at the northern end of Wādī al-Baṭīn shall be the intersection of the Thalweg of the Wādī and the latitude of the point south of Şafwān;

4. That the boundary south of Umm Qaşr shall coincide with the location at which the boundary line on map sheet 5549-I of series K 7611, Edition 2 (1990), produced by the Military Survey of the United Kingdom, crosses the western shore of Khowr Zhobeir;
5. That the junction of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr ‘Abdallah shall be the one best identified as the 1932 marker and transposed onto modern orthophoto maps produced by the Commission.

The Commission further decided that:

- A) The boundary line in the Wādī al-Bāṭin shall be a series of straight line segments of about 2 kilometres length best approximating to the lowest point line in the Wādī;
- B) The boundary line from the point at the northern end of the Wādī al-Bāṭin to the point south of Şafwan shall be a line running along the common latitude of the points;
- C) The boundary line from the point south of Şafwan to the point south of Umm Qaşr shall be the shortest line between the points; and
- D) The boundary line from the point south of Umm Qaşr on the shore shall follow the low water line up to the location directly opposite the junction of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr ‘Abdallah.⁸⁰

On 26 August 1992, the Security Council welcomed the report of the boundary demarcation commission between Iraq and Kuwait by resolution 773.⁸¹ The Iraqi member in fact boycotted most of the Commission's sessions, refused to deliver any documents concerned with the border with Kuwait, and declared previous rejection of the Commission's decisions.⁸² The most explosive element of the Commissions' boundary demarcation was that it moved the Umm Qaşr (the most important Iraqi port on the Gulf) boundary to the north, putting all, or most of the naval and commercial ports under Kuwaiti control in addition to many oil wells. Kuwait had never even suggested that Umm Qaşr belonged to Kuwait and all the Kuwaiti government maps show the line of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi boundary as south of Umm Qaşr.

80. Weller, M. *op.cit.* pp. 438-439. For more details over the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border demarcation, see. *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.39. 28 June 1993. pp. D1 to D4. *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.39. 28 June 1993. p. D1.

81. Mendelson, Maurice & Hulton, Susan. *op.cit.* p. 117

82. A Sarjānī, Khālid. *op.cit.* p. 235.

Kuwait welcomed the United Nations resolution of the demarcation of boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the Kuwaiti representative to the UN said: if Iraq does not accept the results of the Commission, that in itself is an invitation not only to maintain economic sanctions against Iraq but to use all necessary means to make Iraq accept, even by force.⁸³

The Iraq Reaction to the International Commission Demarcation


Iraqi reaction to the new boundary demarcation was announced, on the official side, by the Foreign Minister Muḥammad Sa'īd Al-Ṣaḥāf who claimed that the Iraqi People would never accept the new Iraqi-Kuwaiti demarcation according to the new map of the United Nations and that he considered that the Security Council ratification would transform the area into a powder-keg. The Iraqi minister accused the Commission of being on the Kuwaiti side and subject to international pressure. Minister Al-Ṣaḥāf declared that if Iraq was obliged to accept the boundary demarcation with Kuwait, the Iraqi people would not be satisfied because Iraqi rights had been abused.

The Iraqi Foreign Minister made it clear, in a long memorandum to the United Nations Secretary-General, that he considered that the international Commission of Border Demarcation was dependent, in its work, on the 1963 accord, which was not legitimate and had not been signed by the Iraqi President.

83. Kuwait has recaptured 11 oil wells previously occupied and operated by Iraq in the Rutqa area of northern Kuwait following the demarcation of the UN Commission. The Kuwaiti Oil Minister claims that eight of the 11 wells were located south of the "Arab League Line" where a contingent of forces from Arab League member countries was stationed following the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border crisis in the early 1960s. See *MEES* Vol. XXXVI. No.23. 8 March 1993. p. A7, Jansen, G.H. *op.cit.* p. 9.

On the other side of this, all opposition parties to the Iraqi regime rejected the new boundary demarcation between Iraq and Kuwait and called, in separate communiqués, on the United Nations not to ratify the international commission report.⁸⁴

84. In June 1992 the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed al-Samarāī warned that “imposing the border by force would leave the region in a state of boiling tension”. In November 1992, Iraqi Oil Minister Osāma al-Hītī said the six wells belonged to Iraq “and will remain Iraqi”. He said Baghdad was keeping a close eye on its border oilfields and if a neighbouring country (Kuwait) tried to increase production from one, “We will insist on having our full share. See Pike, David “Cross-border hydrocarbon reserves” *op.cit.* p. 192, and Al-Sarjānī, Khālīd. *op.cit.* p. 235.



The U.N.'s Involvement


The government of Kuwait after the termination of the UN Commission's demarcation of the boundary with Iraq, started to build a 240-km border-ditch, fortified with 1.3 million Iraqi-planted land mines recovered since 1991.⁸⁵ The second Gulf war (1990-1991) led to very serious precedents being set regarding border disputes, since it has always been the case in modern history that border demarcation should be made by a committee nominated by the United Nations without a request from the two concerned parties or authorisation of the international organisation to undertake such a function.

This committee had to reduce a part of the Iraqi territories along the border in favour of Kuwait. As a result of the committee's decisions the movement of Iraq has been restricted in the port of Umm Qaşr, and Iraq has been prevented from exploiting some oil wells in the Rumaila region, which were Iraqi oil wells before her invasion of Kuwait.

Many reports indicate that the demarcation of the border between the two countries represents a temporary political situation, because the existing system had a bad relationship with the United Nations and the Great Powers, and was unacceptable to international public opinion. Whatever the evaluation of the Iraqi regime, it will vanish one day, and the Iraqi people will continue to feel oppressed by this way of demarcating their borders with Kuwait. It is expected that, in the long run, the dispute between the two parties will arise again because Iraq has been forced to accept the border demarcation with Kuwait and the *fait accompli* policy.⁸⁶

85. *Jane's Sentinel Newsletter*: The Gulf States. Vol.2. No.12. 1995. p. 8.

86. It should be noted that Iraq, with or without Saddam Hussein, will continue to be obsessed with the vulnerability of its narrow access to the Gulf. Iraq has only about 40 miles of coastline and it will always want access to or control of the two Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Those two islands would double Iraq's coastline and give it control of both banks of the Khaur Abdullah, bringing major influence in the Gulf. See Katzman, Kenneth "Beyond Dual Containment" *op.cit.* p. 22, and Al-'Aqqād, Ṣalāh "Al-Iṭār al-Tārikhī Li-Mushkilāt al-Ḥudūd al-'Arabiyyah" *Majallat al-Siyāsah a-Duwalīyyah* (International Politics) Issue No. 111. January 1993. The Political and Strategic Center, Cairo, p. 175.



Source: International Boundaries Research Unit. *Boundary and Security Bulletin*. Vol. 2. No. 3. October 1994. Department of Geography. University of Durham. England, 1994.

The Iranian Claim to Bahrain

Historical Background

Introduction

In the early history of Bahrain before Islam, Arabs and Persians dominated the islands on account of their pearl-fisheries. Between the seventh and eleventh century it became part of the Islamic Caliphate under Arab authority. After the downfall of the Abbasid Caliphate, the islands of Bahrain were subject to various independent Arab dynasties until the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese occupied them.

Portuguese rule in the islands lasted from 1522 to 1602. With the defeat of the Portuguese in 1602, the islands came under the domination of the Persians until 1783. However, control was wrested away from the Persians by various Sheykhhs, who occupied Bahrain for short periods. The Sultan of Muscat held Bahrain in 1718 and 1720.⁸⁷

The modern history of Bahrain as an independent Emirate dates from 1783, when the 'Utubī Arab Sheykhhs from Zubārah on the Qatar coast conquered the islands and expelled the Persian garrison. Sovereignty over the islands is still in the hands of the descendants of the 'Utubī tribe, who are known, at the present time, as Al-Khalīfah.⁸⁸ The controversy over the sovereignty of the islands between Britain (the protector of Al-Khalīfah) and the Persians is based on many arguments over legitimacy. The Persian argument concentrates on her long-established ancient title over the islands, on the British acknowledgement of the Persian right of sovereignty and on the doctrine of international law that a territory belonging to a sovereign state cannot be lawfully detached so long as its annexation by another state has not been

87. Al-Baharna, Husain M. *The Arab Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and Their International Problems*. *op.cit.* p. 167.

officially recognised by the lawful owner of the territory. The arguments of Britain against the Persian claim are based on the assertion that Bahrain is an independent state and therefore at liberty to place herself under British protection, that Britain has never recognised the Persian sovereignty over the island and that international law does not recognise the principle that the consent of the dispossessed state is necessary to validate a change of sovereignty.⁸⁹

Iranian Claim

The Persian claim of sovereignty over the islands of Bahrain goes back to the agreement of 1820, when the British government concluded a treaty with Bahrain, which was also concluded with the other Sheykhs of the Arab Gulf. As a result of the Persian claim on Bahrain and with the intention of finding some solution to the Persian-British dispute, the British Political Resident (Bruce) in the Gulf concluded, on 30 August 1822, an agreement with the governor of Shirāz, Zaki Khan. The agreement comprised five articles. The second article starts with the positive statement that the island of Bahrain "has always been subordinate to the province of Fārs". The same article also confirms that the tribe of Bani 'Utubī, the possessors of the island, "who have lately become unruly and disobedient", had applied to the commanding officer of the British forces for a distinguishing flag. This flag, if it had been granted, was to be withdrawn and no assistance was to be rendered (by the British) to the Bani 'Utubī thereafter. In articles 4 and 5, the British government was committed to supplying Persia with war vessels for the purpose of conquering Bahrain.⁹⁰

It should be noted that the Government of Bombay entirely disapproved of Bruce's journey to Shirāz. Later, the British government in Bombay disapproved the agreement of 30 August 1822, in a statement issued by the Governor, Mount Stuart

88. Kelly J.B "The Persian Claim to Bahrain" *International Affairs*, Vol. 33. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 53.

89. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. *Bahrain Islands A Legal and Diplomatic Study of the British-Iranian Controversy*. Fredrick A. Praeger, Inc, New York, 1955, pp. 204-205.

90. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. *op.cit.* pp. 106-108.

Elphinstone. He wrote to Bruce and told him that his action was not only unauthorised, but entirely inconsistent with the views of the government and with the “obligation of the public faith”. The Shah of Persia also rejected the agreement and declared that it had been made without his knowledge or injunction.⁹¹

Persia, until 1845, did not make an effective claim to the islands. The most important Persian claim was renewed in 1845, when the Prime Minister of Persia, Ḥajī Mirzā Aghāssī, had issued a statement on March 15 1844, which listed the following arguments in favour of Persia, based on many evidences proving the right of Persia to the ownership of the islands. Mirzā’s argument concentrates on the following claims:

- (I) The Persian Gulf from the commencement of the Shatt al-Arab to Muscat belongs to Persia, and that all the islands of that sea, without exception, and without the participation of any other government, belong entirely to Persia as indeed, in Your Excellency's language, you call that sea the Persian Gulf.
- (II) Bahrain has been under the authority of the governor of Fars from 1300 A.D. In the commencement of the reign of his Majesty the late Shah, the Arab Banī ‘Atub came and conquered it. 'From the tribe itself. . . presents have generally been sent to the governor of Fars.'
- (III) All European and Turkish books of geography, as well as the books of travellers, considered Bahrain as Persian.
- (IV) Bruce's agreement of 30 August 1822 recognised Persia's ownership of Bahrain.

A further argument presented by Persia in support of her claim is the alleged declaration of loyalty and the payment of tribute by the rulers of Bahrain to the government of Persia.⁹²

91. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. *op.cit.* p. 106, and Day, Alan J. *Border and Territorial Disputes*. Longman, London, 2nd edn, 1987, p. 227.

92. Al-Baharna, Husain M. *op.cit.* pp. 167-170.

Britain Rejects the Iranian Claim

The British government's attitude to the Persian Prime Minister's statement over Bahrain was to reject it with another statement issued by the East India Company Committee on July 31 1845. The British statement contains, *inter alia*, the following: (I) that the British government had treated the Sheykhs of Bahrain as independent authorities since their occupation of the island in 1783; (II) that Bahrain might have been a dependency of Fars while the Persians were in actual possession of the island but that to allege that the Persians possessed it since 1300 AD is contrary to the best evidence that could be produced on the subject and; (III) the 1822 treaty had no legal significance as it had been expressly disavowed.⁹³

The Committee therefore concluded that Persia had no legitimate claim to sovereignty over the islands of Bahrain. The Persian claim of 1845 was a response to the critical period witnessed in the history of the ruling family of Al-Khalīfah. During that period the islands of Bahrain faced an internal conflict amongst the Al-Khalīfah family themselves. This resulted in some Sheykhs offering loyalty to Persia in return for her assistance and assistance, from the sultan of Muscat. There was also an external threat from the Wahhabis, Omanis and the government of Persia.⁹⁴

The Iranian Claims During the 1920s

After 1845 no development was effected concerning the relationship between Britain and Persia over the sovereignty of the islands. However, during the 1920s, the government of Persia dispatched two notes of protest against Britain. The first Persian protest note over Bahrain was dated 22 November 1927, when Britain concluded the agreement of Jeddah with Ibn Sa'ud on 20 May 1927. The Persian claim concentrated on article 6 of the agreement in which reference was made to the maintenance of friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of Kuwait and Bahrain.⁹⁵ The second Persian protest was dated 2 August 1928.

93. Day, Alan. *op.cit.* p. 228.

94. Kelley, J.B. *op.cit.* p. 60.

95. Day, Alan. *op.cit.* p. 227.

The British government replied to the two Persian protest notes, and rejected and denied both of them. The two British notes, dated 18 January 1928 and 18 February 1929, denied emphatically that there were any valid grounds upon which the claim of the Persian government to the sovereignty over Bahrain was or could be based. The British government, since 1783, said they had played a significant role in protecting the Al-Khalīfah sovereignty over the islands against the Persians, Wahhabis and the Sultan of Muscat⁹⁶

The Iranian Claims During the 1930s

The government of Iran renewed its claim in 1934, the first protest being against the American government, when it stated that the concession granted to the standard Oil Company in Bahrain could not be recognised as it had not been obtained in Tehran. The second protest was against the British government and referred to the establishment of a British base in Bahrain.

Iran's affiliation with Bahrain

The British–Iranian controversy was again revived in the Iranian press during the oil crisis of 1950. In December 1952, an officially-published list of Persian electoral districts included the Bahrain islands and in November 1957, Bahrain was specified as one of the areas covered by the new Persian administration of the Ports and Islands in the Persian Gulf. Bahrain became the fourteenth province in Iran's new administrative plan, and the giving of two seats in the Iranian Parliament to Bahrain followed this. These were filled by two Bahrainis of Iranian origin, ‘Abdullah al-Zubrah and ‘Abd-al-Ḥamid Al-‘Aliwāt. During the 1950s, Bahrain was subjected to more pressure from Iran and also from some citizens of Persian origin. Passports issued by Bahrain were not recognised in Iran, and when Bahraini citizens entered

96. Al-Baharna, Husain M. *op.cit.* pp. 176-177.

Iran, their passports were withdrawn and a domestic pass was issued instead, and they could not leave if required for military service.⁹⁷

The Iranian claim to Bahrain has been based from time to time on the following grounds:

- (a) The history of Bahrain prior to 1783. Iran has contended that Bahrain formed part of Iran continuously except for the period of Portuguese occupation.
- (b) The absence of Iranian consent to the detachment of Bahrain from Iran.
- (c) The un-ratified agreement of 1822 between the Prince-Governor of Shiraz and Captain Bruce, the British Resident.
- (d) The gold coin alleged to have been struck in Bahrain in 1817.
- (e) Payment of *Peshkesh* (offerings or tribute) by the Sheykh of Bahrain to Iran from time to time.
- (f) The flying of the Iranian flag by Bahrain from time to time.
- (g) Letters from past Rulers of Bahrain admitting Iranian sovereignty.
- (h) The "Clarendon" letter of 1869.
- (i) The closeness of relations between Iran and Bahrain.⁹⁸

Britain Rejects the affiliation

The British government has never admitted the Iranian claim and their argument is based on the following:

- (a) That it manifestly absurd. The modern historical view is that from the eleventh to the sixteenth century Bahrain was an independent State. Although Iran controlled Bahrain at times from the end of the sixteenth century until 1783, this control was neither continuous nor unchallenged.

97. Burell, R.M. "Britain, Iran and the Persian Gulf : Some aspect of the Situation in the 1920s and 1930s" in. Hopwood, Derek *The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1972, p.p. 183-184. See also Al-Gharreb, 'Abdullah M. *Waja Dawur al-Majūs al-Ab'ād al-Tarīkhiyyah wa-al-'Aqā'idīyyah wa-al-Siyāsiyyah Li-al-Thawrah al-Irāniyyah* (n.p.) part one, 1988, Kuwait, p. 301.

98. (LR 6/14) (31 October 1967) *Territorial Disputes Between Iran and the Persian Gulf States*. Joint Research Department Memorandum, p. 1.

- (b) International law does not recognise that the consent of the dispossessed State is an indispensable condition for the valid transfer of sovereignty or for the acquisition of territory.
- (c) This agreement cannot be regarded as ever having been in force, since it was repudiated not only by the Government of Bombay but also by the Shah, who expressed his displeasure that the Prince-Governor of Shirāz should have entered into any arrangements without his knowledge.
- (d) There is no evidence that this coin was in fact minted in Bahrain.
- (e) It was remarked in 1845 that payment of tribute, presents and complimentary messages did not imply an acknowledgement of sovereignty, and in Bahrain's case, have not been confined to Iran. Arguments based on such payments would support claims, which could be made by Saudi Arabia, Muscat and Oman, Turkey or Egypt in addition to Iran.
- (f) Although the Iranian flag was hoisted in 1860, the Turkish flag shortly replaced it. For a period, both flags appear to have been flown simultaneously. The flying of the Iranian flag cannot therefore be regarded as conclusive.
- (g) It is possible that letters admitting Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain were addressed to the Iranian Government in 1799, 1816-17 and 1839, and almost certain that this occurred in 1860. The only letters made available to Her Majesty's Government appear to date from 1860, and little weight can be attached to them since Bahrain ostensibly submitted to Turkey immediately after hoisting the Iranian flag.
- (h) Although the Clarendon letter was loosely expressed, it does not admit the validity of the Iranian claim as the Iranian Government has contended. Indeed it confirmed Her Majesty's Government's intention of continuing to hold the Rulers of Bahrain to their treaty obligations as independent rulers.
- (i) The closeness of relations between Bahrain and Iran is hardly borne out by Iranian restrictions on Bahraini documents, stamps, visas. Much closer relations are

maintained between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and, in a different sense, between Bahrain and Her Majesty's Government.⁹⁹

The Shah of Iran's Claim

The Shah of Iran restated his claim to Bahrain in November, 22, 1957, when he said at a press conference in Tehran:

We consider Bahrain an integral part of Persia... we would gladly accept the allegiance of its ruler in the capacity of the first Iranian governor-general of Bahrain.

The Iranian claim was rejected by the Arab League, which reaffirmed on November 15 1957, that Bahrain was "Arab Territory".¹⁰⁰ The Iranian claim over Bahrain became more intensive during the 1960s. With the British announcement of their intention to withdraw from the Gulf region in 1968, the Shah's government revised and renewed its old claim over Bahrain. The Iranian claim consisted of some historical documents showing that the rulers of Bahrain had many times offered their loyalty to Fārs province and paid tributes (Zakāh and Taxes).¹⁰¹ The Iranian attitude towards the Bahrain question became more conciliatory during the late 1960s. The Shah of Iran declared, on 5 January 1969, that Bahrain's inhabitants were welcome to decide their own fate, although Iran would not want the island to be made over to anyone else without Iranian consent.

The UN Referendum

At the request of both Iran and Britain, the United Nations Secretary- General, U Thant, agreed on March 28 1970 to appoint a special representative to visit Bahrain in order to ascertain the wishes of its population with regard to its future status. The UN representative, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi (Italy) visited the islands of

99. (LR 6/14) (31 October 1967) *Territorial Disputes Between Iran and the Persian Gulf States*. *op.cit.* pp. 1-2.

100. Day, Alan. *op.cit.* p. 228.

101. Anthony, John Duke. *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*. The Middle East Institute, Washington. D.C. 1975, p. 159.

Bahrain between March 30 and April 18 1970 and, in his report issued on May 2, he declared:

*My conclusions have convinced me that the overwhelming majority of the people of Bahrain wish to gain recognition of their identity as a fully independent and sovereign state free to decide for itself her relations with other states.*¹⁰²

The United Nations Security Council unanimously endorsed the report of the secretary-general's special representative, and this endorsement was ratified by the Iranian Majlis, by 186 votes to 4 on May 14, and endorsed unanimously by the Iranian Senate Majlis four days later. The Shah of Iran's recognition of the islands of Bahrain came as a result of the British intention to withdraw from the Gulf region by the end of 1971, and he decided to moderate his position on Bahrain to consolidate his relationships with Saudi Arabia (the second pillar of Gulf security) and with the small Arab Gulf States.

From the early 1970s, by arrangement with Britain and the United States, Iran became the "policeman" of the region with the support of the two countries. Some reports indicate that Iranian recognition of Bahrain was given as compensation for Iranian occupation of the three strategic Arab islands situated at the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz (the Greater and Smaller Tunbs and Abu Musa).¹⁰³

Iran's Recognition of Bahrain

In June 1971, just prior to the Bahrain's independence and as a show of good will from the Shah of Iran, the two countries reached an agreement over their continental shelf boundary. The agreement drew a median line of approximately 29 nautical miles, essentially equidistant from both shores but wedged between the other continental shelf boundaries of Iran with Saudi Arabia and Qatar.¹⁰⁴

102. Day, Alan. *op.cit.* p. 228.

103. Litwak, Robert. *Security in the Persian Gulf 2: Sources of Inter-State conflict*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower, England, 1981, pp. 43-44.

104. Martin, Lenore G. *The Unstable Gulf Threat From Within*. *op.cit.* p. 62.

Iranian pressure on Bahrain became clearer when the Foreign Minister of Iran visited the islands two months before their independence. The Iranian minister put some conditions on the relationships between the two countries:

1. Iran desired to lease the Muḥarraq Air Base following the withdrawal of British forces.
2. Bahrain should refrain from entering into any form of federation or similar arrangement with Kuwait.
3. Bahrain should not interfere in Iran's claim to the three islands (the two Tunbs and Abu Musa).
4. Bahrain should open its doors to Iranian immigrants and its markets to Iranian goods.

The Al-Khalīfah of Bahrain had to accept some of the Iranian demands, especially the second demand, when it refused to join the UAE federation unless it could assume a leadership position. In addition it accepted the fourth demand.¹⁰⁵

Relations between Iran and Bahrain improved during the 1970s as a result of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf region, and the situation remained without any negative effects on Bahrain sovereignty until the fall of the Shah and the emergence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979.

The Iranian Claim of 1979

The Iranian claim over Bahrain became more insistent after the revolutionaries took power, when a leading figure of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ṣādeq Ruḥānī, threatened that Iran would annex Bahrain unless it adopted an Islamic government after the Iranian model.¹⁰⁶

The Egyptian President Sādāt and the Iraqi government responded by offering aid to Bahrain and the Arab Gulf States to counter the Iranian threat. The government of Bāzargān in Iran denounced the unauthorised statement of Ayatollāh Ruḥānī. The

105. Rathmell, Andrew "Bahrain: The Pearl Loses It's Lustre" *Middle East International*. 28 April 1995, London, pp. 18-19.

106. Ramazani, R.K. *The Gulf Co-operation Council Record and Analysis*. *op.cit.* p. 7.

foreign minister of Iran, Ibrāhīm Yazdī, declared that the Ruḥānī declaration did not represent the official view of Iran and that he represented only himself. This was followed two weeks later by a state visit made by the Iranian Assistant Prime Minister for Public Relations and Transition Affairs, Sādeq Tabatabāī.¹⁰⁷

It should be noted that the Iranian claims and threats to the Island of Bahrain still exist without any direct action except for the support and assistance of Islamic Shi'a groups and clerics. As a reaction to the attempted coup in Bahrain in December 1981 by a group belonging to the Islamic Front supported by Iran, the Prime Minister of Bahrain declared, in an interview, that there was "no internal danger in Bahrain, but the external danger is Iran and the present regime in Tehran". He added that the Iranian regime was inciting the Shi'ites in Bahrain and in the Gulf under slogans of the Islamic revolution and with sectarian motives against the Arab Gulf states and their regimes.¹⁰⁸

Since December 1994, Bahrain has not enjoyed social peace, though its stability has come under threat. The Bahraini protest movement, especially in the Shi'a areas, has come into bloody collision with the government security forces. The government of Bahrain, during 1995, faced protest movements, fire-bombings, waves of arrests, curfews and clashes between the security forces and the protesters. The total number of people detained since the trouble started is said by opposition groups, to be as high as 5,000. In January 1996 the government of Bahrain exiled three Shi'a clerics ('Ulamā').¹⁰⁹

Several senior ministers in Bahrain have given interviews and have insisted that the trouble has been instigated by a handful of foreign agents. The government of Bahrain has pointed the finger squarely at Tehran with the support of Lebanon's Ḥizbollah Party, and recalled her ambassador from Tehran.¹¹⁰ The ruling family of Al-Khalīfah still faces a real threat from Shi'a groups who are supported by the

107. Litwak, Robert. *op.cit.* pp. 44-45.

108. Ramazani, R.K. *op.cit.* p. 34.

109. Jarrah, Najm "Getting Tougher" *Middle East International* . 14 April 1995, London. p. 11, and Rathmell, Andrew. "Bahrain: The Pearl Loses It's Lustre" *op.cit.* pp. 18-19.

110. Rathmell, Andrew. *op.cit.* p. 19.

government in Iran. Since the outbreak of demonstrations and fire-bombings, the government of Bahrain has received assistance from many security forces and intelligence officers from the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.¹¹¹

The Iranian-United Arab Emirates Disputes over the Islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa

Introduction

The dispute between the UAE (Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah) and the Islamic Republic of Iran over the island of Abu Mūsā (Sharjah) and the two islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs (Ras al-Khaimah) has brought new tension to the Gulf, which has not enjoyed any type of stability for more than two decades. The tension is caused by the difficult dispute in which each party claims its own rights and sovereignty to the islands. Up to 1996 Iran refused to negotiate with the UAE over any of the disputed islands except for Abu Mūsā, and, in the latter case, it has made the condition that these negotiations must be between Iran and the Sharjah Emirate and not the federal government of the UAE, in view of the fact that the treaty was signed between Iran and the Sheykh of Sharjah in 1971 and not with the federal government.¹¹²

111. Jarrah, Najam "Blaming Foreign Agents" *Middle East International*. 3 February 1995, London, p. 10.

112. Iran adamantly refuses to accept the 'Arbitration' of the dispute and insists that the issue is a bilateral one that can be settled by direct negotiations, without preconditions or linkage of the two Tunbs (the Greater and the Lesser). It therefore rejects any 'internationalisation' of the dispute and involvement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The failure of the 1993 bilateral negotiations between Iran and the UAE led the GCC states, the Arab League and the Damascus Declaration States to decide that the matter should go to the ICJ. See. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" *op.cit.* p. 32. We should note that there is some difference in the references in fixing the distance between such islands and the Iranian and Arab Coasts. The Arab party believes that they are closer to their coasts and the Iranian party that they are closer to Iran. See Al-'Isā, Shamlān. "Al-Khilafāt Bayn al-Imārāt al-'Arabiyyah wa-Irān Ḥawl al-Juzur al-Thalāth" *op.cit.* pp. 52, 61.

The Claims of Two Countries

Iran and the United Arab Emirates (on behalf of the two Emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah) claim to have documents proving their historical suzerainty over the Islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Mūsā. The Persian / Iranian claim to the islands goes back to the pre-British period in the Gulf region. She claims that all these islands were controlled by the Persian government at that time.

The Iranian Claim

This claim is historically dependent on the evidence that the Persian Foreign Minister Ḥājī Mirzā Aghāssī claimed, during the 1840s, that all waters and islands of the Gulf were Persian. In the late nineteenth century Iran reiterated its claim when the three islands were administrated by a section of the Qawāsīm tribe who had migrated to the Persian Coast near Lingeh and when the Qāsimi Sheikh and his followers acquired the status of Persian subjects before the Persians captured the area of Lingeh in 1887. The third Iranian claim lays stress on the British Intelligence Section map, produced in 1886, in which Abu Mūsā and the two Tunbs are shown clearly in Iranian colours, and which was presented to the Nāsir al-Din Shāh in 1888. The Iranian government claimed that Britain took the islands from Iran in 1820, because Russia and Germany were posing a threat to the Gulf region. Moreover, in order to maintain security in the face of widespread piracy in the southern Gulf, Britain pursued its imperial interests over the Islands by declaring that these islands belonged to the Arab Sheikhs of the Trucial States and thus transferred them to the de facto administration of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah when Iran was politically weak.¹¹³

113. Schofield, Richard "Border and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* p p. 35-36 and Mujtahed-Zadah, Pirouz. *op.cit.* p. 67

The Qawāsim Claim

The Qawāsim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah claimed that the three islands of Abu Mūsa and the two Tunbs had been controlled by the Qāsimī Sheikhs since the early eighteenth century. These claims by Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah were based on the fact that these Sheikhs used to collect annual fees from the pearlers and fishermen who shared, with their Arab brethren in the Emirates, tribal linkage, family ties, character, language and traditions.

Between 1750 and 1866 the Qawāsim claimed that the islands were directly under their control. They also claimed that since British control was established over the Omani coast, the Qawasim Sheikhs had signed an agreement with Britain on 8 January 1820, stating therein that the three islands belonged to the Qawasim. Britain recognised their sovereignty over them.¹¹⁴ Documents disclosed by a British Agent in the Gulf proved that the islands of Abu Mūsā and the two Tunbs belonged to the Greater branch of the Qawāsim of the Trucial Coast, and not to the Smaller branch of al-Qawasim who controlled Lingeh.¹¹⁵

The British records, on the other hand, as Richard Schofield mentions in his research on the historical background of the three disputed islands “*Round Table Discussion on the Dispute over the Gulf Islands*” in London in 1993, show that it was not until 1877 that a Persian claim to the Tunbs was first formally entered and not until 1888 that Tehran did the same for Abu Musā. Up until 1873 the British Residency at Bushire had generally believed that the Tunbs belonged to Persia, because of their close connection with southern Persia though the Qāsimī-controlled port of Lingeh. But, by 1882, Britain was apparently of the opinion that the Qāsimī Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah held the title over the Tunbs, after the receipt of original

114. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950-85*. Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 65.

115. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950-85*. *op.cit.* pp. 78-79.

documents from the rulers of the southern Gulf littoral.¹¹⁶ Britain formally recognised the Qāsimī ownership of Abu Musā in 1870 and the two Tunbs in 1880. This recognition came as a result of the British treaties with the southern Coastal Sheykhdoms in 1820.

The Background to the Dispute

The struggle between Iran and Britain (on behalf of the Qawāsim) began when the Persian government defeated the Qawāsim of Lingeh in 1887 and claimed that all the islands situated opposite Lingeh were under the authority of Lingeh. But at that time the Persian government was unable to occupy the three islands, because of the British protection of the Sheykhdoms of the Qawāsim, who controlled the Islands before they broke with their fellows on the Persian Coast in Lingeh in the mid-eighteenth century.

During the first part of the twentieth century Britain encouraged and protected the Qawasim sovereignty over the Islands. Following the end of the First World War and after the division of the Qāsimī state in 1920 into the two branches of Ras-al-Khaimah (the two Tunbs) and Sharjah (Abu Musā), Britain tried to accommodate the Persians by enabling the Iranian governments to discuss their claims over the three islands of Abu Musā and the Tunbs and Bahrain, in the 1920 and 1930s.¹¹⁷

These Anglo-Iranian negotiations over the Islands, which lasted ten years, failed and no compromise was reached. The two countries produced a draft, however, which decided that the island of Šīrī would be recognised as Iranian and Abu Musā as Arab. In 1930, negotiations between Iran and Britain were broken off, because of the British refusal to accept an Iranian claim to the Tunb islands. The Iranian government, during the negotiations with the British delegation, offered to drop its claim over Bahrain if Britain was prepared to recognise its sovereignty over the

116.Schofield, Richard. *Abu Musa and the Tunbs: The Historical Background Round Table Discussion On The Dispute Over the Gulf Islands*. The Arab Research Centre, London, 1993, pp. 7-8.

117. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula during the twentieth century" *op.cit.* p. 36.

disputed islands in the lower Gulf. But the British government rejected the Iranian proposals over the islands. The two countries resumed fresh negotiations during the mid-1950s. Britain tried to conclude an agreement between Iran and the two emirates of the Qawāsīm, Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah. However that too did not produce any positive result. In the mid-1960s the dispute over the islands was renewed and more complex negotiations began between Iran and Britain (on behalf of the Trucial Sheikdoms) over the demarcation of their continental shelf boundary were held.

The Negotiation of 1971

The situation over Abu Musā island and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs remained the same until the British decision in 1968 to withdraw from the Gulf after three years. Iran, with the support of the last British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir William Luce, held negotiations with the Sheykhs of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah in November 1971. The Sheykhs offered to settle the dispute on the following bases: (a) a lease agreement, founded on recognition by Iran of Ras al-Khaima's title; or (b) an ascertainment of the wishes of the Tunbs population (comparable with the Bahrain ascertainment); or (c) a meeting of the two sides to exchange documents of title. None of these was acceptable to Iran.¹¹⁸

Julian Walker, a prominent British boundary-maker in the southern Gulf region, mentioned that in the discussion over the disputed islands held in London in 1994, all the documents of the 1971 negotiations had still not been published and were not allowed to be shown, since the William Luce negotiations had used threats to enforce Iran's claim over the islands.¹¹⁹ The Iranian International Newspaper *Kayhan* reported, on 9 November 1970, that Iran would not hesitate to enforce her sovereignty over the islands if her claims were not recognised. Iran's intention to occupy the islands had been stated by the Shah of Iran on many occasions. On

118. *Documents of Arabian Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office*. 28 July 1970, London, pp. 5-6 and Schofield, Richard "Abu Musa and the Tunbs: The Historical Background".[op.cit.](#) p.10

119. Walker, Julian "Al-usus al-Tārīkhiyyah Li al-Nizā ' Ḥawl Juzur al-Khālīj Ḥattā Sanat 1971. Nadwat Juzur al-Khalīj al-'Arabī: Asbāb al-Nizā' Wa-Muṭṭallabāt al-Ḥal'" Arabian-European Studies Centre, Paris, 1994, pp. 68 and 147.

February 16 1971 the Shah stressed that he would act "by force if necessary" if no peaceful agreement for the islands was reached. In an interview with the *Guardian* newspaper, published on 28 September 1971, the Shah said that "we need them (he meant the islands); we shall have them; no power on earth will stop us". During the Iranian occupation of the Islands the Shah claimed that he needed them in order to protect the entrance of the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. The three islands are valued by these two countries for economic and security reasons. The island of Abu Musā contains a large number of oil deposits (in April 1993, and the Iranian Parliament passed a law extending the limits of the country's territorial waters to 12 miles. A limit of 12 miles is significant considering the size of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and the close proximity of the Arab Gulf States. Control of Abu Musā could also directly affect shipping. All of Iran's tanker traffic must pass through this area. The island of Abu Musā lies at the mouth of the narrow Strait of Hormuz, through which passes a fifth of the world's oil supplies, about 15 million barrels per day.

In the course of the British mediation the Shah of Iran was able to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding with the Sheykh of Sharjah on 29 November 1971, in which they agreed that Iran and Sharjah would share sovereignty over Abu Musā island. But during the negotiations between Iran and the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah over the Two Tunbs the latter failed to accede to Iranian sovereignty. Ras al-Khaimah rejected the Iranian occupation, though it was in no position to resist Iranian power, and was also reluctant to affiliate with the UAE in December 1972.¹²⁰

120. For the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to Iran, see Mojtabeh-Zadeh, Pirouz. *Political Geography The Strait of Hormuz. The Evolution of Iran's Role (1970s and 1980s)*. Geography Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1990, p.6. Harold Hough of *Jane's Intelligence Review* states that "the Iranian military build-up in Abu Musa is part of a greater move by Iran to spread its influence in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf rather than an attempt to solidify its hold on the Strait of Hormuz". For more details over the importance of these islands see Dabbs, Corbett "Abu Musa Island Dispute Between Iran and the UAE" Inter-net Publication. pp. 3-4. As a reaction to the Iranian decision to extend their nautical water to 12 miles, protests were filed with the United Nations by Saudi Arabia on 25 July 1996 (A/50/1029), the UAE in August 1996 (A/50/1033), Kuwait on 26 August 1996 (A/50/1029) and Qatar on 4 September (A/50/1034). A protest was filed by Germany, on behalf of the European Union. See Al-Alkim, Hassan "The United Arab Emirates Perspective on the Islands Questions. *Round Table Discussion on The Dispute Over The Gulf Islands*. The Arab Research Center, London, 1993. pp. 28-29 and also Dabiri, Mohammad Reza "Abu Musa Islands: A Binding Understanding or A Misunderstanding" *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*. Vol.3/4, Winter 1993/94. pp. 578-579.

Some sources indicate that the Iranian accord with Sharjah was due to a British bargain with Iran to recognise the new federation between the Trucial Sheikhdoms, which came to be known the United Arab Emirates.¹²¹

The Iran and Sharjah Memorandum of Understanding 1971

Neither Iran nor Sharjah will give up its claim over Abu Musā nor recognise the other's claim. Against this background the following arrangements were made:

1. The inhabitants of Abu Musā were to remain as subjects to the laws and legislation of Sharjah, but Iranian forces would occupy an agreed part of the Island.
2. Revenues from oil produced from the Island and its territorial waters, within 12 nautical miles, were to be divided equally between Iran and Sharjah.
3. The Iranian government was to grant aid amounting to 1.5 million pounds annually to Sharjah for a period of nine years, or until Sharjah's oil revenues reached 3 million Pounds annually.
4. The agreement did not affect Sharjah's right of sovereignty over the island. The Sharjah flag was to continue to fly over the Police station, and Sharjah was to continue to administer all parts of the Island not occupied by Iranian forces.
5. Iranian forces were to arrive shortly in the agreed area of Abu Musā.
6. The Buttes Gas and oil company was to undertake exploration for oil on the island and in its territorial waters. ¹²²

Iran's Occupation of the Three Islands

The result of the previous understanding and the encouragement given by the United States and Britain was that the Shah of Iran would fill the power vacuum in the Gulf area in line with the Nixon Doctrine after the British Military withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1971. Iranian troops occupied the islands of Abu Musā and the two Tunbs on 30 November 1971, a day before Britain terminated her treaty relations

121. Martin, Lenore G. *op.cit.* p. 49.

122. Taryam, Abdullah Omram. *op.cit.* 184.

with the Sheykhdoms of the Trucial states and two days before the formal declaration setting up the United Arab Emirates on 2 December 1971.¹²³

The Iranian policy of occupying the three islands on 30 November 1971, was aimed at settling the issue in its own favour before the British withdrawal, and not allowing the federation of the UAE to be launched before the issue was resolved. The Iranian occupation was also a compensation for the Iranian recognition of Bahrain in 1971.¹²⁴ In fact the Iranian occupation of 1971 came as a consequence of the three years of discussions between Iran, Britain and the two Qāsimī Sheikhs of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah.

There was resistance to the Iranian troops in Greater Tunb and the clashes resulted in the death of four Ras al-Khaimah guards and three Iranian soldiers. On the other hand, in Abu Musā island, Sheikh Ṣaqr, the brother of the ruler of Sharjah, together with a number of Sharjah officials, welcomed the Iranian officials. Iran tried to absorb all the Arab inhabitants on the Islands and let them continue to live there, but 120 Qāsimī inhabitants of Greater Tunb were expelled from the island to the Ras-al-Khaimah mainland.¹²⁵

The Importance of the Islands

Abu Musā, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb have a strategic location near the 60 mile-long Strait of Hormuz, through which tankers carrying, at that time, half the world's crude oil supplies had to pass. The islands continental shelf contains large deposits of oil. The Tunb islands are respectively known to Arabs as Tunb as-Sughrā and Tunb al-Kubrā, and to the Iranians as Tunb-e Bozorg and Bani Tunb.¹²⁶ Abu Musā island is about 30 square miles in area, has three small oil wells and some deposits of red-oxide; it lies near the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz, 35 miles off the coast of Sharjah, and 43 miles off the Iranian coast on the other side of the Gulf.

123. Schofield, Richard "Abu Musa and the Tunbs: The Historical Background". *op.cit.* p. 11.

124. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. *op.cit.* p. 177.

125. Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan, *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*. *op.cit.* p. 143

126. Day, Alan. *Border and Territorial Disputes*. *op.cit.* p. 242.

The population of the island fluctuates at about 800, and the majority of them are Arab.

Greater Tunb is about 2 miles and a quarter in width and 9 miles in length, and lacks fresh-water wells. Most of its inhabitants were exiled to Ras al-Khaimah in 1971 after the Iranian occupation. The Lesser Tunb, an uninhabited island with no access to drinking water, lies 8 miles from Greater Tunb, and has a length of one mile and a width of three quarters of a mile.¹²⁷

The new council of ministers for the UAE stated at their first meeting held, on 2 December 1971, that the United Arab Emirates repudiated the principle of the use of force, rejected Iran's recent occupation of a part of the cherished Arab homeland and advocated the need to respect legitimate rights and discuss any differences that may occur among states through internationally agreed methods.¹²⁸


It should be noted that not all the Emirates were equally affected by the consequences of the Iranian occupation. In fact some had close links with the Shah, especially Dubai. The new federation of the UAE during the early 1970s, faced on the one hand many internal problems between its members and on the other external pressures from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Oman.¹²⁹

127. See Amirahmadi, Hooshang, "The Colonial Political Dimension of the Iran-UAE Dispute" in: Amirahmadi, Hooshang. *Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Gulf*. Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 13, and Taryam, Abdullah Omran. *op.cit.* p. 178.

128. Day, Alan *op.cit.* p. 242.


129. Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan. *op.cit.* p. 144.

Map No. 24.



University of the United Arab Emirates, Department of Geography. 1992.

Map No. 25.



University of the United Arab Emirates, Department of Geography. 1992.

Reaction to the Iranian Occupation

Reactions to the Iranian occupation were registered in many Arab capitals, as well as in Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, in the form of anti-British and anti-Iranian demonstrations. In Sharjah, an abortive palace coup in February 1972 resulted in the assassination of her ruler.¹³⁰ The Iranian occupation of the three islands was criticised by the Arab League, which claimed that the Iranian and Sharjah accord was also signed under Iranian pressure and there was a threat to take over the island by force if no satisfactory response to Iran's demand was reached. The Arab League in its reports published on December 2 1971, the Arab League declared that the British failure to act was contrary to her treaty obligations with the Trucial Rulers.

The government of Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and with Britain on November 30 1971 and described the Shah's action as a "flagrant aggression in collusion with Britain".

The UN and the Iranian Occupation

At the request of Libya, Algeria, Iraq and the former South Yemen, a discussion of the Iranian occupation of the three islands was held in the United Nations on 9 December 1971. The Iraqi representative claimed that the three islands had been under Arab jurisdiction for centuries and rejected the Iranian argument of historical rights, power vacuum and the strategic value to Iran of the Islands. He also criticised the British attitude over the Iranian action.

On the other hand the Iranian representative declared that the Iranian title to the islands was long-standing and substantial, since both maps (the old and the modern one) and a highly authoritative encyclopaedia treated the territories as belonging to Iran. The British representative at the UN, during the discussions over the islands, explained that his government was satisfied with the agreement reached

130. Al-Omair, Ali. *The Arabian Gulf: A Study of Stability and Integration in the Realm of Regional and International Politics after British Withdrawal in 1971*. *op.cit.* p. 59.

between Iran and Sharjah. The Security Council did not adopt any resolution, thereby adjourning the issue to some future time.¹³¹

The Saudi position over the Islands

The Saudi stand on the Iranian occupation of the three islands was lukewarm with no strong protests. Saudi Arabia said that it did not expect Iran to behave in such a way. Instead it hoped that Iran would reconsider her stand and work towards the future stability of the region. However, according to some sources, Saudi Arabia, after the British announced their intention to withdraw from the Gulf area in 1968, had adopted a policy of rapprochement with Iran, especially after the state visit of the Shah of Iran to Riyadh in 1968, which marked the starting-point of a new relationship between the two countries. Saudi Arabia also during the early 1970s was able to resolve its own dispute with Iran over the islands of 'Arabī and Fārsī (more details see Chapter 7, p. 392).¹³²

The British Position over the Islands

The British Foreign office, in a strong reaction to the Arab countries over the Iranian occupation of the three Islands, argued, just one day before the treaty relations were terminated on the first of December 1971, that it was impossible to stop the Iranian action. But the *Times* Newspaper, on the 2nd of December 1971, criticised the British government as "hypocritical" and said that the agreement was "as valid on the last day as on the first".¹³³

131. Day, Alan. *op.cit.* p. 241.

132. For an account of the Saudi reaction see Foreign and Commonwealth Office memorandum, 28 July 1970 pp. 5-6, London. For the reaction of other Arab Gulf States, see *op.cit.* p. 7, and Taryam, Abdullah Omran. *op.cit.* p. 186. For possible reasons behind Saudi attitudes, see *'AALAM AL-KHALEEJ*. No. 46. April 1997, London. p. 1.

133. Day, Alan. *op.cit.* p. 241

Iranian Occupation During the 1970s

After the British withdrawal in the early 1970s the Shah of Iran became the "police man" of the Gulf region. The dispute over the three islands was frozen, on the pretext of the internal and external threats envisaged by the new American policy of the Twin Pillars (Iran and Saudi Arabia) in the Gulf region.¹³⁴

During the early 1970s the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah started to improve his relationship with Iraq with the aim of exerting pressure on Iran. Iraq was the only State in the Gulf which requested, on many occasions, that Iran withdraw from these islands. Despite the differences between Iran and the UAE over the three islands, relations between the two countries improved in many ways, especially with Dubai and Abu Dhabi. The UAE saw Iran's occupation as a *de facto* action and was unable to do anything about it except to reject the Iranian sovereignty over the islands. On August 12 1974, following an official visit to Iran by the UAE Vice-President, (Sheykh Rāshid b. Sa'īd) the two countries concluded an agreement demarcating the continental shelf. This agreement defined the boundaries of the two countries along the median line in the Gulf water. But the delineation of the territorial waters did not include the islands over which the two countries claimed sovereignty.¹³⁵

The Dispute is Revived after the Iranian Revolution

The question of the disputes between Iran and the UAE (on behalf of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah) resumed after the fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of the Islamic Iranian revolution in 1979, when the Iraqi ambassador in Beirut issued a declaration demanding that the Iranian government withdraw from the islands. The Iraqi demands were rejected by Iran.¹³⁶

The first president of the Islamic Iranian Republic, Abu al-Ḥasan Banī Ṣadr, stated in March 1980:

134. Al-Alkim, Hassan "The United Arab Emirates Perspective on the Islands Question" *op.cit.* p. 28.

135. Al-Alkim, Hassan. Hamdan. *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates.* *op.cit.* p. 145.

136. Day, Alan. *op.cit.* p. 244

*Evacuate the islands? Who is going to take them? To whom do the islands belong? Not to any one... in the south there is Abu-Dhabi, Qatar, Oman, Dubai, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia... to us these states are connected with the United States and are not independent. At the end there is the Strait of Hormuz through which oil passes. They (the Arab governments) are afraid of our revolution. If we allow them to have the islands they will control the Strait. In other words the United States would control the waterway. Is it possible to give such a gift to the United States?... If all of them, the littoral states of the Gulf, were independent, we would have returned the islands to them.*¹³⁷

In April 1980, in a message to the United Nations Secretary-General, the Iraqi Foreign Minister called for the immediate withdrawal of Iran from the islands and accused Iran of pursuing an aggressive and expansionist policy in the Gulf region. Iran stated on the same day that its differences with Iraq went beyond the disputed islands and that the Iraqi government was "under the control of Zionists and Imperialists" while "pretending that it wants to preserve Arab interests in the region". Also in response to the Iraqi demands, Ayatollāh Ruḥānī stated, on April 1980, that Iran would lay claim to Bahrain if the Iraqi government continued to demand the return of the islands of Abu Musā and the two Tunbs.

Some reports indicate that the Iraqi demands for Iran to withdraw from the three islands came as a result of the Iraqi foreign Minister Sa'dun Ḥamādī's meeting with the American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the United Nations in 1979.¹³⁸ The government of the UAE did not take any formal action over the disputed islands until 11 December 1980, when they dispatched a message to the United Nations stating that while they desired to maintain good, neighbourly relations and co-operate to maintain security and stability in the Gulf area, they insisted on the restoration of their full sovereignty over the three islands and declared that they were ready to negotiate with the Iranian government to reach a solution which would fully recognise the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the islands in accordance with the United Nations Charter and Principles. The UAE representative at the UN

137. Al-Alkim, Hassan "The United Arab Emirates Perspective on the island's question" *op.cit.* pp. 28-29. *The Economist Magazine* suggested in 1979 that the USA should occupy the three islands as a means to force Iran to release the American hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran and to enhance at the same time the protection and security of the tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz. See Hushang, Amīr Aḥmadī "Al-nizā' al-Irānī al-Imārātī al-Isti'māriyyah wa-al-Siyāsiyyah" *Shu'ūn al-Awsat* Strategic and Research Center, Beirut, p. 40.

138. Day, Alan. J. *op.cit.* p. 244

asked for the distribution of this message as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly.¹³⁹ In a formal statement declared on March 28 1982, the ruler of Ras-al-Khaimah and the members of the UAE Council said that their country would not compromise or change its position regarding the three islands, adding that "the three islands belong to the Arabs, about which there can be no discussion. Iran's leaders know this better than others; no contact on this issue has been made between them and us".

After the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran, the Iraqi regime reiterated its call for the re-establishment of Arab sovereignty over the three Gulf islands. Saddām Ḥussein, the Iraqi President, claimed that the restoration of Abu Musā and the two Tunbs to the Arab homeland was a prime territorial goal in his decision to make war on Iran in 1980.¹⁴⁰ During the war, Iran used these islands for military purposes, especially when the two countries started the Tankers war in 1984, and Abu Musā used as a base for speedboat attacks on shipping and oil installations. From the early 1980s, Iran's developmental program on Abu Musā island included the construction of an airport, roads, and civilian and military facilities. The prominence of these islands increased after the Iranian President Rafsanjani visited them in 1993.¹⁴¹

The Iranian Action of 1992

From the establishment of the GCC in 1981 all the Council members recognised and supported the sovereignty of the UAE over the three islands. The dispute over the three islands did not progress at all until 1987 after a failed Coup in Sharjah when Iranian troops had occupied the Sharjah part of Abu Musā island, but in 1989 the two countries agreed to solve the problem in accordance with the previous *status quo* of the 1970 accord.

139. Day, Alan. J. *op.cit.* p. 344

140. Schofield, Richard " Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* p. 40

141. Al-'Alkim, Ḥassan. "*Al-Usus al-Tārīkhiyyah Lil-Nizā ' Ḥawl Juzur al-Khalīj ḥattā sanat 1971 Nadwat Juzur al-Khalīj al-'Arabi: Asbāb al-Nizā' Wa-Muṭṭallabāt al-Ḥal . op.cit* pp. 68, 147.

The reason for the current Iran-UAE islands dispute came about when, in April 1992, Iranian authorities expelled from Abu Musā about 100 foreigners working for the UAE government because they did not have Iranian visas. Later that year, in August 1992, the Iranian authorities refused to allow foreigners without Iranian visas to disembark at Abu Musā and forced UAE vessels to turn back. Iran's foreign minister 'Alī Akbar Velāyātī played down the incidents as isolated actions of junior Iranian officials.¹⁴²

In fact the United Arab Emirates did not announce her dispute with Iran for six months. Their aim was to contain the dispute and reach a peaceful settlement with Iran. However, some sources indicate that the United Arab Emirates delayed the announcement of the dispute with Iran to coincide with the new American policy in the Gulf region after the liberation of Kuwait, which came to be known as the "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran.¹⁴³

Iranian official statements in April and August 1992 stressed the Iranian intention to abide by what was agreed in the 1971 accord between Iran and Sharjah and denied any intention of expelling the Arab inhabitants of the islands whose Sharjah citizenship was duly acknowledged.¹⁴⁴

Sheykh Zayed's Reaction

Sheykh Zāyed b. Sultan, the President of the United Arab Emirates, visited a number of Arab countries following the Iranian action of 1992, to explain his country's view on the Iranian occupation of the islands. Many of them have already aligned themselves with the UAE in condemning the action, including Iran's regional ally,

142. Schofield, Richard "Borders and territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the twentieth century" *op.cit.* p.70, and Moberly, John "Renewed Tension in the Gulf Over Abu Musā and the Tunbs: Some Considerations Affecting Reaction in the Gulf and more Widely". *Round Table Discussion on The Dispute Over the Gulf Islands*. Arab Research Centre, London, 1993. pp 16-17.

143. The UAE issued a strongly-worded statement on 2 September warning that Iran's recent action on Abu Musa could disturb relations between the two countries. *MEES*. Vol. XXXV. No.49. 7 September 1992. p.A8. For GCC and Iranian opinions See *MEES*. Vol. XXXV. No.49. 7 September 1992. p. A5, and El-Reyyes, Riyād Najīb. *Riyāḥ al-Sumūm al-Sa'ūdiyyah wa-Duwal al-Jazīrah Ba'd Ḥarb al-Khalīj 1991-1994*. *op.cit.* pp. 416-417.

Syria. The Arab League, in September 1992, also affirmed the sovereignty of the UAE over the islands. The Arab League affirmed it would give full support to any measures taken by the UAE.

Some Arab states have tried to use the floor of the United Nations to intervene in the dispute. Thus, the Security Council has received memoranda signed by the GCC member states, Egypt and Syria, asking Iran to “end her occupation of Arab islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates.” in the Arabian Gulf. Many Arab and Western media have described the Iranian actions on the three islands as comparable to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.¹⁴⁵

The Iranian government's reaction to the decision of the Arab League was announced by the Iranian foreign minister ‘Alī Akbar Velāyātī in the same month of September 1992. He said that Arab protests over Abu Musā and Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb could open up a Pandora's box of territorial claims in the region. He added that the islands in question were Iranian islands and the world should disregard the United Arab Emirates’ “invalid historical claims.”¹⁴⁶

The Negotiations Between the Two Countries

After many attempts to resolve the situation of Abu Musā island, the two sides commenced negotiations in Abu Dhabi on 27 September 1992. But the conversation between the two countries broke down when the Iranian delegation refused to discuss the UAE demands over the two Tunbs. The UAE delegation presented their Iranian counterpart with the following demands:

1. To terminate her military occupation of the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb;
2. To commit herself to respect the provisions of the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding with respect to the island of Abu Musā;

144. Moberly, John. *op.cit.* p. 17.

145. Amira Ḥamdi, Hushang “The Colonial-Political Dimension of the Iran-UAE Dispute” in: Amira Ḥamdi, Hushang (ed.) *Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Gulf*. Macmillan, London, 1994, pp. 12-13.

146. Taylor, Alan “UAE and Iran Irreparable Damage?” *Middle East International*, 25 September 1992, London, p. 12.

3. To refrain from intervening in any way or under any circumstances or under any pretext with the United Arab Emirates exercising her complete jurisdiction over her sector of Abu Musā island;
4. To revoke all steps or measures which she had imposed on the government organs on the island of Abu Musā and on the citizens of the state and on expatriates who worked there;
5. To indicate a suitable framework to resolve the question of sovereignty over the island of Abu Musā within a specified period of time.¹⁴⁷

After the talks between the countries broke down in Abu Dhabi on 27 September the government of the UAE decided to take their case to the United Nations. They also issued a statement demanding that Iran end its military occupation of the islands and confirm her commitment to the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding with Sharjah regarding Abu Musā. After the Iranian refusal to discuss the issue of the Tunbs and to resume any further negotiations with the UAE, the GCC summit's communiqué of 1993 used strong language against Iran, pledging thereby a "total support... for any peaceful means".

The United Arab Emirates employed such means to regain Abu Musā and the two Tunb islands, and made it clear that Tehran would have to mend its ways radically if it wanted to win the confidence of its Arab neighbours.¹⁴⁸ In its reaction to the GCC communiqué the Iranian government accused the council's position over the islands of being part of a Western-orchestrated campaign against Iran. Hashemi Rafsanjani retorted that the Arab Gulf states had no reason to fear Iran or her arms build-up, and warned that anyone who attempted to dislodge her from the islands would have to cross a "sea of blood".¹⁴⁹

147. Al-Alkim, Hassan "The United Arab Emirates Perspective on the Islands Question" *op.cit.* pp. 32-33.

148. Taylor, Alan "The UAE and Iran Deadlock Over the Islands". *Middle East International* 9 October 1992, London, p. 4.

149. Jarrah, Najm "The GCC A dispute resolved." *Middle East International*. 8 January 1993, London, p. 12.

Iran has declared on many occasions that the dispute over Abu Musā island was an issue between Iran and Sharjah and not with the United Arab Emirates.¹⁵⁰ In response to the statement issued by the GCC, the Iranian speaker of the Shūrā Council stated that the Arab leaders of the Gulf could forget about history; before they became independent of British colonisation these islands were, still are, and will remain Iranian. The response of Iran to the Emirates' claims includes the following:

The Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb are Iranian and are an integral part of the Iranian territories. The sovereignty of Iran over these islands is not negotiable; the negotiations on Abu Musā island would have to be arranged within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding, in a way that achieves the economic, defensive and strategic objectives of Iran in the Gulf; the question should be discussed without superpower intervention under any pretext, and to prevent provocation of any regional claims to international organisations.¹⁵¹

The situation over the islands of Abu Musā and the Tunbs has remained the same without any talks being convened between the two countries since the last talks in November 1995. The two sides failed to agree to negotiations in Doha even on an agenda for competing claims to sovereignty. After the talks, Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan of the UAE said his country was ready to settle the issue peacefully but blamed Iran for the failure after talks. He threatened to submit the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague if the question could not be resolved by direct talks.¹⁵² The UAE went into the talks with a four-point agenda: to end Iran's military occupation of the islands; to abide by a 1971 agreement over the islands; to settle the issue of sovereignty over Abu Musā; and to refer the whole issue to the (ICJ) if a deal could not be reached. As regards Iranian reaction to the talks, the Iranian official described them as a good prelude to better understanding with the UAE; Iran was

150. Walker, Julian. *Al-Usus al-Tārīkhiyyah Lil-Nizā' Ḥawl Juzur al-Khalīj Ḥattā sanat 1971* *op.cit.* p. 72.

151. Al-'Īsā, Shamlan. *op.cit.* pp. 61- 62.

152 On 10 October 1992 the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ali Bisharati, made his position clear when he said that Tehran would reject international arbitration and that "if the UAE wants to submit this question to the ICJ it must obtain Iran's agreement; in that case we will make no concession on this matter". See *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.3. 19 October 1992. p. A6.

ready to sign a non-aggression pact to ease tension. As a result of the failure of the negotiations of Doḥa, the Iranian admiral said his country was prepared to fight for “80 years” over the islands.

Oman is the only member of the GCC which has offered to mediate between the two countries.¹⁵³ The Saudi government’s position over the disputed three islands became more flexible when she supported, in a statement issued in 1996, the sovereignty of Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudi statement called for more direct talks between the two countries. It should be noted that the Saudi position over the disputed islands had not been clear since the Shah of Iran’s occupation of these islands. The UAE Foreign Minister has rejected calls for a new meeting with Iran over the disputed islands. The Minister said there was no point holding another round unless Iran was going to offer something new. ¹⁵⁴

The three islands have indeed become a national issue, making it impossible for the Iranian government to negotiate any concession with the UAE.¹⁵⁵ It should be noted that, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the West, especially the United States and Britain, have exploited the dispute over the islands as a pretext to isolate and sanction Iran’s domestic and international policy. The former US Defence Secretary William Perry warned in March 1995 that Iran had positioned chemical weapons on Abu Musā. It was also claimed that there were 6,000 Iranian military personnel on the Tunb island group and Abu Musā, and that they had constructed a series of military facilities, including surface-to-air missile batteries, anti-ship coastal defence batteries and the positioning of 155 mm artillery shells with chemical warheads.¹⁵⁶

In late January 1997, the UAE protested to Iran’s Ambassador in Abu Dhabi after an Iranian vessel crossed into UAE territorial waters to tow a small vessel

153. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. “United Arab Emirates Country Report” 1st quarter 1996, London, p. 4-9.

154. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. “United Arab Emirates Country Report” 2nd quarter 1996. London. p. 10.

155. Amirahmadi, Hushang. *op.cit.* p. 18.

carrying building materials. Throughout the early part of 1997 the UAE has continued to seek support from the GCC and the Arab League for a swift solution to the dispute either through bilateral negotiations or the International Court of Justice in the Hague.¹⁵⁷

The Omani-Yemeni Border Disputes

Introduction

The Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia are the only two members of the Gulf Cooperation Council which have common borders with the Republic of Yemen. The common border between Oman and Yemen lies on the common border between the Dhofar Province in the south of Oman and al-Mahrah Province (former South Yemen).

The border dispute between Oman and Yemen is quite straightforward when compared with the other border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula. This dispute gives a good example to others by the recent developments between the two parties, as a result of which they resolved their border disputes and agreed to demarcate the borders and to sign the border agreement in October 1992. The Omani-Yemeni agreement coincided with an intensive conflict on other border disputes such as between Qatar and Bahrain (over the islands of Ḥawar), Qatar and Saudi Arabia (the al-Khufus incident) and Saudi Arabia and Yemen (clashes over the Saudi-Yemeni border).¹⁵⁸

156. The US and Britain declare that they are supporting the resolution of the GCC that these matters should be determined by peaceful negotiations rather than by the use of force. *MEES*, Vol.XXXV, No.49. *op.cit.* p. A9 and *Jane's Sentinel Newsletters*: The Arab Gulf States. 1995. *op.cit.* p. 7.

157. *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. "UAE Country Report" 2nd quarter 1997. *op.cit.* p. 13.

158. Kechichian, Joseph A. *Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula Through the 1990s*, Rand. Washington D.C. 1992, p. 93.

Historical Development

Concerning the historical development of the borders between the two countries, they refer to the old border line which separates the southern Omani borders (Dhofar) from al-Mahrah Sultanate, which represented one of the southern provinces of the Unified Yemen in 1990. In 1965 an agreement was signed between the British authorities in Aden and Sultan Sa'īd b. Taimur of Muscat and Oman. The border line was just an amendment of the previous border line which was called the Higginbotham Line after the governor of Aden at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. It was this line that was included in the agreements signed between the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the al-Mahrah Sultanate in 1954 and 1960.

The British objective was to draw the border between the two parties so as to protect its local and regional interests in the eastern Aden protectorate and in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman (during that period both Muscat and Aden were under the control of the British government.)¹⁵⁹

The Political Development of the Dispute

British troops withdrew from South Yemen at the end of the 1960s, and the National Front took power on 30 November 1967. In a first statement concerning the borders inherited from the era of colonisation, South Yemen recognised that she adhered, in all respects, to all the agreements signed between the South Yemen Protectorates and the neighbouring countries. However, political developments in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in South Yemen, led to an attempt to violate the 1965 agreement. Many sources attribute such violation to three main reasons:

1. Developments in the structure and the nature of political power in South Yemen, its application of global Marxist Ideology, its association with the former Soviet Union and its attempt to struggle against what it considered traditional Arab systems blindly following American and British colonisation.

¹⁵⁹ On the history of sovereignty of Perim, Kamaran and the Kuria Muria islands, see El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. *op.cit.* p. 18.

2. The outbreak of the armed resistance movement in the Omani Dhofar Province bordering Southern Yemen: this movement gained political and military support from the government of the former South Yemen.
3. The government of Oman obtained external aid from Iran and Jordan in the beginning of the 1970s and was able to eradicate all sorts of armed resistance in Dhofar Province. The Omani military operations for elimination of the armed resistance in Dhofar Province created new borders which did not correspond to the border line shown in the 1965 agreement.

Aden Supports the Omani Opposition

The political and military developments resulted in a border between the two countries, which contributed to the deep divisions between the governments of Muscat and Aden.¹⁶⁰ The two countries' relations were seriously strained by the support given by the South Yemen regime to the military activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in the Dhofar Province.

Some sources indicate that South Yemeni support for the PFLO was part of a strategic aim to lay a claim to the Dhofar area, which had been historically controlled by many Ḥaḍramī families.¹⁶¹ During the early 1970s there were major clashes on the frontier and in May 1972 the Omani Air Force bombed South Yemeni artillery positions across the border. During the mid 1970s, the border of the two countries witnessed intensive clashes and the Omani Air Force again bombed the centres and stations of the PFLO in al-Mahrah Province inside Yemen.

160. Abū-Ṭālib, Ḥassan "Ḥālāt al-Ḥudūd al-Yamaniyyah ma'a 'Umān wa-al-Sa'ūdiyyah" *Majallat al-Siyāsah a-Duwalīyah* (International Politics) (ed). Ḥarb, Usāmā Ghazālī. Issue No.111, January 1993. The Stragic Political Centre, Cairo. pp. 214 - 215.

161. Day, Alan J and others (eds). *op.cit.* p. 401, 3rd edn.

The Superpowers' Involvement

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ideological tension between Oman (pro-Western Camp) and South Yemen (pro-Soviet Camp) increased the hostilities between the two countries. This was accomplished through mass-media campaigns and through external interference, which led the disputants to provide military bases and facilities in their territories. During this time South Yemen became a centre for a number of Soviet bloc personnel. Reportedly some 16,000 Cubans and East Germans, as well as 5,000 Soviets, were there as advisors. They assisted in the construction of a military air base in South Yemen at al-Ghaydah, less than sixty miles from the Omani border.¹⁶²

The Mediation of Kuwait and the U.A.E.

Since the establishment of the GCC in May 1981, two members of the council, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, have played a significant role in mediation between Oman and South Yemen. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries arranged a series of meetings between them in Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, which culminated in direct talks between the two sides in July 1982. After further discussions, a four-point agreement was concluded in November 1982 on normalising relations. These points concentrated on:

- (a) a commitment to establish normal relations" and to form a "technical committee" including Kuwait and UAE representatives, to discuss outstanding border problems;
- (b) an undertaking not to allow "any foreign forces to use their territories for aggression or provocation against the other country";
- (c) a promise to stop hostile media campaigns;
- (d) an agreement to "exchange diplomatic representation" after bilateral contacts.¹⁶³

162. Martin, Lenore G. *The Unstable Gulf Threats from Within*. op.cit. pp. 60-61.

163. Day, Alan J op.cit. p. 401, 3rd edn.

Direct Negotiations

These committees did not make any progress as a dispute broke out between the two sides over their relations with America and the Soviet Union. The two countries continued participating in joint exercises, military manoeuvres and military training, especially the Omani government, which carried out many joint exercises with American troops on Omani soil. In October 1983, the countries declared that they had agreed to establish diplomatic relations without making any progress on the issue of the border. Negotiation was suspended as a result of the internal conflict of 1986 in South Yemen.¹⁶⁴

Some unofficial sources mention that the Omani Air Force supported forces loyal to President ‘Alī Naṣṣer Muḥammad in the Yemeni civil war in January 1986 and bombed Aden airport. It should be noted that ‘Alī Naṣṣer Muḥammad, when he came to power in 1986, adopted a policy of reconciliation with the members of the GCC.¹⁶⁵

In 1987, the negotiations were resumed in a more congenial atmosphere after ‘Alī Naṣṣer took power. The negotiation process was affected by the lack of trust between Oman due to the South Yemeni support of the PFLO. The negotiations over the border disputes between Oman and South Yemen did not make any progress until the two Yemeni countries (South Yemen and North Yemen) became unified as the Republic of Yemen in May 1990.

164. *Al-Taqrīr al-Istrāṭījī al-‘Arabī 1992*. “Azmat Majlis al-Ta‘āwun al-Khalījī wa-Fatḥ Malaff al-Ḥudūd fi al-Jazīrah al-‘Arabiyyah” Yāssin, Sayyid. (ed.) The Political and Strategical Studies Centre. Cairo, 1993, p. 198.

165. Day, Alan J *op.cit.* pp. 401-402. 3rd edn.

Serious Negotiations

The government of the Sultanate of Oman started serious negotiations with the Unified Yemeni state, in spite of the contradictory situation regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Border negotiations began progressing well at the beginning of September 1991, when the political leaderships in both Muscat and Ṣan'ā decided to take responsibility for the border problem in place of the joint technical committee, a matter which encouraged the two leaderships to resolve the main border dispute in less than two months, when the final borders were planned. There was a minor amendment to the 1965 agreement, which was considered as the basis for the border negotiations. This amendment changed the bending zigzag into a straight line, a matter which persuaded Yemen to give up the policy of *fait accompli*, as it meant that there had to be concessions from both sides in a way that satisfied the two parties, and made neither a winner nor a loser. This was the basis for these negotiations.

On 1 October 1992, the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman signed the final border agreement in Ṣan'ā.¹⁶⁶ The demarcation agreement consisted of 10 articles which defined the onshore boundary as a straight line running from a point at Ras Dharbat 'Alī on the Arabian Sea through the Ḥabrūt region to latitude 19°N and longitude 52°E. The agreement also provides for the delineation of the offshore boundary between the two countries in accordance with the provisions of international law, the relative UN conventions, and the international law of the sea. The Yemeni government ratified the agreement a week later on 7 October 1992.¹⁶⁷

It should be recorded that the final agreement of the border between Oman and Yemen was signed by Thuwaini b. Shihāb, the personal representative of Sultan Qaboos and Ḥaydar Abu Bakr al-'Aṭṭās (from Ḥaḍramaut in South Yemen) the former Prime Minister of Yemen. The Omani objective was to sign the border agreement with one of the former South Yemen leaders in order to avoid the leaders

166. *Al-Taqrīr al-Istratījī al-'Arabī 1992*. "Azmat Majlis al-Ta'āwun al-Khalījī wa-Fatḥ Malaff al-Ḥudūd fi al-Jazīrah al-'Arabiyyah" *op.cit.* p. 198.

of North Yemen making any formal agreement especially over the border issue (for full text of the agreement see appendices p. 504)

The two countries have recently opened the border crossing between them after 25 years and have agreed to construct a new 250-km road link from Qishn and al-Ghaidah in Yemen to Mazyunah and Thamrait in Oman's Dhofar province. On 28 September, the Omani government granted Yemen \$21million to finance the construction of the road. Oman also signed a contract with a German firm to carry out a detailed survey of its border with Yemen under the terms of the border agreement.



On 2 October 1990 Sultan Qaboos of Oman made his first official visit to Yemen. Unfortunately the visit coincided with a deterioration of relations between the Yemeni President 'Alī 'Abdullah Ṣāleḥ and his Vice-President 'Alī Sālim al-Baiḍ. This led to the Yemeni civil war of 1994.¹⁶⁸ On 3 June 1995 the two countries held a ceremony near the border. Both parties expressed their pleasure at the successful completion of the project and stressed the importance of fraternal relations and peaceful coexistence. A copy of the border agreement was subsequently deposited with the Arab League in Cairo. However, in July 1998 the border agreement of October 1992 between Oman and Yemen rejected by Saudi Arabia and the situation over the boundaries between the three countries become more critical over the Saudi claim of some lands demarcated by Oman and Yemen (For more details of the agreement see the Appendix p. 499).¹⁶⁹

167. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century" *op.cit.* p. 68, and *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI. No.2. 12 October 1992, p. A8.

168. *MEES*. Vol. XXXVI No.2. 12 October 1992, p. A8.

169. *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Summer 1995, IBRU, University of Durham, p. 19. For more details over the Saudi Arabia claim of August 1998 see the *Reuter News Agency*. Thursday 16 July 1998 and the *French News Agency* Friday 17, July 1998.


Map No. 26.



Source: *Geographic Notes*. Winter 1992-93. Vol. 2. No. 4. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Washington. D.C.

STATE (INR/GE)

Map No. 27.



Source: *Middle East Economic Survey* (MEES) Vol. 36:5. 2 November 1992. London, 1992.



The Maritime Boundary Disputes in the Gulf Region

Introduction

The Arabian (Persian) Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman which connects the Gulf to the Arabian Sea, is some 500 miles long and between 50 and 200 miles wide. The depth rarely exceeds 50 fathoms. There are no significant seabed features such as troughs or declivities, and all the countries of the Gulf region share a common continental shelf. The issue of offshore boundaries in the Gulf region affects all of these states.

The Arab Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman share the western shore of the Gulf, while Iraq lies at its tip and Iran occupies its eastern shore.¹ The coastline of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf is nearly 2,000 miles (3,219 km) long. The main factor causing these countries to settle their offshore boundaries was the discovery of oil. The presence of a large number of proven and probable petroleum deposits in the Gulf ensured that the position of maritime boundaries became important.

Following President Truman's proclamation of 1945, all the Arab Gulf States except Saudi Arabia (all the Arab Gulf States during that time were under the protection of the United Kingdom) issued proclamations in which they individually defined their future policies in connection with the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the offshore areas lying off their coasts. Saudi Arabia was the first Arab Gulf country (28 May 1949) to claim that the sea-bed and sub-soil areas of the

1. Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf" in: *Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and Developments*. (eds.) Johnston, Douglas M and Saunders, Phillip M. (eds.) Croom Helm, London, 1988, p. 204. The Arab Gulf states have no common border with Iran. They share a large area of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. The division of territorial waters between the countries seems easy from a geographical angle, but the matter of strategic and mineral or natural resources is very complicated. Moreover, due to a long history of rivalry between the Arabs, on the one hand, and the Iranians, on the other, the solution to any dispute between them must include many psychological, historical, and social factors. See. Al-Asha'al, 'Abdullah op.cit. p. 76.

Gulf contiguous to her coasts were 'subject to her jurisdiction and control'. After the Saudi pronouncement all the Arab Gulf States (Sheikhdoms) issued similar proclamations in June 1949.² None of the Gulf region states are signatories to the Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf of 1958.³ (Iran alone signed this Convention but decided not to ratify it.) But they have all now signed the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

It should be recorded that all these countries had considered the "median line" system as constituting the customary international rule for Continental Shelf delimitation. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Iraq have separately declared their adherence to the principle of the median line via their national legislation. In 1993 Iran and the UAE joined the system. The other two states which have not done so (Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) have, in practice, acknowledged the "median line" norm as part of the customary international law in the course of their offshore boundary agreements.⁴ During the early 1960s the countries of the Gulf region, as a result of the pressures exerted on them by foreign oil companies in the region, agreed on Continental Shelf demarcation on the seabed in Gulf waters (some oil companies were reluctant to spend considerable amounts on the survey, exploration, and development of areas whose title was still in dispute). Offshore delimitation in the Gulf region faced obstacles caused by three major factors, the first being the presence of about 130 islands,⁵ most of which are small and uninhabited. The second obstacle is the

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2. For more details on the development of the concept of the Continental Shelf in International Law with special reference to the proclamations of 1949 see *the Canadian Yearbook of International Law* 1984. "The Legal Regime of the Continental Shelf" and *The Canadian Yearbook of International Law* 1985. "The Legal Regime of the Continental Shelf". El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1979, pp. 83-84. See Al-Baharna, Husain. *Arab Gulf States*. *op.cit.* p. 278.
 3. The Geneva Convention of 1958 was the first multilateral Convention which embodies the Continental Shelf as a legal concept. It resulted from the Conference of International law of the Sea, held in Geneva from 24 February to 27 April. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, which comprises 15 Articles, was adopted by the states represented in the Conference on 26 April 1958. See Al-Baharna, Husain M. *Arab Gulf States*. *op.cit.* p. 286
 4. Amin, S.H. "Law of the Continental Shelf Delimitation: The Gulf Example" *Netherland International Law Review*. Vol. XXVII, p. 345.
 5. The foreign oil companies played a significant role between the Arabian / Persian Gulf States on the delimitation of their maritime boundary and most were settled by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. See Young, Richard "The Persian Gulf" *New Direction in the law of Sea*. Vol.3. Churchill, Simmonds and Welch (eds.) p. 234.

determination of the base-points for the measurement of the Continental Shelf and the third is the preservation of the unity of hydrocarbon or mineral deposits. In addition to these major factors there are some historical, political and strategic considerations which influence the apportionment of the Continental Shelf between respective Gulf States.⁶

It should be recorded that the output of the offshore oil fields in the Gulf region is 3.6 million barrels per day, or less than 20% of the current output of onshore oil fields in the Gulf.⁷ Since the settlement of the offshore dispute between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1958 a number of the required offshore boundary lines have been definitively settled (for more details of the two countries' offshore development see the Saudi-Bahraini dispute in Chapter 5. P. 261).

Another attempt to settle the offshore boundary disputes in the area of the Gulf was made in October 1963, when the delegations of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait held a meeting in Geneva. The four delegations agreed on working together to reach an equitable settlement of their disputes. In November 1963 Iran and Iraq held discussions on the question of the delimitation of the offshore boundaries. The meeting of the two states resulted in an agreement on 'a basis for joint exploitation of oil in the disputed areas'. In April 1964, the Iranian government held a series of negotiations with the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait relating to the determination of the offshore boundaries between these countries.⁸

6. Young, Richard "The Persian Gulf" *op.cit.* p. 232. See also Amin, S.H. *op.cit.* p. 339.

7. Young, Richard "The Persian Gulf" *op.cit.* p. 236.

8. Al-Baharna, Husain M. *The Arab Gulf States.* *op.cit.* p. 294. See also Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf" *op.cit.* p. 212.

The Saudi Arabia - Iran offshore Boundary

During the early 1960s, as a consequence of Britain's desire to terminate her influence in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and as a result of the discovery of oil in tradable quantities in the Gulf offshore areas, the eight countries of the Gulf held a series of negotiations covering their disputes about offshore boundaries.⁹


The offshore boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran concentrated on the two islands of Al-Arabiyyah and Farsi, small, waterless islets, 13 miles apart, slightly close to the Arabian side, near the middle of the Gulf.¹⁰ Since the early 1960s the two states had held many discussion meetings over their claim to offshore and submarine boundaries, and were able to reach an agreement on 24 October 1968. The agreement has three main provisions. The first gives sovereignty of Al-Arabiyyah island to Saudi Arabia and Farsi to Iran. A 12-nautical mile limit was given to the islands and a local median line was constructed where the two territorial seas of the islands overlapped.¹¹ The agreement also prohibited oil and gas exploration and production within 500 metres of the boundary line. This agreement was the most significant in terms of boundaries in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, and concerned the longest such boundary in the Gulf region. The offshore agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran marked the termination of a period of dispute between the two parties concerning not only the course of their Continental Shelf boundaries in the middle of the Gulf, but also over the security of the Gulf after the British

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9. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah of Iran adopted a flexible policy towards the Arab Gulf States to settle most of the Iranian offshore (Continental Shelf) boundaries (in spite of the Iranian occupation of the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs). The Shah's purpose was to gain the Arab Gulf States approval and become involved in Gulf security after the British withdrawal. During the early 1970s the Shah of Iran was the main pillar of Gulf security.
 10. For more details of the dispute between Kuwait (supported by Britain), Saudi Arabia and Iran, see. Documents (LR 6/14) (31 October, 1967) Joint Research Department Memorandum. *Territorial Disputes Between Iran and the Persian Gulf States*. Appendix D, p. 10.
 11. The settlement of offshore boundary disputes in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf cannot be considered without reference to the principles adopted in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. The Saudi-Iranian accord of 1968 came into force one month after the Judgment of the International Court of Justice resolution over the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. See. Young, Richard "Equitable Solutions for Offshore Boundaries: The 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement". *The American Journal of International Law*. Vol.64. *op.cit.* p. 152.

withdrawal.¹² (for the full text of the agreement between the two countries see appendices p. 527).

12. Since the end of the 1960s, the United States and Britain had prepared the two countries to become involved in Gulf security. By the beginning of the 1970s, the two states were its twin pillars. See MacDonald, Charles G. *Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea Political Interaction and Legal Development in the Persian Gulf*. Greenwood Press, London, 1980. pp.128-130. See also Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf" *op.cit.* p. 212. In 1993 Iran issued a maritime law where she accepted the median system principle at the boundary of its territorial sea.

Map No. 28.



Source: *International Boundaries Research Unit*. Department of Geography. University of Durham. England, 1996.

The Kuwait-Iran offshore Boundary

Since April 1964, the two states of Kuwait and Iran have held many discussions on their offshore boundary disputes. According to Hussein M. Al-Baharna in his book *The Arab Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems* the main matter of dispute appeared to be Iran's insistence on using the Kharj (Khark) island as the base point for determining the Gulf median line (on the ground that it was linked to the mainland by pipeline). In earlier talks the Kuwaitis offered to accept this, provided that the Iranians agreed to acknowledge an equivalent status for the island of Failaka off the Kuwaiti coast. The problem became more difficult for Kuwait when Iran and Kuwait adopted a uniform belt of territorial Sea.¹³

Until 1997, the State of Kuwait did not sign any formal offshore agreement (except for the UN Commission agreement with Iraq) with any of the Gulf States. The Kuwaiti-Saudi offshore boundary is still not officially settled, but some sources indicate that serious negotiations between the two countries took place to settle their offshore boundary disputes and conclude a final agreement over the sovereignty of the two islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim. The Kuwaiti offshore boundary with Iran has not made any progress towards settlement and this is due, in large part, to the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1979. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian government was reluctant to settle any dispute with Kuwait because of the Kuwaiti government support for Iraq.¹⁴

Qatar and Iran Offshore Boundary

Iran and Qatar lie on opposite shores of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. As a consequence of her flexible policy towards the Arab Gulf States and following her maritime agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1968, Iran agreed with the State of Qatar (under the auspices of Britain) to delimit its offshore (Continental Shelf) boundaries. The two parties signed an agreement on 20 September 1969. The agreement provided

13. Al-Baharna, Husain M. *op.cit.* pp. 295-296.

14 Kuwait and Iran held a discussion in early 1994 over their fishing rights at the neck of the Gulf, but to date no formal settlement has been reached. Further discussions were held in 1995. See *Jane's Sentinel News Letter*. The Gulf States. *op.cit.* p. 10.

that the boundary was delimited using the equidistant method, disregarding all islands. The boundary consists of geodetic lines connecting the terminal and turning points and prohibits any drilling operations on either side of the boundary line within a zone 125 metres wide. The only location which is excluded is the Iran and Qatar Continental Shelf on the side of Qatar, and the Bahrain Continental Shelf. This is because of the dispute over this area between the two states.¹⁵

During early 1990, the two sides' relations were affected by a dispute over the ownership of the gas structures comprising the North Dome gasfield (known as the North field in Qatar and the South Pars field in Iran) on the Continental Shelf of the Gulf lying between the two countries. During 1990 and 1991 many meetings were held to resolve their dispute, which were crowned by the signing of many bilateral agreements. The gasfield dispute was settled by their agreement to a joint exploration.¹⁶

Some sources indicate that the government of Qatar improved her relations with Iran during the early 1990s in order to gain Iranian support over her difficulties with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and because she did not want to face an international boundary conflict with Iran as had already happened between Iran and the UAE over the three islands.¹⁷

15. *International Maritime Boundaries*. Vol. II. (eds.) Charney, Jonathan I and Alexander, Lewis M "Iran and Qatar" The American Society of International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London, 1993. p. 1511. See. Amin, S.H. "Law of the Continental Shelf Delimitation: The Gulf Example" *op.cit.* p. 345. Prior to the signing of the 1974 agreement between the two countries, the Shah of Iran and the Omani Sultan issued a joint communique expressing a joint desire for agreements aimed at maintaining stability in the region and ensuring freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

16 On 10 November 1991 an agreement was signed between Qatar and Iran for a feasibility study into a water pipeline from the Karun (Qarun) river in southwest Iran to Qatar. See McLachlan, Keith. *op.cit.* p. 235. The agreement of 1969 between Qatar and Iran defines the maritime border between the two sides, but does not mention how any cross-border reserves should be shared. The North field gas is shared by Qatar and Iran. The Qatari government developed her share, which contains recoverable reserves of 250 trillion cubic feet. Iran, in late 1992, started to develop her part, which has estimated reserves of 100 trillion cubic feet. See Pike, David "Cross-border hydrocarbon reserves" *op.cit.* p. 236. For more details of the Iranian and Qatari Gas Fields. See *MEES*. Vol. XXXIX. No. 10. 4 December 1995. pp. A4-A7.

17. McLachlan, Keith "Hydrocarbons and Iranian Policies towards the Gulf States Confrontation and Co-operation in Island and Continental Shelf affairs" in: *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf states*. (ed.) Schofield, Richard. UCL Press, 1994, London, pp. 235-236.

The Oman-Iran Offshore Boundary

During the reign of the Shah of Iran, Oman was the only Arab Gulf State to have a strong connection with Iran, especially on security matters. This relationship became important when the Shah's troops were sent to Oman to support the Omani Army against the rebellion in Dhofar. During the early 1970s the two countries entered into serious negotiations to resolve their offshore boundaries. On 25 July 1974, they concluded an agreement which delimited the territorial Sea boundary from the eastern part of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to the Gulf of Oman.

The Omani agreement with Iran was the fifth of five maritime boundary agreements negotiated by Iran with the Arab Gulf States on the opposite side of the Gulf. In early 1997 the two parties reached an agreement on the division of the shared Hormuz field. The agreement follows a decision taken in 1995 to proceed with the joint development of the shared gas/condensate field. According to official Iranian sources, the two sides have agreed to share the field on the basis of an 80-20 split in favour of Iran¹⁸ (for full text of the two countries agreement see appendices p. 519).

Until 1997 the two countries did not conclude any Continental Shelf agreement. Some internal sources mention that the Omani government was holding discussions with Iran, Pakistan and Yemen to reach a formal maritime boundary in the disputed areas in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman (with Iran), in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea (with Pakistan), and in the Arabian Sea (with Yemen).¹⁹

The UAE's Offshore Boundary with Iran

The maritime (offshore) boundaries between the United Arab Emirates and Iran can be divided into many areas. The most important dispute is concentrated on the

18. *MEES*. Vol.XI. No.3. 20 January 1997. p. A5.

19. See Charney, Jonathan I. and Alexander, Lewis M. *International Maritime Boundaries* "Iran-Oman" The American Society of International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London, 1993.

sovereignty of the three islands of Abu Musa (claimed by the Emirate of Sharjah) and the two islands of Tunb (claimed by the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah). This dispute has prevented the two side from reaching an agreement on the offshore boundaries between them. The other offshore disputes are between Abu Dhabi and Iran and Dubai and Iran. Iran has no offshore delimitation agreement with any of the other Emirates of the UAE, although there is an Understanding Memorandum signed in 1971 with Sharjah over Abu Musa. (For more details see The Iranian-UAE Disputes over Tunbs and Abu Musa in Chapter 6. P. 359).

The offshore dispute with Dubai was settled by the agreement of 31 August 1974, and the agreement was ratified by Iran on 15 March 1975. However, the UAE's federal government has never ratified it. The agreement of August 1974 separates the boundary (offshore) of the opposite coasts with a common Continental Shelf. The boundary between Dubai and Iran is the only offshore boundary agreed by Iran and the UAE.²⁰

Abu Dhabi's Offshore Disputes with Iran

During the early 1970s Abu Dhabi and Iran entered into a boundary (Continental Shelf) negotiation. But since that time, the two parties have yet to release any of the details of their negotiations. Some sources especially S.H. Amin in his book *Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian / Arabian Gulf*, mention that Abu Dhabi and Iran signed a Continental Shelf boundary agreement, which was initialled in September 1971.²¹ The other important dispute, which affected the negotiations between the two parties, was over the island of Bani Yas which is about 145 miles to the west of the island of Abu Dhabi.²² In January 1972, the Iranian government announced that

pp. 1503-1504, and MacDonald, Charles G. *Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea*. op.cit. p. 134.

20. See Charney, Jonathan I and Alexander, Lewis M. (eds.) *International Maritime Boundaries*. Vol. II. (eds.) "Iran-United Arab Emirates (Dubai)" The American Society of International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London. 1993, p.1534, and MacDonald, Charles G. *Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea*. op.cit. p. 134. See also Bundy, Rodman R "Maritime delimitation in the Gulf" op.cit. p. 183.

21. Amin, S.H. *Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian / Arabian Gulf*. op.cit. pp.167-168.

22. El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. op.cit. p. 103.

it had no more territorial claims in the Gulf and would not use its position to interfere with free transit.²³ Since the outbreak of the Iranian revolution all the Arab Gulf States have been reluctant to enter into any serious negotiations over offshore boundary disputes with the Republic of Iran.

The Qatar-Abu Dhabi Offshore Boundary

The offshore boundary between the two parties was complicated by disputes concerning the sovereignty of the offshore islands of Halul,²⁴ Daiyinah, Shuraiwah and al-Ashat. During the late 1960s, the two sheikhdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi (under the auspices of Britain) resolved their longstanding dispute over the above-mentioned islands and delimited the boundary between the two parties' Continental Shelf. The agreement of 20 March 1969 also provides for 'equal rights of ownership' and revenue-sharing with respect to the Al-Bunduq oilfield. The agreement confirmed that the island of Daiyinah formed part of the territory of Abu Dhabi, while the islands of al-Ashat and Shuraiwah belonged to Qatar; it also provides that neither state shall have any territorial claim upon any islands or offshore areas falling outside the agreed offshore boundary.

The two Emirates agreed that the proceeds from the Al-Bunduq oilfield should be shared equally and controlled by joint development. The agreed Continental Shelf boundary extends for a distance of 115 nautical miles.²⁵

23 .Young, Richard "The Persian Gulf" *op.cit.* p. 234.

24 For the historical background of Halul island, see. El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. *op.cit.* p. 97. The dispute over Halul was resolved in 1962, by British mediation, which appointed two experts to study the two parties' claims and to make recommendations as to how they should be resolved. Halul island came under the sovereignty of Qatar. See Charney, J. I. And Alexander, L.M. (eds.) *International Maritime Boundaries*. Vol. II. "Qatar-United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi)" *op.cit.* p. 1542. As a result of offshore oil exploration in the vicinity of Halul Qatar and Abu Dhabi intensified their rivalry over the ownership of the island. See Al-Baharna, Husain M. *The Arabian Gulf States*. *op.cit.* pp. 303-304.

25. Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf" *op.cit.* p.214, and Bundy, Rodman R "Maritime delimitation in the Gulf" *op.cit.* p.181. See also Charney, J. I. And Alexander, L.M (eds.) *International Maritime Boundaries*. Vol.II. Qatar-United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi)" *op.cit.* pp. 1541-1542.

The Land and Offshore Boundary within the UAE's

The boundaries of the Trucial States (UAE) were not demarcated in any way until the first attempt was made in 1937 at the request of the British government (the British Political Agent in Bahrain). This request came as a result of the pressure exerted by oil companies in the Gulf region.²⁶

The Trucial States (since December 1971 the United Arab Emirates) were sovereign states which had a separate treaty with the United Kingdom up to 1971. Prior to that time the UK had been responsible for the foreign relations and defence of the separate emirates (Sheikhdoms). Since the withdrawal of Britain in the early 1970s and the establishment of the UAE in December 1971, the Sheikhdoms of the Trucial States have had a long history of land and maritime boundary disputes. Britain, as a protector of these Sheikhdoms for more than one hundred years, entered into negotiations with the Sheykhs of the Trucial States to settle their boundary (onshore and offshore) disputes. During the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the British government made an intensive mediation and sent many investigation teams to study the boundary disputes (from the Foreign Office and the Hydrographic Department of the Admiralty) among these states. The British government succeeded in solving some of them and failed in others. Her purpose was to facilitate the areas for petroleum exploration due to pressure from the oil companies that the disputes be settled. The most important one was the settling of the Abu Dhabi-Dubai offshore dispute. The two Sheikhdoms concluded an offshore agreement on 18 February 1968, which followed a series of disputes between 1951 and 1965.²⁷

The 1968 agreement provides the delimitation of the boundary concerned with the Continental Shelf jurisdiction of the two parties.²⁸ It should be noted that the British government, which played a significant role in settling and drawing up the

26. Bowett, D.W. "The Dubai / Sharjah Boundary Arbitration of 1981" *British Year Book International Law*. Vol.65. 1994, Cambridge. p. 104.

27. For the disagreement of 1965/66, see El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. *op.cit.* p. 99. For the shared neutral zone, see Blake, Gerald "Shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf states" *op.cit.* p. 205.

28. Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf" *op.cit.* p.215. See also Charney, J.I. and Alexander, L.M. (eds.) *International Maritime Boundaries*. Vol.II "Abu Dhabi-Dubai" *op.cit.* pp. 1475-1476.

UAE borders, depended on two factors. The first is the documents of the Sheikhdoms and the second the area demarcation subject to the tribes' allegiance. It became more difficult to identify precise boundaries because they overlapped with one another and this led to real difficulties for the British government on the one side and the Sheikhdoms (Emirates) on the other.²⁹

It should be recorded that these uncertainties did not prevent the formation of the federation of the United Arab Emirates. The two Emirates of Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain settled their Continental Shelf boundary which was delimited by an agreement embodied in two separate unilateral declarations issued in 1964 (under the auspices of the British government). But the seaward extent of the boundary between the two parties remains undefined because of the complicated question of Abu Musa island, which lies approximately 1 nautical mile from the Sharjah-Umm al-Qaiwain land frontier. The disputes between the two parties erupted in 1970 over an oil drilling location situated nine miles off the island of Abu Musa and about 32 miles off the coast of Umm al-Qaiwain. Sharjah claimed that the correct translation of the Arabic text of the agreement was 'Sea boundary' rather than 'Seabed boundary'. The offshore dispute between Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain still remains unsettled, in spite of British mediation during the 1970s.³⁰

Like the other Trucial States, Dubai and Sharjah were sovereign states which had separate treaties with the UK up to 1971. The boundary disputes between the two Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah have had a long history of British government mediation. In 1948 the two rulers of Dubai and Sharjah agreed that they would accept British government arbitration over their disputed boundary. The British

29. Bowett, D.W. "The Dubai / Sharjah Boundary Arbitration of 1981" *op.cit.* p. 104. See also Schofield, Richard "Borders and territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the twentieth century" *op.cit.* pp. 27-28.

30. Sea boundary: the maritime or the offshore boundary of a coastal state. This term will contain the territorial sea boundary-contiguous zone boundary-continental shelf boundary and the exclusive economic zone boundary. Sea-bed boundary: a term used in the past to refer to the continental shelf boundary. For More details see El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*, *op.cit.* The question of the Abu Musa Continental Shelf rights relative to those of Umm al-Qaiwain arose in a series of law suits in the United States and Britain involving oil companies which held overlapping offshore concessions granted by Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain. See Charney, J.I. and Alexander L.M. (eds.) *International Maritime Boundaries*. Vol. II. *op.cit.*

Political Agent appointed Julian Walker for this purpose. The first report by Walker over the coastal dispute was submitted in 1955. The ruler of Dubai protested against the British Political Agent's proposal for the boundary settlement with Sharjah in 1956, 1961, 1963 and 1964.³¹

The British mediation left the dispute unsettled between the two parties after her withdrawal from the Gulf region in December 1971. The dispute also extended to the offshore boundary, which had been outside the Walker mandate and was not included in the British Political Agent's decisions. During the early 1970s, the two parties did not reach an effective solution regarding their dispute because the two Emirates became members of the new federation of the UAE. Two incidents which illustrate the friction between the two parties took place when Sharjah protested against the construction of a corniche, an extension of the harbour made by Dubai, and Dubai then made a protest concerning the extension of Sharjah's industrial estate.³²

During 1976, the two parties, as a result of the mediation of the Supreme Council of the UAE, agreed to refer the boundary dispute to *ad hoc* arbitration. In 1981, the Court of Arbitration gave their decision on the disputed areas of the land boundaries and offshore boundaries.³³ As a result of the Court arbitration decision, the parties agreed, in 1985, to sign a boundary agreement which settled their boundary disputes.³⁴

On 29 May 1994, the two Emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Umm al-Qaiwain agreed to settle a longstanding dispute and signed a land boundary agreement. This agreement resulted from mediation by the High Council of the UAE.³⁵

p.1550. "Sharjah-Umm al-Qaywayn". *op.cit* pp.1550-1551. See also El-Hakim, Ali A. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. *op.cit*. pp. 124-125.

31. For the disputed areas, especially the al-Mamzar Peninsula, see. Bowett, D.W "The Dubai / Sharjah Boundary Arbitration of 1981" *op.cit*. pp. 118-120

32 See Charney, J.I. Alexander, L.M. (eds.) *International Maritime Boundaries*. Vol. II. "Dubai-Sharjah" *op.cit*. pp. 1499-1500. See also Bowett, D.W. *op.cit*. pp. 106-107.


33. Bowett, D.W. *op.cit*. pp. 106-107.

34. *Al-Ittiḥād Newspaper*. 24 April 1985. UAE, Abu Dhabi. p. 1.

35. *Al-Shurūq*. Issue No.113. 2-8/6/1994. UAE. Sharjah. p. 5.

It should be noted that boundaries are still in dispute between many countries in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf such as offshore boundaries of Saudi Arabia-Yemen, Oman-Yemen, Oman-UAE, Oman-Iran, Abu Dhabi-Saudi Arabia, Qatar-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia and Kuwait-Iran. The most controversial of these offshore disputes is that between the seven Emirates of the UAE over the regional waters of Abu Musa, which is not yet settled (because of the sovereignty conflict between Iran and UAE). Most of these countries are in the process of negotiating their offshore disputes. The Gulf also contains areas of co-sovereignty, both on land and the seabed. Those include: Iraq-Saudi Arabia (Neutral Zone), Saudi Arabia - Kuwait (Neutral Zone) Abu Dhabi-Dubai (Neutral Zone), Saudi Arabia-Bahrain (shared revenues), Abu Dhabi-Qatar (shared revenues), Oman-Sharjah (shared zone), Oman-Ajman (shared Zone), Fujairah-Sharjah (shared Zone) and Iran-Sharjah (joint administration and revenues) 36

36. Blake, Gerald "Shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf states" *op.cit.* p. 201.



Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (CIA) Year Book 1984. Washington, D.C.

Conclusion of Chapters Five, Six and Seven

These chapters concentrate on the political developments in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf region over historical and political boundary disputes, especially between the six states of the Arab Gulf who formed the GCC in 1981.

Border disputes, onshore or offshore, are one of the main obstacles to peace in the third world. The Arab states which constitute part of this world, show that it is impossible to demarcate borders without disputes. There are many examples of such a situation. There is the border problem between Algeria and Morocco that led to an armed conflict between the two countries in the 1960s, and the political repercussions are apparent to this day. Other examples are the disputes between Mauritania and Morocco, Tunisia and Libya (on the continental shelf and the regional waters), Egypt and Sudan (on Halayb), Syria and Lebanon, Iraq and Iran (the greatest border dispute in the region) and the border disputes between the GCC states themselves on one the hand and between the GCC states and their neighbours on the other. Most analysts attach the blame for this to the countries which colonised the area-Britain, the Ottoman Empire, France-and the Western oil companies.

The first attempt to demarcate the frontiers in the Arabian Peninsula started in the early 1910s, and came as a result of British and Ottoman rivalries. Britain and the Ottomans concluded agreements in 1913 and 1914 to demarcate the Arabian Peninsula frontiers and their spheres of influence. But these agreements received no formal approval by the two sides because of the outbreak of World War I. Britain, since the termination of this War and as a result of its responsibility over its protectorates in the Arabian Peninsula, played a significant role in demarcating the frontiers of these Sheykhdoms with Ibn Saud. The questions of Al-Buraimi, the agreement of Al-'Uqair in 1922, the Iraqi claim over Kuwait and the Iranian claim over Bahrain were the main examples of the British responsibility to defend the legitimate sovereignty of these Sheykhdoms against the more powerful states of Saudi Arabi, Iran and Iraq.

The border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf region are still the main obstacles which stand in the way of real co-operation between the Arab Gulf

States (GCC). All the GCC states have at least one real border dispute, onshore and offshore, with each other. Saudi Arabia the largest of the six Arab Gulf states, has a real border dispute with every one of these countries. Qatar has one with Bahrain, the UAE with Oman, Qatar with Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia with Iraq, Saudi Arabia with Yemen, Saudi Arabia with Iran, the United Arab Emirates with Iran (over the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs and offshore boundary), Kuwait with Iraq, Kuwait with Iran, Oman with Yemen, Oman with Iran, Qatar with Iran. There are also the internal border disputes between the seven Emirates (Sheykhdoms) of the UAE. Disputes over boundaries, whether they are onshore or offshore, are unlikely to be the sole cause of armed conflict between states. They can, however, become the symbol of deteriorating relationships, and may be used as a justification for military action.

The boundary disputes in the Gulf region are the product of political relationships operating on a number of levels. There are many factors that lead to the complexity of border settlements between the GCC states on one side and between the GCC states and their neighbours (Iraq, Iran and the Yemen) on the other :

1) The nature of these states: the nature of the modern state leads to a complication in the border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula. Political loyalties are associated with the tribe more than the land. The continuous bedouinism and nomadism, the division and devotion of the tribes, all these factors played a significant role in complicating the border problem. Most of the previous border demarcations proved this fact, including the al-Uqair agreement in 1922 (between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Saudi Arabia), the Al-Buraimi problem and the Saudi disputes with the other Arab and Gulf states.

2) The economic factor: The international oil companies played a great role in complicating the border problem between the Arab Gulf states (Sheykhdoms). A good example of such complexity is the problem of the Al-Buraimi border dispute (between Saudi Arabia, Oman and Abu Dhabi) where the American and British oil companies were heavily involved. The American oil companies supported Saudi Arabia and the British oil companies supported Oman and Abu Dhabi in order to get better concessions. These companies brought great stress on their governments, and

supported some GCC states to aggravate the problems of the borders in which big reserves of oil are found.

3) The physical geography of the Arabian Peninsula: it was difficult for these countries to demarcate the borders on a desert land, due to sand dunes which hinder the delimitation.

4) The foreign role: the demarcation of borders by foreign powers, and the formation of new political entities, urged the political elites (ruling families) of these states to vigorously defend the borders because it represented a self defence. These modern states fear that differences over borders might lead to a review of the existence of the state itself. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās, the Omani Minister of Information, in an interview concerning the reasons for the border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula, explained that the state sovereignty and the historical allegiances of each of these countries, as well as the search for oil, constituted the most important reasons for the outbreak of border disputes between them.¹

The desire for extended territorial boundaries, onshore and offshore, has become more pressing, especially since the discovery of oil in the Gulf region. The sovereignty concept and the border disputes between the Arab Gulf states form the greatest challenges to the progress of the GCC. Since the foundation of the Council in May 1981, these countries have witnessed many border clashes. However, the Council has not taken any global initiative to resolve these border problems.

‘Abd al-Azīz Al-Rawās, the Omani Minister of Information, agreed with Muḥammad Al-‘Alawī, the Omani Minister of State for Legal Affairs, that there are a number of things that hinder the activation of the dispute settlement commission at the level of sovereignty for each GCC state. Among these are the fact that these countries always refuse imposed political solutions. The high sensitivity of such countries to border disputes makes them reject the idea of Council intervention. Muḥammad Al-‘Alawī added that the GCC states do not intend to activate the commission for the settlement of disputes in order to avoid the intervention of other countries in their conflicts. Al-‘Alawī said that sovereignty obliges these countries to

1. Interview with ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Al-Rawās. *op.cit.*

refuse intervention in their internal affairs by the member states of the Council. In addition common co-ordination between these states is considered as a new concept. The Minister of State for Legal Affairs explained that the members of the GCC can accept any decision regarding conflicts between them that is made by a non-Gulf or Arab state. For example the GCC states easily accepted decisions made by the International Court of Justice but they could not accept any decision made by the commission for the settlement of borders in the GCC even if that decision were the same. The Minister added that high sensitivity and the concept of sovereignty have become the most difficult challenges to the future progress of the Council.²

2. Interview with 'Abd-al-'Azīz Al-Rawās *op.cit.* and Muḥammad Al-'Alawī the Omani Minister of State for Legal Affairs. 9 February 1998. Muscat, Sultanate of Oman.

Conclusion

Students of the political and the security history of Arab Gulf States since their establishment as autonomous political entities would conclude that external powers played a major role in creating and protecting them against intervention by other powers as well as in suppressing internal rebellions. For example, Britain, after the Protection Treaties of 1800, continued to play a major role in protecting those states and administering their foreign policy up to its military withdrawal from the region at the beginning of the seventies.

Following Britain's withdrawal, the United States moved in to play the same role in protecting the local regimes from intervention by other powers. It made Iran, during the rule of the Shah, as well as Saudi Arabia its two major allies. Both countries have provided a great deal of assistance to the US in implementing its policy in the region, especially the Nixon policy which aimed at containing the Arab nationalist tide as well as the leftist movements in the region and protecting its allies. A good example of that policy was when Iran dispatched its troops into Oman to thwart the Dhofar leftist revolution and managed to suppress it during the mid seventies.

Following the end of the Nixon policy and the collapse of the regime of the Shah came the Carter policy of creating a rapid deployment force in the region, which was followed by the formation of a unified central force during the Reagan and Bush eras which played a major role in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

Later the US under the Clinton administration started a policy in the region of "dual containment" with the aim of containing both Iran and Iraq and ending their threat to its allies. This continues to be the US policy in the region up to the present.

This attention given to the Gulf region by the United States and other countries demonstrates the importance they attach to it as they consider it to be vital for their strategic interests because it contains most of the oil reserves in the world. Western countries and their allies consider that protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf to their countries is strategically important for their interests.

The succession of political events and the internal and external repercussions of those events which took place in the Gulf region at the end of the seventies such as the British military withdrawal from the region, the collapse of the Shah's regime, the outbreak of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - all these factors in addition to other internal factors speeded up the establishment in May 1981 of a political alliance in the Gulf region of restricted membership which was called the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The establishment of the GCC met with various Arab and international reactions which ranged from reservation and welcome on the part of moderate Arab regimes to outright hostility on the part of nationalist and radical Arab regimes as well as the Soviet Union. Opponents described the Council as nothing but a scheme hatched by the US with the aim of extending its influence and the influence of its Western allies in the region. Although the preamble of the constitution of the GCC provided for co-operation in many fields amongst member states whether economic social or cultural, the security concerns and challenges were in fact the most important reasons for the establishment of the Council. However it must be stressed that the Council since its inception in 1981 has been unsuccessful in formulating a collective security regime. All the initiatives that were put forward by some member states in the Council with the aim of finding a joint security formula for member states, especially the initiatives put forward by Oman, were not worth the paper they were written on. Amongst the reasons for this failure to arrive at a common security policy amongst member states has been the fear on the part of some of them of Saudi and Omani hegemony in view of the fact that both countries represent the largest concentration of population in the region. There have also been considerable differences between member states on foreign policy matters. An example of this is the continued disagreement between Oman and Kuwait since the establishment of the Council over some issues related to their foreign policies. Amongst the reasons for the lack of political consensus amongst the Gulf states about the concept of security in the Gulf are the following:

- 1) Differences among member states about the sources of the threats to their security. Kuwait for example believes that Iraq is the biggest threat to its national security. Oman on the other hand believed that the former South Yemen and the Soviet

presence there close to the Hormuz straits represented a threat to its national security. Other Gulf States believe that Iran constitutes the biggest threat to their security. Saudi Arabia which has the largest area, believes that its neighbouring regional powers, especially Iraq, Iran and Yemen, constitute a threat to its national security.

- 2) The small size of the population in these countries and the variation in their sources of armaments.
- 3) Numerous border differences amongst member states.
- 4) The concept of the modern state and state sovereignty and the unwillingness of GCC states to give up some of their national sovereignty.
- 5) Variation in the sources of national income amongst member states, with Oman and Bahrain having much smaller national income than the other member states.

Although more than 18 years have passed since the establishment of the GCC, the issue of security and border disputes between member states continues to be amongst the major obstacles and challenges holding back the development of the Council and undermining the objectives for which it was set up. The questions now are, can Gulf states give up some of their national sovereignty in order to strengthen co-operation amongst themselves? If the member countries were to give up some of their national sovereignty in order to face up to the problem of security and border differences, would they in such a scenario be able to safeguard their internal and external security against foreign aggression?

This thesis suggests that the answer to both questions is no. Those countries as they are currently constituted are very unlikely to give up any of their national sovereignty, nor will they be able to protect themselves against foreign aggression. The regimes in those countries, or more accurately the ruling families rather than the people, will continue to want to link themselves to a number of military and political alliances with some western countries, in particular the United States and Britain, in

order to protect their dynasties as well as to safeguard the flow of oil to Western countries against external threats. A good example of this are the agreements that were concluded between the GCC countries and the United States, Britain and France in the wake of the liberation of Kuwait.

Western countries, especially Britain and the United States, will continue to be in charge of safeguarding the security of the Gulf rulers and states as long as the region continues to be of vital importance to their interests, especially with respect to protecting the oil supplies against regional or international threats.

Regarding the question of border disputes, the concept of the modern state and the concept of national sovereignty in addition to the lack of trust amongst GCC countries, will continue to constitute a major obstacle in the way of the development of the Council. Although there exists at present a body which was set up for the purpose of settling border disputes amongst GCC member states, it has no real teeth and has never been convened since its formation; nor have its members been named.

During a discussion I had with a senior official from one of the member states of the GCC, he stated that the ineffectiveness of that body in settling border disputes amongst member states is due to the fact that member states themselves mistrust each other and that they have no desire to settle their disputes through a Gulf body, preferring instead to solve their problems through an international organisation or tribunal. A good example of this is the border dispute between Qatar and Bahrain which is now in front of the International Court of Justice, after neither of them showed any willingness to bring their dispute before the body set up by the Council for that very purpose.

Researchers who have studied the GCC are still in disagreement about a clear legal definition of the Council. Some of them consider it as nothing but a political alliance. Others consider it to be a small regional organisation. Yet others see its role to be limited to bringing about a degree of political co-operation and co-ordination among its members, and that it has no clear legal character within the framework of regional or international organisations.

All these factors combined have made the Council ineffective in achieving the declared goals and objectives for which it was set up.

Although this thesis deals with some historical and political developments which stood in the way of making the Council effective with respect to the question of the region's security and border disputes, the Council does however constitute a unique model in the Arab region in terms of its structure. It may represent the seed for potential future unity in the Gulf elsewhere which the coming generations may be able to bring about. The similarity in the political systems, the unity of language and religion in addition to economic and social factors make it possible for the coming generations to bring about more integration than currently prevails.

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Appendices and Agreements

Document 1

Foreign Minister's Statement on the Founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Riyadh Communique)

4 February 1981

The United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait, out of consideration of their special relations and joint characteristics stemming from their joint creed, similarity of regimes, unity of heritage, similarity of their political, social and demographic structure, and their cultural and historical affiliation: and out of these states desire to deepen and develop cooperation and coordination among them in all fields in a manner that brings good, development and stability to their peoples, these states foreign ministers met in Riyadh in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 4 Feb 1981 and resumed their consultations with a view to setting up the operational system (*at-tanzīm al-amalī*) and the organizational structure to crystallize and develop the desired cooperation and coordination among their states. They agreed to set up a cooperation council among the said Arab Gulf states, to form a secretariat general for this purpose and to hold periodic meetings on the summit level and the level of foreign ministers with a view to attaining the desired objectives of these states and their peoples in all fields.

This step comes in conformity with the Arab nation's national objectives and within the framework of the Arab League Charter, which urges regional cooperation that is aimed at strengthening the Arab nation and emphasizing these state affiliation to the Arab League and their enhancement of its role in attaining the aims and principles of its charter in a manner that serves the Arab and Islamic issues.

The foreign ministers decided to hold another meeting in Muscat on 8 March 1981. It is to be preceded by the two meetings of experts, on 24 February 1981 and 4 March 1981, in Riyadh and Muscat with a view to completely systematizing what has been agreed upon with regard to establishing a cooperation council for the Arab Gulf states.

Document 2

The Decision to Establish the Gulf Cooperation Council

14 Feb 1981

In the name of God, the compassionate and the merciful: Out of their realizations, common characteristics and similar regimes that govern them, out of their feeling of the importance of establishing close coordination in all spheres, especially the economic and social domains, out of their desire to realize coordination, integration and closer relations in all spheres, the UAE, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait have decided to establish an organization that aims at deepening and bringing closer relations, ties and cooperation among its members in various spheres. The organization shall be named the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf [*liduwal al-khalīj al-‘Arabiyyah*]. Its headquarters shall be in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The council will be the vehicle by means of which the maximum coordination, integration and closer relations will be realized. It will also draw up regulations in the

spheres of economy, finance, education, culture, social affairs, health, communications, information, passports and nationality, travel, transport, trade customs, freight and legal and legislative affairs.

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Organizational structure:

The council shall consist of:

- A. The Supreme Council, to which will be attached a body for resolving disputes.
- B. The Ministerial Council.
- C. The Secretariat General.

The Supreme Council:

- 1. Shall consist of the heads of state of the member states.
- 2. The presidency of the council shall be rotated in alphabetical order.
- 3. The council shall meet in normal sessions twice a year. Emergency sessions may be held.
- 4. Each member has the right to call for an emergency meeting. The meeting shall take place if seconded by another member.

Competency of the Supreme Council:

It will draw up the high policy of the Cooperation Council and the basic lines it will follow. It will discuss the recommendations, laws and bylaws presented to it by the Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General in preparation for their endorsement. It shall form the body for resolving disputes.

Body for resolving disputes:

It shall be attached to the Supreme Council. It shall resolve existing disputes or any that may occur between member states. It also shall be the reference for interpretation of the basic bylaws of the Cooperation Council.

The Ministerial Council:

- 1. It shall be composed of the foreign ministers of the member states, or any ministers deputizing for them.
- 2. It shall draw up the basic regulations for the Secretariat General.
- 3. The Ministerial Council shall prepare for meetings of the Supreme Council and studies, topics, recommendations, bylaws and laws presented to the Supreme Council.

It will also make preparations for meetings of the council.

- 4. The council shall meet six times every year, that is, once every 2 months. Emergency sessions may be held at the proposal of two member states.
- 5. It shall draw up policies, recommendations, studies and projects which aim at developing cooperation and coordination among member states in various spheres.
- 6. It shall encourage aspects of cooperation and coordination between the various activities of the private sector.
- 7. It shall endorse routine reports as well as regulations and bylaws concerning administrative affairs, and those proposed by the Secretariat General of the Cooperation Council.
- 8. It shall work to encourage, develop and coordinate existing activities between states in various spheres. Such activities shall be binding should the Ministerial Council endorse them. The

council shall recommend competent ministers to draw up policies as well as studies apt to bring to fruition the objectives of the Cooperation Council.

Secretariat General:

The Cooperation Council shall have a secretary general appointed by the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council shall define the conditions and period of office of the secretary general. He shall be chosen from subjects of the Cooperation Council states.

The secretary general shall be responsible directly for all actions of the assistant secretary generals, the Secretariat General and the good course of work in its various sectors.

The Secretariat General shall have a data information apparatus.

Competency of the Secretariat General:

1. Preparation of studies concerning cooperation and coordination.
2. Following up the implementation of resolutions and recommendation of the Supreme Council and the Ministerial Council by the member states.
3. Preparation of reports and studies required by the Ministerial Council.
4. Preparation of routine reports on the work of the Cooperation Council.
5. Preparation of the budgets and final accounts.
6. Preparation of the draft of financial and administrative bylaws which shall make the body elaborate and commensurate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its increasing responsibilities.

Secretariat General budget

The Secretariat General shall have a budget toward which all member states shall contribute in equal proportions.

[Signed] Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Bahrain, the State of U.A.E. the State of Kuwait, the State of Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman.

Minutes of Meeting

LD142210 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1750 GMT 14 Feb 1981 [Minutes of meeting of the foreign ministers of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia on 4 Feb 1981 in Riyadh]

[Text][No dateline given] The foreign ministers of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have met. They endorse the plan for a cooperation council for the Arab states of the Gulf, the bylaws of which were attached. The foreign ministers have also decided to hold another meeting in Muscat on 8 March 1981, provided that it is preceded by another two meetings of experts on 24 February 1981 and 4 March 1981 in Riyadh and Muscat in order to formulate integral bylaws on what has been approved concerning the establishment of the Cooperation Council of the Arab states of the Gulf. It has been agreed to recommend to the states concerned appointing a minister for cooperation affairs among the Gulf states in the future.

Document 3

The Structure of the GCC

10 March 1981

His Excellency Abd al-Aziz ar-Rawas, Minister of Information and Youth Affairs, opened the sixth Arab Gulf Information Ministers Conference in the Muscat Intercontinental Hotel conference hall at 1030 today.

The conference began with a recitation of verses from the holy Koran. His Excellency Abd al-Aziz ar-Rawas, who is the conference chairman, then delivered the sultan's speech. He welcomed their excellencies, the ministers and the participating delegations, and said that it is auspicious that the meeting is taking place in the light of continuous contacts among our states to construct the greater edifice to Gulf fraternity and effective cooperation among the region's states and peoples in harmony with the inevitability of history and common destiny.

He said that none of them had spared their efforts to unite our voice and ranks. We could not make our voice heard and respected in the world unless we reverted to a united voice in a manner that would yield prosperity for our region and people.

His Excellency Abd al-Aziz ar-Rawas said it was because of this that there is an urgent and pressing need for a new information policy that would lift us to a cultural level from which our nation would derive vitality and transform the role of our Gulf information policy into an active one in the various international fields.

The new information policy we propose is above all political, but it cannot be a substitute for other institutions that have defined duties and tasks. If we make objectivity our guide in information work and exert the required efforts to raise the level of proficiency of our cadres and improve their performance we will be able to attain our goals with the same level of scientific proficiency and technical capacity as that which at present we seek from abroad. For this reason, if we infuse the existing information institutions with experienced information expertise and train the workers in the field of information then we should be able to develop the capacity to attain our goals.

His Excellency went on to say that there is a positive phenomenon that had emerged during the last few years, namely, the Arabic newspaper published by Arabs living abroad. Permit me in your name to hail our colleagues who had made of their [word indistinct] a reality accompanied by the development of Arab corporations in the field of journalism and information. In this manner they carried the Arab voice to our sons and brothers living abroad. He said that it is time the Gulf information institutions which we established by joint efforts during previous conferences were developed.

The right approach which we believe will crystallize these institutions in a manner that will make them more effective and beneficial will not be possible without organization, coordination and consultation among us through a permanent secretariat of a level commensurate with the tasks of the Gulf information policy. One of its principal concerns should be the evaluation of the work of the existing institutions and a follow-up of the implementation of the required information policy.

His Excellency said that the depth of the relations that link us in his region, headed by relations of faith, blood, and neighborliness, were bound-with God's support-to lead us to full coordination in all files in a manner that will save the interests, hopes and aspirations of the peoples in our region and the stability of our states.

Decisions Reported

The Foreign Ministers of the Cooperation Council of the six Gulf Arab states concluded their meeting this afternoon at the guest palaces at Al-Ghubrah. After the final session His Excellency Qais Abd al-Munim Zawawi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, made the following statement to newsmen:

This morning the foreign ministers of the state of the United Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman met in Muscat for their second preparatory meeting to finalize the statutes relating to the Cooperation Council of the Gulf Arab states.

The Ministers discussed the following draft bills and statutes presented to them by the committee of experts following its meetings in the cities of Riyadh and Muscat:

The basic statute [an-nizam al-Tasasī] for the Cooperation Council:

The internal statute[an-nizam ad-Dakhilī] for the Supreme Council:

The internal statute for the Ministerial Council:

The internal statute for the General Secretariat.

the ministers reviewed it but resolved not to make any final decision until the appointment of a secretary general who will express his view about the statute.

The Ministers recommended that the Supreme Council should hold its session at the beginning of May and November every year. The council recommended a meeting of leaders to be held 26-27 May 1981, in the city of Abu Dhabi. This meeting is to be preceded by the foreign ministers meeting on 24 May.

His Excellency Qais Zawawi said the initialling of the statutes will take place later today.

Their excellencies the Foreign Ministers of the six Gulf states have now gone to Salalah where they will be received by His Majesty Sultan Qabus.

Document 4

Charter of the GCC

25 May 1981

Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: The States of the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait.

Being fully aware of their mutual bonds of special relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam: and based on their faith in the common destiny and destination that link their peoples: and in view of their desire to effect coordination, integration interconnection between them in all fields: and based on their conviction that coordination,

cooperation and integration between them serve the higher goals of the Arab Nation: and in order to strengthen their cooperation and reinforce their common links: and in an endeavor to complement efforts already begun in all vital scopes that concern their peoples and realize their hopes for a better future on the path to unity of their State: and in conformity with the Charter of League of Arab States which calls for the realization of closer relations and stronger bonds: and in order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes, have agreed as follows:

Article One, Establishment of Council

A council shall be established hereby to be named The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, hereinafter referred to as the Cooperation Council.

Article Two. Headquarters

The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Article Three. Cooperation Council Meetings

The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its headquarters, and may convene in any member state.

Article Four. Objectives

The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:

1. To effect coordination, integration and interconnection between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity between them.
2. Deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields.
3. Formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:
 - a. Economic and financial affairs
 - b. Commerce, customs and communications
 - c. Social and health affairs
 - e. Information and tourism
 - f. Legislation and administrative affairs.
4. Stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mineralogy, agriculture, water and animal resources: the establishment of scientific research centers, implementation of common projects, and encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples.

Article Five. Council Membership

The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the Foreign Ministers meeting held at Riyadh on 4 Feb 1981.

Article Six. Organizations of the Cooperation Council

The Cooperation Council shall have the following main organizations:

1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
2. Ministerial Council.
3. Secretariat-General.

Each of these organizations may establish branch organizations as necessary.

Article Seven. Supreme Council

1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and shall be formed of heads of member states. Its presidency shall be rotatory based on the alphabetical order of the names of the member states.
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary sessions may be covered at the request of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territories of member states.
4. A Supreme Council shall be considered valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.

Article Eight. Supreme Council's Functions

The Supreme Council shall endeavour to achieve the objectives of the Cooperation Council, particularly as concerns the following :

1. Review matters of interest to the member states.
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic line it should follow.
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval.
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary General is charged to prepare.
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organisations.
6. Approve the rules of procedures of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes and nominate its members.
7. Appoint the Secretary-General.
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.
9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules.
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General.

Article Nine. Voting in Supreme Council

1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous approval of the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote.

Article Ten. Commission for Settlement of Disputes.

1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called "Commission for Settlement of Disputes" and shall be attached to the Supreme Council.
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every case separately based on the nature of the dispute.
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and such dispute is not resolved within the Ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.

Article Eleven. Ministerial Council

1. The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states or other delegated Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate among members every three months by alphabetical order of the states.
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold extraordinary sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session.
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.

Article Twelve. Functions of the Ministerial Council.

The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following :

1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination between member states in the various fields and adopt required resolutions or recommendations concerning thereof.
2. Endeavour to encourage, develop and coordinate activities existing between member states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to the Ministerial Council for further submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into action.
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various private sector activities, develop existing cooperation between the member states chambers of commerce and industry, and encourage the flow of working citizens of the member states among them.
5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or more technical or specialized committee for study and presentation of relevant proposals.
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appropriate recommendations to the Supreme Council.
7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedures as well as the Rules of Procedures of the Secretariat-General.
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-General, for a renewable period of three years.
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary-General, and submit recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat-General.
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare its agenda.
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.

Article Thirteen. Voting at Ministerial Council.

1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous vote of the member states present and participating in the vote, and in procedural matters by majority vote.

Article Fourteen. Secretariat-General

1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General who shall be assisted by assistants and a number of staff as required.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a citizen of one of the Cooperation Council states, for a period of three years which may be renewed for one time only.
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the Assistant Secretaries-General.
4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat General's staff from among the citizens of member states, and may not make exceptions without the approval of the Ministerial Council.
5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat-General and the smooth flow of work in its various organisations. He shall represent the Cooperation Council with other parties within the powers vested in him.

Article Fifteen. Functions of the Secretariat-General.

The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following functions :

1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, and to integrated plans and programs for member states' common action.
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work.
3. Follow up the execution by the member states of the resolutions and recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council.
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council for Ministerial Council.
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities.
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budget and closing accounts.
7. Make preparations for meetings and prepare agenda and draft resolutions for the Ministerial Council.
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convocation of an extraordinary session of the Council whenever necessary.
9. Any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.

Article Sixteen. The Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretaries-General and all the Secretariat General's staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence and for the common interest of the member states. They shall refrain from any action or behaviour that is incompatible with their duties and from divulging the secrets of their jobs either during or after their tenure of office.

Article Seventeen. Privileges and Immunities.

1. The Cooperation Council and its organisations shall enjoy on the territories of all member states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as required to realize their objectives and carry out their functions.
2. Representatives of the member states of the Council, and the Council's employees, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in agreements to be concluded for their purpose

between the member states. A special agreement shall organise the relation between the Council and the state in which it has its headquarters.

3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are prepared and put into effect, the representatives of the member states in the Cooperation Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities established for similar organisations.

Article Eighteen. Budget of the Secretariat-General.

The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the member states shall contribute equal amounts.

Article Nineteen. Charter Implementation.

1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of states of the six member states named in his Charter's preamble.

2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall act as custodian and shall deliver a true copy thereof to every member state, pending the establishment of the Secretariat-General at which time the latter shall become depository.

Article Twenty. Amendments to Charter.

1. Any member state may request an amendment of this Charter.

2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who shall refer them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the Ministerial Council.

Article Twenty-One. Closing Provisions.

No reservations may be voiced in respect of the provisions of this Charter.

Article Twenty-two.

The Secretariat-General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter with the League of Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial Council.

This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic language at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 corresponding to 25 May 1981.

United Arab Emirates

State of Bahrain

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Sultanate of Oman

State of Qatar

State of Kuwait

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

Document 5

Rules of Procedures of the Supreme Council

25 May 1981

Article One, Definitions

These regulations shall be called Rules of Procedures of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council and shall encompass the rules that govern procedures for convening the Council and the exercise of its functions.

Article Two, Membership

1. Supreme Council shall be composed of the Heads of State of the Cooperation Council member states. The president shall be rotary based on the alphabetical order of the state's name.

2. Each member state shall notify the Secretary General of the names of the members of its delegations to the council meeting, at least seven days prior to the date set for opening the meeting.

Article Three

With due regard to the objectives of the Cooperation Council and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council as specified in Article 4 and 8 of the Charter, the Supreme Council may perform the following:

1. From technical committees and select their members from member states nominees who specialize in the committee's respective field.

2. Call one or more of its members to a specific subject and submit a report thereon to be distributed to the members sufficiently in advance of the meeting set for discussing that subject.

Article Four, Convening the Supreme Council

1. a. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year, and may hold extraordinary sessions at the request of any one member seconded by another member.
b. The Supreme Council shall hold its session at the heads of state level.
c. The Supreme Council shall its session in the member state's territories.
d. Prior to convening the Supreme Council, the Secretary General shall hold a meeting to be attended by delegates of the member states for consultation on matters related to the session's agenda.

2. a. The Secretary General shall set the opening date of the Council sessions and suggest a closing date.

b. The Secretary General shall issue the invitations for convening a regular sessions less than thirty days in advance, and for convening an extraordinary session, within no more than five days.

Article Five

1. The Supreme Council shall at the start of every session decide whether the meeting shall be secret or public.

2. A meeting shall be considered valid if attended by heads of state of two thirds of the member states. Its resolutions in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous agreement of the member states present and participating in the vote, while resolutions in procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote. Any member abstaining shall document his being not bound by the resolution

Article Six

1. The Council shall hold an extraordinary session based on:
 - a. Resolution issued in a previous session,
 - b. Request of a member state seconded by another state. In this case, the council shall convene within no more than five days from that date of issue of the invitation for holding the extraordinary session.
2. No matters may be placed on the extraordinary session's agenda other than those for which the session was convened to discuss.

Article Seven

1. Presidency of the Supreme Council shall, at the opening of each regular session, go to a head of state by rotation based on the alphabetical order of the member states' names. The President shall continue to exercise the function of the Presidency until such functions are entrusted to his successor at the beginning of the next regular session.
2. The head of a state that is party to an outstanding dispute may not preside over a session or meeting called to discuss the subject of the dispute. In such case, the Council shall designate a temporary president.
3. The President shall declare the opening and closing of sessions and meeting, the suspension of meeting, and closures, and shall see that the Cooperation Council Charter and these rules of Procedures are duly complied with. He shall give the floor to speakers based on the order of their requests, submit suggestions for acceptance by the membership, direct voting procedures, give final decisions on points of order, announce resolutions, follow up on works of committees, and inform the Council of all incoming correspondence.
4. The President may take part in deliberation and submit suggestions in the name of the state which he represents and may, for this purpose, assign a member of his state's delegation to act on his behalf in such instances.

Article Eight, Supreme Council Agenda

1. The Ministerial Council shall prepare a draft agenda for the Supreme Council, and such draft agenda shall be convened by the Secretary General, together with explanatory notes and documentation, to the member states under cover of a letter of convocation at least thirty days before the date set for meeting.
2. The draft agenda shall include the following:
 - a. A report by the Secretary General on the Supreme Council's activities between the two sessions, and actions taken to carry out its resolutions.

- b. Reports and matters received from the Ministerial Council and the Secretary General.
 - c. Matters which the Supreme Council had previously decided to include on the agenda.
 - d. Matters suggested by a member state for necessary review by the Supreme Council.
3. Every member state may request inclusion of additional items in the draft agenda provided such request is tabled at least fifteen days prior to the date set for opening the session. Such matters shall be listed in an additional agenda which shall be sent, along with relevant documentation, to the member state, at least five days before the date set for the session.
4. Any member state may request inclusion of extra items on the draft agenda as late as the date set for opening a session, if such matters are considered both important and urgent.
5. The Council shall approve its agenda at the start of every session.
6. The Council may, during the session, add new items that are considered urgent.
7. The ordinary session shall be adjourned after completion of discussions of the items placed on the agenda. The Supreme Council may decide to suspend the session's meeting before completion of discussions on agenda items, and resume such meetings at later date.

Article Nine, Office and Committees of Supreme Council

1. The Supreme Council Office shall be formed, in every session, of the Council President, the Chairman of the Ministerial Council and the Secretary General. The Office shall be headed by the Supreme Council President.

2. The Office shall carry out the following functions:

a. Review the text of resolutions passed by the Supreme Council without affecting their contents.

b. Assist the President of the Supreme Council in directing the activities of the session in a general way.

c. Other tasks indicated in these Rules of Procedures or other matters entrusted to it by the Supreme Council.

Article Ten

1. The Council may, at the start of every session, create any committees that it deems necessary to allow adequate study of matters listed on the agenda. Delegates of member states shall take part in the activities of such committees.

2. Meetings of committees shall continue until they complete their task, with due regard for the date set for closing the session and the resolutions shall be carried by majority vote.

3. Every committee shall start its work by selecting a chairman from among its members. The rapporteur of the committee shall act for the chairman in directing the meeting in the absence of the chairman. The chairman, or other rapporteur in the chairman's absence, shall submit to the Council all the explanations that requests in the committee's reports. The chairman may, with the approval of the session's president, take part in the discussions, without voting if he is not a member of the Supreme Council.

4. the Council may refer any of the matters included in the agenda to the committees, based on their specialization for study and reporting. Any one item may be referred to more than one committee.
5. Committees may neither discuss any matter nor refer to them by the Council, nor adopt any recommendation which, if approved by the Council, may produce a financial obligation, before the committee receives a report from the Secretary General regarding financial and administrative results that may ensue from adopting the resolution.

Article Eleven, Progress of Deliberations and suggestions

1. Every member state may participate in the deliberations and committees of the Supreme Council as stipulated in these Rules of Procedures.
2. The President shall direct discussion of the items as presented in order on the meetings agenda and may, when necessary, call the Secretary General or his representative to the meeting to explain any point as necessary.
3. The President shall give the floor to speakers in the order of their requests. He may give priority to the Chairman or rapporteur of a committee to submit a report or explain specific points.
4. Every member may, during deliberations, raise points of order which the President shall resolve immediately and his decision shall be valid unless contradicted by a majority of the Supreme Council member states.

Article Twelve

1. Every member may, during the discussion of any subject, request suspension or adjournment of the meeting or discussion of the subject, or closure. Such requests may not be discussed, but the President shall put them to the vote, if duly seconded, and decision shall be by majority of the member states.
2. With due regards to provision of item 4 of the proceeding Article, suggestions indicated in item 1 of the Article, shall be given priority over others based on the following order:
 - a. Suspend the meeting
 - b. Adjourn the meeting
 - c. Postpone discussion of the matter on hand
 - d. Closure of discussion of the matter on hand
3. Apart from suggestions concerning language or procedural matter, draft resolutions and substantive amendments shall be submitted in writing to the Secretary General or his representative who shall distribute them as soon as possible to the delegations. No draft resolutions may be submitted for discussion or voting before the text thereof is distributed to all the delegations.
4. A proposal that has already been decided upon in the same session may not be reconsidered unless the Council decides otherwise.

Article Thirteen

The President shall follow the activities of the committees, inform the Supreme Council of correspondence received, and formally announce before members all the resolutions and recommendations arrived at.

Article fourteen, Voting

Every member state shall have one vote and no state may represent another state or vote for it.

ARTICLE FIFTEEN

1. Voting shall be by calling the names in the alphabetical order of the states names, or by raising hands. Voting shall be secret if so requested by a member by decision of the President. The Supreme Council may decide otherwise. The vote of every member shall be documented in the minutes of the meeting if voting is effected by calling the names. The minutes shall indicate the result of voting, if the vote is secret or by show of hands.

2. A member may abstain from a vote or express reservations over a procedural matter or part thereof, in which case the reservations shall be read at the time the resolution is announced and shall be duly documented in writing. Members may present explanations about their stand in the voting after voting is completed.

3. Once the President announces that voting has started, no interruption may be made unless the matter relates to a point of order relevant to the vote.

ARTICLE SIXTEEN

1. If a member requests amendment of a proposal, voting on the amendment shall be carried out first. If there are more than one amendment, voting shall be first made on the amendment which in the President's opinion is farthest from the original proposal, then on the next farthest, and then so on until voting is completed on all proposed amendments. If one or more such amendments is passed, then voting shall be made on the original proposal as amended.

2. Any new proposal shall be deemed as an amendment to the original proposal if it merely entails an addition to, omission from or change to a part of the original proposal.

ARTICLE SEVENTEEN

1. The Supreme Council may create technical committees charged with giving advice on the design and execution of Supreme Council programs in specific fields.

2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the members of the technical committees from specialists who are citizens of the member states.

3. The technical committees shall meet at the invitation of the Secretary-General and shall lay down their work plans in consultation with him.

4. The Secretary-General shall prepare the committees agendas after consultation with the chairman of the committee concerned.

ARTICLE EIGHTEEN : AMENDMENT OF RULES OF PROCEDURES

1. Any member state may propose amendments to the Rules of Procedures.

2. No proposed amendments may be considered unless the relevant proposal is circulated to the member states by the Secretariat-General prior to tabling with the Ministerial Council by at least thirty days.

3. No basic changes may be introduced to the proposed amendment mentioned in the preceding item unless the text of such proposed changes have been circulated to the member states by the Secretariat-General before tabling with the Ministerial Council by at least fifteen days.

4. Except for items based on the provisions of the Charter, and with due regard to preceding items, these Rules of Procedures shall be amended by a resolution of the Supreme Council approved by the majority of the members.

ARTICLE NINETEEN : EFFECTIVE DATE

These Rules of Procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the Supreme Council and may not be amended except in accordance with procedures set forth in the preceding Article.

These Rules of Procedures are signed at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 May 1981 AD.

United Arab Emirates

State of Bahrain

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Sultanate of Oman

State of Qatar

State of Kuwait

DOCUMENT 6

RULES OF PROCEDURES OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL - 25 MAY 1981

ARTICLE ONE

1. These regulations shall be called Rules of Procedures of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council and shall encompass rules governing Council meetings and exercise of its functions.

2. The following terms as used in these shall have the meanings indicated :

Cooperation Council - The Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council

Charter - Statute establishing the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council

Supreme Council - The highest body of the body of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council

Council - Ministerial Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council

Secretary General - The Secretary-General of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council

Chairman - The Chairman of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council

ARTICLE TWO : STATE REPRESENTATION

1. The Ministerial Council shall be composed of the member states Foreign Ministers or other delegated Ministers.
2. Every member state shall, at least one week prior to the convening of every Ministerial Council's ordinary session, convey to the Secretary-General a list of the names of the members of its delegation. For extraordinary sessions, the list shall be submitted three days before the date set for the session.

ARTICLE THREE : CONVENING THE SESSIONS

1. The Ministerial Council shall decide in every meeting the venue of its next regular session.
2. The Secretary-General shall decide, in consultation with the member states, the venues of extraordinary sessions.
3. If circumstances should arise that preclude the convening of an ordinary or extraordinary session at the place set for it, the Secretary-General shall so inform the member states and shall set another place for the meeting after consultation with them.

ARTICLE FOUR : ORDINARY SESSIONS

1. The Council shall convene in ordinary session once every three months.
2. The Secretary-General shall set the date for opening the session and suggest the date of its closing.
3. The Secretary-General shall address the invitation to attend a Council ordinary session at least fifteen days in advance, and shall indicate therein the date and place set for the meeting, as well as attach thereto the session's agenda, explanatory notes and other documentation.

ARTICLE FIVE : EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS

1. The Council shall hold an extraordinary session at the request of any member state seconded by another member.
2. The Secretary-General shall address the invitation to the council's extraordinary session and attach a memorandum containing the request of the member which asked for the meeting.
3. The Secretary-General shall specify in the invitation the place, date and agenda of the session.

ARTICLE SIX

1. The Council may itself decide to hold extraordinary sessions, in which case it shall specify the agenda, time and place of the session.
2. The Secretary-General shall send out to the member states the invitation to attend the Council's extraordinary meeting, along with a memorandum

containing the Council's decision to this effect, and specifying the date and agenda of the session.

3. The extraordinary session shall be convened within a maximum of five days from the date of issue of the invitation.

ARTICLE SEVEN

No matters, other than those for which the extraordinary session was called, may be included on its agenda.

ARTICLE EIGHT : AGENDA

The Secretary-General shall prepare a draft agenda for a Council's ordinary session and such draft shall include the following :

1. The Secretary-General's Report on the Cooperation Council's work.
2. Matters referred to him by the Supreme Council.
3. Matters which the Council had previously decided to include on the agenda.
4. Matters which the Secretary-General believes should be reviewed by the Council.
5. Matters suggested by a member state.

ARTICLE NINE

Member states shall convey to the Secretary-General their suggestions on matters they wish to include on the Council's agenda at least thirty days prior to the date of the Council's ordinary session.

ARTICLE TEN

Member states or the Secretary-General may request the inclusion of additional items on the Council's draft agenda at least ten days prior to the date set for opening an ordinary session. Such items shall be listed on an additional schedule which shall be conveyed alongwith relevant documentation to the member states at least five days prior to the date of the session.

ARTICLE ELEVEN

Member states or the Secretary-General may request the inclusion of additional items on the Council ordinary session's agenda up to the date set for opening the session if such matters are both important and urgent.

ARTICLE TWELVE

The Council shall approve its agenda at the beginning of every session

ARTICLE THIRTEEN

A Council's ordinary session shall end upon completion of discussion of matters listed on the agenda. The Council may, when necessary, decide to suspend its meetings temporarily before discussion of agenda items is completed and resume its meeting at a later date.

ARTICLE FOURTEEN

The Council may defer discussion of certain items on its agenda and decide to include them with others, when necessary, on the agenda of a subsequent session

ARTICLE FIFTEEN : COUNCIL'S CHAIRMANSHIP

1. Chairmanship of the council shall be entrusted every six months to a head of delegation on rotation based on the alphabetical order of the member states names, and if necessary, to the next in order.
2. The chairman shall exercise his functions until he passes his post to this successor.
3. The Chairman shall, as well, preside over the extraordinary sessions.
4. The representative of a state that is party to an outstanding dispute may not chair the session or meeting assigned for discussing such dispute, in which case the Council shall name a temporary Chairman.

ARTICLE SIXTEEN

1. The Chairman shall announce the opening and closing of sessions and meetings, the suspension of meetings and closure of discussions, and shall see that the provisions of the Charter and these Rules of Procedures are duly respected.
2. The Chairman may participate in the Council's deliberations and vote in the name of the state he represents. He may, for such purpose, delegate another member of his delegation to act on his behalf.

ARTICLE SEVENTEEN, COUNCIL's OFFICE

1. The Council Office shall include chairman, secretary-general, and heads of working subcommittees which the Council decided to form.
2. The Council chairman shall preside over the office.

ARTICLE EIGHTEEN

The Office shall carry out the following tasks:

1. Help the chairman direct the sessions proceeding;
2. coordinate the work of Council and the subcommittees;
3. Supervise the drafting of the resolutions by the Council;
4. Other tasks indicated in these Rules of Procedures or entrusted to it by the Council.

ARTICLE NINETEEN, SUBCOMMITTEES

1. The Council shall utilize preparatory and working committees to accomplish its tasks.
2. The Secretariat-General shall participate the works of the committees.

ARTICLE TWENTY

1. The Secretary-General may, in consultation with the chairman of the session, form preparatory committees charged with the study of matters listed on the agenda.

2. Preparatory committees shall be composed of delegates of member states and may, when necessary, seek the help of such experts as they may deem fit.
3. Each preparatory committee shall meet at least three days prior to the opening of the session by invitation of the Secretary-General. The work of the committee shall end at the close of the session.

ARTICLE TWENTY ONE

1. The Council may, at the start of each session, form working committees and charge them with specific tasks.
2. The work of the working committees shall continue until the date set for closing the session.

ARTICLE TWENTY TWO

1. Each subcommittee shall start its work by electing a chairman and a rapporteur from among its members. When the chairman is absent, the rapporteur shall act for him in directing the meeting.
2. The chairman or rapporteur of each subcommittee shall submit a report on its work of the council.
3. The chairman or rapporteur of a subcommittee shall present to the council all explanations required about the contents of the subcommittee's report.

ARTICLE TWENTY THREE

1. The Secretariat-General shall organize the technical secretariat and subcommittees of the Council.
2. The Secretariat-General shall prepare minutes of meeting documenting discussions, resolutions and recommendations. Such minutes shall be prepared for all meetings of the Council and its subcommittees.
3. The Secretariat-General shall supervise the organization of the Council's relations with the information media.
4. The Secretariat-General shall convey the Council's resolutions and recommendations and relevant documentation to the member states within fifteen days after the end of the session.

ARTICLE TWENTY FOUR

The council's Secretariat and subcommittees shall receive and distribute documents, reports, resolutions and recommendations of the Council and its subcommittees and shall draw up and distribute minutes and daily bulletins, as well as safeguard the documents and carry out any other tasks required by the Council's work.

ARTICLE TWENTY FIVE

Texts of resolutions or recommendations made by the Council may not be announced or published except by decision of the Council.

ARTICLE TWENTY SIX, DELIBERATIONS

Every member state may take part in the deliberations of the Council and its subcommittees in the manner prescribed in these Rules of Procedures.

ARTICLE TWENTY SEVEN

1. The chairman shall direct deliberations on matters in hand in the order they are listed on the council's agenda.

2. The chairman shall give the floor to speakers in the order of their requests. Priority may be given to the chairman or rapporteur of a certain committee to present its report or explain certain points therein. The floor shall be given to the Secretary-General or his representative whenever it is necessary.

3. The Council chairman may, during deliberations, read the list of the names of members who requested the floor, and with the approval of the council, close the list. The only exception exercise of the right of reply.

ARTICLE TWENTY EIGHT

The Council shall decide whether the meeting shall be open or secret.

ARTICLE TWENTY NINE

1. Every member may raise a point of order which the chairman shall resolve immediately and his decision shall be final unless opposed by majority of the member states.

2. A member who raises a point may not go beyond the point he raised.

ARTICLE THIRTY

1. Every member may during discussion of any matter, suggest the suspension or adjournment of the meeting, or discussion of matter in hand of closure. The chairman shall in such cases submit the suggestion to the vote directly, if the suggestion is seconded by another member, and it requires the approval of the majority of the member states to pass.

2. With due regard to the provisions of the preceding item, suggestions indicated therein shall be put to the vote in the following order:

- a. Suspension of meeting
- b. Adjournment of meeting
- c. Postponement of discussion of matter in hand
- d. Closure of discussion of the matter in hand.

ARTICLE THIRTY ONE

1. Member states may suggest draft resolutions or recommendations of amendments thereto, and may withdraw such suggestions unless they are voted upon.

2. Drafts indicated in the preceding item shall be submitted in writing to Secretariat-General for distribution to delegations as soon as possible.

3. Except for suggestions concerning language or procedures drafts indicated in this Article may not be discussed or voted upon before their texts are distributed to all delegations.

4. A suggestion already decided upon in the same session may not be reconsidered unless the Council decides otherwise.

ARTICLE THIRTY TWO

The Chairman shall follow the work of the committees, inform the Council of oncoming correspondence, and formally announce before members the resolutions and recommendations that have been arrived at.

ARTICLE THIRTY THREE, VOTING

1. The Council shall pass its resolutions with the unanimous approval of the member states present and participating in the vote, while decisions in procedural matters shall be passed by a majority vote. The member abstaining from the vote shall document his non subscription to the decision.
2. If members of Council should disagree on the definition of the matter being put to the vote, the matter shall be settled by the majority vote of the member states present.

ARTICLE THIRTY FOUR

1. Every member state shall have one vote.
2. No member state may represent another state or vote for it.

ARTICLE THIRTY FIVE

1. Voting shall be by calling the names on the alphabetical order of the state's names, or by raising hands.
2. Voting shall be by secret ballot if so requested by a member or by decision of the Chairman. The Council, however, may decide otherwise.
3. The vote of every member shall be documented in the minutes of the meeting of voting is effected by calling the names. The minutes shall indicate the result of voting if the vote as secret or by show of hands.
4. Member states may explain positions after the vote and such explanations shall be written down in the minutes of the meeting.
5. Once the Chairman announces the voting has started, no interruption may be made except for a point of order relating to the vote or postponement in accordance with the provisions of this next Article.

ARTICLE THIRTY SIX

1. The Council Chairman with the help of the Secretary-General shall endeavor to reconcile the stands of member states on disputed matters and obtain agreement to draft resolution before submitting it to the vote.
2. The Council Chairman, the Secretary-General or any member state may request postponement of a vote for a specific period during further negotiations may be made concerning the item submitted to the vote.

ARTICLE THIRTY SEVEN

1. If a member requests amendment of a proposal, voting on the amendment shall be carried out first be made on the amendment which the Chairman considers to be farthest from the original proposal, then the next farthest, and so until all proposed amendments have been voted upon if one or more amendments are passed, then voting shall be made on the original proposal as amended.
2. A new proposal shall be deemed as an amendment to the original proposal if it merely entails an addition to, omission from, or change to a part of the original proposal.

ARTICLE THIRTY EIGHT

1. Any member state of the Secretary-General may propose amending these Rules of Procedures.

2. No proposed amendment to these Rules of Procedures may be considered unless the relevant proposal is circulated to the member states by the Secretary-General at least thirty days before submission to the council.

3. No basic changes may be introduced to the proposed amendment mentioned in the preceding item unless the texts of such proposed change have been circulated to the member states at least fifteen days prior to submission to the Council.

4. Except for items in provisions of the Charter and with due regard to preceding items, these Rules of Procedures shall be amended by a resolution of the Council approved by majority of its members.

ARTICLE THIRTY NINE, EFFECTIVE DATE

These Rules of procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the Council and may not be amended except in accordance with procedures set forth in the preceding article.

Thus, these Rules of procedures are signed at Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 May 1981 AD.

United Arab Emirates

State of Bahrain

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Sultanate of Oman

State of Qatar

State of Kuwait

Document 7

Rules of Procedures of the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes

25 May 1981

Preamble

In accordance with the provisions of Article Six of the Charter of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council; and in execution of the provision of Article Ten of the Cooperation Council Charter, a Commission for Settlement of Disputes, hereinafter referred to as The Commission, shall be set up and its jurisdiction and rules for its proceedings shall be as follows:

Article One, Terminology

Terms used in these Rules of Procedures shall have the same meaning established in the Charter of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council.

Article Two, Commission's Seat and meetings

The Commission shall have its headquarters at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and shall hold its meetings on the territory of the state where its headquarters is located, but may hold its meetings elsewhere, when necessary.

Article Three, Jurisdiction

The Commission shall, once installed, have jurisdiction to consider the following matters referred to it by the Supreme Council:

1. Disputes between member states.

2. Differences of opinions as to the interpretation or execution of the Cooperation Council Charter.

Article Four, Commission's Membership

1. The Commission shall be formed of an appropriate number of citizens of member states not involved in the dispute as the Council selects in every case separately depending on the nature of the dispute, provided that the number shall not be less than three members.

2. The Commission may seek the advice of any such experts as it may deem necessary.

3. Unless the Supreme Council decides otherwise, the Commission's task shall end with the submission of its recommendations or opinion to the Supreme Council which, after the conclusion of the Commission's task, may summon it at any time to explain or elaborate on its recommendations or opinions.

Article Five, Meetings and Internal Procedures

1. The Commission's meeting shall be valid if attended by all members.

2. The Secretariat-General of the Cooperation Council shall prepare procedures required to conduct the Commission's affairs, and such procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the Ministerial Council.

3. Each party to the dispute shall send representatives to the Commission who shall be entitled to follow proceedings and present their defense.

Article Six, Chairmanship

The Commission shall select a chairman from among its members.

Article Seven, Voting

Every member of the commission shall have one vote, and shall issue its recommendations or opinions on matters referred to it by majority of the members. In case of a tie, the party with the Chairman's vote shall prevail.

Article Eight, Commission's Secretariat

1. The Secretary-General shall appoint a recorder for the Commission, and a sufficient number of employees to carry out secretarial work.

2. The Supreme Council may create an independent organization to carry out the Commission's secretarial work when the need arises.

Article Nine, Recommendations and Opinions

1. The Commission shall issue its recommendations or opinions in accordance with the Cooperation Council's Charter, international laws and practices, and the principles of Islamic Sharjah. The Commission shall submit its findings on the case in hand to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.

2. The Commission may, while considering any dispute referred to it and pending the issue of its final recommendations thereon, ask the Supreme Council to take interim action called for by necessity or circumstances.

3. The Commission's recommendations or opinions shall spell out the reasons on which they were based and shall be signed by the chairman and recorder.

4. If an opinion is passed wholly or partially by unanimous vote of the members, the dissenting members shall be entitled to document their dissenting opinion.

Article Ten, Immunities and Privileges

The Commission and its members shall enjoy such immunities and privileges in the territories of the member states as are required to realize its objectives and in accordance with Article Seventeen of the Cooperation council Charter.

Article Eleven, Commission's Budget

The Commission's budget shall be considered part of the Secretariat-General budget. Remuneration's of the Commission's members shall be established by the Supreme Council.

Article Twelve, Amendments

1. Any member state may request for amendments of these rules of Procedures.
2. Requests for amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who shall relay them to the member states by at least four months before submission to the Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall be effective if approved unanimously by the Supreme Council.

Article Thirteen, Effective Date

These Rules of Procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the Supreme Council.

These Rules of Procedures were signed at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 May 1981 AD.

United Arab Emirates

State of Bahrain

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Sultanate of Oman

State of Qatar

State of Kuwait

Document 8

Bylaws of the GCC

26 May 1981

During their closed meeting today, the heads of the six Gulf states participating in the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council approved the bylaws of the Supreme Council, which is the supreme authority of the Cooperation Council and one of its three main organs, in addition to the Ministerial Council and the General Secretariat. The following is the text of the Supreme Council's bylaws:

Article One:

The following shall be called the Bylaws of the Supreme Council of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council. They contain the rules regulating the convocation of the council and the exercise of its tasks.

Article Two: The Supreme Council's Membership and Tasks

1. The Supreme Council shall consist of the heads of the Cooperation Councils' member states, Its presidency shall be periodic in accordance with the alphabetical order of the names of these states.

2. Every members state shall notify the Secretary General of the names of its delegates to the council's meeting at least 7 days before its opening date.

Article Three:

Taking into consideration the Cooperation Council's aims and the Supreme Council's jurisdictions as stipulated in articles four and eight of the statutes, the council shall perform the following:

1. To form technical committees and choose its members from members states nominees, who are specialized in these committees fields of work.
2. To entrust one or more of its members with the task of studying a certain subject and submit a report about it to be distributed among the members sometime before the session is held to discuss it.

Article Four, The convocation of the Supreme Council

1. A. The Supreme Council shall hold two ordinary sessions a year. Extraordinary sessions can be held upon the request of any member with the second of another member.

B. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions on the level of the heads of state.

C. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the Countries of the member states.

D. Before the convocation of the Supreme Council, the secretary general shallcall for a meeting to be attended by the representatives of the member work.

2 A. The Secretary General shall fix the dates the sessions shall begin. He shall also propose the dates they shall end.

B. The Secretary General shall address invitations to attend the ordinary session at least 30 days before the convocation date and 5 days at most before the convocation of an extraordinary session.

Article Five:

1. The Supreme Council shall decide whether the sessions will be secret or public at the beginning of every session.

2. The Supreme Council's convocation shall be sound if it is attended by the heads of two-thirds of the member states. It shall adopt its decisions on objective issues by the unanimous vote of the states present and on procedural affairs by the majority. The member who abstains from voting must record that he will not abide by the decision.

Article Six:

1. The Supreme Council shall hold an extraordinary session:

A. Upon a decision adopted at a previous session.

B. Upon the request of a member state and the approval of another. In this case, the Council shall convene within 5 days after the invitation for the extraordinary session.

2. The agenda of the extraordinary sessions shall not include topics other than those for which they were held.

Article Seven: Supreme Council Presidency

1. At the beginning of every ordinary session, the presidency of the Supreme Council shall be alternately assumed by the heads of member states in accordance with the alphabetical order of the names of the countries. The president shall continue exercising the functions of the presidency until his successor assumes this responsibility at the beginning of the next ordinary session.

2. The head of a state which is party to an existing conflict cannot preside over the session or the meeting devoted to the discussion of this conflict. In this case, the Council shall appoint a temporary president.

3. The president shall open and close the sessions or meetings, suspend sessions, decide when to end the discussions, guarantee respect for the Gulf Cooperation Councils statutes, give the floor to those who ask for it first, submit proposals on which opinions are to be given, direct the operation of voting, decide on various points of the statutes, announce resolutions, follow up the work of the committees and inform the council about the letter it receives.

4. The president shall have the right to participate in deliberations and discussions on behalf of the country he represents. he shall also have the right to delegate a member of his delegation for this purpose.

Article Eight: The Supreme Council's Agenda

1. The Ministerial Council shall prepare the Supreme Council's draft agenda and the secretary general shall communicate it to the member states with explanatory memorandums, documents and the letter inviting the Council to convene, at least 30 days before the date of convening the council.

2. The draft agenda shall contain:

A. The Secretary General's report on the Supreme Council's work during the period that falls between the two sessions and the measures taken to implement its decisions.

B. Reports and topics coming from the Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General.

C. Topics that the Supreme Council had previously decided to list on its agenda.

D. Topics proposed by a member state which it considers as necessary to be discussed by the Supreme Council.

3. Each member state shall have the right to list additional topics on the Supreme Council's draft agenda at least 15 days before the set date of the Council's session. These topics will be listed in an additional agenda that will be sent to the member States along with their documents at least 5 days before the date of the session.

4. Any member state shall have the right to list additional topics to the session's agenda until the date that has been set for its opening if these topics are (at) the same time important and urgent.

5. The Council approves its agenda at the beginning of every session.

6. The Council shall have the right to list additional topics to the agenda during the session if they are urgent.

7. The ordinary session shall end after the completion of the discussion of the items listed on the agenda. The Supreme Council shall have the right to suspend the meetings of the session temporarily before having completed the discussion of the agenda and to resume the meeting at a later date.

Article Nine : The Supreme Council's Bureau and Committee.

1. The Supreme Council's Bureau shall consist, at every ordinary session of the council's chairman, of the chairman of the Ministerial Council and the secretary general. The chairman of the Supreme Council shall preside over the bureau.

2. The bureau shall assume the following tasks:

A. A review of the formulation of the resolution that are adopted by the Supreme Council without changing their content.

B. The task of assisting the Supreme Council chairman in the management of the session in a general manner.

C. Other tasks that are contained in the status or those which are entrusted to the bureau by the Supreme Council.

Article Ten :

1. At the outset of every ordinary session, the council shall form the committee it deems necessary and in such a way that the opportunity is given for making a detailed study of the issue on the agenda. Representatives from the member states shall participate in the work of these committee.

2. The committees' meetings shall continue in order to complete their work, taking into consideration the specific date for ending the session. The committee shall issue their resolutions with majority votes.

3. Every committee shall begin its work with the election of a chairman and rapporteur from among its members. If the chairman is absent he shall manage its sessions. If the chairman is absent, his representative or the rapporteur shall give the council all the required clarifications on the contents of the committee's report. The rapporteur or chairman's representative can, with the approval of the chairman of the session, participate in the deliberations without voting, unless he is a member of the council.

4. The council shall refer issues listed on the agenda to committee in accordance with their specialization in order to have them study these issues and prepare reports on them. An issue can be referred to more than one committee.

5. The committee cannot discuss any issue unless it is referred to them by the Council. The committees also can not adopt any recommendations on any issue that is listed on their agenda and

whose adoption entails a financial commitment by the council before they receive a report from the Secretary General on the financial and administrative effects pertaining to the adoption of these recommendations.

Article Eleven: The Progress of Deliberations and Proposals

1. Each member state shall have the right to participate in the deliberations of the Supreme Council and its committees in accordance with the statutes.
2. The chairman directs the deliberations on the issues to be discussed according to their order in the session's agenda. When necessary the chairman can invite the secretary general or the person who represents him at the meeting to clarify what he considers necessary.
3. The chairman yields the floor in accordance with requests made. The floor may be given to the chairman or rapporteur of a committee to submit the committee's report or explain points contained in it.
4. Any member can raise a point of the statutes during the deliberations on which the chairman shall immediately decide. The chairman's decision will be executed unless it is reversed by a majority vote of the Supreme Council.

Article Twelve:

1. During the discussion of any issue, any member can propose the suspension or postponement of the session, the postponement of the discussion of the issue in question or the ending of discussion. The proposal shall not be the subject for discussion but shall be submitted to a vote by the chairman if it is seconded by another member. The adoption of this proposal shall be made with a majority vote of member states.
2. Taking into consideration the contents of paragraph four, article eleven, proposals made in accordance with paragraph one this article shall be given preference to all other points preceding them according to the following order:
 - A. the suspension of the session
 - B. the postponement of the session
 - C. ending discussion of the issue under discussion.
3. Excluding proposals on formulation and on procedural matters, draft resolutions and fundamental amendments shall be submitted in writing to the Secretary General or to the person who represents him for distribution to the delegations as soon as possible. The discussion of a draft resolution or its submission to a vote cannot take place before the distribution of their text to all the delegations.
4. Any proposal on which a decision has been taken during the same session cannot be reconsidered unless the council decides otherwise.

Article Thirteen:

The Chairman shall follow up the committee's work, inform the Supreme Council of the messages received by it and officially announce before the members the recommendations reached.

Article Fourteen: Voting

Each member state shall have one vote and no state shall represent another state or vote for it.

Article Fifteen:

1. Voting shall be made by calling the name in accordance with the alphabetical order of the states' names or by raising the hand. Voting shall be in the form of a secret ballot if asked to be so by a member or upon a decision by the chairman. The Supreme Council shall have the right to decide otherwise and to write down in the session's minutes the vote of every member if the ballot is made by calling the roll. The result of the ballot shall be included in the minutes if the ballot is secret or made by raising hand.
2. Every member shall have the right to abstain from voting or to express a reservation about a procedural decision or part of it. The reservation shall be read out when the decision is announced and shall be written down. The members shall have the right to explain their stands toward the voting when said voting ends.
3. Once the chairman announces the beginning of voting, no one shall interrupt him unless this interruption pertains to a legal point concerning the voting.

Article Sixteen:

1. If a member asks for the amendment of a proposal, a vote shall be held first on this amendment. Should there be more than one amendment, voting will begin on the amendment whose subject is seen by the chairman as furthest detached from that of the original amendment. Voting shall then be on the amendment next furthest detached and so forth until all proposed amendments are voted upon. If one or more amendment is approved, the amended original proposal shall then be voted upon.
2. Any new proposal shall be considered and amendment of the original proposal if it includes the mere addition, omission or change of any part of the original proposal.

Article Seventeen:

1. The Supreme Council shall form technical committees entrusted with the task of offering consultation in the preparation and implementation of the Supreme Council's programs in certain fields.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the technical committees' members from among the specialist citizens of the member states.
3. The technical committees shall meet upon the invitation of the Secretary General and shall prepare their working plan through consultations with him.
4. The Secretary General shall draw up the technical committees' agenda after consultations with the competent committee's chairman.

Article Eighteen: Amendment of the Bylaws

1. Every state has the right to suggest the amendment of these bylaws.
2. It is impermissible to examine the request to amend the bylaws unless the proposal regarding this amendment is sent to the member states by the Secretariat General at least 30 days before submitting it to the Ministerial Council.

3. It is impermissible to introduce any basic changes on the amendment proposal as cited in the previous paragraph unless the text of these proposed changes has been sent to the member states by the Secretariat General at least 15 days before it is submitted to the Ministerial Council.

4. With the exception of the articles based on the provisions of the statutes, taking into consideration the above mentioned paragraphs, these bylaws are amended by a decision adopted by the Supreme Council upon the approval of the majority of its members.

Article Nineteen: The Validity of the Bylaws

These bylaws shall be valid as of the date they are approved by the Supreme Council. They shall not be amended except in accordance with the measures cited in the previous article.

These bylaws have been signed in the city of Abu Dhabi in the UAE on 22 Rajab 1401 Hegira, corresponding to 26 May 1981.

The United Arab Emirates

The State of Bahrain

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Sultanate of Oman

The State of Qatar

The State of Kuwait

Document 9

Abu Dhabi Supreme Council Summit: Final Communiqué

26 May 1981

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

Final statement of the first meeting of the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council of the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf countries:

In the response to the invitation of his Highness the President of the UAE and with the help of God, a meeting was held in Abu Dhabi 21-22 Rajab 1401 Hegira, corresponding to 25-26 May 1981, of Their Majesties and their Highnesses Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan President of the UAE; Shaykh Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifah, Amir of the State of Bahrain; King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Sultan Qabus ibn Said of Oman; Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar; and Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad Al-Jabir as-Sahah, the Amir of Kuwait.

Out of the fraternal spirit that exists among these countries and their peoples; in completion of the efforts begun by their leaders to lay down a model formula that includes their countries and enables these countries to cooperate and coordinate among themselves; out of their belief in the importance of cooperation among these countries; in response to their peoples' expectations for increased cooperation and efforts to achieve a better future; and in accordance with the results of the meetings of their Foreign Ministers in Riyadh on 4 February 1981 and in Muscat on 9 March 1981;

Their majesties and highnesses agreed to establish a council of their countries to be called the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf States (Majlis at-Ta'awun li Duwal al-Khalij al-Arabiyyah). They signed the statutes of the council, which are aimed at developing cooperation among these states

enhancing their relations; achieving coordination; integration and closer links; deepening and strengthening the ties and relations that exist among their peoples in various fields; implementing joint projects and drawing up similar systems in economic, cultural, information, social and legislative fields in order to serve their interests and strengthen their ability to hold on to their beliefs and values.

Their Majesties and Highnesses also decided to appoint Abdullah Bisharah secretary general of the Cooperation Council Riyadh, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, shall be the Council's permanent headquarters.

Out of their realization of the inevitability of economic integration among their countries and a social merger among their peoples, they believe that the current circumstances of their states and the similar issues and problems they face, in addition to their similar economic and social systems, make it necessary to lay down the bases for and establish the institutions and apparatus that will make this economic integration and social merger a living reality.

In order to achieve these goals, in accordance with Article 4 of the Council's statutes, they decided to set up specialized committees as outlined in detail in the enclosed working paper approved by the Supreme Council.

Their Majesties and Highnesses reviewed the current situation in the area. They reaffirm that the region's security and stability are the responsibility of its peoples and countries and that this council expresses the will of these countries and their right to defend their security and independence. They also affirm their absolute rejection of foreign interference in the region from any source. They call for keeping the entire region free of international conflicts, particularly the present of military fleets and foreign bases, in order to safeguard their interests and the interests and the interests of the world.

They declare that guaranteeing stability in the Gulf is linked to the achievement of peace in the Middle East, and this underlines the need to achieve a just solution for the Palestinian question- a solution that safeguards the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, including their rights to repatriation and the establishment of an independent state, and ensures Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, the foremost of which is Jerusalem.

Their Majesties and Highnesses discussed the serious situation arising from the escalation of Zionist aggression against the Arab nation. They discussed in a spirit of national responsibility Israel's persistence in violating fraternal Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and the savage bombardment of Lebanese cities and towns and Palestinian refugee camps, its war of extermination launched against the Palestinians, its aggression against the Arab Deterrent Forces and its threats to fraternal Syria. They affirm their full support and backing for Syria. They appeal to all parties in Lebanon to discard their differences, put an end to the bloodshed in Lebanon and embark on reconciliation talks within the framework of Lebanese legitimacy.

Their Majesties and Highnesses support the efforts being made to end the Iraqi-Iranian war, since it is one of the problems that threaten the region's security and increases the possibility of foreign intervention in the region. They stress the need to redouble efforts to find a final settlement to the dispute.

Their Majesties and Highnesses also reaffirm their commitment to the Arab League Charter and the resolutions of Arab summit conferences. They reiterate their support for Islamic Conference Organization and their commitment to its resolutions. They express their adherence to the principles of nonalignment and to the UN Charter.

In response to the invitation of His Majesty King Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it was decided to hold the second meeting in Riyadh in Muharram, 1402 Hegira, corresponding to the first half of November 1981.

Issued in Abu Dhabi 22 Rajab, 1401 Hegira, 26 may 1981.1

THE UNITED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

With the help of God the Almighty;

The Governments of the Member States of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council;

In accordance with the Charter thereof, which calls for closer relations and stronger links; and, desiring to develop extend and enhance their economic ties on solid foundations, in the best interest of their peoples and for the sake of working to coordinate and standardize their economic, financial and monetary policies, as well as their commercial and industrial legislation, and Customs regulations have agreed as follows :

CHAPTER ONE TRADE EXCHANGE

ARTICLE 1

- a. The Member States shall permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin. Also, they shall permit exportation thereof to other Member States.
- b. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are from Member States shall receive the same treatment as national products.

ARTICLE 2

1. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin shall be exempted from reciprocal charges.
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, transportation, freight or unloading, shall not be considered as customs duties when they are levied on domestic products.

1. **(Source):** Ramazani, R.K. *The Gulf Cooperation Council Record and Analysis* op.cit. And the *Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf*. GCC. Secretariat General, Printing Press, Riyadh. 1992.

ARTICLE 3

1. For products of national origin to qualify as national manufactured products, the value added ensuing from their production in Member States shall not be less than 40% of their final value as at the termination of the production phase. In addition Member States citizens' share in the ownership of the producing plant shall not be less than 51%.
2. Every item enjoying exemption hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of origin duly authenticated by the appropriate government agency concerned.

ARTICLE 4

1. Member States shall establish a uniform minimum Customs tariff applicable to the products of countries other than G.C.C. Member States.
2. One of the objectives of the uniform Customs tariff shall be the protection of national products from foreign competition.
3. The uniform Customs tariff shall be implemented gradually within five years from the date on which this agreement becomes effective. Arrangements for its gradual implementation shall be agreed upon within one year from the said date.

ARTICLE 5

Member States shall grant all facilities for the transit of any Member State's goods to other Member States, exempting them from all duties and taxes whatsoever, without prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 2.

ARTICLE 6

Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from entry into the territory of a Member State by its local regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between the Customs authorities of the Member States.

ARTICLE 7

Member States shall coordinate their commercial policies and relations with other states and regional economic groupings and blocs with a view to creating balanced trade relations and equitable circumstances and terms of trade therewith.

To achieve this goal, the Member States shall make the following arrangements :

1. Coordination of import/export policies and regulations.
2. Coordination of policies for building up strategic food stocks.
3. Conclusion of collective economic agreements in cases where joint benefits to Member States would be realised.
4. Taking action for the creation of collective negotiating power to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis foreign parties in the field of importation of basic needs and exportation of major products.

CHAPTER TWO
THE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND INDIVIDUALS
AND THE EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

ARTICLE 8

The Member States shall agree on executive principles to ensure that each Member State shall grant the citizens of all other Member States the same treatment as is granted to its own citizens without any discrimination of differentiation in the following fields :

1. Freedom of movement work and residence.
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity.
4. Free movement of capital.

ARTICLE 9

The Member States shall encourage their respective private sectors to establish joint ventures in order to link their citizens' economic interests in various spheres of activity.

CHAPTER THREE
COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT

ARTICLE 10

The Member States shall endeavor to achieve the coordination and harmonization of their respective development plans with a view to achieving integration in economic affairs.

ARTICLE 11

1. The Member States shall endeavour to coordinate their policies with regard to all aspects of the oil industry including extraction, refining, marketing, processing, pricing, the exploitation of natural gas, and development of energy sources.
2. The Member States shall endeavour to formulate unified oil policies and adopt common positions vis-a-vis the outside world, and in international and specialized organisations.

ARTICLE 12

To achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement, the Member States shall :

1. Coordinate industrial activities and formulate policies and mechanisms which will lead to industrial development and the diversification of their products on an integrated basis.
2. Standardize their industrial legislation and regulations and guide their local production units to meet their needs.
3. Allocate industries between Member States according to relative advantages and Economic feasibility, and encourage the establishment of basic as well as ancillary industries.

ARTICLE 13

Within the framework of their coordinating activities, the Member States shall pay special attention to the establishment of joint ventures in the fields of industry, agriculture and service, and shall support

them with public, private or mixed capital in order to achieve economic integration, productive interface, and common development on sound economic bases.

CHAPTER FOUR TECHNICAL COOPERATION

ARTICLE 14

The Member States shall collaborate in finding spheres for common technical cooperation aimed at building a genuine local base founded on encouragement and support of research and applied sciences and technology as well as adapting imported technology to meet the needs of the region and to achieve the objectives of progress and development.

ARTICLE 15

Member States shall establish procedures, make arrangement and lay down terms for the transfer of technology, selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes thereto as would serve their various needs. Member States shall also, whenever feasible, conclude uniform agreements with foreign governments and scientific or commercial organisations to achieve their objectives.

ARTICLE 16

Member States shall formulate policies and implement coordinated programs for technical, vocational and professional training and qualification at all levels and stages. They shall also develop educational curricula at all levels to link education and technology with the development needs of the Member States.

ARTICLE 17

Member States shall coordinate their manpower policies and shall formulate uniform and standardized criteria and classifications for the various categories of occupations and crafts in different sectors in order to avoid harmful competition among themselves and to optimize the utilization of available human resources.

CHAPTER FIVE TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

ARTICLE 18

Member States shall accord passenger and cargo transportation belonging to citizens of the other Member States, when transiting or entering its territory, the same treatment they accord to the means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to their own citizens, including exemption from all duties and taxes, whatsoever. However, local means of transportation are excluded.

ARTICLE 19

1. Member States shall cooperate in the fields of land and sea transportation, and communications. They shall also coordinate and establish infrastructure projects such as seaports, airports, water and power stations and roads, with a view to realising joint economic development and the linking of their economic activities with each other.
2. The contracting states shall coordinate aviation and air transport policies among them and promote all areas of joint action at various levels.

ARTICLE 20

Member States shall allow steamers, ships and boats and their cargoes, belonging to any Member State freely to use the various port facilities and grant them the same treatment and privileges granted to their own in docking or calling at the ports as concerns fees, pilotage and docking services, freight, loading and unloading, maintenance, repair, storage of goods and other similar services.

CHAPTER SIX FINANCIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION

ARTICLE 21

Member States shall seek to unify investment rules and regulations in order to achieve a joint investment policy aimed at directing their domestic and foreign investment towards serving their interest, and realising their peoples' aspirations for development and progress.

ARTICLE 22

Member States shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary and banking policies and enhance cooperation between monetary agencies and central banks, including the endeavour to establish a joint currency in order to further their desired economic.

ARTICLE 23

Member States shall seek to coordinate their external policies in the sphere of international and regional development aid.

CHAPTER SEVEN CLOSING PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 24

In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the procedures resulting therefrom, consideration shall be given to differences in the levels of development as between Member States and the local development priorities of each. Any Member States may be temporarily exempted from applying such provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local situations in that state or specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be for a specified period and shall be decided by the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf.

ARTICLE 25

No Member State shall grant any non-member state any preferential privilege exceeding that granted herein.

ARTICLE 26

- a. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after its approval by the Supreme Council.
- b. This Agreement may be amended by consent of the Supreme Council.

ARTICLE 27

In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of Member States, execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

ARTICLE 28

Provisions herein shall supercede any similar provisions contained in bilateral agreements. Drawn up at Riyadh on 15 Muharram 1402, corresponding to 11 November 1982.2

Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention – 1922

Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

The frontier between Najd and Kuwait begins in the West from junction of the Wadi al Aujah (W. al Audja) with the Batin (El Batin), leaving Raqi (Rikai) to Najd, from this point it continues in a straight line until it joins latitude 29 and the red semi-circle referred to in Article 5 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 29th July 1913. The line then follows the side of the red semi-circle until it reaches a point terminating (sic) on the coast south of Ras al-Wali'ah (Ras el Kaliyah) and this is the indisputable southern frontier of Kuwait territory. The portion of territory bounded on the North by this line and which is bounded on the West by a low mountainous ridge called Shaq (Esh Shakk) and on the East by the sea and on the South by a line passing from West to East from Shaq (Esh Shakk) to 'Ain al 'Abd (Ain el Abd) and thence to the coast north of Ras al Mish'ab (Ras Mishaab), in this territory the Governments of Najd and Kuwait will share equal rights until through the good offices of the Government of Great Britain a further agreement is made between Najd and Kuwait concerning it.

The map on which this boundary has been made is Asia 1-1,000,000 made by the Royal Geographical Society under the direction of the Geographical Section General Staff and printed at the War Office in the 1918.

Written in the port of 'Uqair and signed by the representatives of both Governments on the Second day of December 1922 corresponding to 13th of Rabi' al Thani, 1341.

ABDULLAH SA'ID DAMLUJI

Representative of His
Highness the Sultan of Nadj
J.C. More Major
Political Agent, Kuwait.

I have agreed to the contents of this agreement.

'ABDUL 'AZIZ BIN 'ABDUL RAHMAN AS-SA'UD Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies

2. (Source): *Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Secretariat General. The Unified Economic Agreement*. GCC. Printing Press, Riyadh, 1992.

I have agreed to the contents of this agreement. AHMAD AL-JABIR AS-SABAH Hakim of Kuwait
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement to partition the Neutral Zone
Signed at Al-Hadda, Saudi Arabia, 7 July 1965

**Agreement Between the State of Kuwait and
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Relating to
the Partition of the Neutral Zone.**

In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Whereas the two Contracting Parties have equal rights in the shared Zone whose land boundaries are delineated in accordance with the boundary Convention made at Al Uqair in 13 Rabi, Thani, 1341 corresponding to 2nd December, 1922, and the agreed Minutes signed at Kuwait on 12 Shau'al, 1380, corresponding to 21st March, 1961 (called hereinafter the 'Partitioned Zone'), and

Whereas the aforesaid Convention did not regulate the exercise of those rights, and as that state of affairs was of a provisional nature which entailed serious practical difficulties and

Whereas the two Contracting Parties, an exchange of notes on 15/3/1383 corresponding to 5th August, 1963 (in regard to partitioning the Neutral Zone), have accepted to put an end to that temporary state of affairs by means of partitioning that Zone into two sections, so that the one shall be annexed to the State of Kuwait and the other shall be annexed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, provided that these equal rights of the two Parties shall be preserved in full in the whole partitioned Zone as this had originally been decided by the Convention made at Al Uqair that it is shared between the two parties, and shall be safeguarded by the provisions of international responsibility. They therefore have agreed upon the following:--

Article I. The boundary line between the two sections of the Zone is to be the line which divides them into two equal parts and which begins from a point at the mid eastern shore on the low-tide line, and ends at the western boundary line of the Zone. That boundary line shall be demarcated in a natural manner by the Committee of Survey which is to determine that boundary line of the Neutral Zone and which is to be set up in the manner agreed upon in the protocol annexed to the notes exchanged between the two parties at Jeddah on 15.3.1383 corresponding to 5th August, 1963. This boundary line shall be approved by the two sides in an agreement they will conclude later on.

Article II. Without prejudice to the provisions of this agreement, the part lying to the north of the line dividing the Partitioned Zone into two equal parts shall be annexed to Kuwait as an integral part of its territory, and the part lying to the south of the line dividing the Partitioned Zone into two equal parts shall be annexed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as an integral part of its territory.

Article III. Each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise the rights of administration, legislation and defence over that part of the Partitioned Zone annexed to his territory in the same manner exercised in his territory of origin while observing other provisions of the Agreement, and without

prejudice to the rights of the contracting parties to natural resources in the whole of the Partitioned Zone.

Article IV. Each of the Contracting Parties shall respect the rights of the other Party to the shared natural resources either existing at present or that shall exist in future in that part of the Partitioned Zone which is annexed to his territory.

Article V. If one of the parties cedes or otherwise alienates all or part of those equal rights which are safeguarded by the provisions of this Agreement and which are exercised over any part of the Partitioned Zone to any other State, the other Party shall be relieved of his obligations under this Agreement.

Article VI. Each of the Contracting Parties shall be under obligation not to take any local or international measure or action which may result in whatsoever form in hindering the other party from exercising the rights which are safeguarded by this agreement, and he shall be under obligations to co-operate with the other Party fully to protect these rights.

Article VII. Each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise over the territorial waters which adjoin that part of the Partitioned Zone which will be annexed to its territory the same rights as those exercised over the part annexed to its territory; and the two Contracting Parties shall agree to determine the boundary line which divides the territorial waters which adjoin the Partitioned Zone.

For the purpose of exploiting the natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, not more than six marine miles of the sea-bed and sub-soil adjoining the Partitioned Zone shall be annexed to the principal land of that Partitioned Zone.

Article VIII. On determining the northern boundary of the submerged Zone adjoining the Partitioned Zone, it shall be delineated as if the Zone has not been partitioned and without regard to the provisions of this Agreement.

And, the two Contracting Parties shall exercise their equal rights in the submerged Zone beyond the aforesaid six miles limit mentioned in the previous Article, by means of shared exploitation unless the two Parties agree otherwise.

Article IX. Each of the Contracting Parties shall in the part annexed to the other party of the Partitioned Zone evacuate the establishments occupied by the government officials who perform administrative and legal work, and hand it over to the other party provided that such provisions shall not apply to establishments occupied by employees engaged in measuring oil, checking and auditing accounts, technical supervision and purchasing committees and such similar supervision work.

Article X. If one of the Contracting Parties entrusts the companies that have been granted a joint concession by the two parties, with the construction of establishments for judicial and administrative purposes in accordance with terms of the concession in that part of the Partitioned Zone to be annexed to his territory, the cost of establishing such constructions shall be deducted from the capital expenses of the concessionary companies, provided that such costs shall be limited to necessary and reasonable expenses.

Article XI. The present agreements of oil concessions shall remain in force and either Party pledges to respect their provisions and the amendments entered into in that half of the Partitioned

Zone which shall be annexed to this territory. He shall also undertake such legislative and legal measures necessary for the continued exercise by the concessionary companies of their rights and discharge of their obligations.

Article XII. Each Contracting Party shall be responsible in that part of the Partitioned Zone which will be annexed to its territory for protection and security according to the obligations provided for in the present concession agreements in force.

Article XIII. To avoid double taxation, each Contracting Party shall undertake to enact legislative safeguards which ensure the non-imposition of taxation or custom duties or royalties on the companies that have been granted a concession, in the Partitioned Zone by the other Party.

Article XIV. Entry of citizens of the two contracting parties, and their moving about in the Partitioned Zone, who are working as officials, employees, labourers and contractors in establishments and firms engaged in the exploitation of natural resources according to concessions now in force and their subsidiaries shall be by valid passports issued by the other Party or by a card of special form to be issued by one of the Contracting Parties, and to be agreed upon, without the need for obtaining entry visas.

Article XV. Without prejudice to the concessionary oil agreements in force, each of the parties shall safeguard in that part of the Partitioned Zone annexed to his territory, freedom of work to the citizens of the other party and the right to practice any profession or occupation on equal levels with his citizens, concerning oil resources granted in the present concessions or in what may supersede them in future.

With regard to natural resources which may be discovered in future, the two parties shall agree on the rights of each other's citizens to work and to practice any occupation.

Article XVI. Each of the contracting parties shall respect the rights of the other party's citizens in the present establishments and constructions, existing in that part of the Partitioned Zone which shall be annexed to its territory.

Article XVII. To safeguard the continuance of the two Contracting Parties' efforts in exploiting natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, a joint permanent committee shall be set up and called hereinafter the 'Committee'.

Article XVIII. The Committee shall be composed of an equal number from the two Contracting Parties' representatives, and the two competent ministers for natural resources, in each of the Contracting Governments, shall agree upon the number of the Committee members, its rules of procedure and how to safeguard the necessary appropriations for it.

Article XIX. The Committee shall have the following powers:

- (a) To facilitate passage of officials, employees of concessionary companies and of ancillary companies and establishments in the Partitioned Zone, other than the citizens of the two Parties.
- (b) Studies relative to projects of exploiting common natural resources.
- (c) To study the new licences, contracts, and concessions relating to common natural resources and submit its recommendations to the two competent ministers as to what should be done in this respect.

To discuss whatever the two competent ministers refer to it.

The Committee in performing its duties shall have the right to sign contracts, and shall submit its reports and recommendations directly to the competent ministers.

Article XX. The two competent ministers shall consult together to grant or to amend any new concession relating to common natural resources and the party who does not agree with the other, shall send him a written notification giving the reasons, before granting or amending the new concession.

If any other establishment or company is allowed to replace any present establishment or company exploiting natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, this replacement shall not be considered as a new concession provided that the rights of the other Party shall remain intact.

Article XXI. The two Contracting Parties shall undertake to supply the Committee with information, data and documents which are needed by it to facilitate its task.

Article XXII. If a dispute arises with regard to the interpretation or application of this agreement or the rights and obligations which it creates, the two Contracting Parties shall seek to settle such disputes by friendly means for the settlement of disputes which include having recourse to the Arab league.

If the aforesaid methods fail to settle the dispute, then it shall be submitted before the International Court of Justice.

The two Contracting parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in this respect.

If one of the two Contracting Parties takes a measure which is objectionable to the other Party, the objecting Party may ask the International Court of Justice to indicate any provisional measures to be taken to suspend the measure which is objected to or allow its continuance pending the final decision.

If one of the Contracting Parties refuses to abide by the judgement made against it, then the other party shall be relieved from its obligations under this Agreement.

Article XXIII. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by each Contracting Party in accordance with its constructional procedures and shall come into force on the date of exchanging of instruments of ratification.

Done in two original texts in the Arabic Language and both of them are authentic. FOR THE STATE OF KUWAIT FOR THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA.³

3. *Source:* Baharna, Husain M. *The Arabian Gulf States, their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems*. Reprinted by Tein Wah Press (Ltd), Singapore, 1978.

Letters from The Prime Minister of Iraq and the Ruler of Kuwait Reaffirming the Kuwait-Iraq Boundary, Dated July 21, 1932 and August 10, 1932, Respectively

Nuri Pasha to Sir F. Humphrys
Office of the Council of Ministers,
Baghdad, July 21, 1932

I think Your Excellency will agree that the time has now come when it is desirable to reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and Kuwait.

I therefore request that the necessary action may be taken to obtain the agreement of the competent authority or authorities in Kuwait to the following description of the existing frontier between the two countries:-

"From the intersection of the Wadi-el-Audja with the Batin and thence northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Um Qasr leaving them to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor Abdulla. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, Auhah, Hubbar, Qaru and Umm-el-Maradim appertain to Kuwait."

(b) Translation of a Letter from the Ruler of Kuwait to the Political Agent, Kuwait, dated August 10, 1932.

With the hand of pleasure we have received your confidential letter dated the 7th instant (Rabi Thani 1351 (9th August, 1932), and have noted the contents of same, as well as the translation of the letter dated the 25th July, 1932, of His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Hon. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the translation of the letter dated 21 July 1932, of His Excellency Nuri Pasha-as-Said, the Iraq Prime Minister, regarding the Iraq-Kuwait frontier. We also have noted from the Hon. The Political Resident's letter dated the 30th July, 1932, that the frontier proposed by the Iraq Prime Minister is approved of by his Majesty's Government. And, therefore, we beg to inform you that we agree to reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and Kuwait as described in the Iraq Prime Minister's letter.⁴

Saudi-Qatari Borders agreement of 1965

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

No. 14

Date : 29 Jumada 11 A.H. 1385

With the help of Almighty God,

We, Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud,
King of Saudi Arabia

Having considered Council of Ministers decision No. 345 of 26 Jumada 11 A.H. 1385,
And having considered articles 19 and 20 of the Statute of the Council of Ministers, promulgated by
Royal decree No. 38 of 22 Shawwal A.H. 1377,
Hereby decree as follows :

I. We ratify the Agreement on the Delimitation of the Offshore and Land Boundaries between
the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Qatar and the attached map,
as annexed hereto;

II. It is for the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned to implement the present
Decree.

(Signed) Faisal

AGREEMENT ON THE DELIMITATION OF THE OFFSHORE AND LAND BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND QATAR

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, represented by His Excellency Shaikh
Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, and the Government of Qatar,
represented by His Highness Shaikh Khalifah Bin Hamad Al-Thani, Deputy Ruler and Crown Prince,
Desiring to delimitates the land and offshore boundaries between the two countries given the great
importance of so doing, and in view of the link of friendship and bonds of brotherhood prevailing
between the two fraternal countries,

And taking into consideration the letter dated 23 Jumada I A.H. 1371 from His Majesty King
Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud addressed to His Highness Shaikh Ali Bin Abd Allah Al-Thani,

Have decided to conclude the following agreement,

Article 1

Dawhat Salwa shall be divided equally between the two countries on the basis of
equidistance from the two coasts. As regard indentations, a straight median line shall be adopted to
the extent possible.

Article 1

The land boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar starts from a point on
the coast of Dawhat Salwa at the approximate geographical location of :

Meridian 50 49' 46"

Parallel 24 11' 50"

It extends from this point in a strict line to the highest point at Qarn Abu Wa'il and proceeds thence in
a straight line to a point on the Southern-Western edge of the Jawb al-Salamah area at the
geographical location of :

Meridian 50 55' 44"

Parallel 24 32' 43"

4. Source: Baharna, Husain M. op.cit

It extends thence in a straight line to a point on the South-Eastern edge of the Jawb al-Salamah area at the geographical location of :

Meridian 51 00' 00"

Parallel 24 30' 00"

It extends thence in a straight line to a point on the Southern edge of Sabkhat Sawda Nathil at the geographical location of :

Meridian 51 05' 55"

Parallel 16 28' 16"

It extends thence in a straight line to a point on the shore of Khawr al-Udayd at the approximate geographical location of :

Meridian 51 16' 02"

Parallel 24 36' 48"

All of the points indicated area shown in a preliminary manner on map No. JF 2224 dated December 1961 on the scale of 1:200,000 annexed to this agreement and signed by the two parties.

Article 3

An international survey company shall be commissioned to carry out a survey and establish on the ground the boundary points and boundary lines between the two countries in accordance with the provision of this agreement and to prepare a map of the land and offshore boundaries between the two countries and other related dates. After signature by both parties, this map shall constitute the official map showing the boundaries and shall be annexed to the agreement as an integral part thereof.

Article 4

The costs of the survey referred to in the previous articles shall be shared equally by the two Governments.

Article 5

A Joint Technical Commission shall be formed of two members from each of the two parties to be entrusted with the preparation of specifications for the survey, the establishment of the boundary points and boundary lines between the two countries in accordance with this agreement and the supervision of the implementation of the survey and the examination of its results.

Article 6

Done at Riyadh on 11 Shaaban A.H. 1386 corresponding to 4 December 1965 in two copies, one to be retained by each state. This agreement shall be considered to have entered into force after the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two Governments.

For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

(Signed)

Ahmad Zaki Yamani

For Qatar

(Signed)

Khalifah Bin Hamad Al-Thani

5. Source: Baharna, Husain M. op.cit.

Text Of Saudi-UAE Border Agreement

The following is the full text of the 21 August 1974 boundary agreement and relevant exchange of letters between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This agreement (English translation from Arabic) was recently deposited with the United Nations as a public document.

His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud,
King of Saudi Arabia,
And His Highness Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, President of the
United Arab Emirates,

In pursuance of the principles of the Holy Shariah professed by the Islamic Community, proceeding from the spirit of Islamic solidarity that embraces the Arabian Peninsula and on the basis of the bonds of amity between them, the links of brotherhood between their fraternal peoples and the relationship of neighbourliness existing between their two countries.

And in view of the desire of each of the two States to delimit the offshore and land boundaries between their territories in a definitive manner in a spirit of Islamic brotherhood and Arab fraternity,

The High Contracting parties have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The land boundary separating the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the territory of the United Arab Emirates is the line delimited in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

Article 2

The land boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates starts from point (a) on the coast of the Arabian Gulf at the approximate geographical location of :

Parallel 24° 11' 58" north;

Meridian 51° 35' 26" east.

It extends from this point in a straight line proceeding in a southerly direction to point (b) at the geographical location of :

Parallel 24° 07' 24" north;

Meridian 51° 35' 26" east.

It extends from this point in a straight line proceeding in a southeasterly direction to point (c) at the geographical location of :

Parallel 22° 56' 09" north;

Meridian 52° 34' 52" east.

It extends from this point in a straight line proceeding east by south to point (d) at the geographical location of :

Parallel 22° 37' 41" north;

Meridian 55° 08' 14" east.

The boundary extends from this point in a straight line proceeding in a north-easterly direction, leading Umm al-Zumul to the east of point (e) at the geographical location of :

Parallel 22° 42' 02" north;

Meridian 55° 12' 10" east.

The boundary extends from point (e) in straight lines joining the points at the following geographical locations :

Point	Parallel - North	Meridian - east
f	23° 32' 11"	55° 30'00"
g	24° 00' 00"	55° 34'10"
h	24° 01' 00"	55° 51'00"
i	24° 13' 00"	55° 54'00"
j	24° 11' 00"	55° 50'00"

From point (j), the boundary extends to point (k) at the approximate geographical location of 24° 13' 45" north and 55° 15' east, and from point (k) the boundary extends to point (l) at the geographical location of 24° 19' north and 55° 50' east, so that the three villages located to the east of point (k) are left inside the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. From point (l), the boundary extends to the intersection of the boundaries of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman, on which agreement shall be reached by the three States.

All of the aforesaid points are shown in a preliminary manner on a map on the 1:500,000 scale annexed to this Agreement and signed by the two High Contracting Parties.

Article 3

1. All hydrocarbons in the Shaybah-Zarrarah field shall be considered as belonging to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. The United Arab Emirates agrees and undertakes not to engage in or to permit any exploration or drilling for or exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of the Shaybah-Zarrarah field lying to the north of the boundary line.
3. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or any company or corporation operating with its permission may engage in exploration and drilling for the exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of the Shaybah-Zarrqah field lying to the north of the boundary line, and the two States shall subsequently reach agreement on the manner in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall engage in such activities.

Article 4

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates each undertake to refrain from engaging in and from permitting the exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of its territory to which the hydrocarbon fields primarily located in the territory of the other State extend.

Article 5

1. The United Arab Emirates recognizes the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over Huwaysat island, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the all the other islands opposite its coast on the Arabian Gulf.

2. The United Arab Emirates agrees to the construction by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the islands of Al-Qaffay and Makasib of any general installations it may wish to establish thereon.

3. Representatives of the High Contracting Parties shall, as soon as possible, delimit the offshore boundaries between the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the territory of the United Arab Emirates and between the islands subject to the sovereignty of each of them. They shall do so on such a basis of equity as will ensure free and direct access to the high seas from the territorial waters of that part of the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adjacent to the territory of the United Arab Emirates and from the territorial waters of Huwaysat island, mentioned in paragraph 1 above, and in such a manner as to take account of suitability for deep-water navigation between the high seas and that part of the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia indicated above. The High Contracting Parties shall have joint sovereignty over the entire area linking the territorial waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the high seas, in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.

Article 6

A duly qualified international company to be selected by the two countries shall survey and delimit on the ground the boundary points and boundary lines set forth in article 2 above and prepare a map of the land boundaries between the two countries and other related data. This map, after signature by the representatives of the High Contracting Parties, shall be the official map showing the desired boundaries and shall be annexed to this agreement as an integral part thereof

Article 7

A joint technical commission shall be formed of three members from each of the two countries to prepare specifications for the work required of the aforesaid company, to establish the boundary points and boundary lines between the two countries in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and to supervise the implementation of the work and examine its results.

Article 8

This Agreement was drawn up in two copies in the Arabic language, one copy to be retained by each State.

Article 9

This Agreement shall enter into force immediately on signature.

Article 10

DONE at Jeddah, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on 3 Shaban A.H. 1394, corresponding to 21 August A.D. 1974.

Signed

Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud

King of Saudi Arabia

Signed

Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan

President of the United Arab Emirates 6

INTERNATIONAL BORDER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE SULTANATE OF OMAN

The High Contracting Parties,

The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahad bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia,
and His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman,

Acting in accordance with the principles of Islamic Law professed by the Islamic community,

Proceeding from a desire to strengthen the existing bonds of fraternity among the States of the
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf,

Relying on the ties of affection, the links of brotherliness and the neighbourly relationship existing
between the two sister countries,

And having regard for the desire of each of the two States to fix the boundaries between them in a
definitive manner in a spirit of Islamic and Arabic fraternity,

Have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The boundary separating the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabic and the territory of the
Sultanate of Oman shall be that described in Article 2 of this Agreement.

Article 2

The boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman shall consist of
straight lines joining the following major frontier points :

1. Umm az Zumul, at the geographical coordinates of 22 degrees, 42 minutes, 30
seconds north latitude and 55 degrees, 12 minutes, 30 seconds east longitude.
2. The point of intersection of coordinates 22 degrees north latitude and 55
degrees, north latitude and 55 degrees, 40 minutes east longitude.
3. The point of intersection of coordinates 20 degrees north latitude and 55
degrees, north latitude and 55 degrees, 40 minutes east longitude.
4. The point of intersection of coordinates 19 degrees north latitude and 52
degrees, north latitude and 55 degrees, 40 minutes east longitude.

6. **(Source):** *Middle East Economic Survey. (MEES)*. 19 June 1995.

Article 3

A duly qualified international company, to be selected by the two countries, shall survey and establish on the ground the frontier points and the boundary line set forth in article 2 above and shall prepare the detailed maps and other related data necessary for that purpose. Such maps, after signature by representatives of the two Parties, shall be the official maps showing the frontier between the two countries and shall be appended to this Treaty as an integral part thereof.

Article 4

A Joint Technical Commission consisting of four members from each of the two countries shall be formed to prepare the terms of reference for the work required of the aforesaid company, to supervise the execution of that work, and to scrutinize its results.

Article 5

Under the supervision of the Joint Technical Commission, markers shall be placed along the agreed frontier separating the territories of the two countries, and the Commission shall agree on what distance shall separate one marker from another.

Article 6

Issues arising out of the demarcation of the frontier or emerging thereafter shall be settled by friendly means and through direct contacts between the two Parties on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and the eschewal of prejudice to the interests of either Party.

Article 7

Frontier authorities, and the rights to grazing, movement and the use of water sources in the frontier zone, shall be regulated in accordance with the two Annexes appended to this Agreement.

Article 8

This Agreement was drawn up in two original copies in the Arabic language, each State retaining one copy.

Article 9

This Agreement shall enter into force immediately on signature, and the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two Governments shall take place subsequently.

Article 10

Done at Hafr al Batin on the fourth day of Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to the twenty-first day of March A.D. 1990.

Qaboos bin Said
Sultan of Oman

Fahd Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
King of Saudi Arabia

**Annex I to the International Border Agreement Between the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of
Oman Concerning the Organization of
Frontier Authorities**

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman,
In implementation of article 5 of the International Border Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, signed on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D.
1990,

And desiring to arrange the terms of reference of the frontier authorities,
Have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The two Parties have agreed that disputes, violations and incidents occurring in the frontier zone covered by this Annex shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions contained herein.

Article 2

1. For the purpose of the implementation of this Annex, the frontier zone shall be regarded as the area extending from the boundary line between the two countries to a depth of 5 kilometers inside the territory of each Party.
2. With the exception of installations of official agencies and installations of the frontier forces, neither Party may erect any installations, encampments or the like within the limits of the zone indicated in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 3

1. Each of the Parties shall appoint the frontier authorities set forth hereunder in order to effect the implementation of the provisions of this Annex.
 - (a) First-level frontier authorities
For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :
Director-General of the Border Guard
For the Sultanate of Oman :
Inspector-General of Police and Customs
 - (b) Higher-level frontier authorities
For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :
Minister of the Interior
For the Sultanate of Oman :
Minister of the Interior
2. The Frontier authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article may be changed or other authorities introduced by agreement of the Parties through the diplomatic channel.

Article 4

The Parties shall, within one month of the entry into force of this Annex, provide each other with the full names and functional titles of the members of the frontier authorities and a copy of their letters of

appointment. The letter of appointment shall contain a photograph of the incumbent and his signature. Any changes subsequently made in this regard shall be communicated in the same matter.

Article 5

Each authorised member of the frontier authorities shall be entitled to appoint the assistants that he requires, and he shall provide their names, functional titles and letters of appointment to the frontier authorities of the other Party.

Article 6

Frontier “violations” and “incidents” included within the scope of the provisions of this Annex shall mean :

1. Interference with or destruction of boundary markers or destruction of buildings of other installations directly relating to the frontier.
2. Shooting at control posts and frontier guards, or at persons, or at boundary markers, or at frontier installations located in the territory of the other Party.
3. Flight by those charged with committing a crime in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country to which they belong into the frontier zone in order to take refuge in the frontier zone of the other Party.
4. Incidents of robbery and theft involving nationals of one of the Parties in the frontier zone of the other Party.
5. Smuggling by a persons or persons from the territory of one of the Parties to the territory of the other Party.
6. Hunting of wild animals within the frontier zone.
7. Misuse or pollution of well water or anything which may impair its use.

Article 7.

The frontier authorities of each of the Parties shall, in the frontier zone, have the terms of reference set forth hereunder :

1. To take necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents.
2. To take the necessary measures, and to inform the frontier authorities of the other Party, in order to preclude the commission of crimes, smuggling and infiltration by persons in the frontier zone of the other Party, to prevent such persons from crossing the frontier, to intercept them as required and to pursue them in order to arrest them. Any such pursuit shall halt at the furthestmost point of the frontier zone described in article 3, paragraph 1 of this Annex, and the frontier authorities concerned shall notify the frontier authorities of the other Party, which shall take the necessary measures to arrest such persons and hand them over to the frontier authorities of the former Party.
3. To take the necessary measures to combat smuggling and infiltration between the two countries, and to exchange information on such activities with the other frontier authorities with a view to their suppression.
4. To exchange information in the event of disasters in the frontier zone and to cooperate in containing them.

5. To take preventive measures against the spread of livestock diseases or epidemics or agricultural parasites into the territory of the other Party. For this purpose, the frontier authorities of the Party in whose territory the livestock disease or epidemic has appeared shall notify the frontier authorities of the other Party accordingly. In the event that there is a suspicion of disease in livestock that must cross the frontier of the two Parties, the necessary measures shall be taken to prevent the spread of such disease in accordance with the hygiene and veterinary inspection regulations of each of the two parties.

6. To investigate all frontier incidents.

7. To settle such conflicts that may arise in connection with the violations and incidents mentioned in article 6 of this Annex, and to consider, within the limits of their powers, applications for compensation consequent on a frontier incident that may be submitted by one of the Parties or by persons present in the frontier zone that comes under their jurisdiction.

Article 8

1. Should a national of one of the Parties take refuge in the frontier zone of the other Party after committing a crime under the law of the Party to which he belongs in the frontier zone of that Party, the frontier authorities of the Party in whose territory the crime was committed may request that the suspect be arrested. The frontier authorities of the other Party shall do all in their power to apprehend the person being sought and, on apprehending him, shall inform the frontier authorities of the Party making the request.

2. The frontier authorities of a Party which are requested to make an arrest may return the suspect within a period of not more than 10 days from the date of his arrest.

3. Should the frontier authorities to which the request is made be prevented for any reason from handing over the suspect within a 10-day period, they shall keep him under arrest until such time as the documents relating to his return are delivered through the diplomatic channel. The period for which the criminal is detained may not, in any circumstances, exceed two months.

Article 9

The frontier authorities may, by prior agreement, undertake the joint on-site investigation of a frontier incident with a view to establishing the facts. In such case, and if required, they may bring with them experts and witnesses. The investigation shall be supervised by the Party in whose territory it takes place. A report on the investigation shall be drawn up and signed by the competent authorities in the two countries. It shall contain a summary of the evidence and deliberations and of the results reached by the investigation and shall be transmitted to the competent judicial authorities.

Article 10

The frontier authorities of the two Parties shall, by common accord, designate points for meetings and the exchange of letters, points for the transfer of persons and property and crossing points.

Article 11

The members of the frontier authorities shall, in the exercise of their functions, enjoy the immunity necessary for them to perform their duties, and the materials that they require for that purpose shall not be subject to taxes or customs duties.

Article 12

While present in the frontier zone of one of the Parties, the persons mentioned in article 9 of this Annex shall be provided with the necessary assistance.

Article 13

1. The frontier authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex shall meet, in rotation, in the territory of each of the Parties once every six months, or whenever there is need for a meeting, with the approval of the two Parties, to settle outstanding issues within their competence. If the said authorities do not succeed in resolving such issues, they shall be submitted for settlement to the authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex.

2. The frontier authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) or article 3 of this Annex shall meet, in rotation, in the territory of each of the Parties once a year, or if the frontier authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex should otherwise propose that a special meeting be held, for consultation and the resolution of outstanding issues.

Article 14

1. For the purpose of keeping border markers in position and for their maintenance, the frontier authorities of the two countries for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex shall exchange information relating thereto and shall undertake an on-site inspection thereof prior to their semi-annual meeting, referred to in article 13, paragraph 1, of this Annex, so that they may discuss the matter and submit the necessary reports to the frontier authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex.

2. Should it appear to the frontier authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex that the positions of markers have been changed or that their condition requires maintenance or repair as a result of damage by natural or non-natural causes, those authorities shall notify the competent agencies of the two Parties so that the necessary technical arrangements may be made to restore the markers to their positions, or maintain, or repair them in accordance with the technical specifications agreed upon by the two Parties, as set forth in the reports of the Joint Saudi-Omani Commission established under the terms of the International Border Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman.

Article 15

This Annex shall remain in force for a five-year period with effect from the date of its entry into force and shall be renewed automatically for the same term unless one of the Parties notifies the other through the diplomatic channel of its desire to amend it within six months of the date of expiry of the aforementioned term.

Article 16

This Annex shall enter into force immediately on signature, and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged by the two Governments subsequently.

Done in two original copies in the Arabic language, each copy being equally authentic, and signed at Hafr al Batin this twenty-fourth day of Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to the twenty-first day of March A.D. 1990.

For the Government of the

Sultanate of Oman :

Badr bin Saud Bin Hareb Al-Busaidi

Minister of the Interior

For the Government of the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :

Nayif Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

Minister of the Interior

**Annex II to the International Border Agreement Between the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman Concerning the
Regulation of Rights to Grazing, Movement and the Use
of Water Sources in the Frontier Zone**

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman,
In implementation of article 5 of the International Border Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman signed on 4 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D.
1990,

Desiring to lay down specific principles to ensure that their nationals may make use of the range lands
and waters located in the frontier zone of their two countries,

And desiring to regulate matters relating to grazing and sources of water,

Have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The frontier zone is the area extending from the boundary line to a depth of 5 kilometers inside the
territory of each of the Parties, and grazing and residence shall not be permitted in this zone.

Article 2

For the purposes of this Annex, the grazing zone shall be defined as a depth of 20 kilometers from the
furthestmost part of the frontier zone indicated in article 1 of this Annex into the territory of each of the
two countries.

Article 3

Herdsmen who are nationals of the two Parties and who reside in the vicinity of the frontier zones may
make use of the range lands and water sources in the grazing zone defined in article 2 of this Annex.

Article 4

The frontier authorities of the two Parties shall establish the crossing-points that may be used for the
purposes of this Annex through consultation, on an annual basis in the light of grazing requirements.

Article 5

Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 3 of this Annex, when permitted by the
competent frontier authorities to pasture and to make use of water sources in the grazing zones,
nationals of the two Parties shall be exempt from :

1. The laws and regulations in force relating to residence and passports. They shall be issued
with a transit document by the frontier authorities of the Party of which they are nationals permitting
them to cross the frontier.
2. Taxes and duties on their livestock, tents and related equipment, customarily necessary
household articles and the foodstuffs and consumer goods that they carry with them, without prejudice
to the rights of each Party to impose customs duties on livestock or goods destined for trade in the
territory of the other Party.

Article 6

Each Party reserves the right to limit the number of such vehicles as herdsmen may wish to bring into its territory and the number and types of firearms that they are permitted to carry. Such weapons as may be brought in must be officially licensed by the relevant authorities in the two countries by virtue of official documents establishing the identity of the owner, and the frontier authorities shall issue to owners of firearms to exceed that permitted, they shall hand them over, in exchange for a receipt, to the responsible authorities at the crossing-point, which shall restore the firearms to them on their return.

Article 7

Should a contagious livestock disease, an epidemic or the like break out, each Party may impose the necessary veterinary or sanitary measures and invoke orders prohibiting importation and exportation. The competent authorities in each of the two countries shall cooperate in this field.

Article 8

The persons indicated in this Annex shall, in the territory of the receiving country, have the right to make use of the health services and shall be permitted to provide themselves with the necessary foodstuffs and consumer goods within the boundaries of the area in which they are permitted to pasture. Should there be no health center in the grazing zone, however, emergency cases shall be transferred to the nearest health center through the crossing-point authorities.

Article 9

This Annex shall remain in force for a period of five years with effect from the date of its entry into force, and it shall be renewed automatically for the same term unless one of the parties informs the other through the diplomatic channel of its desire to amend it within six months of the date of expiry of the aforesaid period.

Article 10

This Annex shall enter into force immediately on signature, and the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two Governments shall take place subsequently.

Done in two original copies in the Arabic language, each copy being equally authentic, and signed at Hafr al Batin on the fourth day of Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to the twenty-first day of March A.D. 1990.

For the Government of the

Sultanate of Oman :

Badr bin Saud Bin Hareb Al-Busaidi

Minister of the Interior

For the Government of the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :

Nayif bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

Minister of the Interior

MINUTES

Today, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in Riyadh, His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faysal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and His Excellency Mr. Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman, exchanged instruments of ratification of the International Border Agreement

between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, of Annex I to the Agreement, concerning the regulation of frontier authorities, and of Annex II to the Agreement, concerning the regulation of rights to pasture, movement and the use of water sources in the frontier zone between the two countries, signed by the two countries on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990.

Signed accordingly.

Sultanate of Oman

Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Riyadh :

Tuesday, 7 Dhulqadah A.H. 1411

Corresponding to 21 May A.D. 1991

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Saud Al-Faysal

Minister of Foreign Affairs

**SULTANATE OF OMAN
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MUSCAT**

Instrument of Ratification

No. 100/021010/320005

Date : 5 Dhulqadah A.H. 1411

Corresponding to 20 May A.D. 1991

**Instrument of Ratification of the International Border Agreement
Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
signed by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, and of the Two
Annexes to the Agreement**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs attests to the fact that, in accordance with article 3 of the Law Regulating the Administrative Apparatus of the State, promulgated by Decree of the Sultan No. 26/75, agreements signed by His Majesty the Sultan are, by virtue of their mere signature, considered to be part of the law of the land without need for the promulgation of a Decree of the Sultan ratifying them. The foregoing applies to the International Border Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, signed by His Majesty (may God preserve him) on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990.

This instrument has been issued in order to attest to the foregoing in accordance with article 9 of the said Agreement.

Decree of the Sultan No. 44/91, of 3 Dhulqadah A.H. 1411, corresponding to 18 May A.D. 1991, has been promulgated to ratify Annex I to the aforesaid Agreement, concerning the organization of frontier authorities, and Annex II to the Agreement, concerning the regulation of rights to pasture,

movement and the use of water sources in the frontier zone, both signed at Hafr al Batin on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990.

Yusuf Bin Alawi bin Abdallah

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Sultanate of Oman

Decree of the Sultan Number 44/91

**Ratifying the Two Annexes to the International Border Agreement
Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

We, Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman,

Having reviewed Decree of the Sultan No. 26/75, promulgating the Law Regulating the Administrative Apparatus of the State, and the amendments thereto,

The International Border Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabic, signed by us on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990,

Annex I to the aforesaid Agreement, concerning the organization of frontier authorities, and its Annex II, concerning the regulation of rights to pasture, movement and the use of water sources in the frontier zone, both signed at Hafr al Batin on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410 corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990,

And in accordance with the requirements of the general interest,

Have decreed as follows :

Article 1:

The ratification of Annex I to the aforesaid International Border Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, concerning the organization of frontier authorities, and Annex II to the Agreement, concerning the regulation of rights to pasture, movement and the use of water sources in the frontier zone, both signed at Hafr al Batin on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990.

Article 2:

This Decree shall be published in the Official Gazette, and it shall enter into force as of the date of its promulgation.

Promulgated on 3 Dhulqadah A.H. 1411

Corresponding to 18 May A.D. 1991

Qaboos bin Said

Sultan of Oman

**The King
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Instrument of Ratification**

With the help of Almighty God:

We, Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia,

Having taken cognizance of the International Border Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman and of the two Annexes appended thereto, signed at Hafr al Batin on the twenty-fourth day of Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to the twenty-first day of March A.D. 1990, which have been approved by Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 155 of 29 Shaban A.H. 1410 and with regard to which Royal Decree Number M/23 of 5 Ramadan A.H. 1410 has been promulgated,

Having given careful consideration to the Agreement and to the two Annexes appended thereto,

Have found them to be acceptable and have approved them as a whole and in their particulars, and we declare, by virtue of this instrument, that we have ratified them and endorsed them and that we undertake, God willing, to implement their provisions in all faith and sincerity.

In witness whereof, we have affixed our signature to this instrument.

Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

Promulgated from the Yamamah Palace, Riyadh, on the twenty-third day of Shawwal A.H. 1411, corresponding to the fourth day of May A.D. 1991.

**INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE SULTANATE OF OMAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

The Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen, proceeding from the fraternal links and the common interest that unite their two countries and peoples, in pursuance of the noble Islamic Shariah, prompted by the desire to strengthen the existing bonds of brotherhood and the relationship of neighborliness between the two fraternal countries,

And in view of the desire of each of the two countries to delineate the boundaries between them in definitive manner, have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The boundary line separating the territory of the Sultanate of Oman and the territory of the Republic of Yemen shall be described in article 2 of this Agreement and based on geodesic system 84.

Article 2

The boundary line between the Sultanate of Oman and Republic of Yemen begins from the principal point at Ras Darbat Ali (the Rock), numbered at Point No. 1, at the intersection of the geographical coordinates of parallel 16 degrees, 39 minutes, 3.83 seconds North and meridian 53 degrees, 6 minutes, 30.88 seconds east, and ends at the principal point numbered as point 8 at the geographical alignment of the intersection of parallel 19 degrees north with meridian 52 degrees east, and the

boundary line extends between the two principal points whose coordinates are set forth above passing through points 2, 3, 4, 4a, 4b, 5, 6, and 7, in accordance with the following coordinates:

Point No. 2 is at the intersection of parallel 17 minutes, 7.91 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees, 48 minutes, 44.22 seconds east.

Point No. 3 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 17 minutes, 40 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees, 44 minutes, 45 seconds east.

Point No. 4 is the at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 18 minutes, 6.93 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees, 44 minutes, 33.50 seconds east.

Point No. 4a, ancillary to point number 4, is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 18 minutes, 8.42 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees, 44 minutes, 35.57 seconds east.

Point No. 5 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 18 minutes, 15 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees, 45 minutes, 5 seconds east.

Point No. 6 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 18 minutes, 21 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees, 45 minutes, 2 seconds east.

Point No. 7 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 20 minutes, 59.04 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees, 46 minutes, 55.83 seconds east.

Article 3

A Joint Technical Commission shall be formed of the survey authorities of the two countries and its task shall be :

(a) To survey and establish on the ground the boundary points and the boundary line set forth in article 2 and to prepare in a definitive manner the detailed maps and related data necessary for that purpose so that those maps - after signature by representatives of the two parties - shall be the official maps showing the boundaries between the two countries and shall be annexed to this Agreement as an integral part hereof.

(b) To supervise the emplacement of markers (pillars) along the agreed boundary line separating the territories of the two countries, and to reach agreement on what distance shall separate one marker (pillar) from another.

Article 5

All issues arising out of the demarcation of the boundary line and any issues emerging thereafter shall be settled by amicable means through direct contact between the two Parties on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and the absence of prejudice to the interests of either Party.

Article 6

In the event of the discovery of common natural resources, agreement shall be reached on the manner of their exploitation and division in accordance with the established international norms and customs and the principles of justice and fairness.

Article 7

The border authorities and rights to grazing, movement and the use of water resources in the boundary zone shall be regulated in accordance with the two Annexes appended to this Agreement. Use of the property of residents in the border zone shall also be regulated in accordance with a special annex to

be agreed upon by the two Parties. All of the annexes mentioned in this article shall be considered an integral part of this Agreement.

Article 8

This Agreement and its Annexes were drawn up in two original copies in the Arabic language, each State retaining one copy.

Article 9

This Agreement shall enter into force after ratification in accordance with the procedures followed in each of the contracting countries and the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two States.

Article 10

This Agreement was done at Sanaa on 3 Rabi II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992

For the Government of the

For the Government of the

Republic of Yemen :

Sultanate of Oman

Haider Abu Bakr Al-Attas

Thuwayni bin Shihab Al Said

Prime Minister

Special Representative of His

Majesty the Sultan

Annex I to the International Boundary Agreement Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen, Concerning the Organization of Border Authorities

The Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the Government of the Republic of Yemen, in implementation of article 7 of the International Boundary Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen signed on 3 Rabi II A.H. 1413 corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992, and in their desire to arrange the terms of reference of the border authorities, have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The two Parties have agreed that disputes, violations and incidents occurring in the border zone covered by this Annex shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions contained herein.

Article 2

1. The border zone shall be regarded as the area extending from the common boundary line between the two countries to a depth of 5 kilometers inside the territory of each of the two Parties.

2. With the exception of installations of official crossing points and border force installations, neither Party may erect or maintain any fortifications, installations, military camps or the like within the limits of the zone indicated in paragraph 1 of this article. Immediately on the entry into force of the International Boundary Agreement between them, the two Parties shall take the necessary measures for the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph, within a period of time to be agreed upon, with regard to existing fortifications, installations and military camps.

Article 3

1. Each of the Contracting Parties shall appoint the border authorities set forth hereunder in order to effect the implementation of the provisions of this Annex.

(a) First-level border authorities :

For the Sultanate of Oman:

Inspector-General of Police and Customs

For the Republic of Yemen:

Governor of the relevant Governorate

(b) Second-level border authorities:

For the Sultanate of Oman:

Minister of the Interior

For the Republic of Yemen:

Minister of the Interior and Security

2. The border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article may be changed or other authorities introduced by agreement of the Contracting Parties through the diplomatic channel.

Article 4

The Parties shall, within one month of the entry into force of this Annex, communicate to each other through the diplomatic channel the full names of the members of the border authorities, their functional titles and copies of their letters of appointment. The letter of appointment shall contain a photograph of the bearer of his signature. Any changes subsequently made in this regard shall be communicated in the same manner.

Article 5

Each authorised member of the border authorities shall be entitled to appoint assistants, and he shall provide their names, functional titles and letters of appointment to the border authorities of the other party.

Article 6

The violations and incidents relating to the boundaries that are included within the scope of the provisions of this Annex are:

- (a) Interference with or destruction of boundary pillars or destruction of buildings or other installations directly relating to the boundaries;
- (b) Shooting at border posts and border guards or at persons or at boundary pillars or boundary installations located in the territory of the other Party;
- (c) Flight by those charged with committing a crime under the law of the Contracting Party to which they belong into the border zone in order to take refuge in the border zone of the other Contracting Party;
- (d) Incidents of robbery and theft involving nationals of one of the Contracting Parties in the border zone of the other Party;
- (e) Smuggling by a person or persons from the territory of the Contracting Parties to the territory of the other Party;
- (f) Hunting of wild animals within the border zone;
- (g) Misuse or contamination of water resources and anything which may impair their use.

Article 7

The border authorities of each of the Contracting Parties shall, in the border zone, have the powers set forth hereunder:

- (a) To take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents;
- (b) To take the necessary measures, and to notify the border authorities of the other Party accordingly, in order to preclude the commission of crimes, smuggling and infiltration by persons in the border zone of the other Party, to prevent such persons from crossing the boundaries and to intercept them as required or pursue them in order to arrest them. In the event that such persons should cross the boundary line from the border zone of one of the Contracting Parties into the border zone of the other Party, pursuit must halt and the border authority concerned shall notify the border authority of the other Party, which shall take the necessary measures to arrest them and hand them over to the border authorities of the former Party;
- (c) To take the necessary measures to combat smuggling and infiltration between the two countries, and to exchange information on such activities with the other border authorities with a view to their suppression;
- (d) To exchange information in the event of disasters in the border zone and to cooperate in containing them;
- (e) To take preventive measures against the spread of livestock diseases or epidemics or agricultural parasites into the territory of the other Party. For this purpose, the border authority of the Party in whose territory a livestock disease or epidemic has appeared shall notify the authority of the other Party. In the event that there is suspicion of disease in livestock that must cross the boundaries of the two Parties, the necessary measures shall be taken to prevent the spread of such disease in accordance with the hygiene and veterinary inspection regulations of each of the two Parties;
- (f) To investigate all border incidents;
- (g) To settle such disputes as may arise in connection with the violations and incidents mentioned in article 6 of this Annex and to consider, within the limits of their powers, applications for compensation submitted following a border incident by one of the Parties or by persons present in the border zone that comes under their jurisdiction.

Article 8

1. Should a national of one of the Parties take refuge in the border zone of the other Party after committing a crime under the law of the Party to which he belongs in the border zone of that Party, the border authority of the Party in whose territory the crime was committed may request that the suspect be arrested. The border authority of the other Party shall do all in its power to apprehend the person being sought and, on apprehending him, shall notify the border authority of the Party making the request.
2. The border authority of a Party which is requested to arrest the suspect may return him within a period of not more than 10 days from the date of his arrest.
3. Should the border authority requested to arrest the suspect refrain for any reason from handing him over within a 10-day period, it shall keep him under arrest until such time as the

documents relating to his return are delivered through diplomatic channels. The period for which the suspect is detained shall not, in any event, exceed 60 days.

Article 9

The border authorities may, by prior agreement, undertake the joint on-site investigation of a border incident with a view to establishing the facts. In such a case, and if required, they may bring with them experts and witnesses. The investigation shall be supervised by the Party in whose territory it takes place. A report of the investigation shall be drawn up and signed by the competent authorities in the two countries. It shall contain a summary of the facts and deliberation and of the conclusions reached by the investigation and shall be transmitted to the competent judicial authorities.

Article 10

The border authorities of the two Parties shall, by common accord, designate points for meetings and the exchange of correspondence and points for the hand-over of persons and property as well as official crossing points.

Article 11

The Members of the border authorities, their assistants and experts may cross the boundaries in exercise of the functions arising out of the provisions of this Annex. Members of the border authorities and their assistants shall cross the boundaries on production of the letters of appointment mentioned in articles 4 and 5 of this Annex after notifying the competent authorities of the other Contracting Party and with their agreement.

Article 12

The closest border post of the other Contracting Party shall be notified of the day and time of crossing of those persons required to cross the boundaries in accordance with the provisions of this Annex at least 24 hours before the time requested. This period may be reduced in cases of extreme necessity by agreement between the Contracting Parties.

Article 13

The members of the border authorities shall, in the exercise of their functions, enjoy the necessary immunity for the performance of their duties, and the materials that they require for that purpose shall not be subject to taxes or customs duties.

Article 14

While present in the border zone of one of the two Parties, the persons mentioned in article 9 of this Annex shall be provided with the necessary assistance.

Article 15

1. The border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex shall meet alternately in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties once every six months or whenever there is need for a meeting, by agreement of the two Parties, in order to settle outstanding issues within their competence. Should the aforesaid authorities fail to reach agreement on the settlement of such issues, they shall be submitted to the border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex for the decision to decide upon them as they deem appropriate.

2. The border authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex shall meet alternately in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties once a year or if the border authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex should otherwise propose that a special meeting be held for consultation and the resolution of outstanding issues.

Article 16

1. For the purposes of keeping the boundary markers (pillars) in position and of their maintenance, the border authorities of the two countries mentioned in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex shall exchange information relating thereto and shall undertake an on-site inspection thereof prior to the convening of the semi-annual meeting, referred to in paragraph 1 of article 15 of this Annex, so that they may discuss the matter and submit the necessary report on the markers (pillars) to the border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex.

2. Should it appear to the border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex that the locations of the markers (pillars) have been changed or that their condition requires maintenance or repair as a result of damage, those authorities shall notify the competent agencies of the two Parties so that the necessary technical arrangements may be made to restore the markers (pillars) to their positions or maintain or repair them in accordance with the technical specifications agreed upon by the two Parties in the reports of the Technical Commission referred to in article 4 of the International Boundary Agreement between the two countries and endorsed thereby.

Article 17

This Annex shall remain in force for a five-year period from the date of the entry in force of the Agreement. This Annex shall be renewed automatically for the same term unless one of the Parties notifies the other through the diplomatic channel of its desire to amend it six months before the date of expiry of the appointed term.

Article 18

This Annex shall enter into force after ratification in accordance with the procedures followed in each of the two countries and the exchange of instruments of ratification hereof by the two Governments. Done at Sanaa this third day of Rabi II A.H. 1413, corresponding to the first day of October A.D. 1992.

For the Government of the Republic of Yemen:
Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas
Prime Minister

For the Government of the
Thuwayni bin Shihab Al-Said
Special Representative of
His Majesty the Sultan

**Annex II to the International Boundary Agreement Between the Sultanate of Oman and the
Republic of Yemen, Concerning the Regulation of Rights to Grazing, Movement and the Use of
Water Resources in the Border Zone**

The Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the Government of the Republic of Yemen, in implementation of article 7 of the International Boundary Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen signed on 3 Rabi II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992, And desiring to regulate rights to grazing, movement and the use of water resources in the border zone, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purpose of this Annex, the grazing zone shall be defined as extending to a maximum depth of 25 kilometers from the common boundary line in the territory of each of the two countries.

Article 2

Herdsmen who are nationals of the two Parties and who are in the border zones and their vicinity may make use of the range lands and the water resources in the grazing zone defined in article 1 of this Annex in accordance with the tribal customs prevailing in the area.

Article 3

The border authorities of the two Parties shall establish the range of grazing and the crossing-points that may be used for the purposes of this Annex through annual consultation and in the light of grazing requirements.

Article 4

Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 2 of this Annex, when permitted by the border authorities concerned to pasture and to make use of the water resources in the grazing zones, nationals of the two Parties shall be exempt from:

- (a) The laws and regulations in force relating to residence and passports. They shall be issued with a transit document by the border authorities of the Party of which they are nationals permitting them to cross the boundary;
- (b) Taxes and duties on their livestock, tents and related equipment, customarily necessary household articles and the foodstuffs and consumption goods that they carry with them, without prejudice to the rights of the Parties to levy customs duties on livestock or goods destined for trade in the territory of the other Party.

Article 5

Each party reserves the right to limit the number of such vehicles as herdsmen may wish to bring into its territory and the number and types of firearms that they are permitted to carry. Such weapons as may be brought in must be officially licensed by the relevant authorities in the two countries by virtue of official documents establishing the identity of the owner, and the border authorities shall issue to owners documents permitting them to carry their weapons. Should the number of firearms exceed that permitted, they shall be handed over against receipt to the responsible agency at the crossing-point and shall be returned to their owners on their return.

Article 6

Should a contagious livestock disease, epidemic or the like break out, each Party may impose the necessary veterinary or sanitary measures and invoke the order in force prohibiting import and exportation. The competent authorities in both countries shall cooperate in this regard.

Article 7

The persons indicated in the Annex shall, in the territory of the receiving country, be entitled to benefit from the health services. They shall be permitted to provide themselves with the necessary foodstuffs and consumption goods within the boundaries of the zone in which they are permitted to pasture. Should there be no health center in the grazing zone, however, emergency cases shall be referred to the nearest health center through the crossing-point authorities.

Article 8

This Annex shall remain in force for a term of five years from the date of entry into force of the Agreement. This Annex shall be renewed automatically for the same term unless one of the Parties informs the other through the diplomatic channel of its desire to amend it six months before the date of expiry of the appointed term.

Article 9

This Annex shall enter into force after ratification in accordance with the procedures followed in each of the two countries and the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two Governments.

Done at Sana'a this third day of Rabi' al-Thani A.H. 1413, corresponding to the first day of October A.D. 1992.

For the Government of the
Republic of the Yemen:

Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas
Prime Minister

For the Government of the
Sultanate of Oman:

Thuwayni bin Shihab Al-Sa'id
Special Representative of
His Majesty the Sultan

Protocol of the Exchange of the Instruments of Ratification of the Boundary Agreement and its Two Annexes Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen

Today, Sunday, the third of Rajab 1413 A.H., corresponding to 27 December 1992 A.D., at the Foreign Ministry of the Sultanate of Oman in Muscat, H.E. Yusuf bin Alwaili bin Abdallah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman, and H.E. Dr. Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen, exchanged the instruments of ratification of the International Boundary Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen and of the First Annex thereto, concerning the Regulation of the Border Authorities and the Second Annex concerning the Regulation of Rights to Grazing, Movement and the use of Water Resources in the border Zone, Annexed to the Agreement, signed by the two countries on 3 Rabi' al-Thani 1413 A.H., corresponding to 1 October 1992 A.D.

In witness thereof, this protocol has been signed.

For the Sultanate of Oman:
Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of Yemen:
Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani
Minister for Foreign Affairs

**Protocol of the Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the International Boundary
Agreement Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen and of the Two Annexes
Thereeto**

There took place today, Sunday, 3 Rajab A.H. 1413, corresponding to 27 December A.D. 1992, at the premises of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman at Muscat and between His Excellency Mr. Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman, and His Excellency Dr. Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen, the exchange of instruments of ratification of the International Boundary Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen and of Annex I, concerning the organization of the order authorities, and Annex II, concerning rights to Grazing, Movement and the use of Water Resources in the boundary zone between the two countries, to the Agreement, as signed by the two countries on 3 Rabi' II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992.

In witness whereof, this record was signed.

For the Sultanate of Oman:
Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah
Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of Yemen:
Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani
Minister for Foreign Affairs

**Sultanate of Oman
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Muscat
Instrument of Ratification**

No: 1301/21070/120004/38032

25 Jumada II A.H. 1413

20 December A.D. 1992

I, Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman,
By virtue of the powers vested in me and on the basis of the Sultan's Decree No 75/92 promulgated on 5 Jumada I A.H. 1413, corresponding to 31 October A.D. 1992.

Do declare by virtue of this instrument the ratification by the Government of the Sultanate of Oman of the International Boundary Agreement between the Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the Government of the Republic of Yemen and the two Annexes thereto signed at Sanaa on 1 October A.D. 1992.

In witness whereof, I have signed this instrument today, Sunday 25 Juamda II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 20 December A.D. 1992.

Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah

Republic of Yemen
Minister of Legal Affairs
Sanaa

Instrument of Ratification

The Chairman of the Presidential Council:

Having examined the International Boundary Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman-attached to this Law- signed at Sanaa on 3 Rabi II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992, and comprising 10 articles and two Annexes, concerning the organization of border authorities and concerning the regulation of rights to Grazing, Movement and the use of Water Resources in the border zone,

And the documents and instruments relating to all the constitutional measures necessary for the ratification of this Agreement by the executive and legislative authorities in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen.

We have promulgated law No. 44 of 1992 concerning the ratification of the said Agreement and its two Annexes.

On the basis of the mutual confidence between the Parties to this Agreement, and being fully convinced of the beneficial consequences and the close cooperation that will arise out of the entry into force of this Agreement,

We hereby declare our definitive approval and our ratification of the Agreement and its Annexes heretofore referred to and our commitment to all of its provisions.

Accordingly, and in witness to the foregoing, we affix to this instrument our signature and the official seal of State.

Recorded at the Presidency of the Republic, Sanaa

Date : 6 Jumada I A.H. 1413 corresponding to 31 October A.D. 1992.

Ali Abdallah Salih

Chairman of the Presidential Council 7

7 (Source): Kechichian, Joseph A. *Oman and the World: the Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*. op.cit.

Text of Memorandum of Understanding

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

A memorandum of Understanding between the governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen.

Out of their desire firmly to entrench and bolster the ties of brotherly relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the two sides have agreed on the following:

Clause 1. The two sides affirm their commitment to the legitimacy and binding nature of the Ta'if accord signed on 6th Safar 1353 AH, corresponding to 20th May 1934; its appendices, known as the Ta'if accord, which will be referred to hereafter as the accord.

Clause 2. A joint committee will be set up, composed of an equal number (of people) from each side, within a period of 30 days. Its task will be to re-establish the (border) signs in accordance with the border reports appended to the accord-those (border signs) still existing and those which have fallen down-starting from the border point "Rasif al-Bahr, precisely from Ra's al-Mi'wajj Shami to the Radif Qarad outlet" (Arabic: rasif al-bahr tamamah ra's al-mi'wajj shami li manfadh radif qarad) between Maydi and Mawsim, to the last point previously demarcated in Jabal al-Thar. Modern scientific methods are to be used to establish the signs by agreeing with a specialist company, to be selected by the two sides, to execute the task. The company will carry out its task under the supervision of the committee.

Clause 3. The current committee formed by the two countries will continue its work to decide on the required measures and the steps leading to the demarcation of the remaining parts of the border, starting from Jabal al-Thar to the end of the two countries' border, including agreement on means of arbitration in the event of differences between the two countries.

Clause 4. A joint committee will be formed which will negotiate on determining the sea border in accordance with international law, starting from the border point on the Red Sea coast mentioned in clause 2 above.

Clause 5. A senior military committee will be formed by the two sides to ensure the prevention of military incidents, movements or other (activities) on the border between the two countries.

Clause 6. A joint ministerial committee will be formed to develop economic, trade and cultural relations between the two countries, and to boost aspects of cooperation between them. This committee will start its work within 30 days from the date of signing this memorandum.

Clause 7. A joint higher committee will be appointed to work on realising the aforementioned, facilitate the tasks of the aforementioned committees and remove any obstacles or difficulties that may obstruct their work.

Clause 8. Each of the two countries affirms its commitment not to allow itself either to be used as a base and a centre for aggression on the other, or for carrying out political, military or information activities against the other.

Clause 9. In order to continue the maintenance of an amicable and appropriate climate to ensure the success of the talks, each side will undertake not to carry out any propaganda against the other.

Clause 10. There is nothing in this memorandum that includes an amendment to the Ta'if accord or its appendices, including the border reports.

Clause 11. Everything that is discussed by the aforementioned committee will be checked and recorded in minutes, which will be signed by officials from both sides."

This memorandum was signed in Mecca al-Mukarramah on Sunday 27th Ramadan 1415 AH, corresponding to 26 February 1995 AD. It will come into effect on the date of exchanging the ratification documents.

(Signed) For the government of the Republic of Yemen: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and Development Abd al-Qadir Abd al-Rahman Bajammal.

For the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Personal advisor to the Servant of the two Holy Places (King Fahd) Ibrahim Abdullah al-Anqari.⁸

UAE-Saudi Agreement on Security Cooperation

The text of a UAE-Saudi Arabian agreement on security cooperation and the extradition of criminals was published in Abu Dhabi today in No.119 of the *Official Gazette*, issued for January 1983. The agreement is in two parts: Part I deals with security cooperation between the two countries, and Part II deals with the extradition of criminals.

Part I of the agreement comprises three sections. Article 1 states that the two countries have agreed to organize regular meetings between officials of their border posts in adjacent areas on their border to coordinate information and cooperation. The two countries will set up a follow-up committee made up of security officials in the Interior Ministries of the two countries. The committee will meet once year or whenever necessary.

Article 2 prohibits border patrols from crossing the border of the two countries for a distance of more than 20 km to apprehend those who are being pursued, and provides that the latter should be handed over to the state on whose territory the pursuit began. The principle of immediate extradition will be in force if arrest is effected by officials of the state (word indistinct) and that state had taken part in the pursuit.

Article 3 defines the method of extraditing fugitives and the handing over of their possessions and the method of transport to the nearest post in the state on whose territory the pursuit began. The vehicles used in the pursuit should have official plates and should not be more than three, while the number of the members of the patrol taking part in the pursuit should not exceed 12 and must be lightly armed. Hot pursuit should stop on arriving at the nearest town, village or Bedu encampment. The authorities of the two countries will be notified as soon as the pursuit is over, regardless of the fact whether the

8. Source: *Middle East Economic Digest (MEES)*. Vol. XXXVIII No.23. 6 March 1995.

results are positive or negative. The notification will be in the form of a *proces-verbal* signed by the two sides.

Section 2 of Part I of the agreement deals with fighting infiltration. It says that the two countries will make efforts to combat infiltration across their borders by adopting different measures against those whose participation in the infiltration is proved.

Article 3 of Part I deals with fighting crime. Article 1 of this section provides that the two sides will exchange the names of those who have been convicted of serious crimes, as well as the names of suspects and those who are under surveillance and who have been allowed to travel, particularly on the occasions when this is necessary. Each side will communicate to the other any information it has on any criminal actions that have been committed, or are planned to be committed, in the other side's territory or abroad. There will be close contacts between officials of the respective investigation office.

Article 3 of section 3 says that the competent authority of each country will inform its counterpart in the other country of the new crimes that occur, the method of their perpetration, and the measures taken to investigate and suppress them. The two sides will also exchange information on developing the methods of fighting crime, the regulations and research of their respective Interior Ministries, and books, magazines and other publications published in the two states. Each side will inform the other of the conferences and seminars that are held and that lie within the competence of their respective Interior Ministries, particularly in the field of fighting crime and of road safety, within a period of not less than one month before such conferences and seminars are scheduled to be held, so that the other side will be able to take part if it so desires.

Article 7 of section 3 says that each side will safeguard the secrecy of information and will not pass it to a third party with the consent of the other side.

Part 2 of the agreement deals with the extradition of criminals and comprises 16 articles. Article 1 says that the extradition of criminals is a duty if the crime committed is of the type that requires punishment, penalty or reprimand, or if it was committed in the country requesting extradition or outside the two states, and the laws of the state requesting extradition demand that the criminal be tried in its territory.

Article 2 refers to the crimes for which extradition is prohibited. These are political crimes, crimes committed in the territory of the country that is being asked to extradite, crimes committed by members of the Diplomatic Corps who enjoy diplomatic immunity, or any other person who enjoys immunity in accordance with international law, as well as crimes that are still under investigation in the country that is being asked to extradite or in the state on which the crime has taken place when the state is other than that which is requesting extradition.

The article excludes from this prohibition some crimes that are not political, such as murder, robbery, theft, or the hijacking of aircraft or other means of transport, as well as physical assault on the two heads of state, their wives or members of their families, heirs apparent, ministers and those of their rank, and military crimes.

Article 4 says the state whose interests were harmed most by the crime has priority in acceding to its extradition. However, if the extradition requests are based on various crimes, priority is given on the basis of the circumstances and events of the crime with particular regard to the seriousness of the crime and the place where it was committed, and when one of the states requesting extradition undertakes to return the person whose extradition is being requested.

Article 5 of the agreement says that if the person whose extradition is being requested by one of the two states had committed a crime in the state that has arrested him or is wanted by the judicial authorities of that country, extradition is deferred until such time as the person's trial is over, or he completes his sentence or part of it. It is permitted to send the person whose extradition is sought temporarily to the state that is seeking to bring him to appear before its judiciary on condition that the state undertakes to return him once his interrogation is over or once a sentence is passed on him in the case for which the request for his extradition was made. He will be incarcerated in accordance with the sentence passed on him by the authorities that handed him over.

Articles 6 and 7 define the conditions for submitting the extradition demand. It should contain a detailed statement of the identity of the wanted person and his description, a warrant for his arrest issued by the competent authorities, and a certified copy of the provisions of the law that stipulate punishment for the act committed. However, if the person whose extradition is sought admits that he is in fact the wanted person, and confesses his crime and agrees to be extradited without and extradition, the competent authorities can order his extradition.

Article 8 says that the competent authority in the state that is being asked to extradite a person must notify the competent authority in the state that is seeking extradition of its decision on the extradition request, whether it accedes to the request or rejects it, within a maximum period of two months, and must explain the reasons for its decision.

Articles 9 and 10 allow extradition demands to be made by cable or telephone in exceptional circumstances. The state that is being asked to extradite will take the necessary precautions to place the wanted person under surveillance, and will hold him in preventive custody for a period that does not exceed 30 days until the extradition demand is received. All that is found on the wanted person at the time of his arrest, and anything that can be used as evidence of the crime, will be handed over.

Article 11 stipulates that the wanted person should not be tried by the state demanding his extradition except for the crime for which his extradition was sought and the crimes he commits after his extradition. He may be tried for other crimes not stated in the extradition demand if the wanted person consents to this, or if he has the opportunity to leave the territory of the state to which he has been extradited and has not made use of this opportunity within a period of 30 days, then it will be possible to try him for other crimes.

Article 12 states that the state seeking extradition will foot all the expenses incurred by its extradition demand and the expense of the extradited person's return if his innocence is proved.

Article 13 calls on the two states to cooperate in the search and apprehension of criminals, and to extend the necessary facilities with regard to the exchange of information through direct contacts or official visits.

Article 14 specifies a period of 30 days for receiving the wanted person, beginning with the date on which the notification of the extradition order was cabled to the state demanding extradition. Otherwise, the state from which extradition is sought has the right to free the wanted person, whose extradition cannot again be demanded for the same crime.

Articles 15 and 16 specify that the term of the agreement is five years, and that it will come into force one month after the exchange of documents of ratification of the agreement concluded between the two states.⁹

**AGREEMENT CONCERNING DELIMITATION OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF BETWEEN IRAN AND OMAN**

The Imperial Government of Iran
and

The Government of the Sultanate of Oman

Desirous of establishing in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line between the respective areas of the continental shelf over which they have sovereign rights in accordance with international law, and after having exchanged credentials, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The line dividing the continental shelf lying between the territory of Iran on the one side and the territory of Oman on the other side shall consist of geodetic lines between the following points in the sequence hereinafter set out:

Point (1) is the most western point which is the intersection of the geodetic line drawn between point (0) having the coordinates of 55° 42' 15" E 26° 14' 45" N and point (2) having coordinates of 55° 47' 45" E 26° 16' 35" N with the lateral offshore boundary line between Oman and As al-Khaymah.

	Longitude East			Longitude North				
Point (2)	55	47	45	26	16	35		
Point (3)	55	52	15	26	18	50		
Point (4)	56	06	45	26	28	40		
Point (5)	56	08	35	26	31	05		
Point (6)	56	10	25	26	32	50		
Point (7)	56	14	30	26	35	25		
Point (8)	56	16	30	26	35	35		
Point (9)	56	19	40	26	37	00	W	Intersect of Larac 12m.
Point (10)	56	33	00	26	42	15	E	Intersect of Larac 12m.
Point (11)	56	41	00	26	44	15		

⁹ Source: Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan. *The GCC States in an Unstable World: Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of Small States*. Saqi Books, London, 1994.

Point (12)	56	44	00	26	41	35
Point (13)	56	45	15	26	39	40
Point (14)	56	47	45	26	35	15
Point (15)	56	47	30	26	25	15
Point (16)	56	48	05	26	22	00
Point (17)	56	47	50	26	16	30
Point (18)	56	48	00	26	11	35
Point (19)	56	50	15	26	03	05
Point (20)	56	49	50	25	58	05
Point (21)	56	51	30	25	45	20

Point (22) is the most southern point located at the intersection of the geodetic demarcation line drawn from point (21) (specified above) at an azimuth angle of 190° 00: 00' and of the lateral offshore boundary line between Oman and Sharjah.

Article 2

If any single geological petroleum structure field, or any single geological structure or field of any other mineral extends across the boundary line set out in Article 1 of this Agreement and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of that boundary line could be exploited wholly or in part by directional drilling from the other side of the boundary line then :

- (a) No well shall be drilled on either side of the boundary line as set out in Article 1 so that any producing section thereof is less than 125 meters from the said boundary line except by mutual agreement between the two contracting parties.
- (b) If the circumstances considered in this Article shall arise both Parties hereto shall use their best endeavours to reach agreement as to the manner in which the operations on both sides of the boundary line could be coordinated or utilised.

Article 3

The Boundary line referred to in Article 1 herewith has been illustrated on the British Admiralty Chart No. 2888, 1962 edition with small corrections through 1974, and with the ellipsoid used in said chart, which is annexed to this Agreement.

The said Chart has been made in duplicate and signed by the representatives of both Parties each of whom has retained one copy thereof.

Article 4

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of the superajacent waters or airspace above any part of the Continental shelf.

Article 5

- (a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Muscat.
- (b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised, have signed this Agreement.

Done in duplicate at Tehran the 25th day of July, 1974, corresponding to the 3rd day of Mordad 1853, corresponding to the 5th day of Rajab 1394, in Persian, Arabic and English languages, all texts being equally authoritative.

FOR THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SULTANATE OF OMAN

Bahman Zand

Qais Al-Zawawi

[Ambassador of Iran in Oman]

[Minister of State for Foreign Affairs]

Sultanate of Oman

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Office of the Minister

Proces-Verbal

On the exchange of the instrument of ratification of the Agreement concern Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Oman and Iran

The undersigned Qais Al-Zawawi, Minister of State of Foreign Affairs of Oman and Bahman Zand, Ambassador of Iran in Oman, met at this day at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Muscat, in order to exchange the instruments of ratification of the Agreement concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Iran and Oman signed at Tehran on the 25th day of July 1974.

And having examined and compared the texts of the said instruments of ratification which were found in good and due form, proceeded to their exchange.

In Witness Whereof, the present Proces-Verbal was signed in duplicate.

Done at Muscat on the twenty-eighth day of May of the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five.

For Oman

For Iran

[Qais Al-Zawawi]

[Bahman Zand]

(Source): Kechichian, Joseph A. *Oman and the World: the Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*. op.cit.

Offshore Boundary Agreement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate,

This Agreement on the redefinition of the offshore boundary between the Amirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai is concluded between His Highness Shaikh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nahyan, the Ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, and His Highness Shaikh Rashid ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, the Ruler of the Emirate of Dubai.

Considering that the present offshore boundary between the Amirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi starts at Ras Hasian on the coast and extends seawards in a straight line in a northwesterly direction passing to the west of the Fateh wells belonging to the Amirate of Dubai;

And considering that the two contracting parties wish to redefine this boundary to the benefit of their countries and the well-being of their peoples;

Agreement and assent has been reached between the two contracting parties in respect of the following :

- (1) This boundary shall be redefined in such a way to annex to the Amirate of Dubai a part of the sea area lying to the west of the aforesaid present boundary and forming a parallelogram whose horizontal base in ten kilometers measured along the coast in a westerly direction from Ras Hasian and whose vertical side is equal in length to the present boundary referred to above, so that are thus described shall lie to the west of the Fateh wells and extend in a southwesterly direction to the coast.
- (2) The aforesaid area shall become part of the possessions and rights of Dubai.

This agreement is hereby signed by the two contracting parties at as-Samih on the 18th day of February 1968, corresponding to the 20th day of Dhu al-Qa'dah, 1387 H.

(signed) Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nahyan Ruler of the Amirate of Abu Dhabi	(signed:) Rashid ibn Sa'id al-Maktum Ruler of the Amirate of Dubai
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Witnessed by :

Agreement Concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Iran and Bahrain

THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN

DESIROUS of establishing in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line between the respective areas of the continental shelf over which they have sovereign rights in accordance with international law,

HAVE AGREED as follows :

Article 1

The line dividing the continental shelf lying between the territory of Iran on the one side and the territory of Bahrain on the other side shall consist of geodetic lines between the following points in the sequence hereinafter set out :

Point (1) is the Eastern-most point on the Eastern-most part of the Northern boundary line of the continental shelf appertaining to Bahrain as formed by the intersection of a line starting from the point having the latitude of 27 degrees, 00 minutes, 35 seconds North and longitude 51 degrees, 23 minutes, 00 seconds East, and having geodetic azimuth of 278 degrees, 14 minutes, 27 seconds, with a boundary line dividing the continental shelf appertaining to Bahrain and Qatar, thence :

Point	Lat. N	Long. E
-------	--------	---------

2	27° 02' 46"	51° 05' 54"
3	27° 06' 30"	50° 57' 00"
4	27° 10' 00"	50° 54' 00"

Article 2

If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any single geological structure or field of any other mineral extends across the boundary line set out in Article 1 of this Agreement and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of that boundary line could be exploited wholly or in part by directional drilling from the other side of the boundary line then :

- a) No well shall be drilled on either side of the boundary line as set out in Article 1 so that any producing section thereof is less than 125 meters from the said boundary line except by mutual agreement between the Imperial Government of Iran and the Government of Bahrain.
- b) If the circumstances considered in this Article shall arise both Parties hereto shall use their best endeavours to reach agreement as to the manner in which the operations on both sides of the boundary line could be co-ordinated or unitized.

Article 3

The boundary line referred to in Article 1 hereof has been illustrated on the British Admiralty chart No. 2847 which is annexed hereto and has been thereon marked in red.

Article 4

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of the superajacent waters or air-space above any part of the continental shelf.

Article 5

- a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Tehran.
- b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized by their respective Governments so to do have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Bahrain the 22nd Rabi' al Thani 1391 corresponding to the 27th Khordad 1350 corresponding to the 17th June 1971 in the Persian, Arabic and English languages, all texts being equally authoritative.

For the Imperial Government of
Iran :
(Signed)

For the Government
of Bahrain :
(Signed)

Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement dated 22 February 1958

Whereas the regional waters between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Bahrain meet together in many places overlooked by their respective coasts,

And in view of the royal proclamation issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the 1st Sha'ban in the year 1368 (corresponding to 28th May 1949) and the ordinance issued by the Government of Bahrain on the 5th June 1949 about the exploitation of the sea-bed,

And in view of the spirit of affection and mutual friendship and the desire of H.M. the King of Saudi Arabia to extend every possible assistance to the Government of Bahrain,
the following agreement has been made :

First clause

1. The boundary line between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Government will begin, on the basis of the middle line from point 1, which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the tip of the Ras al Bar(A) at the southern extremity of Bahrain and Ras Muharra (B) on the coast of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

2. Then the above-mentioned middle line will extend from point 1 to point 2 situated at the mid-point of the line running between point (A) and the northern tip of the island of Zakhuniya (C).

3. Then the line will extend from point 2 to point 3 situated at the mid-point of the line running between point A and the tip of Ras Saiya (D).

4. Then the line will extend from point 3 to point 4, which is defined on the attached map and which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the two points E and F which are both defined on the map.

5. Then the line will extend from point 4 to point 5, which is defined on the map and which is situated at the point (sic) of the line running between the two points G and H which are defined on the map.

6. Then the line will extend from point 5 to point 6, which is defined on the map and which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the two points I and J which are defined on the map.

7. Then the line will extend from point 6 to point 7 situated at the mid-point of the line running between the south-western tip of the island of Umm Nasan (K) and Ras Al Kureya (L).

8. Then the line will extend from point 7 to point 8 situated at the western extremity of the island Al Baina As Saghir, leaving the island to the Government of Bahrain.

9. Then the line will extend from point 7 to point 8 situated at the western extremity of the island Al Baina Al Kabir, leaving the island to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

10. Then the line will extend from point 9 to point 10 situated at the mid-point of the line running between the north-western tip of Khor Fasht (M) and the southern end of the island of Chaschus (N).

11. Then the line will extend from point 10 to point 11 situated at the mid-point of the line running between point 10 to point 11 situated at the western edge of Fasht Al Jarim and point N referred to in subsection 10 above.

12. Then the line will extend from point 11 to point 12 situated at latitude 26° 31' 48" north and longitude 50° 23' 15" east approximately.

13. Then the line will extend from point 12 to point 13 situated at latitude 26° 37' 15" north and longitude 50° 33' 24" east approximately.

14. Then the line will extend from point 13 to point 14 situated at latitude 26° 59' 30" north and longitude 50° 46' 24" east approximately, leaving the Rennie Shoals (known as Najwat Al Riqai and Fasht Al Anawiya) to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

15. Then the line will extend from point 14 in a north-easterly direction to the extent agreed upon in the royal proclamation issued on the 1st Sha'ban in the year 1368 (corresponding to 28th May, 1949) and in the ordinance issued by the Government of Bahrain on the 5th June, 1949.

16. Everything that is situated to the left of the above-mentioned line the above subsections belongs to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and everything to the right of that line to the Government of Bahrain, with the obligation of the two governments to accept what will subsequently appear in the second.

Second Clause

The area situated within the six defined sides is as follows :

1. A line beginning from a point situated at latitude 27° north and longitude 50° 23' east approximately.

2. From there to a point situated at latitude 26° 31' 48" north and longitude 50° 23' 15" east approximately.

3. From there to a point situated at latitude 26° 37' north and longitude 50° 33' east approximately.

4. From there to a point situated at latitude 26° 59' 30" north and longitude 50° 46' 24" east approximately.

5. From there to a point situated at latitude 26° 59' 30" north and longitude 50° 40' east.

6. From there to a point situated at latitude 27° north and longitude 50° 40' east approximately.

7. From there to the straight point.

This area cited and defined above shall be in the part falling to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in accordance with the wish of H.H. the Ruler of Bahrain and the agreement of H.M. the King of Saudi Arabia. The exploitation of the oil resources in this area will be carried out in the way chosen by His Majesty on the condition that he grants to the Government of Bahrain one half of the net revenue accruing to the Government of Saudi Arabia and arising from this exploitation, and on the understanding that this does not infringe the right of sovereignty of the Government of Saudi Arabia nor the right of administration over this above-mentioned area.

Third Clause

Two copies of a map shall be attached to this agreement, making as clear as possible the positions and points referred to in the foregoing subsections, subject to the map being made final by the expert knowledge of the committee defined in the fourth clause below. This map shall become final and an integral part of this agreement after approval and signature by the accredited representatives of the two governments on behalf of the two parties.

Fourth Clause

The two parties shall choose a technical body to undertake the necessary measures to confirm the boundaries in accordance with the provision of this agreement on the condition that this body shall complete its work two months at the most after the date of execution of this agreement.

Fifth Clause

After the committee referred to in the fourth clause has completed its work and two parties agree on the final map which it will have prepared, a body of technical delegates from both sides shall undertake the placing of signs and the establishing of the boundaries in accordance with the detailed announcements made clear in the final map.

Sixth Clause

This agreement shall come into effect from the date on which it is signed by the two parties.

**Agreement Concerning Boundary Line Dividing the Continental Shelf between
Iran and Qatar**

THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF QATAR,

DESIROUS of establishing in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line between the respective areas of continental shelf over which they have sovereign rights in accordance with international law,

HAVE AGREED as follows :

Article 1

The boundary line dividing the continental shelf laying between the territory of Iran, on the one side, and that of Qatar, on the other side, shall consist of geodetic lines between the following points in the sequence given below :

Point (1) is the westernmost point on the westernmost part of the northern boundary line of the continental shelf appertaining to Qatar formed by a line geodetic azimuth 478° 14' 27" west from Point 2 below.

Point	Latitude N	Longitude E
2	27° 00' 35"	51° 23' 00"
3	26° 56' 20"	51° 44' 05"

4	26° 33' 25"	52° 12' 10"
5	26° 06' 20"	52° 42' 30"
6	25° 31' 50"	53° 02' 05"

Article 2

If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field or any single geological structure of field of any other mineral deposit, extends across the Boundary line set out in Article (1) of this Agreement and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of that Boundary line could be exploited wholly or in part by directional drilling from the other side of the Boundary line, then:

- (a) no well shall be drilled on either side of the Boundary line as set out in Article (1) so that any producing section thereof is less than 125 meter from the said Boundary line, except by mutual agreement between the two Governments.
- (b) both Government shall endeavour to reach agreements as to the manner in which the operations on both sides of the Boundary line could be co-ordinated or unitized.

Article 3

The Boundary line referred to in Article (1) herein has been illustrated on the British Admiralty Chart No. 2837 which is annexed to this Agreement.

The said Chart has been made in duplicate and signed by the representatives Government each of whom has retained one copy thereof.

Article 4

Nothing in this Agreement shall after affect the status of the superajacent waters of airspace above any part of the continental shelf.

Article 5

(a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Doha Qatar as soon as possible.

(b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Doha Qatar the 20 September 1969, corresponding to the 9th Rajab 1389, and corresponding to the 29 Shahrivar 1348, in the Persian, Arabic and English languages, all texts being equally authoritative.

For the Imperial Government of Iran
[Signed]

For the Government of Qatar :
[Signed]

**Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty over the Islands of
Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi and the Delimitation of the Boundary Line
Separating the Submarine Areas between the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and Iran.**

The Royal Government of Saudi Arabia, represented by His Excellency Shaikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, of the one part and the Imperial Government of Iran, represented by His Excellency Dr. Manoochehr Eghbal, Chairman of the Board and Central Managing Director of the National Iranian Oil Company, of the other part,

Desirous of resolving the difference between them regarding sovereignty over the islands of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi and

Desirous further of determining in a just and accurate manner the boundary line separating the respective submarine areas over which each party is entitled by international law to exercise sovereign rights,

Now therefore and with due respect to the principle of the law and particular circumstances,

And after exchanging the credentials, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties mutually recognize the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia over the island of Farsi. Each island shall possess a belt of territorial sea twelve nautical miles in width, measured from the line of lowest low water on each of the said islands. In the area where these belts overlap, a boundary line separating the territorial seas of the two islands shall be drawn so as to be equidistant throughout its length from the lowest low water lines on each island.

Article 2

The boundary line separating the submarine areas which appertain to Saudi Arabia from the submarine areas which appertain to Iran shall be a line established as hereinafter provided. Both Parties mutually recognize that each possesses over the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas on its side of the line sovereign rights of the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources therein.

Article 3

The boundary line referred to in Article 2 shall be :

(a) Except in the vicinity of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi, the said line is determined by straight lines between the following points whose latitude and longitude are specified herein below:

Point	Latitude N	Longitude E
1	27° 10.0'	50° 54.0'
2	27° 18.5'	50° 45.5'
3	27° 26.5'	50° 37.0'
4	27° 56.5'	50° 17.5'
5	28° 08.5'	50° 06.5'
6	28° 17.6'	49° 56.2'

7	28° 21.0'	49° 50.9'
8	28° 24.7'	49° 47.8'
9	28° 24.4'	49° 47.4'
10	28° 27.9'	49° 42.0'
11	28° 34.8'	49° 39.7'
12	28° 37.2'	49° 36.2'
13	28° 40.9'	49° 33.5'
14	28° 41.3'	49° 34.3'

(b) In the vicinity of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi, a line laid down as follows:

At the point where the line described in paragraph (a) intersects the limit of the belt of territorial sea around Farsi, the boundary shall follow the limit of that belt on the side facing Saudi Arabia until it meets the boundary line set forth in Article 1 which divides the territorial seas of Farsi and Al-'Arabiah; thence it shall follow that line easterly until it meets the limit of the belt of territorial sea round Al-'Arabiah; thence it shall follow the limit of that belt on the side facing Iran until it intersects again the line described in paragraph (a).

The map prepared by the A.M. Service Corps of Engineers US Army compiled in 1966 was used and shall be used as the basis for the measurement of the coordinated described above and the Boundary Line is illustrated in a copy of the said map signed and attached hereto.

Article 4

Each Party Agrees that no oil drilling operation shall be conducted by our under its authority, within a zone extending five hundred (500) meters in width in the submarine areas on its side of the Boundary Line described in Article 3, said zone to be measured from said boundary.

Article 5

This Agreement is done in duplicate in the Arabic and Persian languages, both texts being equally authentic. An English translation thereof is also signed by both Parties and annexed thereto.

This Agreement shall enter into force upon the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification which shall take place at Jeddah as soon as possible.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the above-named plenipotentiaries, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Tehran this Second day of Sha'ban, 1388 (Hejira calendar), corresponding to the Second day of Aban, 1347 (Iranian calendar), and to the twenty-fourth day of October, 1968.

For the Royal Government
of Saudi Arabia :
Ahmed Zaki Yamani
Minister of Petroleum
and Mineral Resources

For the Imperial Government
of Iran :
Manoochehr Eghbal
Chairman of the Board and General
Managing Director of the National
Iranian Oil Company

Offshore Boundary Agreement between Iran and Dubai

The Government of the State of U.A.E. and the Imperial Government of Iran desirous of establishing in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line between the respective areas of continental shelf over which they have sovereign rights in accordance with international law,

HAVE AGREED as follows :

Article 1

The boundary line dividing the continental shelf laying between the territory of U.A.E on one side and that of Iran on the other side, except in the vicinity of Sirri Island, shall consist of geodetic lines between the following points.

Point 1: 54° 05' 16" long. East 25° 38' 13" lat. North to

Point 2: 54° 26' 18" long. East 25° 39' 55" lat. North to

Point 3: 54° 30' 25" long. East 25° 41' 35" lat. North From this point the boundary coincides with the southern 12-mile limit of the territorial water of the Sirri Island to :

Point 4: 54° 44' 50" long. East 25° 47' 20" lat. To

Point 5: 54° 45' 07" long. East 25° 47' 30" lat. North

Article 2

If any single geological Petroleum structure of Petroleum field, or any single geological structure or field or any other mineral deposit extends across the boundary line set out in Article (1) of this Agreement and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of that Boundary line could be exploited wholly or in part by directional drilling from the other side of the Boundary line then :

- (a) No well shall be drilled on either side of the Boundary line as set out in Article (1) so that any producing section thereof is less than 125 meters from the said Boundary line, except by mutual agreement between the two Governments.
- (b) Both Governments shall endeavour to reach agreement as to the manner in which the operations on both sides of the Boundary line could be coordinated or unitized.

Article 3

The Boundary line referred to in Article (1) herein has been illustrated on the British Admiralty Chart No: 2837 which is annexed to this Agreement.

Article 4

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of the superajacent [sic] waters or airspace above any part of the Continental Shelf.

Article 5

(a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at as soon as possible

(b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tehran the 24 Rajah 1394 corresponding to the 13 August 1974 in the Arabic, Persian, and English languages, all texts being equally authoritative.

For the State of U.A.E.

For the Imperial Government of Iran

**Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and Sovereign
Rights over Islands between Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Signed on 20
March 1969**

Recognizing the cordial and fraternal relations that exist between the two sister Arab States, and desirous of settling maritime boundary lines and sovereign rights over islands on the basis of their mutual interests, the two Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:

- (1) That 'Dina' Island is part of the territory of Abu Dhabi;
- (2) That the islands of 'Lashat' and 'Sharho' are part of the territory of Qatar;
- (3) That both States will have no further national claims against each other in islands and waters beyond the maritime boundary lines herein agreed to.

- (4) That the maritime boundary lines referred to in paragraph (3) above are as follows:

- (a) A straight line between point A at :

Lat. 25° 31' 50"

Long. 53° 02' 05"

and point B, 'Bir Elbundug', at:

Lat. 25° 05' 54.79"

Long. 52° 36' 50.98"

- (b) A straight line between point B (described above), and point C, at:

Lat. 24° 48' 40"

Long. 52° 16' 20"

- (c) A straight line from point C (described above) to point D (at Bab Khor Eladid at the territorial sea boundary) at:

Lat. 24° 48' 40"

Long. 52° 16' 20"

- (5) That the above points and lines shall as soon as possible be drawn in a small maritime boundary chart in duplicate, each to be signed by both Contracting Parties;

- (6) That the Contracting Parties will have equal rights of ownership over 'Hagl Elbundug' and agreed to consult each other in all matters concerning its exploitation;
 - (7) That 'Hagl Elbundug' shall be exploited by ADMA (Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Co.) in accordance with the terms of the agreements between the Company and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. All revenues, profits and benefits derived from such

exploitation shall be divided on equal shares by the Governments of Qatar and Abu Dhabi.

Sea-Bed Boundaries -Agreement by the Ruler of Sharjah

I agree that the sea-bed boundary between Sharjah and Umm al Qaywayn shall be a line starting from a point on the coast near the site of the dead well Mirdar Bu Salaf and going out to sea on a bearing of 312°.

I further agree that the sea-bed boundary between Sharjah and Ajman in the north shall be a line starting from a point on the coast in Zora opposite in the point where the track from Zora Fauqiniyah (Karijiyah) debauches on to the Zora Tahtiyah track and going out to sea on a bearing of 304°.

I further agree that the sea-bed boundary between Sharjah and Ajman in the south shall be a line starting from a point on the coast in Bu Athum near the circle of White sand-hills about half way between Shaikh Reshid's Tower and the BuTajjarah well, and going out to sea on a bearing of 310°.

I further agree that beacons may be erected on the shore at the points referred to above where the boundaries start.

(Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi)

Ruler of Sharjah.

Sea-Bed Boundary - Agreement by the Ruler of Umm al Qayawayn

I agree that the sea-bed boundary between Umm al Qayawayn and Sharjah shall be a line starting from a point on the Coast near the site of the dead well Mirdar bu Salaf and going out to sea on a bearing on 312 degree.

I further agree that beacons may be erected on the shore at the point referred to above where the boundary starts.

(Shaikh Ahmed bin Rashid al Moala)

Ruler of Umm al Qaywayn. 10

10 Charney, Johnathan I. (ed.). *International Maritime Boundaries*. Volume II op.cit. pp. 1475-1555.